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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the adaptation and the acculturation of foreign 
firearms amongst the indigenous people in Taiwan and the role of these firearms in resistance 
against the Western, Japanese and Chinese invasions in the period of 1860-1914. I argue that 
through the avenues of access to firearms and their absorption into indigenous cultures , the 
Taiwanese indigenes preserved some of their cultural and economic independence. The 
firearm did not only just serve as a killing weapon in the battles for the indigenes, but it also 
extended in purpose and meaning within indigenous cultures. To reveal the use of firearms by 
the indigenes and their firearms cultures, this dissertation has used various sources such as the 
British, Qing Chinese and Japanese official reports and documents, books, journals, and articles 
written by travellers, missionaries, consular officials, merchants, researchers, etc. in English, 
European and Chinese languages. 
We begin with the fundamental complexities of the geographical conditions between 
the western plains and the eastern mountain forests of Taiwan, the cultures of indigenous 
people, and the nature of resistances of the indigenes against Dutch, Spanish and Qing colonists 
and Chinese settlers before 1860. Since Taiwan was forced to open its ports under the Tianjin 
Treaty in 1858, the Western nations were eager to secure their strategic positions in Asia and 
exploit important industrial materials – such as camphor and coal – and the flourishing tea 
industries in the eastern mountain areas of Taiwan where many indigenous tribes lived. 
Political and economic encroachments within Taiwan had moved further and further eastward. 
Numerous clashes between the indigenes and the Qing armies and Chinese exploiters were 
inevitable. Ceaseless skirmishes by the Formosan indigenes obstructed the progress of 
resources exploitation, especially camphor. The process of the “opening up the mountains and 
pacifying the indigenes” scheme greatly accelerated these conflicts. Further revolts of the 
mountain indigenes became greater and more brutal after the occupation of Japan and its 
attempts at indigenous management. However, the Taiwanese indigenes did not appear to lose 
their power entirely in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, but 
defended their right to live in their territories in major episodes of resistance.  
V 
 
Understanding this, and addressing the questions of when and how they armed and 
why they so long resisted, required the examination of the sources and different scales of 
warfare or conflicts, disclosing the use of firearms by the indigenes in three phases: the 
traditional level (1860-1883), the traditional-modernised level (1884-1895) and the 
modernised-advanced level (1896-1914). Through the demonstration of warfare or conflicts 
that the indigenes were involved in directly or indirectly and the surveying of armaments 
among the Western, Japanese and the Qing military and Chinese civilians at each phase, we 
disclose the types of weapons the indigenes operated with and their procurements of firearms. 
This in turn helps in understanding the circumstances of indigenous people, the dispersal of 
firearms and their cultural-technological contacts in the different periods. Finally, firearms 
were not only applied by the Taiwanese indigenes within their hunting expeditions and fighting 
cultures, but also embedded within their lives and communities. Compared with the use and 
the management of firearms of the Qing and Japanese military, the indigenes appeared to 
succeed in technology transfer and adaptions, which might have given them the capability to 
fight against the intruders. This claim (shown throughout the thesis but particularly arising from 
material in Chapter 7) leads also to the argument that major cultural-anthropological 
approaches concerning the historical relations between culture and technology (associated 
especially with the work of Peter Berger and Stephen Hill) need historical nuancing upon further 
consideration of extraneous factors, exact physical location, and precise temporal or sequential 
location of major events. 
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A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION AND TRANSLATION 
 
The Romanisation of indigenous languages in Taiwan has been widely used and 
recognized by the government, and has been applied to most of the names of places, people 
and certain customs. Due to the historical origins of the languages (mainly English and Chinese) 
used in this dissertation, some of the personal names might be different from contemporary 
ones. I kept the names retrieved from original references and identified them with 
contemporary resources. For those unidentifiable, I retained the pinyin Romanisation of 
Chinese words.  
Historical Chinese names and names of places were not changed or revised, either, and 
have also been given their Hanyu pinyin. This standard is currently adopted both academically 
and officially, e.g. Bankimseng (萬金庄, Pingdong County) and Liu Yongfu 劉永福. All the names 
of places and people in the main body and references are presented in Hanyu pinyin, unless 
translation is provided. 
The Chinese and Japanese names are presented in the East Asian order. That is, the 
surname comes first and the first name second, unless, in the English publications, an individual 
adopts the Western order. 
The titles and names of authors and publishers of secondary sources in the Chinese 
language have been kept in their original Chinese characters and pinyin. This is because the 
translation into English or transliteration would not make it easier to trace the original source. 
Where provided, original translations from Chinese into English of the titles and names of 
authors and publishers of secondary sources, quotations, governmental titles, institutions, 
footnotes etc. have been kept. Such original translations are indicated in the text by the use of 
round brackets, that is ( ). This means, for instance, that in the several cases where the original 
source uses the term “aboriginal” or “aborignes”, I have left this without change, in order that 
the reader may trace the original. See for example pp 36-37. All other translations from Chinese 
into English are mine, and are indicated in the text by the use of square brackets, that is [ ].  
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Prologue 
In June 2014, several Truku indigenes of the Knkreyan tribe in Mukumiqi Valley in 
Hualian County fired their hunting rifles to the sky next to a memorial for victims of Typhoon 
Ofelia in 1990. They ignited a smoke signal and closed the main road to their villages to proclaim 
their right and determination to protect their lands from Taiwanese tourists. Since Mukumqi 
Valley had opened to the public in 2006, at least 3,000 tourists had crowded daily into this 
exceptional natural landscape by scooters, cars and minibuses. According to the chairman of 
the Knkreyan tribal committee, Masaw, the Truku indigenes have been suffering from the 
crowds, the rubbish left by tourists, traffic jams, air pollution and the noise. The Truku indigenes 
of the Knkreyan tribe appealed to suspend all the tourists and that a license be imposed for 
entering the mountains and to give the mountains and forests some rest for one year.1 The acts 
of firing hunting rifles into the air, setting smoke signals (which was also a Truku ritual for 
delivering messages to their ancestors), and blocking the road were undoubtedly designed to 
raise awareness of the predicament of the Truku indigenes caused by tourists, the most modern 
of encroachers.  
If we consider this incident as a form of resistance initiated by the Truku indigenes in 
response to tourists and to the Taiwanese government in contemporary Taiwan, then we might 
also place them against an historical background of many crucial resistances of the mountain 
indigenes to the Western nations, the Qing and Japanese governments, the Chinese and the 
plains indigenes. The mountain indigenes would fight against whoever entered their grounds 
without their permission and in many cases took the invaders’ heads as their trophies, seen as 
the most dramatic symbol of savagery and otherness. Luckily, the resistance of the Truku 
indigenes today did not cause any bloodshed. These scenes at most seemed to echo the past, 
the late nineteenth century, the period when the Western nations were actively seeking raw 
materials for their industrial states, profiting in trade and exploiting resources from their 
colonies. The mountain indigenes, who have been living in the central and eastern mountains 
for over one thousand years, were constrained to battle against any intruders since the opening 
                                                             
1 Loa Iok-sin, ‘Mukumuqi Residents Block Road against Tourists’, Taipei Times, 8 June 2014, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/06/08/2003592242; Yang Chengyu, ‘Mukumuqi 
Shengtai Weiji Tailugezu Hanwei Buluo Shengcun 「慕谷慕魚」生態危機 太魯閣族捍衛部落生存 (Ecological 
Crisis for Mukumuqi, Truku Indigenes Defend for Their Living)’, The News Lens, 9 June 2014, 
http://www.thenewslens.com/post/46754/. 
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of four Treaty Ports in Taiwan from 1860. In turn, with a few exceptions – mostly missionaries 
– they were neglected and mistreated by the colonists, the Qing and Japanese governments, 
and the Chinese who settled in Taiwan. As a matter of fact, none of the colonial powers 
succeeded in achieving total control over the mountain indigenes. Even when they threw the 
most modern weapon at them, they all had major troubles in pacifying the resistance or in 
managing the mountain indigenes. This certainly manifests as an unusual feature in world 
history.  
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Part I Formosa as a Dynamic Context 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about where, when and how the mountain indigenes of Taiwan 
successfully used firearms to repel invaders, who were driven by the resource exploitation and 
profits in the mountain regions, in order to protect their lands and hunting territories in the 
period of 1860-1914.  
This is the period when the second industrial revolution in Western Europe and the 
United States was emerging as a new phase of industrial modernization. Based especially on 
novel innovations, the second industrial revolution was about to make a great impact on the 
rest of the world for better or for worse via its pioneering inventions in energy, new materials, 
chemistry, and communication technologies.2 The earlier innovations of the steam engine and 
improvement of water energy, which replaced the traditional hand production methods, were 
applied to the developments of textile and iron industries, to early mass productions and then 
extended to the locomotive and steam-ship transportation systems. Heavier and more 
technological industries became the ever-changing loci for the utilisation of physical and 
chemical sciences to a greater degree than ever before. These developments first emerged in 
Britain, but nodes of industrialisation spread throughout continental Europe and the United 
States from the 1830s under different modes.3 Particularly in the years around 1870, which 
could be considered as the critical period in world history, some new and powerful industrial 
capacities were created which clearly increased the military might of the Atlantic system, such 
as in the United States (steel) and Germany (chemicals). The dominance of a new military-
industrial nexus in powerful and industrialized countries was proven in the victories in wars 
such as the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Franco-Prussia War (1870-1871) in Europe, and 
the American Civil War (1861-1865).4 Such military and industrial development not only created 
competition among the Western nations for further technological progressions, but also 
                                                             
2 Peter N. Stearns, The Industrial Revolution in World History (Westview Press, 2012), 10–11. 
3 Patrick K. O’Brien, ed., Philip’s Atlas of World History (London: Philip’s, 1999), 168–71, 180–81; Tom Kemp, 
Industrialization in Nineteenth Century Europe (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 1–30. 
4 Ian Inkster, ‘Review Article: Technology and Culture during the First Climacteric’, The International History 
Review 31, no. 2 (June 2009): 356–64; Holger Herwig et al., Cassell’s World History of Warfare (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2003), 410–38. 
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allowed them to expand their markets as a collective group of great power industrialisers, to 
trade and invest into such civilisations as China, Japan, Southeast Asia, etc. Most of the time, 
these expansions were accompanied by military menace to traditional empires and societies 
by using – or postulating the use of – Western military and transport technologies such as rifles, 
cannon, warships, etc., which were the outcomes from the earlier industrial revolutions.5 The 
most obvious yet perhaps complex example of this was Britain. After recovering from the 
burdens of the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), Britain challenged China aggressively on 
commercial grounds and used commerce as its own excuse in the First Opium War (1839-1842). 
Other places also confronted similar situations - Germany in Africa, Netherlands in Indonesia, 
France in Vietnam, etc. where expansions in many instances incorporated an imperialist control 
over new territories. These may or may not have been of great benefit to the great powers, but 
for a time they did stave off both market invasions of the new territories by other powers (e.g. 
Britain and Germany in Africa) and the coming of actual large-scale war among themselves 
(which came in 1914-1918). So in the crucial period of this thesis the great powers expanded 
outwards and in doing so tested their developing technologies, gathered a greater variety of 
raw materials and dominated the new commercial pathways between Asia, the Americas, 
Africa and Europe. If not all technologies or adventures could be profitable, commercial and 
transport expansions generated profits in shipping, railroadisation, insurance and financial 
services for powerful groups and interests within Europe and America.6 Although the expansion 
of industrial revolutions of the West to some extent stimulated industrialization elsewhere, 
mostly colonies exhibited much more problematic results.7. The object of the Western nations 
as colonists was not only to exploit the resources and to profit from their colonies via deploying 
armaments and transportation systems, but also to compete with other Western nations 
outside of Europe in their colonies, which continued to accelerate the race to military 
technologies and industrialization.8 The exception of Japan which succeeded in industrialisation 
                                                             
5 Stearns, The Industrial Revolution in World History, 53–54, 103–4. 
6 Ian Inkster, Science and Technology in History. An Approach to Industrial Development , Macmillan, London 1991 
and Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992, Chapters 5 and 6. 
7 See Inkster op.cit. 1991 for the exception of areas of recent settlement such as Australia, chapter 10; for 
imperialism in India and China and more generally Inkster chapter 8 and 9, Jeff Horn et al., Reconceptualizing the 
Industrial Revolution, MIT Press, 2010 chapters 13-15; Roy MacLeod et al. eds., Technology and the Raj, Sage, 
London, 1995, especially chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, 11; Franz Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern 
World, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, new York, 1975 Chapters 6 and 9, see also pp. 148-159. 
8 Daniel R. Headrick, ‘The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in 
the Nineteenth Century’, The Journal of Modern History, 1979, 231–263; Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms 
Dynamic in World Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 37–38; David Arnold, ‘Europe, Technology, and 
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largely by transferring Western technologies, especially military technologies and adopting 
Western scientific knowledge and ideas rapidly from the 1870s, is of special importance to this 
thesis, as it was the Japanese colonisation of Formosa/Taiwan from 1895 that so transformed 
the frontier between industrialisation and the indigenous people of the island. This is one of 
the major themes of the thesis. Colonialism was a technological phenomenon or process, not 
just a directly political or commercial phenomenon, which by spreading modern military 
technologies to places where there were no or ineffective military technologies to use against 
the industrialised countries, determined many complex world outcomes.  
Moreover, beyond “the colonies”, there were the peoples of the frontiers, ethnicities 
within such colonies, which were “othered” or beyond colonisation directly – as in our case of 
Taiwan. These peoples of the frontiers were ultimately affected by colonialism, although in 
most cases the imperialists were not particularly interested in occupying these places , which 
they considered as especially “backward” and “primitive” outsider territories, troublesome at 
most. The problem of indigenous people in world history began to arise when they were forced 
to react and resist against territorial encroachments and resource exploitation from European 
or other settlements.  
There are many such instances that could be listed: the resistances of Aborigines in the 
different regions of Australia with their primitive weapons such as spears and stick over the 
invasions and land appropriations of white settlement from the late 1780s to the 1930s9; the 
series of battles the indigenous Maori fought against the British troops over their lands, forests, 
fisheries and resource ownerships in various parts of New Zealand from 1845-1872, the so-
called New Zealand War or the Maori War10; the resistances of African inhabitants over forced 
                                                             
Colonialism in the 20th Century’, History and Technology 21, no. 1 (1 March 2005): 85–106. 
9 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 25–37; John Connor, The 
Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838 (Australia: UNSW Press, 2002); Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders, and Kathryn 
Cronin, ‘“The Blood-Dimmed Tide” - Frontier Violence and Aboriginal Resistance’, in Race Relations in Colonial 
Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination (University of Queensland Press, 1975), 33–
46. 
10 For further information on the New Zealand War, see James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian 
Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland, N.Z. ; New York: Penguin Books Australia, 1998). According to Vayda, 
the guns Maoris first obtained from the European traders were flintlocks in the early 19 th century when the 
trading and whaling ships were calling along the eastern coast of the northern part of New Zealand’s North 
Island. Muskets were used by the Maoris in tribal warfare such as the Musket Wars (1807-1842) before their 
armed conflicts against European settlers from 1830s.Andrew P. Vayda, ‘Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand: 
Disruption of a War System’, Political Science Quarterly 85, no. 4 (December 1970): 560–84. Rich historical 
material on the New Zealand War in various parts of New Zealand have been digitalised by the Victoria 
University. It could be useful for further comparative studies between the Maori and the Taiwan indigenes in the 
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labour, increased tax and land appropriations 11, such as the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879,12 the 
Bambatha Revolt in South Africa in 1906 13, the Hereros revolt in Namibia in 1904-1907,14 the 
Maji Maji rebellion 1905-190715, and so on; and the indigenous rebellions commenced by the 
Cree, Blackfoot, Blood, Peigan and Saulteaux tribes and their alliance with Métis militants led 
by Louis Riel against the Canadian government over their lands, which were relinquished in 
treaties and affected their bison herds and living, (also called the North–West rebellion) in 
1885.16 
Certainly, the causes of armed resistances initiated by indigenous peoples against the 
colonists varied by different circumstances and depended on their contacts or connections with 
others and the colonists. The sorts of weaponry the indigenes possessed or practised in life and 
operated in wars also varied greatly, and most importantly their access to modern weaponry 
and their adaptation or absorption of modern weaponry in their lives and in combats brought 
even more complex forces into account. And all these did not necessarily come into effect or 
function as benefits for indigenous peoples to fight against the European military, who were on 
the whole furnished with modern guns with sufficient ammunition and were well trained. For 
instance, the Aborigines used muskets only in hunting, if at all, instead of using them in warfare 
in Australia. The reason for this could be the deficiency of ammunition provision and the 
symbolic feature of the spear as signifying manhood in the Aboriginal societies, so the use of 
spears became indispensable for the Aborigines in warfare. In addition, the large mammals of 
Australia were not dangerous to the indigenous people, so there was little of any tradition or 
normal culture of using arms to defend life.17 Another example can be found in the Anglo-Zulu 
                                                             
adaptation of firearms in warfare. See ‘New Zealand Wars (1845–1872)’, Victoria University of Wellingto Library, 
accessed 21 February 2016, http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-corpus-newzealandwars.html.  
11Robert Tignor et al., Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: From the Beginning of Humankind to the Present , 3rd ed. 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 675–77. 
12 Angus McBride, The Zulu War (Osprey Publishing, 2013). 
13 Sean Redding, ‘A Blood-Stained Tax: Poll Tax and the Bambatha Rebellion in South Africa’, African Studies 
Review 43, no. 2 (September 2000): 29–54. 
14 Jon Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros (University of California Press, 1981). 
15 Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 
1874-1915’, Environmental History 8, no. 3 (July 2003): 430. 
16 Blair Stonechild and W. A. Waiser, Loyal Till Death: Indians and the North-West Rebellion (Fifth House, 1997); 
Fadi Saleem Ennab, ‘Rupturing the Myth of the Peaceful Western Canadian Frontier: A Socio-Historical Study of 
Colonization, Violence, and the North West Mounted Police, 1873-1905’ (MA, University of Manitoba, 2010). 
17 John Connor, ‘Frontier Wars’, ed. Peter Dennis et al., Oxford Reference, The Oxford Companion to Australian 
Military History, accessed 21 February 2016, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195517842.001.0001/acref-9780195517842-e-492. 
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War. The Zulu used firearms only as their subordinate weapons and failed to develop tactics 
with firearms effectively, even though there was evidence of firearms transferring to Zululand 
and 1,000 Martini Henry rifles and 500,000 rounds were captured by the Zulu at  Isandlwan.18 
Jack Hogan later emphasized the constraint of employing firearms and the importance of close 
combat and assegai19 in the Zulu culture of warfare.20   
In the cases of Australian Aborigines and the Zulu, the problem seems to lie in the 
accommodation of modern firearms when fighting against the British military. These cases of 
indigenous resistances or rebellions in Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and North America have 
been widely studied and researched. The possession and application of firearms of the 
Taiwanese indigenes in armed conflicts against the invaders from foreign countries, the Qing 
and the Japanese governances and the Chinese settlers and within the indigenous communities 
has been far less discussed or researched. Here we construct a broad context for a noveler 
historical case, particularly one that allows for the difference between formal colonialism21, and 
the phases of encroachment that were faced by the indigenes in Taiwan. Only Chen Zongren 
wrote a good academic article on the introduction, exchange and use of modern firearms by 
the indigenes in the late nineteenth century through historical images and literatures. 22 
Another Taiwanese historian Xu Yuliang discussed the establishment of the indigenes’ military, 
and briefly considered the use of firearms by the plains and mountain indigenes during the Qing 
governance in Taiwan from the late seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.23  
 
 
                                                             
18 J. J. Guy, ‘A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879’, The 
Journal of African History 12, no. 4 (1971): 557–70. 
19 A slender, iron-tipped, hardwood spear used chiefly by southern African peoples. 
20 Jack Hogan, ‘“Hardly a Place for a Nervous Old Gentlement to Take a Stroll”: Firearms and the Zulu during the 
Anglo-Zulu War’, in A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empire (Routledge, 2013), 129–48. 
21 This refers to the Dutch colonialism, see Chapter 2, p45-48; the references here are to the brief Spanish 
attempts on the north of the island, see Chapter 2, p49-55; to the British factory briefly run by the East India 
Company during 1670-1685, see Chapter 2, p72.  
22 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang -Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru 、
liutong Yu Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 (The Aborigines with Modern 
Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society)’, Tai Da Lishi Xuebao 
臺大歷史學報 (Historical Inquiry) 36 (2005): 53–106. 
23 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of 
Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe 九州出版社, 2008), 66–98, 190, 195-199, 202, 207, 
210–13, 219–20. 
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1. Taiwan Scene  
 
Taiwan or Formosa, the name given by the Portuguese mariners in the sixteenth century 
and commonly used later by European diplomats, visitors and travellers, was long neglected by 
the Qing government until the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, it had been regarded as a 
marginal state throughout Chinese civilization. This negligent attitude of the Qing government 
continued to exist even after the opening of the treaty ports of Taiwan at Tamsui, Keelung, 
Taiwanfoo and Takow to Europeans under the Tianjin Treaty in 1858, after the Second Opium 
War (1856-1860). To a limited degree the Western countries had extended their attentiveness 
and interests to the strategic position of Taiwan for trading with China while they were 
spreading their trading posts from Southeast Asia to East Asia with their military technologies. 
They had also learnt that Taiwan held some rich resources in its mountain regions such as 
camphor, indigo, coal, sulphur, which were to become amongst the primary materials in the 
second industrial revolution, and tea and sugar, which European consumers had consumed 
from much earlier times. Moreover, the locations of these resources were mostly in the 
mountain regions, where the Chinese sovereignty was very problematic and which were 
dominated by the mountain indigenes, the head hunters. Over time, Europeans were fully 
aware of these elements. Expeditions and investigations were sent to Taiwan by Western 
countries and merchants, who also employed the local Chinese in exploiting the resources and 
risking their lives in the mountains, under the increasing demand of the world market. Under 
this circumstance, the mountain indigenes were subject to the encroachments from the 
Chinese, whom they thus long hated and with whom they were in frequent conflicts, and 
ultimately from the West. It was only inevitable for the mountain indigenes to resist and protect 
their lands. Conflicts between the indigenes and the Chinese, who entered the mountains or 
operated close to the indigenous borders, had started to accumulate from the mid-nineteenth 
century. As we shall see, this situation was only going to get worse. 
Despite all that, the Qing government did not develop any positive intention to exercise 
its control over the eastern mountainous districts, where the mountain indigenes lived, nor did 
the Formosan indigenes recognise its sovereignty in Taiwan.  
It was only from the first Japanese expedition in southern Taiwan in 1874, which aimed 
to punish the Paiwan indigenes for murdering Ryukyuan fishermen, that the Qing government 
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began to show real concern for Chinese coastal security and the management of indigen es in 
eastern Taiwan. Shen Baozheng 沈葆楨 was sent by the Qing government, and his policies on 
the “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” 開山撫番 and modernising Taiwan 
and its military defence were formed and implemented subsequent to the threat posed by 
Japan. Later Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, who was primarily despatched to confront the French 
invasion in northern Taiwan in 1884, determined to modernise Taiwan and purposed to exploit 
and monopolise the resources in the mountains by suppressing the indigenes in Taiwan. The 
intervention of the Qing government only made the indigenes’ lives worse and diminished their 
living space, which resulted in even more conflicts and resistances from them. So, Japanese 
colonialism in Taiwan came on the back of a rise in frontier conflicts arising from both 
commercial and political forces. The new colonial element was the outcome of Japan defeating 
the imperial Qing in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, where Japan resolved to profit from Taiwan 
as her outpost of Meiji industrial modernisation. Japan surged against  the eastern frontier in 
her effort at solving the problem of indigenes by using her advanced and efficient 
communication systems and armaments in the indigenes’ territories. These not only penetrated 
into the mountain indigenes’ lands further than during the Qing, but also accelerated even 
greater resistances of the mountain indigenes in Taiwan. 
The mountain indigenes in Taiwan appeared to execute a series of exceptionally 
prolonged resistances whilst they were also involved in mediating and utilising their networks 
with the Chinese and the Western foreigners, who acted as the operators of the economic or 
even political encroachments at the edge of the technologically modernising world economy. 
Robert Eskildsen has suggested that the participation of the Formosan indigenes in the frontier 
zone, which was created and maintained by them, “mediated interaction and exchange among 
the heterogeneous populations of the island in the context of rule by successive colonial 
regimes.”24 Certainly, the indigenes managed to sustain themselves from or at times depended 
on interacting and trading with the Chinese and the others for firearms, gunpowder, knives, 
pottery, salt, wine, beads, clothes, iron, copper etc. There seems, then, to be a case for agreeing 
with Eskildsen that “the workings of this frontier zone … reveal so much about Taiwan’s place 
in the history of East Asia.”25 Nevertheless, this frontier zone was never peaceful and soundless 
                                                             
24 Robert Eskildsen, ‘Taiwan: A Periphery in Search of a Narrative’, The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (2005): 
284. 
25 Ibid. 
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in the process of functioning and was full of clashes and battles. Eskildsen refers to a “striking 
competence” in resistance on the frontiers of Japanese colonialism and in this thesis we intend 
to bed this idea down into a precise chronology and a nuanced social, cultural and economic 
context.26  
 
2. Approaches 
 
Firearms were probably taken in by the mountain indigenes under the circumstances of 
encountering increasing encroachments and conflicts, while they also had access to firearms 
from their existing trading/exchanging networks to aid their prolonged resistances. This could 
be seen as a process of technology transfer for the purposes of warfare among the Formosan 
indigenes. Nevertheless, issues over technology transfer, which involved local technical, 
economic, political, social, cultural and psychological conditions, were often complex and could 
not be resolved in a short period of time or even could not be resolved at all. In world history, 
technology transfer has failed much more often than it has succeeded.27 Jeremy Black in his 
recent work, War and Technology, also noticed the complexities in adopting technologies for 
those men responsible for fighting and for those men who must use technologies in war.28 It is 
also highly possible that locals in the periphery reject such technology or cause conflicts in the 
process of technology transfer. Ian Inkster argues that where technology is transferring from 
the advanced global system into more indigenous or simple social structures, the chances of 
cultural or even political conflict is far higher than success.29 Peter B. Heller also suggested that 
the most difficult impediments in technology transfer were the ”socio-cultural barriers”, which 
comprised different norms and values that were prevalent or predominated between the two 
sides. He also emphasizes that in the process of technology transfer, the technology receiver 
and the suppliers too often never understand each other’s norms and values in general and 
                                                             
26 Ibid., 289. 
27 Ian Inkster, ‘Technology Transfer and Industrial Transformation: An Interpretation of the Pattern of Economic 
Development circa 1870-1914’, in Technological Change. Methods and Themes in the History of Technology, ed. 
Robert Fox (London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), 177–201; Ian Inkster, ‘Technology Transfer: The 
Historical Dimensions in Detail’, MetaScience 8 (1990): 12–19. 
28 Jeremy Black, War and Technology (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 2–4. 
29 Ian Inkster, ‘Politicising the Gerschenkron Schema: Technology Transfer, Late Development and the State in 
Historical Perspective’, The Journal of European Economic History 31 (2002): 45–87. 
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these sociocultural barriers occurred concurrently and could be synergistic. 30  However, in 
systems where technology develops in evolutionary fashion, as one outcome of cultural 
development, there is no necessary reason to fear any debilitating conflict between new 
techniques and existing social norms and values. As Dani Cavallaro has summarised, 
“technology should not be regarded as a malevolent power keen on robbing humans of their 
skills and creativity or indeed capable of autonomous creativity”.31 Stephen Hill also suggested 
that ”social, political and economic negotiations are involved in bringing particular 
technological systems into existence … the impact of technological change varies according to 
the social and cultural context into which new technologies are implanted”.32 From the cases 
mentioned earlier, the Australian Aborigines and the Zulu appear not to have managed to use 
firearms effectively when fighting against the British military. The character of the firearm as a 
destructive tool for defense or attack seemed to fail its primary function for the Aborigines and 
the Zulus in battlefields during this period.  
How did the mountain indigenes of Taiwan contrive these resistances against the 
Chinese settlers, the Qing army and the Japanese army for such a long time, especially when 
the Qing and the Japanese governments both owned superior military technology, which they 
purchased, transferred and tried to adapt from the West? What were the character and 
conditions of weapons that the Formosan indigenes possessed and fought with against the 
invaders? How did the Formosan indigenes receive firearms as a foreign and fatal technology 
and operate it in combats, when the mountain indigenes did not have the material of iron nor 
the skills for forging or manufacturing firearms and making powder? Thus they could only obtain 
firearms and powder from outsiders. How did they acquire the knowledge and the techniques 
of firearms? Did they manage to adapt Western techniques and weapons or to negotiate them 
within their societies, political and economic systems, as Stephen Hill , has suggested as a 
necessary element in absorption?   
In this dissertation, I would like to suggest that among the goods the Formosan 
indigenes exchanged or traded with the Chinese and others, the possession and use of firearms 
was critical in giving them the capacity to fight against any intruders of that time. Because of 
                                                             
30 Peter B. Heller, Technology Transfer and Human Values: Concepts, Applications, Cases  (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1985), 74–76. 
31 Dani Cavallaro, Critical and Cultural Theory (The Athlone Press, 2001), 192. 
32 Stephen Hill, The Tragedy of Technology: Human Liberation versus Domination in the Late Twentieth Century 
(London: Pluto, 1988), 6. 
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their destructive power, firearms might have first appeared to the indigenes to merely 
strengthen or enrich their cultures and skills in hunting and headhunting customs. As time went 
on, through the application of firearms in warfare or resistance, they maintained independence 
while the foreigners and Chinese encroachers continued to interfere with their lands and their 
communities. Can we interpret these elements as a creatively induced ”culture of firearms”, 
which was also given meanings in the social, political and economic contexts by the indigenes 
and the indigenous societies in Taiwan?  
Peter Berger the sociologist has suggested that it might be possible to examine the roots 
of globalization and its impacts by reducing the problem to its elements, and here technology 
– the firearm – does emerge as being of importance. Berger firstly provided his “four faces” of 
global culture in order to give the term more meanings, particularly in relation to “locals”.33 
Most importantly Berger goes on to develop his notion in a manner useful to empirical, 
especially historical, enquiry. He provides a typology relating globalization to changes in local or 
indigenous cultures. Following a fairly loose relationship with his four original categories of 
potential processes:  
1. Cultural globalization replaces local culture 
2. Coexistence occurs between the global and local cultures 
3. There is some combination of particular local culture with global culture  
4. Local culture rejects the cultural globalization trends34 
These may all be seen as historical processes, and there is really on the surface little reason to 
believe that they occur extensively, permanently, or that any one is exclusive of the other. It 
seems obvious that in the real world it is possible that an “indigenous society” in contact with 
a more advanced system or permeated by global phenomena may at different points in time or 
place go through every one of such responses.  
However, such notions need testing against some reality. In particular, my aim is to take 
                                                             
33 He suggested 4 types of global cultures, which were ‘Davos Culture or International Business Culture’, ‘Faculty 
Club international or World Intellectual Culture’, ‘Mcworld Culture or Global popular culture’ and New Religious 
Movement or popular religious culture’, and invited sociologists from several countries such as China, Japan, 
India, Germany, Hungary, South Africa, Chile, Turkey and America to examine these countries and their 
interactions and responses. Peter L. Berger, ‘Four Faces of Global Culture’, National Interest 49 (1997): 23–29; 
Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–5. 
34Hsiao, Hsin-huang, Coexistence and Synthesis: Cultural Globalization and Localization in contemporary Taiwan, 
in Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington ed., Many globalizations cultural diversity in the contemporary 
world, OUP, 2002, 50 
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up Berger’s typology in terms of Stephen Hill’s The Tragedy of Technology, which points out that 
technology is “enframed” within cultures, and that its introduction or transfer into new, perhaps 
more primitive or elementary cultures, intrinsically involves cultural introductions thus resulting 
in cultural tension. Technologies seemingly represent Western industrial culture. 35  Can we 
consider that in our case firearms were embedded and given meanings within the indigenous 
cultures and argue that the resistance of the indigenes in Taiwan depended on the culture 
absorption of modern firearms into traditional patterns of warfare and hunting and social status? 
More particularly, may we read the history of Taiwan 1861-1914 in terms of the Berger-Hill type 
of approaches? If neither of the Berger extremes of possibilities 1 and 4 fits our history, how 
and when was it that the possibilities 2 or 3 or 2/3 arose and were maintained? Did indigenous 
cultures adapt the gun or was the gun adapted into indigenous cultures? If the latter, then under 
what imperatives or external forces did such cultural adaptation occur, and how did it serve to 
prolong the independence of indigenous cultures? These sorts of questions seem to link 
anthropological and historical enquiry, but more importantly may help in the interpretation of 
the detailed history to be examined here. 
 
3. Intention, Structures and Sources 
 
Through examination of the Taiwan case, the purpose of the thesis is to uncover the 
underlying historical conditions and aspects of globalization which impact on indigenous 
societies most sweepingly (Berger 1 above) or least sweepingly (Berger option 4 above), or 
whether more commonly the relationship between external and internal cultural forces is 
somehow found at modes 2 or 3. If the latter, then what were the determining factors and how 
did they operate in different sub-periods and regions? 
 
Chapter 2, aims to demonstrate the fundamental and really dramatic east and west 
dualism of Taiwan, a feature of the island until the present time and from before the 1860s. It 
begins with the description of the physical environment of Taiwan as one of the assets that the 
mountain indigenous people benefit from and which enclosed the plains and mountain 
indigenes’ cultural assets, which included their beliefs, socio-political organizations, 
                                                             
35 Hill, The Tragedy of Technology: Human Liberation versus Domination in the Late Twentieth Century , 44. 
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headhunting customs, economic activities and warfare in Taiwan. These two assets - physical 
environment and culture - do not change in a short period of time, even until today. Then I will 
discuss the fall of the western plain to others over time, which is briefly traced back to the 
beginning of encroachment from the colonists and the Chinese immigrants from the 
seventeenth century under Dutch, Spanish, Zheng and early Qing regimes, and concentrate on 
historical problems relating to indigenous history, pattern of interaction with ethnic groups and 
different attempts at indigenous “management” and the varying attitudes of its “governances”, 
especially in the post-1860s. Finally, the chapter considers the emergence of resistance by the 
indigenes, mostly in western plains areas, through combining the physical assets and cultural 
assets of the indigenes, the intrusions of the Chinese and colonists and the use of primitive or 
undeveloped weapons in the plains indigenes’ hands versus those of the colonists before 1860. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I use mostly secondary sources such as published books, 
journal articles, and unpublished theses, which focus on the themes of indigenous cultures, the 
governances of the Dutch, the Spanish and the early Qing in Taiwan in both English and Chinese 
languages.  
Chapter 3 then emphasises the acceleration of encroachments from the western plains 
toward the eastern mountain regions from the 1860s when the ports in Taiwan were forced to 
open to the Western nations under the Tianjin Treaty in 1860 after the defeat of the Qing 
government in the Second Opium War 1856-1860 and from 1895 when Taiwan was ceded to 
Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 after another defeat of the Qing government in 
the Sino-Japanese War. The mountain indigenes faced more frequent connections and greater 
clashes with the outsiders other than the earlier settled Chinese, due to the rise and expansion 
of Western power in Asia. In order to demonstrate these political and economic encroachments 
toward the mountain indigenes, I will present evidence of some substantial attempts of 
Western nations to dominate eastern Taiwan, some close and violent contacts with the 
mountain indigenes, the economic imperative for exploiting mountain resources such as 
camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other minerals, and the Qing and Japanese governments’ 
policies targeted at the mountain indigenes for pursuing ultimate control over the resources in 
the eastern mountains. These are the plausible factors explaining the mountain indigenes’ 
initiation of various scales of resistanc for over half a century. It moves to explain the reason 
for choosing firearms in this thesis as a global technology and technology of resistance, and to 
why the mountain indigenous people in Taiwan did not appear to be mere victims when 
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modern technology arrived, unlike other technologically undeveloped cultures or colonies, but 
adapted and absorbed weaponry into their hunting and head-hunting culture to fight back 
instead, and so to reserve some of their independence.  
From chapters 4 to 6 we focus on the sources of conflicts and use of firearms among 
the mountain indigenes in 3 different stages – traditional level (circa 1860 to 1883), traditional-
modernized level (circa 1884- 1895) and the modernized-advanced level (circa 1896-1914). The 
aims of chapters 4 to 6 are to explore the level of firearms that the mountain indigenes 
possessed based on their types of firearms and to survey their access to or procurements of 
firearms in these 3 different stages. In each chapter, I will first examine the occurrence of 
warfare or conflicts that the mountain indigenes were involved in. Secondly, I will investigate 
the types of armaments, mainly firearms that the Western military, the Qing military, the 
Chinese militia settled in Taiwan and the Chinese civilians used or carried. This helps us to 
understand the circumstances of the mountain indigenes in different scales of warfare, which 
might have given them the feasibilities of knowing and experiencing something of the modern 
or advanced armaments their enemies operated. Finally, I will discuss the findings about the 
types of firearms that were used by the mountain indigenes and how they obtained the 
firearms directly and indirectly. The different levels of firearms that passed to the mountain 
indigenes could be the most significant reason that the mountain indigenes were enabled to 
fight against their enemies in varied resistances. These are the structures I would like to 
demonstrate in different periods that I selected for each chapter. 
In order to support these different themes from Chapter 3 to 6, for Chapter 3 we 
investigate the literature on the foreign activities, which involved the mountain indigenes, the 
development of several industries in the mountain regions, and the mountain indigenes’ 
management under the late Qing governance and the early Japanese governance. For Chapter 
4 to 6, I then focus on the warfare and conflicts in 1860-1914, which is the research period in 
this dissertation. This is the period when Taiwan was under the late Qing governance and the 
early Japanese governance after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. For the material in the 
late Qing (1860-1895), I use mostly printed local gazetteers and memoirs of the Qing governors, 
which are in the Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary collectanea on Taiwan), 
records of the Qing officials from the Ming Qing Taiwan Xinzheng Dang 明清臺灣行政檔 
(Administrative Records on Taiwan in the Ming and Qing Eras) in Taiwan lishi shuwei tushuguan 
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臺灣歷史數位圖書館 Taiwan History Digital Library in Chinese language. For the material in 
the early Japanese colonization (1895-1914), I use Riju shiqi Yuanzhumin xingzheng zhigao 日
據時期原住民行政志稿  or also called Riban shikô 理蕃誌稿  (Records of Indigenes’ 
Management), which were translated by Chen Jintian into Chinese language and Taiwan 
zhongdufu danan 臺灣總督府檔案 (Archives of Taiwan Sotokufu) on the mountain indigenes’ 
regions (Yilan, Taipei-Taoyuan, Xinzhu-Miaoli, and Dong Taiwan, which includes Pingdong, 
Taidong and Hualian), which were also translated by Wang Xuexin into Chinese language. Apart 
from the Qing and Japanese official documents, to provide different perspectives, I also used 
British Annual Trade Reports, Intelligence Reports and Occasional Political Reports and Review, 
which are in the Taiwan Political and Economic Reports, 1861-1960 [8 vols] and journals, articles 
and reports written by foreign travellers, consular officials, merchants and missionaries, who 
were in Taiwan at the time. Some secondary references will be used and contribute different 
themes in each chapter.  
Chapter 7 gathers the materials related to the possession and use of firearms of the 
indigenes from Chapters 4 to 6, and becomes an independent, interpretive chapter. This 
chapter suggests the nature of the acculturation of the firearms among the indigenes and their 
societies in the period of 1860-1914, which we now argue to have been crucial to answering 
the further question of how very successful the indigenous resistances were. I would like to 
outline and give traces of the failure of the Chinese troops in obtaining, maintaining and 
adapting firearms and how the Taiwan Japanese Sotokufu managed and regulated the 
indigenes’ firearms in Taiwan as a contrast to the more effective outcome of indigenes’ firearms 
cultures. Because the mountain indigenes did not possess their own written languages or have 
written historical records, to uncover their traditional cultures and how they used firearms , I 
use published books, journals, reports, and articles, written by foreign travellers, consular 
officials, merchants, missionaries, anthropologists, etc., who had a lot of experience of close 
contacts with the mountain indigenes and their communities. Most of them were written in 
English and some of them were in European languages, which were translated by Reed College, 
USA in the Reed Digital Collections. Some of them were used also in the previous chapters. 
During the Japanese colonization, several Japanese anthropologists were sent to the mountain 
indigenous districts by the Taiwan Sotokufu for assisting the Japanese officials and police to 
manage the mountain indigenes, such as Inō Kanori, Ushinosuke Mori and Torii Ryūzō, whose 
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works were translated by independent researchers. These are the sources for explaining the 
cultural embedment of firearms in the mountain indigenes ’ societies, which might be the 
reason that the mountain indigenes were able to fight against invaders successfully and over a 
long period of complex change.   
In this dissertation, I will use indigenes or indigenous as the terminology instead of 
aborigines or aboriginal for the indigenous people in Taiwan. According to the UN, the word 
“indigenous” is broadly applied to peoples, communities and nations who live in their original 
territories or regions and affirm their ownership on cultural patterns, languages, social and legal 
systems with historical continuity, before they are influenced by invasion or colonization.36 This 
term has been commonly used in a global context. Also I will use the terms firearms or small 
arms, which refers to various types of hand-held or portable gun, such as matchlock, musket, 
rifles, etc.37 , instead of “guns” that refers to a projectile weapon, which was forced by the 
explosion of gunpowder in metallic tubes, and can thus include weapons from large cannon to 
small arms.38  
In accordance with the primary sources I use and translate from a wide variety of 
published and archival material, sometimes the words or characters do not offer clear 
indications or meaning about the types of weapons in Chinese and English languages. For 
instance, in the Chinese literature, the Chinese character qiang 槍 refers to an agricultural tool, 
spear or firearm 39  although the Chinese character 鎗, also pronounced as qiang means 
armament, which could discharge gunpowder or bullets and shoot targets. 40  The word 
yangqiang 洋槍 means foreign or Western firearms, which did not disclose the types of firearms, 
but might have also suggested modern types of weapons in the context of the nineteenth 
century; in the English or Western literature, words like “arms” or “weapons”, which were often 
used by the authors or appeared in the reports, did not always provide the specific types of 
                                                             
36 State of the World's Indigenous Peoples, Secretariat of Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UN, 2009, p4-
7. in http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf  
37 ‘Firearm’, accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/firearm; ‘Small 
Arm’, Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.britannica.com/technology/small-arm. 
38 ‘Gun’, Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.britannica.com/technology/gun-
weapon. 
39 ‘Qian 槍’, Ming Yang Baike Da Cidian 名揚百科大辭典 [Míngyáng Encycloedias and Dictionaries] (Taipei: 
Mingyang 名揚, 1886). 
40 ‘Qian 鎗’, Jiaoyubu Zhongbian Guoyu Cidian Xiuding Ben 教育部重編國語辭典修訂本[Revised Edition of 
Chinese Dictionary] (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2015), http://dict.revised.moe.edu.tw/cgi-
bin/cbdic/gsweb.cgi?ccd=K9QbX6&o=e0&sec=sec1&op=v&view=0-1. 
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armaments. I shall try to select the obvious ones which gave clear indications in this dissertation, 
but I could not always identify the types or models of firearms even within the context. 
Moreover, in both Chinese and Western literatures, qiangtang 前膛 (muzzle-loader) and 
houtang 後膛 (breech-loader) were often recorded for the kinds of firearms or guns in 
accordance of course to the ways they loaded the gunpowder. Nevertheless, in terms of 
differentiating the level of firearms or small arm, I intend to distinguish them based on the 
methods of loading gunpowder or bullets: qiangtang 前膛 (muzzle-loader), which was mostly 
used before the mid-nineteenth century, will be considered as the traditional level; houtang 後
膛 (breech-loader), which was a nineteenth century invention from the West, will be considered 
as the modernised or advanced level. 41 
Due to the complexity of relationships between different races in Taiwan during the 
period of this research (1860-1914), the terms West and foreigner mostly refers to the 
encroachment in eastern Taiwan by the industrialising powers until 1895. From that time, 
Japanese colonialism – fuelled by the tools of Western-style industrialism – dominated the 
encroachment process as the result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.42 Prior to that time, it was 
really only in the 1874 that Japan joined the Western powers in disturbing the Chinese presence 
on the island. The Qing military generally includes the armies from mainland China, the Green 
Standard Army, the Chinese militia, which were formed by the local gentry settled in Taiwan, 
and the Chinese braves settled in Taiwan. However, I will classify them for the different purposes 
in each chapter. Unless specified otherwise, all Chinese and other foreign quotations or terms 
are translated fairly freely by myself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
41 Oyvind Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge: A Practical History of Black Powder Firearms  (New York: 
The Crowood Press Ltd, 2013), 9–12. 
42 Ian Inkster, Japanese Industrialisation: Historical and Cultural Perspectives  (London: Routledge, 2001). Chapter 
3-6   
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Part I Formosa a Dynamic Context 
Chapter 2 East and West Dualism: the Chinese, the Foreigners, and the 
Indigenes in Taiwan 
 
A people who showed various kind and amiable traits of character, but 
whose natural temperament, even were they disposed to work, seems 
unfitted for the systematic toils of civilised nations; whose ignorance and 
simplicity permit them to barter away their noble forests for a mess of 
pottage; who are steeped in poverty and ignorance--the constant dupes 
of unscrupulous and mercenary neighbors; the victims of strong 
passions; without friends, without help, without sympathy--children of 
the present hour. 1 
 
1. Geographical Condition of Taiwan: Physical Environment as an Asset (A) 
 
Taiwan is situated in the middle of a series of islands in the West Pacific Ocean, between 
the Ryukyu Islands, Okinawa and the Philippines and to the southeast of China, encompassed 
by waters – the East China Sea to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the east which is more than 
4,000 meters in depth, the Bashi Channel to the south and Taiwan Strait to the west which is 
less than 70 meters in depth. The nearest islands to Taiwan are the Ryukyu Islands which are 
less than 128,748 meters from eastern Taiwan and around 160,934.4 meters from mainland 
China. The total area of Taiwan is 22,487,363.7 square meters. It is approximately 394,289 
meters long and 144,841 meters wide with 25 main rivers, mostly in the western plain of Taiwan. 
The west coast consists mostly of sandbars, shoals and lagoons in the south, which are in 
contrast to the precipitous and rocky cliffs which fall rapidly to the Pacific Ocean on the east 
coast of Taiwan. The most remarkable feature of Taiwan is a chain of steep mountains, up to 
3,048 meters in height at least, occupying the most central and eastern parts of the island and 
accompanied by discrete and numerous hills up to 1,524 meters in height. The highest point is 
Yu Shan or Mt. Morrison (3,996.84 meters) which is situated in the centre of Taiwan. Mountain 
areas are mostly covered by exuberant forest up to a height of 914.4 meters consisting of palms, 
banyan, cork, camphor trees, tree ferns, dense thickets, gigantic Cryptomerias and 
                                                             
1 William A. Hancock, ‘A Visit to the Savages of Formosa’, Good Words 25 (1885): 379. 
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Chamaecyparis. Most of the land in the western plain area is less than 304.8 meters above sea 
level and is composed of the deposition of silt and alluvial plains where most economic crops 
were planted.2 See Map 2:1 below.  
 
Map 2.1 Map of Taiwan 
 
Source: Geoatalas.com 
(http://www.geoatlas.com/en/maps/countries-3/taiwan-
1146?PHPSESSID=529e4e79be09fce27cc03dbe2f0949fc) 
 
An Estonian naval office, Pavel Ivanovich Ibis, visited Taiwan for a month in the year of 
1875 after the Japanese expedition, and gave an interesting account of the east and west 
                                                             
2 The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A dictionary of arts, sciences, and general literature .1889, 1951, 2014. 
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geographical contrast of Taiwan as, “a ridge height of 8000 feet stretches for 115 miles in north-
northeasterly direction, forms a strict divide, then quickly decreases in altitude to the south. 
But to the north it abuts an equally high, but only 15 mile long mountain range that is 
perpendicular to it (Dodd's range), and ends in a chaotic jumble … Moving westward, there are 
terraces of clay and sand layers with an almost imperceptible decline towards the east, and 
finally the plain, which contains almost all of the third part of the island, its west side; only 
slowly declining to the sea, it forms a shallow coast only accessible at a few places.” 3 
Unfavourable coastal lines with rugged coast on the east and inadequate entry points, 
restricted outsiders from landing on the island. Yet some Chinese fishermen from the southern 
coast province sailed from time to time to Taiwan and traded with the indigenes who inhabited 
the west coast plain area, but indigenes could always expel them from the island. Indigenes 
living in the north and the east were protected by the range of lofty mountains and dense forest 
which served as natural fortifications. Every river, mountain, hill, ravine or forest could easily 
turn into their defence or ambush positions. Their understanding and comprehensive 
knowledge of terrains gave them great advantages in hunting expeditions or tribal warfare.  
On the contrary, the location of Taiwan and its hazardous topography especially in 
eastern Taiwan, restrained the likelihood of searching for new residence or for land which could 
produce rich crops. Moreover, just as today unpredictable weather or natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and typhoons in summer and autumn which carried immense and incessant rain 
and strong winds often caused severe damage by floods or mudflows which might flush or blow 
away their dwellings, crops and animals. Some coherence can be found from an encyclopaedic 
Dutch work on China by Arnoldus Montanus in the seventeenth century, where “Formosa, 
especially the coast, suffers much storms and tempests; for often times the wind blows down 
whole trees and houses, rending both walls and roofs from top to bottom ... It also rains here 
very much; wherefore none can travel above two months, being December and January.” 4 
Indigenous people in Taiwan have learnt to adapt to their physical environment; on the other 
                                                             
3 Pavel Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, ed. Douglas Fix, 
trans. Christian Buss, Globus 31 (1877): 149–52. 
4 Arnoldus Montanus, Atlas Chinensis Being a Second Part of A Relation of Remarkable Passages in Two 
Embassies from the East-India Company of the United Provinces to the Vice-Roy Singlamong and General Taising 
Lipovi and to Konchi, Emperor of China and East-Tartary: With a Relation of the Netherlanders Assisting the Tartar 
against Coxinga and the Chinese Fleet, Who till Then Were Masters of the Sea : And a More Exact Geographical 
Description than Formerly Both of the Whole Empire of China in General and in Particular of Everyone of the 
Fifteen Provinces, trans. John Ogilby (London: Printed by Tho. Johnson for the author, 1671). 
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hand, they were restrained by the geographical conditions and natural disasters from which 
they could not escape.  
 
2. Formosan Indigenes and Cultural Assets (B)  
 
Formosan indigenes will be mainly treated as a whole in this thesis as their cultures, 
economic activities and beliefs share similarity. Due to the early or later contact with outsiders 
and various levels of assimilation with Chinese culture, indigenes in Taiwan were commonly 
divided into two groups: mountain indigenes and plains indigenes. This also reflects on their 
experience of and access to technology therefore I will use mountain indigenes as the often 
called uncivilised or ferocious inhabitants in the mountains in both Chinese and Western 
literature, and plains indigenes and pepos as civilised or domestic inhabitants on the western 
plain of Taiwan.5 Specific groups of indigenes will be identified when necessary. Formosan 
indigenes did not have written records themselves, so we can only try to understand their lives 
and cultures from travellers’ journals, missionaries’ reports and governmental reports in 
Chinese and European languages and later from some anthropologists, governmental and 
police reports in Japanese during Japanese colonization (1895-1945). Their observations and 
descriptions of Formosan indigenes might suit their preferences due to their positions and their 
priorities of the time; however, it will be sufficient to give us a broad picture of how Formosan 
indigenes associated with others in the nineteenth century.  
Formosan indigenes were firstly systematically studied by Inō Kanori, Torii Ryuzo and 
Mori Ushinosuke who were ethnographers and anthropologists sent by the Japanese 
government from 1896. From linguistic evidence, Taiwan indigenous people are Austronesians 
or Malayo-Polynesians who share the same language family in the Pacific Ocean and Indian 
Ocean areas such as Madagascar, Indonesia, the Philippines, New Guinea, Hawaii, etc. 6 
                                                             
5 Qing literati often called mountain indigenes– shengfan (生番 raw aborigines) and Plains indigenes shufan (熟番 
“cooked indigenes”). Most of European writers refer Chin-huan as mountain indigenesand shufan as “Sek-huan” 
“Pepohwans” or “Plains indigenes” who were defined by their submission to Qing rules through their payment of 
head tax or the levels of cultural assimilation with Chinese.  Later Japanese government maintained the 
categorization from Qing and later called mountain indigenes– takasago-zoku 高砂族 and plains indigenes - Pepo
平埔族.  
6 Austronesian languages are the most extensive languages family in the world, which comprise over 1, 000 
languages and were spoken by 351 million people. Taiwan indigenes belong to the most northern region among 
the Austronesian languages family and the current hypothesis suggest that an origin of Austronesia languages was 
in Taiwan based on its linguistic evidence. David R. Thomas, ‘Asal Usul Orang Austronesia (Origins of the 
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However, the origin and the arrival of Formosan indigenes remain uncertain from different 
disciplines’ pursuits including archaeology, anthropology, linguistic and human genetic studies. 
7 Currently the Council of Indigenous People, Executive Yuan has recognized 16 groups based 
on their culture and language differences8: Amis 阿美族, Atayal 泰雅族, Paiwan 排灣族, Bunun
布農族, Tsou 鄒族, Rukai 魯凱, Puyuma 卑南族, Saisiyat 賽夏族, Yami 達悟族9, Thao 邵族, 
Kavalan 噶瑪蘭族, Truku 太魯閣族, Sakizaya 撒奇萊雅族, Seediq 賽德克族, Hla'alua 拉阿魯
哇族 and Kanakanavu 卡那卡那富族 (Map2:2).10 Currently approximately 530,000 Formosan 
indigenes, also known as Yuanzhumin 原住民11 live in the middle and eastern parts of Taiwan, 
except the Yami who live on Lan-Yu or Orchid Island. Indinges constituted 2.38% of the entire 
population of Taiwan in December 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Austronesian People)’, in Alam Melayu: Satu Pengenalan (Malay World: One Contribution to Knowledge)  (Institut 
Alam Dan Tamandun Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2011), 2–4. Further information on the history of 
Austronesian, see Peter S. Bellwood, James J. Fox, and D. T. Tryon, eds., The Austronesians: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives (Canberra: Australian National University, 1995). 
7 David Blundell, Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, Prehistory  (Taipei: SMC Pub., 2009); Paul 
Jen-kuei Li, The Ethnic Groups, Languages and Migration of the Formosan Natives, trans. Sauvé Noah (Taipei: 
National Academy for Educational Research, 2012). 
8 Council of Indigenous People, Executive Yuan: http://www.apc.gov.tw 
9 Yami 達悟族 will not be included in this research as of less occurrence in resistance and engagement with 
mainland Taiwan.  
10 Hla'alua 拉阿魯哇族 and Kanakanavu 卡那卡那富族 were categorised as part of Tsou 鄒族, until June, 2014 
when Taiwanese government legally recognised them as separated tribes.  
11 Yuánzhùmín 原住民 means native/ indigenous residence in Chinese which is commonly used in Taiwan 
nowadays, but in this thesis I intend to use Indigenes or Formosans.  
24 
 
Map 2:2 Distribution of 16 recognized Indigenous tribes in Taiwan 
 
Source: National Chiayi University 國立嘉義大學  
(http://www.ncyu.edu.tw/aptc/content.aspx?site_content_sn=6760) 
 
Formosan indigenous tribes were commonly divided into two major groups – mountain 
indigenes, who are Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Tsou, Rukai, Puyuma, Saisiyat, Yami, Thao, 
Truku, and Seediq. Distinguished from these were the Pingpu or Pepos or plains indigenes 平埔
族: the Kevalan 噶瑪蘭, Ketagala凱達格蘭, Taokas道卡斯, Pazeh 巴宰, Papora 巴布拉, Babuza
巴布薩/ 貓霧揀, Hoanya 洪雅, Siraya 西拉雅12 and Makatau 馬卡道. According to Formosan 
                                                             
12 Siraya was recognized by Tainan city  
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languages Professor Jen-Kuei, Li, Basay 馬賽, Luilang 雷朗 and Trobian 多囉美遠 belong to 
Ketaglan group; Taokas 道卡斯, Papora 巴布拉, Babuza 巴布薩/ 貓霧揀 and Favorlang 費佛朗 
belong to Barburan 巴布蘭; Siraya/ Siraiya 西拉雅, Makattao 馬卡道 and Taivoan 四社熟番. 
(See Map 2:3) Most of the Pingpu reside in the northeast Lanyan plain, the Taipei basin, the 
west coast plain of Taiwan to the south plain, but mostly are not recognized yet by the 
Taiwanese government except Kevalan and Thao tribes. Pingpu or Pepos are also commonly 
known as having largely adopted Chinese culture and became assimilated to those Chinese who 
largely settled in Taiwan from the seventeenth century from Fujian Province and Guangdong 
Province.  
Map 2:3 Distribution of Pingpu tribes 
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Source: Li Paul Jen-kuei, Yilanxian Nandao Minzu Yu Yuyan 宜蘭縣南島民族與語言 [Yilan 
County - Austronesian and Languages] (Yilan: Yilan County, 1996). Map is made by Huang 
Qingqi 黃清琦 http://blog.xuite.net/hqq.hqq/blog/25870376 
 
2.1. Belief and Socio –Political Structures 
   
Most Formosan indigenes are Christians nowadays since Christianity was first 
introduced by Dutch and Spanish missionaries in the seventeenth century and were later largely 
converted by English and Canadian Presbyterian ministers in the nineteenth century. After years 
of hard work from medical missionaries, churches, hospitals, and schools were set up in 
indigenous villages from the late nineteenth century. Christianity remains in co-existence with 
Formosan indigenes’ original belief system – animism, which regards natural objects and 
phenomenon as having spirits. They believe these invisible spirits accompanied by their 
ancestors’ spirits are in mountains to protect their communities, agriculture, and hunting, and 
closely associate with their fortune and misfortune in daily lives and social-political structures. 
Their admiration and fear toward spirits, also called “Zuling” 祖靈 is demonstrated in various 
ceremonies which are led and interpreted by tribal sorcerers or sorceress or priests. Ceremonies 
were meant to entertain or please their Zuling and were held when planting crops, harvesting, 
hunting and head hunting, at weddings, coming-of-age ceremonies, funerals, and also when 
there were occurrences of disaster or spread of disease. 13 Their awareness of spirits developed 
and maintained order within their societies through sacred law and old customs which they 
inherited from their ancestors in order to rejoin them after death. For instance, Atayal, Seediq 
and Truku call their ancestral spirits “utux” or “utux rudan” which is the driving force of 
complying gaga or gaya/waya – unwritten ethics and law interwoven within their societies 
since the day they were born. There are rules and traditional taboos covering marriage, death, 
sowing festival, ancestral spirits offerings, naming, hunting, headhunting, exchange ritual, life 
rituals, which are subject to the norms under gaga, gaya/waya. Gaga, gaya/waya 
                                                             
13 Wang Songshan 王嵩山, Taiwan Yuanzhumin de Shehui Yu Wenhua 臺灣原住民的社會與文化 [Societies and 
Cultures of Taiwan Aborigines] (Taipei: 聯經, 2001); Pan Ying 潘英, Taiwan Pingpuzu Shi 臺灣平埔族史 [History 
of Plains indigenes in Taiwan] (Taipei: SMC Pub., 2001); FurunoKiyoto 古野淸人, Taiwan Yuanzhumin de Jiyu 
Shenghuo 臺灣原住民的祭儀生活 [Ritual Lives of Taiwanese Indigenes], trans. Ye Wan-Qi 葉婉奇, 臺灣土著譯
叢 3 (Taipei: 原民文化事業公司, 2000); Tadasu 鈴木質 Suzuki, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Fengsu 台灣原住民風俗 
[Customs of Aborigines in Taiwan ], trans. Wang Meijing 王美晶 (Taipei: 原住民文化, 1999). 
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specifications covers the entire tribe, and once someone breaches gaga, gaya/waya such as in 
betrayal, divorce or adultery, gaga groups or others apply utux tribal punishment, and it brings 
bad luck.14 This dependency of their beliefs in Zuling and their ancestral regulations when 
practising old customs not only forms strong tribal consciousness, it also defines their social-
political structures.  
From Japanese colonization until the present day, governments and scholars have been 
studying Formosan indigenous societies and their socio-political organisations. They could be 
approximately summarised into these types: (A) matrilineal societies with age-graded systems: 
Amis, Sakizaya, Puyuma and Pepos (B) amalgamative patrilineal societies: Atayal, Sediq, Saisiyat, 
Tsou, Bunun, Truku (C) dominate-based societies by aristocracy: Rukai and Paiwan.15 Each of 
their societies operated differently, sometimes sharing similarities relating to the distribution 
of power, classes and the social functions of females and males, etc. In matrilineal societies with 
male age-graded systems, females dominated domestic issues and simple agriculture, and 
inherited family properties; males monopolised political affairs and hunting. In Amis, Sakizaya 
and Puyuma, boys from the age of 12 had to live in a gathering house where they received 
training for hunting from senior male members and participated in tribal affairs until married. 
Male elders were highly respected and were responsible for supervision, guidance, education 
and trial within their age-graded system (Figure2:1).16 Amalgamative patrilineal societies, Atayal, 
Sediq, Bunun and Truku are egalitarian and acephalous17. The chief or toumu 頭目 is usually 
                                                             
14 Allis Nokan 瓦歷斯 諾幹 and Yu Guanghong 余光弘, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi -Taiyazu Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史-
泰雅族史篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes: Atayal) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2002); Hei dai ba yan 黑帶巴
彥, Taiyaren de Shenghuo Xingtai Tanyuan- Yige Taiyaren de Xianshen Shuofa 泰雅人的生活型態探源- 一個泰雅
人的現身說法 [The Origin of Atayal’s Life Style: An Atayal’s Experience] (Hsinchu County: Hsinchu County 
Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2002). 
15 These are based on the summary of Scott Simon from Wei Hui-lin and Huang Ying-Guei’s classification on the 
indigenous societies. See Scott Simon, ‘Politics and Headhunting among the Formosan Sejiq: Ethnohistorical 
Perspectives’, Oceania 82, no. 2 (2012): 171; Wei Hweilin 衛惠林, ‘台灣土著社會的部落組織與權威 [Tribal 
Organization and Authority Systems of Taiwan Aboriginal Society]’, 考古人類學刊 [Journal of Archarology and 
Anthropology] 25–26 (1965): 71–92; Huang Yingkuei 黃應貴, ‘臺灣土著的兩種社會類型及其意義 [Taiwan 
Aborigines’ Two Social Types and Their Meanings]’, in 台灣土著社會文化研究論文集 [Anthology of Research 
Taiwanese Aboriginal Society and Culture] (Taipei: 聯經, 1986), 3–43.  
16 Taiwan Sôtokufu Rinji Taiwan Kyûkan Chôsakai 臺灣總督府臨時臺灣舊慣調查會, Fanzu Diaocha Baogao Shu: 
Ameizu/Beinanzu 蕃族調查報告書: 阿美族/卑南族 [Report on Savage Tribes: Amis & Puyuma Tribes], trans. 
Institute of Ethnology 中央研究院民族學研究所 Academia Sinica, vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of 
Ethnology 中央研究院民族學研究所, 2007); Frank M LeBar, Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. Volume 2: 
Philippines and Formosa (New Haven: Human relations area files press, 1975); Pan Ying 潘英, Taiwan Pingpuzu 
Shi 臺灣平埔族史 [History of Plains indigenes in Taiwan]. 
17 No leader 
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elected and judged by senior members and is non-hereditary. The selection was based on his 
talent, courage in war, hunting and headhunting and moral reputation. The Atayal divided their 
society into different functional groups such as kinship, ceremonies, hunting, purification or 
conjugation, unlike the Bunun who divided into clans, each clan sharing equal responsibility for 
public affairs, territories, economic activities and so on.18 Both Saisiyat and Tsou were male 
dominated communities which depended on their totems or clans and male elders were also 
highly regarded and engaged within tribal affairs most of the time. Young males in the Tsou 
when they reached the age of 12 to 13 also had the tradition of living in a gathering house to 
receive training in tribal history, culture, hunting and living skills.19 The components of the Rukai 
and Paiwan societies were aristocracy – the dominant party, and commoner. Both of these were 
hereditary. The eldest child became chief or toumu and obtained the ownership of land, hunting 
territories, rivers and collected taxes and managed tribal affairs and ceremonies. The rest of the 
children and relatives of aristocracy spread into different ranks and obtained various rights and 
duties. The characteristics of aristocracy can be found in their head ornaments, leopard leather, 
clay pots, beads, bronze knife, and some rare articles and carving or pattern on their beams and 
poles (Figure 2:2 & 2:3). Single males in Rukia also had to devote themselves to the gathering 
house and obligate tribal rules. 20  Later chiefs/ toumu were appointed by the Japanese 
government for easier management. Their social-political structures strongly depended on and 
fit tight with their belief system, which assisted in forming a strong consensus of obligation 
towards their communities. This gave them strength when encountering other cultures in order 
to protect themselves even if they died in battles. Their strict social structure gave them strong 
support and resilience during conflicts and resistance.   
 
                                                             
18 Ishii Shinji, ‘The Life of the Mountain People in Formosa’, Folklore 28, no. 2 (1917): 119; Allis Nokan 瓦歷斯 諾
幹 and Yu Guanghong 余光弘, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi -Taiyazu Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史-泰雅族史篇 (The History 
of Formosan Indigenes: Atayal). 
19 Wang Songshan 王嵩山, Wang Minghui 汪明輝, and Pu Zhongcheng 浦忠成, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi ─zouzu 
Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史─鄒族史篇 (The History of Formosa Indigenes: Tsou) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2001); 
LeBar, Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. Volume 2: Philippines and Formosa ; Shao Shuofang 劭碩芳, 
‘Lieshou 、yishi Yu Zuqun Guanxi：yi Alishan Zouzu Mayasvi Weili 獵首、儀式與族群關係：以阿里山鄒族
mayasvi 為例 [Headhunting, Ritual and Ethnic Relations: Tsou’s Mayasvi as Case Study]’ (MA, National Taitung 
University, Graduate School of Austronesia Culture, 2008), 28–30. 
20 Tong Chunfa 童春發, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi ─paiwanzu Shipian 臺灣原住民史─排灣族史篇 (The History of 
Formosan Indigenes: Paiwan) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2001), 
http://www.govbooks.com.tw/viewitem.aspx?prodno=63593; Qiao Zongwen 喬宗忞, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi 
─lukaizushipian 臺灣原住民史─魯凱族史篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes: Rukai) (Nantou: Taiwan 
Historica, 2001), http://www.govbooks.com.tw/viewitem.aspx?prodno=63595. 
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Figure 2:1 Male Gathering House 
 
Source: Shinji Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants (London: The 
China Society, 1916), 21 
 
Figure 2:2 Rukai noble woman and man 
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Source: Digital Museum of Taiwan indigenous people  
http://www.dmtip.gov.tw/Aborigines/Photo.aspx?CategoryID=5&ClassID=16&TypeID=2
8&RaceID=7&PhotoID=2621 
 
Figure 2:3 Paiwan Warrior with leather cap, ornament with leopard teeth and firearm 
 
Source: Shinji Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants (London: The 
China Society, 1916), 18 
 
2.2. Headhunting  
 
Headhunting represented a significant and glorious activity for male indigenes in their 
societies although it was the most savage marker for most outsiders from the seventeenth 
century. Zhang Xuyi suggests that the early investigators of headhunting like Inō Kanori first 
claimed that the headhunting ritual was the natural result of competition for survival which 
focused on the external pressure emanating from the Chinese. However, later Mori Ushinosuke 
revised this and suggested that indigenous headhunting was a congenital custom rather than 
behaviour as the result of competition with Chinese resettlement.21 For instance, Atayal and 
                                                             
21 Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習
與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy 
of Indigenes Management]’ (MA, National Taiwan University, 1995), 6–7. 
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Seediq believed the spirit of heads they hunted became a protective spirit to maintain and 
expand individual and tribal spiritual energy which pursued their ancestor or “utux”. Atayal 
often called headhunting, “mз-gaga”, meaning practising old custom– gaga. 22 Therefore, the 
more heads they hunted, the stronger and more powerful the tribes. Zhang used the view of 
Okada Ken on Tsou’ headhunting custom that it acted as mediator between tribes and god, the 
heads they hunted would expand their community spiritually and bring prosperous harvest and 
hunting to tribes.23 Similarity can be found with the Amis who considered heads would please 
their “malataw” (God of war) in order to bring good harvest. Head-hunters showed off and 
gained courage while dancing in front of the heads and pouring wine into the heads’ mouths in 
the ceremonies. 24 This strong consensus of practising old custom meant to benefit their 
communities dominated every male indigene aiming at pursuing heads, which lead them to be 
closely engaged with and recognized by their ancestors as well as their communities. This 
somehow echoes what Steere remarked on in the late nineteenth century, “this custom is not 
founded upon a desire for revenge but upon a love for heads for their own sake.”25 
This unusual headhunting ritual and its significance among the indigenous societies was 
commonly narrated by visitors in the nineteenth century. For example, Taintor’s account during 
his trip in northern Formosa in 1869 showed how the head hunting ritual and skulls were valued 
and determined a person’s position within indigenous communities: 
The savage has higher motives; his rank and character depend on his 
personal prowess and valour; and a savage who has not killed and 
beheaded a Chinaman is “of no use,” as it was explained to me. His word 
is not believed, he has no respectable standing in the community, and 
in general terms it may be said of him that he has not won his spurs. He 
rises in position and character according to the number of heads he can 
count, and those who get the most heads become, as it is in truth said, 
                                                             
22 Allis Nokan 瓦歷斯 諾幹 and Yu Guanghong 余光弘, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi -Taiyazu Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史-
泰雅族史篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes: Atayal), 8; Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao 
Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting 
Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy of Indigenes Management]’, 25–26; Gup 
Mingzheng 郭明正, Youjian Zhenxiang: Saidekezu Yu Wushe Shijian 又見真相：賽德克族與霧社事件[ Review 
the Truth: Seediq Tribe and Wushe Incident] (Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 2012), 48–49. 
23 Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習
與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy 
of Indigenes Management]’, 9–10. 
24 Taiwan Sôtokufu Rinji Taiwan Kyûkan Chôsakai 臺灣總督府臨時臺灣舊慣調查會, Fanzu Diaocha Baogaoshu: 
Amei Zu/beinan Zu 蕃族調查報告書: 阿美族/卑南族 [Report on Savage Tribes: Amis & Puyuma Tribes], 1:34–37. 
25 Joseph Beal Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, ed. Rengui Li (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History (Preparatory 
Office), Academia Sinica, 2002), 58. 
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the head-men of the village.26  
 
Professor Steere also noted, “Head taking an honor with them, young man cannot take a wife 
until (he) has taken a head.” 27 A Chinese governor, Hu Zhuan 胡傳 also noted the heads that 
indigenous man hunted could be used as a betrothal gift, even if the indigenous woman did not 
wish to marry. Unless the woman’s brothers could hunt a head to return the favour, the woman 
had to marry the man.28 These both show that the possession of hunted heads was significant 
to indigenous men when pursuing a wife. Teenage boys were taught and witnessed the 
importance of headhunting during their stay in the gathering house and were lead by their elder 
male family members on headhunting expeditions. Guerin, the French Vice Consul visited 
Taiwan in 1868 and noted that, “when a boy is between twelve and fourteen years old, his father, 
brother or some relative takes him on a Chinese-hunting expedition.”29 Steere also described 
the indigenous boys as sleeping on the ground near many human skulls in the hut and he 
interpreted it as “perhaps to make them courageous and to give them a desire to possess the 
heads of their enemies.”30 Although plains indigenes seemed to give up practising the head 
hunting ritual for a long time, their reverence for human skulls could be noticed by Chinese 
officials in the eighteenth century such as Huang Shu-Jing and Lan Ding-Yuan, who were 
concerned with indigenous affairs and wrote about how skulls were decorated with gold or 
tinfoil and held as treasures by indigenes.31 By the nineteenth century, a similar respectful 
manner of plains indigenes could be seen. For instance, Ibis noted how they worshiped skulls by 
sacrificing something twice a month and how the skulls were involved at birth, wedding and 
death ceremonies as part of their religious customs.32 In 1897 in the The China Review, a former 
                                                             
26 Edward C. Taintor, ‘The Aborigines of Northern Formosa’, Journal of the North Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society 10 (1874): 62. 
27 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 190. 
28 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taidong Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊 [Journal of Taidong], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣
文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 81 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 49–50. 
29 M Guérin and J Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’î Le de Formose.’, ed. Douglas Fix, trans. Miranda Fix and Hugh 
Hochman, Bulletin de La Société de Géographie de Paris, 5, 15 (1868): 556; Harold M. Otness, One Thousand 
Westerners in Taiwan to 1945: A Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary  (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, 
Academia Sinica, 1999), 66. 
30 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 96. 
31 Huang Shujing 黃淑璥, Tai Hai Shichalu 臺海使槎錄 [A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Sea], Taiwan Wenxian 
Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 4 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1957); Lan Dingyuan 藍鼎元, 
Dong Zheng Ji 東征集 [Record of the Eastern Campaign], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary 
Collectanea on Taiwan) 12, 1958. 
32 Pavel Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, ed. Douglas Fix and Julia Canright, trans. Kirill Shklovsky, Morskoi Sbornik 
152 (1876): 131. 
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resident living in Taiwan for 5 years reported, how the “relics of their ancient religion, the deer’s 
and wild boar’s heads, are now in many houses supplanted by the familiar joss.”33 According to 
these customs of plains indigenes, the heads they worshipped, or even the replacement of 
human heads by the animals’ heads, were valued by them still. Human skulls were also displayed 
proudly by the indigenes in their villages or huts, as described by Steere,  
a little platform with twenty-four human skulls upon it. There had 
evidently been some ceremony over these recently, and they were 
decorated with little branches of bamboo and streamers of red cloth … 
The central one evidently the most recently taken, had a little arbor built 
over it, as if it was worthy of some special honor.34  
 
The hair from the head they hunted then became the indigenes’ ornaments as in,  
he appeared extremely proud, he showed us the tail of six Chinamen, 
tied up in a bunch, which he said had belonged to men that he had killed; 
each tail had a small piece of scalp attached to it.35   
 
This was shown to Captain Bax, by indigenous men from the south during his visit. The photos 
in Figure 2:4 and Figure 2:5 were taken during the Japanese period, but they reveal scenes that 
Steere and Bax tried to present in their narratives. 
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34 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 51. 
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Figure 2:4 A Bunun man of the Kantaban group in the P’u-li areas carrying a newly taken head 
of an Atayal native of the Wu-she group 
 
Source: Sung Wenxun 宋文薰, 日據時代臺灣原住民族生活圖譜 (The Pictorial Life of the 
Taiwan Aborigines During the Japanese Period), 113 
 
                  Figure 2:5 Skull rack of Paiwan near the entrance of Bogari village 
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Source: Sung Wenxun 宋文薰, 日據時代臺灣原住民族生活圖譜 (The Pictorial Life of the 
Taiwan Aborigines During the Japanese Period), 67 
 
Tribal ceremonies were strongly linked with headhunting and some of them are still 
practised today such as djemulja (Stabbing ball 刺球) which represented the human head in the 
Paiwan’s Maleveg.36 Young boys in the Puyuma tribes at the age of 12-18 had to participate in 
“mangamangayaw” or “basibas” (Monkey ceremony 猴祭). During the ceremony, they killed 
monkeys as in the practice of headhunting and wished for success in headhunting expedition 
when they grew up (Figure 2:6). 37 The Sakizaya family would prepare a “lapid” (headhunting 
bag) for teenage boys, who were the lowest class of their age ranks before they entered the 
gathering house. (Figure 2:7) The inheritance of the “lapid” from the elders in the family not 
only represented entering the age-ranks system as in tribal tradition, but also symbolised male 
courage. 38 Guérin also noted that “If hunting is successful, the child receives his first chevron, 
in this case a tattoo mark, when he brings the heads back to the village. But his chin is not 
decorated until he has slain a Chinese with his own hand. There is often a very brief lapse of 
time between the two.”39 Males’ facial or body tattoo in Atayal, Seediq, Truku, Sasiaya and Rukai 
tribes distinguished their glories in headhunting (Figure 2:8).40 Most outsiders were disgusted 
by Formosan indigenes’ brutal behaviour of obsessing over human heads, however headhunting 
remained popular within indigenous societies because it had several cultural meanings and 
social functions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36 Yang Nanjun 楊南郡, ed., Tanxian Taiwan-Torii Ryūzō de Taiwan Renleixue Zhilǚ 探險台灣 - 鳥居龍藏的台灣
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Amei Zu/beinan Zu 蕃族調查報告書: 阿美族/卑南族 [Report on Savage Tribes: Amis & Puyuma Tribes], 1:252. 
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of Savage Tribes : Atayal Tribe], trans. Institute of Ethnology 中央研究院民族學研究所 Academia Sinica, vol. 1 
(Taipei : Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1996), 76–77. 
36 
 
Figure 2:6 Puyuma’s “mangamangayaw” or “basibas” – Monkey Ceremony  
 
Source: Digital Museum of Taiwan Indigenous People 
http://www.dmtip.gov.tw/Aborigines/Photo.aspx?Cat  
 
Figure 2:7 Atayal’s headhunting bag decorated with human hair 
 
Source: Digital Taiwan-Culture and Nature 
http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/1b/35/b2.htmlegoryID=5&ClassID=16&TypeID
=31&RaceID=6&PhotoID=1984 
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Figure 2:8 Atayal Woman and man with their tattoos  
 
 Source: Ishii, Shinji, The Island of Formosa and its Primitive Inhabitants, 16 
 
It is difficult to know when and how Formosan indigenes transferred their headhunting 
ritual to a resistance “asset” as their natural reaction when facing intruders, but it did give them 
protection for centuries. Most importantly it rewarded individual pride and status within their 
communities. The motivations and reasons for the headhunting ritual among different 
indigenous groups can be broadly summarized after studies by several anthropologists: (a) 
conflict resolution, (b) vengeance, (c) provability for courage or masculinity, (d) entry 
requirement into male initiation or power group, (e) eligibility for marriage, (f) disasters or 
disease elimination, (g) agricultural fertility, (h) emotional vent, (i) gain spiritual power, (j) obtain 
facial tattoo, (k) forgiveness of previous fault or sin. 41  Can some of these motivations and 
reasons be thought of as the assets of indigenous headhunting action triggered by the early 
Chinese settlers who occupied their lands and by later Westerners and the Japanese 
government who desired to exploit their natural resources? Qing and Japanese governments 
                                                             
41  Various reasons for headhunting were suggested by scholars from the Japanese regime such as Kojima 
Yoshimichi, Mori Ushinosuke, and contemporary scholars from the Atayal tribe - Masaw Mowna and Zhang Xu-Yi, 
however the clarification of headhunting reason will not be discussed further here.Kojima Yoshimichi 小島由道, 
Fanzu Guanxi Diaocha Baogaoshu 番族慣習調查報告書[Report on the Customs of Savage Tribes: Atayal Tribe]; 
Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳：森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations of 
Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], trans. Yang Nanjun 楊南郡 (Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 2012); Tadasu Suzuki 鈴木質, Taiwan 
Yuanzhumin Fengsu 台灣原住民風俗 [Customs of Aborigines in Taiwan ]; Mowna Masaw 廖守臣 , Taiyazu de 
Shehui Zuzhi 泰雅族的社會組織 [Atayal Social Organization] (Hualien: Tzu Chi University Research Center on 
Aboriginal Health, 1998); Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 
臺灣原住民出草慣習與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan 
Government-General’s Policy of Indigenes Management]’. 
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struggled to pacify and to persuade Formosan indigenes to give up their headhunting ritual, but 
usually failed. The headhunting ritual was supposedly forced into abandonment when firearms 
were confiscated by the Japanese government after several efforts at their prohibition after 
1895. 
 
2.3. Economic Activities  
 
Formosan indigenes practised nomad cultivation, which has been regarded as the most 
primitive way of agriculture and the most effective way to maintain ecological balance: firstly 
selecting land, burning the land as a process of fertilising, growing rice, millet, sorghum, beans, 
sweet potatoes, etc for a few years and moving to another area.42 However, Xiao suggested in 
the Gazetteer of Zhuluo County 諸羅縣志 that another cultivation method of growing rice, 
where possibly plains indigenes covered up the land with straw so the weeds rotted and 
fertilised it, instead of burning the land, avoided destroying grass for deer and their living 
territory.43 Plains indigenes’ cultivation skill was of higher efficiency than mountain indigenes, 
using buffaloes which had been introduced by the Dutch for ploughing and pulling carts.44 This 
was maybe the result of earlier contact with Chinese and the gradual adoption of their 
agricultural techniques. A huge variety of plants and nuts could be found in the forest and used 
for different purposes in cooking, decorating and making nets for hunting or fishing. Women 
were mostly engaged with farming and men with hunting and fishing. When harvest periods 
arrived, women and men reaped together. Hunting was another major economic activity. They 
had wild boars, bear, deer, pheasants, squirrels, monkeys, tigers, hares, goats, serpents, and 
hedgehogs and preserved meat with salt. Other parts such as deer horn, penis, skin, gall were 
sold to the Chinese for medical purposes.45 Their plentiful experience of hunting wild animals 
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in mountains, combined with headhunting, offered them clear advantages in defeating invaders 
(See Figure 2:9 and Chart 2:1). The men of an entire village usually participated in hunting 
expeditions and each man carried two or three spears, sometimes two or three villages joined 
together to hunt too.46 According to Formosa under the Dutch, a rich primary collection of Dutch 
Reports during the Dutch occupation in the seventeenth century translated by Rev. William 
Campbell, they had great talents when setting up snares made of cane or bamboo in woods or 
in places where their target animals –mostly deer and pigs - often appeared in great numbers. 
Another way of setting up snares was in narrow paths or open fields tied with bent bamboos, 
secured by small piece of wood and covered by earth. When their target animal passed by, the 
bamboos sprung right up and caught its legs, then they killed it with their spears. They caught 
thousands of animals yearly by using these methods.47 The Dutch also relied on such indigenous 
hunting skill to obtain deer skins which were highly valuable articles exported from Taiwan in 
the seventeenth century. Domestic animals were also treated as their meat supply. It is noticed 
by Captain Bax that Pepo villagers bred pigs, fowls, ducks and geese.48 Dogs were treated as 
their company in households and used in hunting expeditions, and eating dog meat was 
prohibited. Almost all Formosan indigenous groups were good at fishing by setting traps, using 
nets, spears or baskets, poisoning and varous methods (See Figure 2:10).49 Abundant natural 
resources in Taiwan offered Formosan indigenes independent and self-sufficient lives. Food 
supply should be taken into account during their prolonged resistance, as it can be seen as a 
supportive element. The intrusion from Chinese settlers, Chinese and later Ja panese 
governments reduced the food supply in their territories, which provoked greater warfare.  
Commerce was another important economic activity for Formosan indigenes. Articles 
that they commonly traded with the Chinese were mostly luxury goods which could not be 
found or produced easily by themselves such as firearms, gunpowder, knives, pottery, salt, wine, 
beads, clothes, iron, copper etc. In return the Chinese gained leopard skin, deer skin, antlers, 
venison, bear, and mushrooms and sometimes the right to exploit their border land for 
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Cultures of Taiwan Aborigines]. 
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cultivation. 50 The lack of iron and steel forced them to trade with the Chinese in order to 
produce primary weapons for defence. They could also receive goods from foreign visitors, 
especially from the late nineteenth century. For instance, as British consul Nevill Perkins noted, 
“They are with few exception, friendly to foreigners, and particularly appreciate gifts of soap, 
fancy coloured clothes, which they unravel for ornamental purposes, needles, steel implements, 
small mirrors, and the like. It is hardly necessary to state that arrack, powder, and shot are 
always welcome acquisitions.” 51  However, the frequency of acquiring goods from foreign 
visitors like this were variable and unpredictable for the indigenes.  
 
Figure 2:9 Indigenes’ hunting expedition  
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 134. 
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51 TEPR 5/193-207, Report on Formosa by Mr. N. Perkins, Consul Nevill Perkins, 31/Jan/1895, 197  
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Figure 2:10 Indigenes fishing  
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 164. 
 
2.4. Warfare   
 
Apart from periodic warfare between adjacent tribal groups, countless and various 
scales of warfare between Formosan indigenous tribes and Chinese settlers were frequently 
noted by visitors and later became major obstacles for Qing and Japanese colonization in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Conflicts originated mostly over hunting territories which 
did not have clear demarcation, sources of water and revenge of murder between tribes, but 
remained small scale and were resolved within a few days. Most of the tribes did not appear to 
annex other tribes or expand their territory intentionally. According to Taylor’s experience with 
indigenes in Southern Taiwan during his service as South Cape lighthouse keeper from 1882-
1887, tribal warfare only took place when reimbursement required from a plaintiff could not be 
achieved in a murder case. The ones that then had the most casualties would be considered as 
in the wrong and to pay indemnity. He also noted “Bush fighting is the general mode of war, 
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and their engagements are not very sanguinary. Generally, all grown-up men possess a gun, but 
the bow and spear are also used, the arrow being said to be the most deadly weapon in the 
bush … As a general rule women or children are never molested, neither are houses fired, nor 
property plundered; to kill each other being the sole purpose of the warriors. Sometimes, if the 
two contending tribes do not adjourn, young children are taken captive, but never considered 
slaves, and become part of the captor’s family.” 52 The intention of battles between tribes 
seemed to be to act as the ultimate resolution for justice instead of slaughtering their 
opponents. In Xu Yuliang’s research, he discusses briefly the patterns of the Atayal and the Amis 
in war with other tribes: the Atayal tribe would send a neutral to the enemy tribe and confirm 
the time and location. The indigenes began to fight once they confirmed the enemy’s identity. 
The tribal chief would not join the fight.53 In the Amis tribes, the Amis elders would be the ones 
who made the decision for going to war, which normally would not last for more than 3 days 
and all the food would be carried by the warriors themselves.54 Nevertheless, these continuous 
tribal conflicts also sustained the capacities of indigenes in combats, which became part of the 
indigenes’ living style.  
 
3. Pre 1860 Formosa  
 
Formosan indigenes, mostly indigenes in the western plain area, first had limited 
contacts only from the sixteenth century, usually with fishermen or merchants mostly from 
Fujian Province or Chinese and Japanese pirates, who rarely settled despite being only 100 miles 
from southeast coast of China. This section will discuss the relationships and contacts of 
Formosan indigenes with other outsiders from the seventeenth century when the Dutch began 
to colonize this fertile island, the Koxinga regime and early Qing governance, before Taiwan 
opened its ports to European merchants under the Tianjin Treaty of 1858. From here I intend 
to emphasise the existence of indigenous conflicts or resistances over political, economic and 
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cultural factors that have occurred under different regimes. 
 
3.1. Formosa Before and Under the Dutch (1624-1661)  
 
The Dutch East India Company actively sought trading ports in Asia and claimed its 
liberty to trade with China from the seventeenth century. After a few failures of occupying the 
Pescadores (Panghu islands) and defeated by the Ming navy between 1622-1624, the Dutch 
East India Company turned to Taiwan and established its entrepôt near Tainan in 1624.55 During 
37 years of Dutch colonization, Formosa became a trading centre for gold, silver and silk in Asia 
while exporting sugar and deer skin to Japan. The Dutch exportation of deer skin and other fur 
products, from which they gained most of their profits, ranged from 20,000 to 150,000 skins in 
total from 1634 to 1660.56 
At first the company dominated the south-western plain areas and gradually spread its 
influence by using military power to the north, the mountain areas in the east being less 
explored until the late 1640s when the Dutch sent investigation teams to look for gold. In 1650 
the indigenous population was estimated to be between 64,000 and 68,000 according to a 
Dutch census, with only 2,800 Dutch based in Taiwan, mostly soldiers. 57  Records of Dutch 
earliest contact in Formosa and with its inhabitants began in 1623, when a Dutch Commander, 
Cornelis Reijersz, and his fellows investigated Tainan. The indigenes inhabiting Soulang 蕭壠 
(Jiali District, Tainan City) and other southern tribes expressed their friendliness and invited his 
fellows to visit their tribes.58 However, this peaceful relationship did not last long. The Dutch 
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subdued resistances, some of which were incited by Chinese traders who settled earlier, and 
pacified the indigenous tribes with their superior military weapons. The Dutch attacked plains 
indigenes in Ma-tou (Madou District, Tainan City) in 1635, burned down Takareiang village, 
which was the most powerful village in Pintung County, to punish the murderers of Dutchmen. 
In 1636 soldiers on horseback also attacked Hsing-kang villagers with their muskets. Troops 
were sent to pacify the Tung-lo and Favorolong several times from 1636 and, finally, in 1641, 
Tung-lo, Favorolong and other tribes within the region surrendered to the Dutch.59 Hundreds of 
musketeers were sent by the Dutch to Sochel Sochel and Kakitapan in 1644 and the plains 
indigenes attacked the Dutch soldiers by surprise as in “when we marched along some narrow 
paths, which on both sides were overgrown with tall reeds and coppice, the scoundrels shot 
and killed two of our men and injured three or four of them suddenly coming out of the thicket 
and attacking us before we saw them and then immediately they ran off again.”60 In the end 
villages and granaries were destroyed and plains indigenes were either killed or fled into 
mountains. The indigenes were affected by the Dutch firearms and cannon and their reaction 
was described as, "They immediately ran away, being unable to bear the whine of our bullets, 
and they were astonished when they saw one of their own lying still without seeing what had 
struck him."61 Due to the fear of the Dutch military prowess, later more and more indigenous 
tribes sent their representatives and complied with the company. The Dutch East India 
Company’s power expanded further to northern Taiwan to expel the Spanish after their 16 years 
of occupation in Tamsui and Keelung (1626-1642), and to explore for gold on the east coast of 
Taiwan. With superior weaponry like muskets in comparison with indigenous arrows, bows and 
spears, or by halting salt and iron supplies, the company conquered most of the plains 
indigenous tribes such as the Wulaowan tribe 武朥灣社 in the Taipei basin62, the Patsiral, Vatan, 
and Talleroma tribes etc of the Amis in Hualien County during their gold investigation. Some 
plain indigenous tribes such as the Dorkop, Tarroboan, Borine submitted themselves with gifts 
                                                             
59Villagers in Tung-lo and Favorlang molested Dutch licensed deer hunters and killed some Chinese. Campbell, 
Formosa under the Dutch, 116-117-124-234; John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the 
Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 53, 55–56, 123–24. 
60 Léonard Blussé and Natalie Everts, eds., The Formosan Encounter: Notes on Formosa’s Aboriginal Society: A 
Selection of Documents from Dutch Archival Sources. 1636-1645, vol. 2 (Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan 
Aborigines, 2000), 475. 
61 Governor Frederiksz. de Witt to Batavia, letter, 15 November 1626, VOC 1090: 196–206 quoted in Tonio 
Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese : Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), ch9:7, footnote:34, http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/index.html. 
62 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 59. 
45 
 
of pigs, yam, rice, alcohol to the company or exchanged gifts - cangan, beads, mirror, etc.63 By 
1650, expeditionary forces brought the Dutch effective control over 300 villages across the 
western plain and the east coast of Taiwan. 64 Indigenous affairs management became one of 
the major tasks for the Dutch East India Company for easier management and missionary 
activities. Indigenous tribes originally resided in distant islands such as Lamey (Xiaoliuqiu 
Township, Pingdong County) and Bottol Tatachel (Lan-Yu) and mountains such as Sotimor 山豬
毛 tribes (Sandimen Township, Pingdong County), Polti tribe 糞地社 and others were forced or 
encouraged to relocation or to affiliate with other tribes. However, some displacement did not 
take effect as the Dutch might have expected, most failed and sometimes lead to insurrection. 
Professor Kang suggested several other factors of the Dutch’s tribal consolidation which lead to 
deterioration in relations. He found it often due to the imbalance in power and resource 
distribution, and the different religions and social structures between original indigenous tribes 
and newly immigrated tribes.65  
Missionaries worked as intermediariess between the Dutch, Chinese and the plains 
indigenous tribes and their duties included: interpreting for civil officers when collecting tax, 
selling deer-hunting licenses and setting up Christian congregations within plains 
indigenes’/Chinese communities. A lot of plains indigenes became Christian at this time and 
later became allies of the Dutch authorities and even quelled rebellions led by Chinese 
farmers.66 However, Christian influence on plains indigenes was questionable. Extracts from the 
“Zeelandia Day –Journal” in 1661 from Formosa under the Dutch revealed how plains indigenes’ 
religion and customs were long suppressed by missionaries: “these fellows now speak with 
much disdain of the true Christian faith which we endeavoured to implant in their hearts, and 
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are delighted that they are now free from attending the schools. Everywhere they have 
destroyed the books and utensils, and have introduced the abominable usages and customs of 
heathenism … they murdered one of our Dutch people; and after having struck off the head 
they danced around it with great joy and merriment, just as they formerly did with their 
vanquished enemies.”67  
With Dutch encouragement and protection, many of the Chinese along the coastal 
provinces began to migrate to the lower and fertile plains of western Taiwan and to assist with 
the company’s trading of deerskin and venison from the plains indigenes. Rice and sugar 
plantations also began in the rich western plain. Plains indigenes were often unfriendly towards 
the Chinese and attacked them sporadically, taking their heads as rewards when defending their 
villages, land right and hunting territories. The situation got worse when enormous numbers of 
Chinese immigrants rushed to settle in Taiwan due to famine and political turmoil in China in 
the 1640s. According to Shepherd’s estimation, by 1661 the Chinese population was about 
35,000, but not more than 50,000. 68 In 1652, a Chinese rebellion emerged, Guo Huaiyi gathered 
4,000 to 5,000 Chinese farmers against the company’s heavy taxation. It was quickly suppressed 
in 2 weeks with the support of 2,000 “Christian Formosans” and 120 Dutch men with musket 
or cannon. Nearly 3,000 Chinese were slaughtered. 69  Without the assistance of the large 
number of plains indigenes’, the company would probably not have supprssed this rebellion 
readily, given their limited number of soldiers and weapons.  
  
3.2. Spaniards in the North (1626-1642)   
 
While Spain established its colony in the Philippines, which had become the commercial 
centre of silver in exchange for Chinese porcelain and silk in East Asia from the 1570s, the need 
to prevent Dutch interference in their Japanese trade and easier access to trade with China 
impelled the Spaniards to occupy and build fort San Salvador in Keelung, northern Taiwan, after 
the Dutch had seized Tayouan in southern Taiwan in 1624. Spaniards also perceived Taiwan as 
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a fine relay point for Catholic missions to China and Japan, with its beneficial location, abundant 
natural resources and existing mercantile connections with Fujian Province. 70  During the 
Spanish provisional occupation in Keelung in 1626, which later spread to  Tamsui River and 
another fort, San Domingo in Tamsui in 1628, the plains indigenes, terrified by the Spaniard’s 
harquebuses fled.71 However, some returned to “Senar” (probably in the Tamsui area) under 
Dominican, Jacinoto Esquivel’s encouragement for the convenience of preaching in 1632. 72 
Shepherd noted that the natives were invited by Esquivel and some Spaniards to fireworks and 
sword dance performances to celebrate the return to Senar73, however it might have been an 
occasion to demonstrate Spanish military superiority to the indigenes. Missionaries like Friar 
Jimenez, Dominican, Francisco Vaez and Luis Muro set up churches and schools in 1633 in Senar 
with Spanish military assistance, but three years later Father Vaez was killed, the church and 
houses were burned by indigenes because he had become involved in some tribal conflicts. A 
few months after the murder of Father Vaez, Muro, 20 Spanish soldiers and 40 workers were 
ambushed by 300 warriors during their journey to Senar to obtain grain.74  
Relatively peaceful encounters between indigenes, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese can 
be found, such as commercial activities or intermarriages in Quimarurri-Taparri and Tamsui. 
Esquivel documented indigenes trading fish, quarry, wood, salt and other goods with the 
Spanish, exchanging gold, silver, sulphur, rattan and deer pelts to the Chinese and the Japanese 
for brass bracelets, bells, clothes, beads and other Chinese products.75 Plains indigenes in the 
north interacted with the Spaniards differently in different regions; some adopted the Spanish 
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language and converted to Catholicism, but some murderous incidents also occurred included 
pillaging grounded ships and attacking foreign sailors. 76  Unlike the Dutch who had strong 
military capacity in southern Taiwan, especially after 1636, the Spanish governor decided to 
reduce his garrison in Tamsui and withdrew to Keelung with 127 Spanish soldiers and some 
Pampangans to reduce its cost as the revenue did not reach the level they expected. The news 
of the Spanish withdrawal soon spread to the Dutch and thus began their plan to expel the 
Spanish with indigenes’ assistance. In August 1642, the Spanish surrendered to the Dutch after 
several days of siege and weaponry shortage. The Spanish base in northern Taiwan had only 
lasted 16 years, but local indigenes sustained rudimentary contact with the Spanish, mostly 
through Catholic missionaries and trade. The Spanish did not seem to have had effective control 
over the indigenes despite their superior weapons. When the Spanish sent a troop of soldiers 
to punish indigenes in Turboan after nearly 80 Spanish people were killed in a shipwreck 
incident in 1632, “since the natives outnumbered them, they could not do more, which made 
them even more arrogant, and scornful of the other natives who, out of fear of Spaniards, made 
friends with them.”77 
 
3.3. Zheng’s Governance (1661-1683)  
 
Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 鄭成功 and his 25,000 men and 200 vessels reached 
Tayouan (Tainan City) in April 1661 after being defeated by the Manchus in Nanjing in 1659. 
Soon Zheng managed to find a grain supply in Sakam and beleaguered Provintia, the Dutch fort 
with Chinese residents’ assistance.78 Compared with Zheng’s military forces, the Dutch had less 
than 2,000 soldiers, 2 vessels, 3,000 pounds of gunpowder and other limited suppl ies in 
Zeelandia.79 After nine months’ siege by Zheng’s army, the Dutch surrendered to Zheng in Feb 
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1632 and handed over Zeelandia Castle with artillery, war material, treasure and state 
property.80 
Soon after some chiefs of the plains indigenes made peace with Zheng Chenggong. 
Plains indigenes near Sakam (Cikan) in Tainan County such as the Xingang, Muchialiuwan 目加
溜灣 (Shan Hua 善化), Xiaolung, Matou, Taliwu 他里霧 and Panhsien 崩山 in central Taiwan 
welcomed his arrival and received clothes and tobacco from him during his tour of inspection 
with his soldiers.81 Meanwhile, many Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong flowed into Taiwan, 
Hsu estimated that the Chinese population reached up to 100,000 by the end of Zheng rule, 
twice as many as in the Dutch period. Some were families of Zheng’s army, but mostly the 
immigrants were peasants who sought to avoid Manchu’s maritime forbiddance and coastal 
population removal policies from 1656-1681. 82  Zheng widely encouraged his troops and 
Chinese settlers to cultivate crops, mostly rice and sugar plantations and to open “new lands” 
to meet its provision. 83  By 1681, Zheng’s reclamation had spread throughout most of the 
western plain area from Longkiauw 瑯嶠 (Hengchun Township, Pingdong County) to Keelung. 
Zheng also continued international trade, (mainly exporting deer skins to Japan) and adopted a 
Dutch taxation system in order to recover revenue after years of battling with the Manchus. 
Plains indigenes were heavily taxed via paying their head tax either by cash from deer hunting 
with a fixed rate or paying by grain84 and were required to contribute in corvée labour service 
and to be enrolled in Zheng’s military. 85 Inevitably, this series of reclamations of lands and 
exploitations of indigenous tax and labour clashed with plains indigenes. Jiang Risheng 江日昇 
noted in July 1661, how the plains indigenes of Tatu 大肚 (Dadu District, Taizhong City), lead by 
Adegou 阿德狗 were incited to revolt and slaughtered Yang Kao 楊高. Zheng sent military force 
twice, lead by Yang Zhu 楊祖 first and Huang An 黃安 and Chen Rui 陳瑞 later finally pacified 
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Tatu fan 大肚番 and executed Adegou.86 This was before Zheng defeated the Dutch. A severe 
revolt of plains indigenes in Shalu 沙轆 (Shalu District, Taizhong City) in 1670 was documented 
in Taihai shicha lu 臺海使槎錄 (A Tour of duty in the Taiwan Sea), Liu Guoxuan 劉國軒 
commanded his arms and massacred a great number of the plains indigenes.87 In another 
instance five to six hundred face-tattooed mountain indigenes of Touweilungan 斗尾龍岸 
(probably Atayal living around upstream of Beigang River) fought against Zheng Jing’s 鄭經 
(Zheng Chenggong’s son) three thousand men, but Zheng struggled to exterminate them, but 
only burned their huts as they escaped into mountains. Several disturbances aroused by the 
indigenes of Xingang (Xingang Township, Jiayi County) and Taokas groups in Zhuqian 竹塹 
(Xinzhu City) in 1682 were noted by Yu Yungo 郁永和, but again the indigenes fled into the 
mountains after further battles with Zheng’s army.88 With Zheng’s advanced weaponry such as 
arrows, crossbows, pikes with iron heads and matchlocks which had been used efficiently in 
defeating the Dutch89 with sufficient military force, the indigenes were either repressed or 
escaped into mountains as most of them were familiar with local terrains which gave them some 
advantages in surviving battles. The weapons they held were still in a primary stage, not 
sufficient enough to fight against Zheng’s military forces. By contrast, the Chinese did not cause 
any insurrection under Zheng’s rule. Until Zheng surrendered to the Qing in 1683, most plains 
indigenous tribes in southern Taiwan were affected by Zheng, but not yet the mountain 
indigenes.   
 
3.4. Early Qing Governance (1683-1858)    
 
Zheng submitted to the Qing peacefully in September 1683 after Shi Lang 施琅 -a former 
Zheng’s admiral who turned to the Qing later, attacked the Pescadores with 300 Qing war 
vessels and blocked Zheng’s food supply along the coast. An original plan of officials in China 
was to abandon Taiwan and return Chinese immigrants after conquest. However, Shi Lang 
insisted on retaining Taiwan for Qing maritime security, which reduced the cost of garrisons on 
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southeast coast and benefited from its deer, sulphur and other natural products.90 The following 
year, Taiwan became a prefecture of Fujian Province. The remainders of Zheng and his military 
forces were sent to China or merged with Qing armies. Many Chinese colonists without wives 
and property returned to China after being long hard-pressed under Zheng’s rule. Those who 
chose to stay were required to register with local officials. The Qing regime became now the 
longest regulating colonist in Taiwanese history.  
 
3.4.1. Circumstances of the Plains indigenes  
 
Indigenes went through various phases when interacting with outsiders under Qing rule. 
This is also the period when the western plains were largely dominated by the Chinese under 
Qing rule and plains indigenes were massively victimised and assimilated by them; in contrast, 
the eastern mountain areas were neglected by the Qing government and became places where 
plains indigenes relocated when the Chinese took over their lands, and were where the leaders 
of Chinese riots escaped to from Qing’s suppression. In early Qing governance of Taiwan (1683-
1730s), partial quarantine was imposed by the Qing government in order to prevent any 
potential rebellion. The Qing regulated immigration by only giving licenses to male migrants, 
not families and restricted rice exports. They also continued the tax system from the Dutch and 
Zheng regimes and reduced 30 to 40 % of tribal tax quotas for indigenes and the Chinese head 
and land tax until 1737.91 Plains indigenes could have possibly gained their lives back slowly 
without much disturbance from the Chinese and with less burden of tax; however, from the 
1700s lawless Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong began to cross the strait and claimed lands 
in Taiwan even without licenses. The Qing noticed the ecological pressure and ethnic conflicts 
that Chinese migrants might cause and proposed to protect plains indigenes’ land rights.92 At 
first, they only allowed Chinese to rent lands from the plains indigenes, renewed the contract 
every two or three years and forbade Chinese purchasing indigenous lands privately. They also 
made local officials draw and name borderlines to protect plains indigenes’ lands from local 
Chinese harassment.93 Plains indigenes could not escape from Chinese trespassing, not paying 
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rent, illegally occupying their land, and sometimes tricking illiterate ones into selling their lands. 
Plains indigenes were also heavily abused by Chinese Tongshi 通事 who were responsible for 
collecting the tribal tax, assigning indigenous labour service, and monopolizing trade with them, 
although cases were often found showing that the fees they extorted from them were several 
times more than their original tax obligation.94 To avert extra burden from Chinese interpreters, 
some plains indigenes lived near Chinese settlers or the Chinese administration selected their 
own indigenous interpreters and helped in dealing with officials directly. Corrupted officials  
were often found to assist extortion in remote places by accepting bribes from Chinese 
interpreters to renew their licenses. 95  Xu Yuliang also mentioned that from 1759 plains 
indigenes replaced Chinese and became tongshi 通事 in Tamsui, Zhanghua and Zhuluo 
Counties96 , but it was unclear if the circumstance of plains indigenes had improved or not. 
Moreover, local officials commonly imposed corvée service on plains indigenes: duties included 
carrying officials in sedan chairs, delivering documents, driving oxcarts for officials between 
villages undergoing inspections, transporting wood for shipbuilding and serving in military as 
porters.97 The plains indigenes suffered greatly as they were abused by Chinese interpreters 
under the Qing’s rule and were treated worse than under the Dutch and Zheng regimes.  
Two plains indigenes resistances in northern Taiwan broke out in 1699 due to the 
unreasonable requests and labour abuse by Chinese interpreters.98 The most severe outbreak 
began in December 1731, when Lin Wuli 林武力 from the Dajiaxii tribe 大甲西社 gathered its 
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neighbouring tribes Dajiadong 大甲東社, Tunxiao 吞霄 and other Taokas tribes, and with over 
1,000 plains indigenes attacked the yamen, murdered Chinese settlers in Shalu 沙轆 and burned 
their homes. A month later nearly 2,000 plains indigenes from the Papora 巴布拉 and Babuza
貓霧捒 groups in Zhanghua County allied with the Dajiaxi tribe, besieged Zhanghua city, 
destroyed military posts and killed numerous soldiers. Finally, it ended after the Qing authorities 
mobilised 3,000 soldiers from Fujian and plains indigenes from the Anli tribe’s 岸里社 for 
assistance. This entire rebellion lasted nearly 10 months and caused serious damage to the 
plains indigenes’ male population, who mostly died in battles or were captured by other 
submitted plains indigenes who were assisting the Qing government or who escaped into 
mountains.99 These rebellions eventually forced the Qing government to confront the Chinese 
abuse and extortion of plains indigenes as they saw the potential threat posed by plains 
indigenes once they formed affiliations. From 1737 the Qing decreed several policies which 
attempted to ease the tension between the Chinese and the plains indigenes including tax 
reduction, inspection of land contracts between them, and prohibition of intermarriage. With 
increasing numbers of Chinese migrants,100 plains indigenes’ circumstances did not improve, 
some suffered from losing their lands and were forced to relocate to the eastern mountains 
from the 1800s, and some gradually assimilated with the Chinese through mixed residence, 
intermarriage and adopting Chinese customs. The resettlement of plains indigenes might have 
caused further constraint on the mountain indigenes’ living and hunting space, which resulted 
in more conflicts.101 Map 2:4 shows the movement of the plains indigenes’ resettlements from 
the western plain into the mountain areas (See Map 2: 4).  
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Map 2:4 Resettlements routes of plains indigenes from 1800  
 
 
Source: Wang I-Shou, ‘Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Historical 
Perspective’, in Chinese Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan (Taipei: 
SMC Pub., 1980), 42 
 
The Qing also saw the importance of the assistance of plains indigenes in subduing 
rebellions. From the second half of the eighteenth century, they began to institutionalise their 
role of guarding the mountain indigenes’ border.102 Plains indigenes’ experience and skills in 
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tribal warfare in mountains were indispensable in assisting pacification as they were stronger 
and faster than the Chinese and with tremendous skills in using spears and arrows in deer 
hunting. Most importantly, fighting in battles continued their headhunting and hunting customs 
as reasserting their social status and gaining rewards. Chinese accounts described indigenes’ 
hunting customs, “Before Taiwan joined Qing’s domain, indigenes hunted for a living, also 
named as “Chu Cao” 出草; this custom had been practised until now. At their age of ten or over, 
they were trained to use arrows and bows, catch what they aimed for within 30 to 40 steps 
away.”103 As the ethnic conflicts between Chinese settlers got worse, the Qing government often 
required their assistance in subduing Chinese rebellions or as trackers when they escaped into 
mountains, particularly in the two biggest Chinese rebellions in the eighteenth century - Zhu 
Yigui rebellion (朱一貴事件) in 1721 and Lin Shuangwen rebellion (林爽文事件) in 1787. The 
establishment of a plains indigenes military was developed under this circumstance in 1788 
when the Imperial Commissioner Fu Kangan 福康安 suggested selecting plains indigenes and 
enlisting them in the Qing army.104 Xu has mentioned how 4,000 plains indigenes were selected, 
given lands and salary, which was the same as the Green Standard army105 in Taiwan, and 
exempted from corvee services. They participated in expelling Chinese pirates Cai Qian 蔡牽 in 
1805-1806 and Zhu Fen 朱濆 in 1808 and quelled local revolt such as that of 1826 when the 
Chinese intermediate Huang Dounai 黃斗奶 initiated an uprising and affiliated with the 
mountain indigenes in Tamsui and the uprising of Lin Gon 林恭 in Fengshan in 1853.106 During 
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the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, they were stationed at Luermen (Tainan City), Keelung 
and Tamsui. The fighting capacity of the plains indigenes after joining the Qing military should 
not be neglected. The role of the plains indigenes military and their armament in quelling 
resistances under the management of the Qing government after 1860 will be discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
3.4.2. Circumstances of the Mountain Indigenes  
 
Mountain indigenes were less disturbed in comparison with plains indigenes before the 
nineteenth century, probably because the Chinese and the plains indigenes were terrified of 
losing their heads in the mountains. Knowledge of the Qing government of the eastern 
mountain area was limited and mostly gained from merchants, adventurers, Chinese 
interpreters and farmers who hungered for profiting from resources in the mountains. Most 
Qing governors described the eastern mountain areas as back mountains 後山 where 
“uncivilised barbarians” lived, and as covered by dense woods, undulating ridges without roads, 
uncultivated land and forestry. It was, however, planted with many betel nut trees and rich in 
gold, which motivated adventurers to risk their lives in further investigation.107 Most of the 
official Chinese impressions of the mountain indigenes was of their passion for killing, 
murderous behaviour and resistance to indoctrination which the Qing government found hard 
to control. For instance, a Superintendent - Fan Xian 范咸 noted in 1747, 
The savage indigenes are fond of disorder by nature. When the 
resources are in shortage, they would come out to hunt and butcher the 
merchants and civilians ... killing is part of their custom and considered 
as bravery. They would take the heads of their victims, skin and remove 
the muscle tissues, and then boil to remove the remaining fat. The 
heads would then be painted in gold colour and stored in the high 
shelves in the hovels. The savage indigenes having the most golden 
skulls would be considered as heroes in the tribe.108  
 
He also noted how the indigenes were scared of gunfire,  
There is a tribe high on top of the mountain named Du-Guo. Its 
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indigenes have this wicked look from their short hair, protruded eyes 
and big ears. Their toes are thin as chicken claws and they climb trees 
like monkeys. They are known for archery and merciless. There are no 
roads connected to the tribe. They travel up and down the mountains 
via lianas to trade with more assimilated aborigines monthly. Even the 
savage aborigines are afraid of them. The Du-Guoeans fear nothing but 
the gunfire. They flee as soon as they hear the sound of it.109 
 
Teng has also noted how early Qing travel writers often mentioned mountain indigenes hiding 
themselves in the underbrush, taking over in the jungle, lurking to ambush those who wandered 
into the mountain forests. 110  Numerous accounts describing the unknown danger in the 
mountain and their murderous inhabitants stopped the Chinese entering eastern Taiwan. For 
instance, in 1726 a Chinese tongshi 通事 reported, how 11 plains indigenes from the Nanri tribe 
南日社 were killed and headhunted by at least 50 mountain indigenes near Dongshi Mountain 
東勢山. 111Another reason for the mountains area largely escaping from Chinese invasion was 
that the Qing government forbade Chinese from entering mountains from 1722 and began the 
building of an entrenchment from 1736-1761 (See Map 2:5, the red line is the indigenous 
border in 1750; the blue line in 1760). This boundary across Taiwan from south to north 
separated the Chinese and the mountain Indigenes, but later in 1790 it moved again toward the 
entrance of the mountain district. The purpose of setting up such a boundary was to avoid 
greater conflict between Chinese and indigenes and to protect Chinese civilians, but it also 
revealed the lack of interest of the Qing government in managing mountain indigenous affairs, 
especially as conflicts in the western plains kept local officials busy enough. Whoever crossed 
the boundaries would be flogged with sticks or sentenced to prison for 3 years.112  
However, mountain indigenes did not lose their linkage with the western plains 
completely, but limited contact remained, mostly through plains indigenes. Mountain indigenes 
often relied on plains indigenes’ supply of salt, iron and clothes in exchange for their mountain 
resources. This reliability of plains indigenes gave them easier access to mountain regions and 
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to deal with indigenes. The Qing government also relied on plains indigenes’ connection with 
mountain indigenes when Chinese revolt survivors escaped into the mountains. For instance, 
during the Lin Shuangwen rebellion, interpreters were led by the plains indigenes to mountain’ 
villages and convinced them that material rewards would be given if they captured and turned 
in Chinese rebels.113 Shipbuilders, who were authorised by the Qing government to obtain 
camphor woods from the mountains for ship repair, also required plains indigenes’ assistance 
as guards when entering into mountains.114 Some mountain indigenes such as the Sotimor in 
Fengshan, Ali 阿里 in Zhuluo 諸羅 and Shuishalian 水沙連 in Zhanghua became compliant 
through plains indigenes’ guidance or persuasion. However, this seeming submission was 
dubious as several Shuishalian groups revolted in 1725-1726, houses were burned down, 62 
Chinese were murdered, and 140 oxen were killed.115 The geographical difficulties in mountain 
regions and headhunting rituals now became the mountain indigenes’ natural defence and the 
boundary preserved some independent space for them until 1874. From the seventeenth 
century, Taiwan appeared to have dual features geographically and culturally under Qing 
governance, however, the entire situation was about to change dramatically from 1860 with 
further encroachment and resource exploitation by the Chinese, Europeans and Japanese. 
Mountain indigenes were eventually forced to participate in this process of becoming modern 
from the mid-nineteenth century.  
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Map 2:5 Map of the indigenes boundary in Taiwan from 1727-1812 
 
Source: Taiwan de Xingzhengqutu 台灣的行政區圖 (The map of Taiwan’s administrative 
districts) http://mapstalk.blogspot.co.uk/2010/02/1684-1945.html 
 
3.5. Western Countries’ Eye Taiwan Before the Tianjin Treaty of 1858  
 
Western countries vastly expanded power with modern military technology over Africa, 
Australia, and Southeast Asia from 1750 a process accelerating after the Crimea war of the 
1850s and the American Civil War of the 1860s. The establishment of European trade stations 
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quickly spread from Southeast Asia to East Asia. European merchants continued their eagerness 
to purchase Oriental goods – silk, tea, jade, jewellery, etc and to trade with China more freely. 
Before the outbreak of the Opium War (1840-1842) when China was forced to open its ports to 
trade with the West, Formosa had caught Europeans’ attention again after the Dutch had set up 
their entrepôt in the seventeenth century, however, this time it was to take a different form. 
Europeans now had better understanding and knowledge of its resources, governance, 
populations, ethnic groups, internal conflicts and the separation of eastern and western Taiwan. 
A French naval officer- Jean-Francois de Galaup comte de La Pérouse noted in his memoir after 
his short stay outside Taiwanfoo during his scientific expedition around the world in 1787: 
It is well known in Europe, that the eastern part of Formosa is inhabited 
by the aborigines, and does not recognize the sovereignty of the 
Chinese; but the western part is extremely populous, because the 
Chinese being too numerous, and greatly oppressed in their own 
country, are always ready to emigrate … As these live in habits of labour 
and industry, this would be a further advantage to the conquerors. But 
it must ever be kept in view, that greater forces would, perhaps, be 
required to keep in subjection than to conquer a people, naturally very 
prone to rebellion … I believe the produce of this island, would one day 
defray the expenses of its government; but I am persuaded, that the first 
years of its possession would be very expensive, and a ministry would 
see with regret, considerable sums of money pass over to this part of 
Asia, which promised but a very distant return.116 
Also in letters from two Spanish governors based in the Philippines in 1787, they notified how 
both the English and French had contemplated stationing in Taiwan as a nearby post to China, 
based on the decrease of English ships entering Bampu and observations from a French 
brigadier – Mr. Conde de Kergarion, who was the chief of a French division in India117, but the 
Spanish did not wish to interfere as they had control over the Philippines already.  
Up to the early nineteenth century, European countries had experiences of colonizing 
Australia, Africa and Pacific islands and increasingly they understood the risk and the cost of 
managing/policing colonies that could become the motherland’s burden. This general sceptical 
attitude was fortified by the knowledge of the existing revolts in Taiwan. However, this was still 
before Europeans properly recognised the extent of the profitable resources that Taiwan could 
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offer and meanwhile they continued actively seeking every possibility to trade with China. 
Taiwan soon appealed to foreign merchants, diplomats, missionaries, and adventurers to visit 
because of its geographical position, which allowed them to gain some advantages economically 
and politically. The Chinese Repository also reported on some considerable exportation from 
Taiwan in 1833, “The quantity of rice exported to Fuhkeen [Fujian] and Chekeang [Zhejiang] is 
very considerable, and employs more than three hundred junks. At Teentsin [Tianjin] alone, 
there arrive annually more than seventy junks loaded with sugar. The exportation of camphor 
is likewise by no means small.” 118 Dr. William Jardine, a British merchant in China from 1825, 
suggested to Lord Palmerston in 1839, on the eve of the First Opium War, the seizing of two or 
three islands, including Taiwan, to block China’s coast and send force to Beijing in order to 
procure Chinese permission to trade at some northern ports, such as Amoy, Foochow, Ningbo, 
Shanghai, after increasing disruppted of the opium trade in Canton.119 This desire was soon 
fulfilled by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 as the result of the First Opium War, whereby European 
countries could trade freely at five ports along the Chinese coast, foreign consuls could reside 
and conduct official business at ports, and missionaries preach freely in China. However, there 
were no intensive European contacts or economic activities with the Chinese or indigenes in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, except for some illegal opium trade conducted by the British, 
two British shipwrecks during the First Opium War (1839-1842) 120 and the disappearance of 
several vessels which were believed lost in coastal Taiwan and whose sailors were detained or 
murdered by Chinese or indigenes.121 The discovery of coal in northern Taiwan drew Europeans’ 
attention again. Britain and America repeatedly sent investigation teams to explore the quality 
and accessibility of coal and to seek the possibility of purchasing or establishing coal stations 
despite the local Chinese authority having rejected and prohibited coal mining. Two American 
officers – Commodore Matthew Perry and U.S. Consul General in Japan Townsend Harris, 
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proposed to possess or purchase Formosa for coal and commercial interest in 1854-1856. As 
Perry noted, 
This significant island, though nominally a province of China is 
practically independent. The imperial authorities maintaining a feeble 
and precarious footing only in isolated parts of the island; a large 
portion being in possession of independent tribes, and yet such as the 
productiveness in minerals, drugs and more valuable products of these 
genial regions, that at this time there is a revenue estimated at a million 
of dollars.122   
 
Whoever procured Taiwan could be seen as obtaining its current fruitful industries evolved by 
Chinese immigrants along with existing trade connections with China. In addition, Europe and 
America did not view eastern Formosa as part of any realistic Chinese governance. A complex 
and further disturbance and economic encroachment in eastern Taiwan commenced after the 
signing of the Tianjin Treaty in 1858.  
 
4. Armed, Alarmed and Aware: The Nature and the Culture of Resistance  
  
Before the acceleration of Western encroachment from 1858, some features of 
Formosan indigenous habitat and traditional cultures might be able to explain the character of 
tribal warfare and its extension into resistance to the variety of intruders coming from the 
western regions. These features could be seen or classified as physical environment assets as in 
Block A in Chart 2:1 below, which provide indigenes with terrain advantage, but also create 
environmental constraints; and cultural assets as Block B in Chart 2:1 which include such 
elements as historical hostilities between tribes, the culture of headhunting and experience of 
hunting large animals. An initial analysis of Blocks A and B and some synergies between Blocks 
A and B is given below. Block C emphasizes the ill treatment of early potentates and disturbance 
from Chinese immigrants of indigenes, especially toward plains indigenes, before 1860 which 
triggered many indigenous revolts. Finally Block D is focused on weaponry. Formosan indigenes 
held weapons in the “primary stage”, which limited their ascendancy. Chart 2:1 suggests that 
                                                             
122 U.S., Congress. House Executive Document No. 97 (Francis L. Hawks, ed., Narrative of the Expedition of an 
American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852,1853, and 1854, by Order of the 
Government of the United States, under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United State Navy, Compiled 
from the Original Notes and Journals of Commodore Perry and His Officers, at His Request and under His 
Supervision, 3 vols.) 33rd Cong., 2d session, 1856, 177-178. quoted in Ibid., 77. 
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the combination of such elements contributed to the capabilities of indigenes in resistance 
before 1860.  
 
Chart 2:1 General Relations between Physical Environment and Cultural Assets as the Context 
of Indigenous Resistance prior to1860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, the geographical conditions gave Formosan indigenes advantages naturally 
when confronting intruders and hunting, especially for indigenes inhabiting the eastern and 
northern mountain areas. The natural defence secured them against harassment or attack by 
intruders or animals. Although indigenes residing in the western plains Taiwan did not enjoy 
much natural protection from the mountains, most indigenous men grew up and trained to 
hunt within their terrain which they were highly familiar with, therefore they could attack 
enemies without being seen, hide themselves or escape easily and catch animals. This following 
account of 1671 provides us with vivid ideas of how the indigenes manipulated their natural 
terrains as their defence: 
The towns which war continually one against another, are fortif’d with 
A. Physical Environment Asset 
 Geographical Advantage 
 Environmental Constraint  
Ability to 
resist 
intrusions 
B. Cultural Asset 
 Belief&Socio-political Structure 
 Headhunting  
 Hunting  
 Hostilities between Tribes 
C. Encroachment before 1860 
 Ill treatment of Early Potentates 
 Disturbance from Chinese immigrants  
D. Primary Weapons 
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all manner of inventions for strength; and instead of walls, surrounded 
with great woods, planted on purpose, and much stronger than any 
walls, for the trees stand exceeding close, and above three hundred 
paces in breadth. The passage in and out are onely little cross paths, 
with many turnings and windings, onely wide enough for one man to 
walk, so that they much follow each other: on both sides of the narrow 
ways are some little out-lets, in which they may lie in an ambuscade, so 
that no man can pass by them.123  
 
On the other hand, indigenes in Taiwan did not benefit from its geographical location where 
they were surrounded by waters as between the Pacific Ocean and the Taiwan Strait, carried 
with seasonal currents which enhanced their risks and difficulties in sailing out to search for 
new territories. Moreover, two thirds of Taiwan is covered by mountains and hills, but only one 
third consists of plains and basins. Its location and conditions of geography constrained 
indigenes’ space of living among animals and competing tribes and limited production of crops 
and agricultural technique development, which impacted on tribal cultures. To attain more 
space, hunting animals became an essential task when expanding their territories or moving to 
new land for cultivation. Meats from hunting were also one of the indigenous main food sources. 
All indigenous men were born to be dexterous and professional hunters. They were well trained 
from adolescence to hunt by senior members in tribes from setting up traps, using spears, bows 
and arrows efficiently and practising various hunting techniques during their stay in the 
“gathering house” or within clans. Joining hunting operations continued to strengthen their 
experiences and conversance with hunting fields.124 Ambiguous demarcation of territories with 
neighbouring tribes often prompted disputes which developed long rooted hostilities between 
tribes. Quarrels over hunting areas, use of water and murder cases did not appear to be 
resolved permanently. Indigenous headhunting culture became an ultimate solution to settle 
disputes when indemnity could not be agreed by both sides; meanwhile it allowed them to 
reassure or reassert their social status repeatedly by cutting off enemies’ heads.  
                                                             
123 Montanus, Atlas Chinensis Being a Second Part of A Relation of Remarkable Passages in Two Embassies from 
the East-India Company of the United Provinces to the Vice-Roy Singlamong and General Taising Lipovi and to 
Konchi, Emperor of China and East-Tartary: With a Relation of the Netherlanders Assisting the Tartar against 
Coxinga and the Chinese Fleet, Who till Then Were Masters of the Sea : And a More Exact Geographical 
Description than Formerly Both of the Whole Empire of China in General and in Particular of Everyone of the 
Fifteen Provinces. Translated by John Ogilby. London: Printed by Tho. Johnson for the author, 1671. 
124 Taiwan Sôtokufu Rinji Taiwan Kyûkan Chôsakai 臺灣總督府臨時臺灣舊慣調查會, Fanzu Diaocha Baogao Shu: 
Ameizu/Beinanzu 蕃族調查報告書: 阿美族/卑南族 [Report on Savage Tribes: Amis & Puyuma Tribes]; LeBar, 
Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. Volume 2: Philippines and Formosa; Pan Ying 潘英, Taiwan Pingpuzu Shi 
臺灣平埔族史 [History of Plains indigenes in Taiwan]. 
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter Section 2.1, through obtaining human heads in 
warfare, indigenous men began to procure their entitlement within their communities when 
pursuing brides, participating in tribal affairs, protecting the village, and most importantly 
fulfilling their Zuling in order to be accepted by their own ancestors after death. Their 
transferable techniques and experiences from hunting expeditions secured their predominant 
status when hunting human heads. The conjuncture of hostilities between tribes, wild-mammal 
hunting and headhunting practices, meant that indigenes not only got to assure their right over 
their dominant territories and independence but also kept themselves highly armed, alarmed 
and aware of any movement within their territories as they were frequently exposed to various 
types of threats. Here we consider all such environmental elements as their innate abilities or 
advantageous positions, which sustained their precedence when competing against intruders 
or enemies and which were to become major assets in fighting for survival after mid-century. 
These assets did not seem to fade away or weaken over time; indeed, indigenes continuously 
exerted these assets to counteract Chinese incursions, to reinforce ruling power or to conciliate 
ethnic conflicts. 
Since the seventeenth century, indigenes in Taiwan never relinquished their 
independence to any rulers fully and the ambience remained in the state of highly disordered 
antagonism. Apart from the existing indigenous tribal warfare, strife between indigenes and 
Chinese immigrants, Chinese ethnic groups and countless uprisings against ruling authorities 
from both indigenous groups and Chinese gradually diffused into the western plains, but mostly 
on a small scale. Relations between indigenous groups and colonists had always been unsettled 
and fragile as described in The Chinese Repository, “On the whole they are a lawless tribe, who 
put the government and every human regulation at defiance, strictly adhering to their clans. 
Some of the country-born in the interior have never acknowledged the mandarins as their 
rulers.”125 As at Block C above, ill treatment of early potentates and disturbance caused by 
Chinese immigrants to Taiwan might be sufficient enough to explain this intensive and inimical 
circumstance before even larger encroachment from 1858. Early colonists like the Dutch, 
Spanish and Zheng Chenggong did not intend to stay in Taiwan for long, but were using it as a 
temporary base to trade with China and other Asian countries, or to recover from defeat by the 
Manchus in the case of the Zhengs. Both the Dutch and Zheng had a shortage of military forces 
                                                             
125 "The Chinese Repository" vol.2, no1, p48 May 1833 in Zhang Xiurong 張秀蓉, A Chronology of 19th Century 
Writings on Formosa: From the Chinese Repository, the Chinese Recorder, and the China Review, 7. 
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and revenue for local pacifications and expenditure, hence searching for local resources to 
increase their revenue became their priority, but it appeared to forever generate disruptions 
with local indigenes. Profiting from the deerskin industry is a clear example here, despite the 
fact that deer hunting was originally one of the indigenous economic activities which only 
supplied their own communities, or provided goods for exchanges with the Chinese.  
From the Dutch arrival, plains indigenes were requested to pay extra taxation on deer 
products, even on pigs and paddy126 following with a poll tax and a farming tax which together 
burdened indigenes, especially as their traditional techniques of agriculture did not procure 
such rich production as that of the Chinese. Moreover, corvee service imposed on plains 
indigenes, which was primarily in Zheng’s military, continued to strain tension between the 
indigenes and Chinese, particularly in the early Qing governance. Local officials and Chinese 
interpreters demanded more labour works which infuriated some indigenous groups and lead 
to several indigenous revolts. Worst of all, numerous Chinese resettled in Taiwan under the 
encouragement and military protection of early potentates at first, but later these failed to 
regulate the Chinese migrants who moved to Taiwan. Later under the Qing government policy 
of “partial quarantine”, the growth of the Chinese population in Taiwan increased from 100,000 
in 1684 to over 3 million in 1887. 127 The indigenes’ environment was severely constrained by 
innumerable Chinese resettlers mostly in the western plains who replaced traditional 
agriculture with higher cultivation methods on rice and sugarcane fields. Much plain indigenous 
lands fell into fraudulent Chinese hands regardless of several indigenous land rights policies that 
were attempted by the Qing government to give plains indigenes protection and to minimise 
potential quarrels with Chinese settlers.128 However, there was no sign of termination of any 
sort of conflicts. Before Taiwan opened its ports to Europeans in 1858, most commerce, conflict 
or other forms of interactions with local indigenes took place on the western plains areas of 
Taiwan.  
The weaponry indigenes held were mostly bows, arrows, shield, swords, spears or darts 
                                                             
126 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 75. 
127 Wang I-Shou, ‘Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Historical Perspective’, 43. 
128 Shepherd suggested the fundamental problem was the unclear recognition and interpretation of indigenous 
land by Qing government despite of Qing government inspected, drew indigenous lands boundary (1737-1738 
and redrew in 1750) and punished Chinese who cross boundaries for cultivation from 1704 to 1790. About 
indigenes land right in early Qing regimes, see John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the 
Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 301–7. 
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as in a primary stage of arms. 129 To obtain iron or other metals when needed for manufacturing 
their primary weapons, indigenes had to barter with the Chinese because iron was not 
produced in Taiwan and later the Qing government restricted Chinese merchants and fishermen 
from carrying iron and military weapons to Taiwan. 130  The weapons operated by the Qing 
military in actual warfare were primarily artillery and Chinese matchlocks (中式火繩槍 or 鳥
槍) 131  which were also extensively utilised and manufactured in late Ming and early Qing 
dynasties. 132 In 1730 and 1789, the Qing emperors Yongzheng 雍正 and Qianlong 乾隆 
respectively manufactured 1,600 Chinese matchlocks, arrows, swords, spears etc for garrisons 
in Taiwan.133 Despite the claims of adventurers such as Maurice Benyovszky, the appearance of 
matchlocks within indigenous communities before the nineteenth century was rare, they were 
mostly held and used to quell revolts effectively by the colonists.134 Their earliest cognition of 
muskets and experience of lethality from the musket could be traced back to the early 
seventeenth century when the Dutch sent several expeditions to suppress indigenes who did 
not believe the sticks carried by Dutchmen between their necks and shoulders during marching 
could kill.135 Meanwhile some evidence showed that muskets entered Taiwan from the early 
                                                             
129 Zhou Zhongxuan 周鍾瑄, Zhuluoxian Zhi 諸羅縣志 [Gazetteer of Zhuluo County], 162; Chen Wenda 陳文達, 
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Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan 
in the Qing Dynasty], 190–93. 
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旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China] 
(Zhengzhou Shi: Daxiang chubanshe 大象出版社, 2004), 153. 
132The matchlocks were largely replicated and manufactured largely by the Ming government and the militaries 
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innovation from the West. The emperors engaged the service of professional armament from the West while 
immense military technology were replicated and manufactured. Ibid., 255–56. 
133Hung, ed. 清宮宮中檔案奏摺臺灣史料 V.4, 2263-2268 and 台案彙錄庚集( Taiwan Archive, 7th collection), 
266-267 quoted in  Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會[Military Affairs 
and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 194, 202. 
134 Ian Inkster, ‘Oriental Enlightenment: The Problematic Military Experiences and Cultural Claims of Count 
Maurice Augustes Comte de Benyowsky in Formosa during 1771’, Taiwan Historical Research 17, no. 1 (March 
2010): 27–70. 
135 Kang Peter. 康培德, ‘Zhimin Jiechu - Dongyindu Gongsi Tanjindui Yu Zhumin de Hudong  殖民接觸- 東印度公
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seventeenth century as during the Spanish occupation an official inventory of goods list 
included muskets, harquebuses and a large number of bullets or shots sent from Manila. 136 An 
agreement signed between Zheng and the British East India Company in 1670 stated that the 
Company should provide on every ship two gunners serving for Zheng for granadoes and other 
fireworks, one smith to make guns for Zheng and that the English should provide 200 barrels of 
gunpowder, 200 gunners with matchlocks and 100 pecull of English iron at a fixed price.137 It is 
uncertain when and how the indigenes initiated actions to procure matchlocks, but some 
possibilities could be suggested here: plunder from the colonists in warfare, pillaging from 
shipwrecks such as when the Rarangus tribe and the neighbouring villages in east coast Taiwan 
seized a Spanish sampan with aids and supplies from Manila in 1628, killed 10 Spaniards and 
took two large bronze artillery pieces, 10 muskets, and two small caskets that might have 
contained money,138 or simply purchased them from the Chinese. The reports of Taiwan Yushi 
御史 or Superintendent - He Shuose 赫碩色 and Xia Zhifang 夏之芳 in 1729 claimed that some 
Chinese had crossed the indigenes border illegally, sold indigenes salt and iron and taught them 
how to use Chinese matchlocks and gunpowder; and evidence was found from the plains 
indigenes’ uprisings in 1731-1732, when various types of weapons including matchlocks were 
captured.139 Dr. Xu stated that plains indigenes could regularly gain iron and gun powder from 
exchanging goods with the Chinese that were smuggled to Taiwan even though the Qing 
government had imposed strict control of armaments on the Chinese. But the Qing government 
clearly reached a predominant position in the quantity of firearms during early governance that 
determined and affected the quelling of revolts.  140 Furthermore, plains indigenes of the Anli 
tribe 岸里社 received gunpowder and operated firearms proficiently in pacification of the Lin 
Shuanwen revolt which later led them to be officially permitted to possess firearms with 
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registered numbers.141 The Taiwan tongshi 臺灣通史 (General History of Taiwan) also recorded 
that the plains indigenes military were furnished with Chinese matchlocks.142 This was the 
earliest stage and evidence of plains indigenes owning firearms with the Qing government’s 
acknowledgement, but again firearms did not gain wide currency because of the general 
limitation of the Qing government.  
These assets gave the ability and incited indigenes to resist intruders in the western plain 
areas of Taiwan, where most exploitation took place before the nineteenth century. Plains 
indigenes originally living in the west of Taiwan seemed to be unable to repel colonists even 
though some plain indigenous tribes tried to resist. They mostly failed or received amnesty and 
gradually assimilated with the Chinese economically and culturally; yet more were forced to 
move to unrestrained eastern mountain regions. Nevertheless, the experience of witnessing 
the power of European and Chinese military technology might have influenced indigenes later 
when pursuing advanced weapons through different contacts. Mountain indigenes living in 
eastern mountainous Taiwan were left in peace without much disturbance until the mid-
nineteenth century when groups of Europeans actively sought to make profit in Asia, and the 
Chinese exploited rich resources in Taiwan which facilitated further encroachment.  
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Part I Formosa a Dynamic Context 
Chapter 3: Commerce and Acceleration of Encroachment after 1860 
 
We wished for our tribes an improvement of another sort. The cessation 
of the forced encroachment would quickly put an end to barbaric 
reprisals. The freedom of trade; the introduction of seeds, agricultural 
tools, and domestic animals; and the exploitation of forests, jade 
quarries, mines of coal, copper, silver and gold would drive the 
aborigines by imperceptible degrees toward the comforts of civilization. 
These simple wishes will probably never be realized. A terrible blockade 
tightening in a continuous manner, though slowly, imprisons the 
Formosan peoples between a sea on which they have lost the habit of 
taking chances, and a plundering and jealous race. The Chinese, masters 
of all the accessible exits, will never let anything enter nor leave.1 
 
Extensive threats to Formosan Indigenes’ residence and lives dispersed and emerged 
throughout Taiwan particularly towards undeveloped mountain regions, followed the forced 
opening of four treaty ports – Tamsui and Keelung in the north, Taiwanfoo and Takow in 
southern Taiwan to Europeans under the Tianjin Treaty in 1858 after the Second Opium War 
(1856-1860). 2 From then indigenous tribes increasingly connected and clashed with outsiders 
apart from the early settled Chinese through trade, resource exploitation, and such varied 
channels. The first section of Chapter 3 concerns the encroachment of the West and focuses on 
the Western countries’ economic and territorial invasions in the mountain indigenes’ territories 
and the contacts foreigners had with them. The second section concentrates on the commercial 
imperatives of camphor, tea, indigo and other industries that threatened the mountain 
indigenes’ lives and territories. Our third section discusses the Chinese encroachment, which 
includes the political encroachment initiated by the Qing government and the contacts 
mountain indigenes made with the Chinese and plains indigenes as forms of intrusion. The 
fourth section gives brief descriptions of the policies of the Japanese government on mountain 
                                                             
1 Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’î Le de Formose.’, 568. 
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indigenes which escalated toward total occupation in the central and the eastern mountain 
regions. 
  
1. Encroachment of the West after the Treaty of Tianjin 
1.1. Economic and Territorial Intrusions 
 
Under the protection of the Tianjin Treaty, merchants, missionaries, scientists and 
adventurers arrived one after another to explore and study this primitive island. Some interests 
of the West in Taiwan initiated in the first half of nineteenth century were outlined in Chapter 
2 (see Section 3.5 p 41-43). Western merchants were actively seeking to profit from trading with 
China and anticipated that raw resources in Taiwan could lead them to a good prospect of 
fortune. First two American firms – Nye Bros. & Co. and Williams, Anthon & Co. proceeded with 
camphor and sugar exports in 1854-1857 and later obtained their foreign monopoly in camphor 
and other goods in exchange for an agreement with local authorities to protect Taokow from 
pirates, which later extended to Jardine, Matheson & Co. and Dent & Co. even before the treaty 
ports were open and consulates were established. 3  Lucrative export from Formosa soon 
attracted European and American merchants who founded their business near treaty ports 
close to raw materials. Major goods exported from northern Taiwan consisted of camphor, rice, 
tea, sulphur, coal, wood, indigo, rattan, and rice paper; in the south export goods were mainly 
rice, brown sugar, white sugar, ground nuts, turmeric, longans, peanuts and sesame oil. 
Imported goods were mainly opium, different types of cotton and woollen goods and other 
Chinese miscellaneous goods. According to a Comparative Table of the Export Trade from the 
Year 1869 to the Year 1874 in Tamsui recorded by British Vice – Consul Herbert J. Allen, there 
was some significant increase of export in tea, camphor, coal and hemp by Europeans. In 1869, 
only 729,232 lbs. of tea were exported by foreigners, the following year it doubled and by the 
year of 1874 increased to 3,281,346 lbs which made over four fold from 1869. Coal and 
camphor-wood planks export grew at least three times from 1869 to 1872. Average export on 
crystallised camphor was about 14,104 cwts and hard wood planks was about 8,216 pieces in 
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these six years.4 Total sugar export from the south, both brown and white, more than doubled 
from 321,534 cwts to 816,929 cwts in the years 1869 to 1874.5 However these major export 
goods like tea, camphor, other woods, coal and sulphur were mostly planted or situated in 
interior hills or mountains in the north and east of Formosa, which were inhabited by mountain 
indigenous people, or close to the borders of mountain indigenous tribes. These border lines 
were constantly moving further east with the growth of exporting industrial crops. Lives of 
Formosan mountain indigenes were immensely harassed and threatened by the growth of 
exploiting and exporting natural resources. The opening of treaty ports allowed foreign 
merchants to participate in local businesses which stimulated a further and greater 
encroachment in mountain indigenes’ lands from the western plain areas in addition to the 
existing persecution from the older Chinese settlers. 
 Unforeseen threats also reached indigenous territories from the sea. With the progress 
of foreign trade in Formosa, more ships navigated by south and east coast Taiwan and foreign 
vessels sometimes were wrecked due to typhoons or hidden reefs. The arrival of unknown ships 
and visitors constituted a menace to local indigenes, especially as they had never witnessed 
European steamships and as weapons were commonly carried on board. According to Davidson, 
in excess of 150 foreign ships were wrecked and lost on or near the Formosan coast between 
1850 and 1869, over 30 vessels were pillaged and burned by pirates and villagers, and more 
than 1, 000 lives were lost.6 Between 1870 and 1885, 46 foreign vessels were wrecked along the 
Formosan coast and near Penghu islands and 7 foreign vessels suffered from pillage and attack 
by the natives.7 The nature of the term “natives” was unclear in Davidson’s reports, whether 
local Chinese or indigenes, and it also depended on where ships were wrecked, either near 
Chinese or indigenes’ areas, although mountain indigenes usually were the ones taking the 
blame. Loss of lives and goods alarmed European merchants and raised European governments’ 
awareness and concern even though some of these acts from the indigenes were meant for 
self-defence. European envoys were sent to Taiwan for investigation and warships were 
dispatched to Southern Taiwan to secure trading routes, to rescue survivors who might have 
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the Trade of Tamsuy nd Kelung for the Year 1874, Acting Vice-Consul Herbert J. Allen, Tamsuy, 22/Apr/1875, 607 
5 TEPR 1/613-621, Trade Report for Taiwan (i.e. Takow and Taiwanfoo) for the Year 1874, Consul WM. Gregory, 
Takow May-Jun/1875, 615 
6 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 180. 
7 Ibid., 216–18. 
73 
 
been detained in Taiwan and also to punish mountain indigenes, but not much success was had. 
For instance, the British warship Inflexible was sent by the British government in 1858 to 
circumnavigate Formosa and hoped to discover survivors, accompanied by an interpreter - 
Robert Swinhoe, who later was appointed as first Vice-Consul in Formosa.8 Two years later, a 
Prussian expedition landed in southern Formosa with its transport Elbe and encountered 
indigenes’ assaults and were commanded to annihilate indigenous villages after retreating to 
the ship.9 The most significant example was an American merchant ship – Rover, later in 1867 
struck near Vele Rete rocks 七星岩 in southern Formosa. Captain Hunt, his wife and crew were 
attacked by Paiwan indigenes from the Koalute 龜仔角 (Pingdong County). A British gunboat - 
Cormorant led by Captain Broad soon aided, but being attacked by mountain indigenes 
retreated after they landed. Subsequently General Le Gendre, the U.S consul at Amoy, and Mr. 
Anson Burlingame, the U.S Minister (1861-1868) in Peking urged both the Qing government and 
Washington to punish the mountain indigenes’ behaviour.10 An expedition was composed of 
two American warships -Hariford and Wyoming- with 181 soldiers led by Admiral Bell, but the 
mission failed. 11  Thereafter another expedition was sent by Japan in 1874 to punish the 
indigenes of Mudan after 54 Ryukyu fishermen had been murdered in southern Formosa in 
1871 which also coerced the Qing government into an attempt to handle the mountain areas 
and people that she had so long neglected. Apart, then, from the 1874 case of Japan, a nation 
looking towards expansion after the Meji Restroation of 1868, it might be said that these earlier 
forms of conflict with Westerners were fortuitous, rare and indeterminate. 
 They gave the eastern coast of Formosa a formidable reputation in the eyes of many 
Westerners; as early as the 1870s the Nottinghamshire Guardian casually reported a speech of 
the excursionist Thomas Cook, the first public speech on his trip around the world when he 
spoke of “that island of cannibalism, Formosa. A recent investigation has been going on there, 
with reference to cannibalism, three Japanese and fourteen of some other nationalities have 
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Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 114. 
10 C.W. Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), 
26. 
11 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 115–16; Robert Eskildsen, 
Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874: Western Sources Related to Japan’s 
1874 Expedition to Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2005), 49. 
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been eaten by the inhabitants of that island”.12 Indeed, as we see, any of these incidental events 
could blow up into warfare or threat by gunboat diplomacy – in essence what we might call in 
modern terms a repeated use of both soft and hard power on the borders of the indigenous 
peoples. Given that on their western frontier they faced periodic and endemic pressures from 
the Chinese settlers, it is not difficult to surmise that the indigenous eastern peoples of the 
island were already conditioned to outside threat.  
Another small incident also showed the endeavour of the West in some part of Taiwan. 
An unsuccessful attempt of occupation in Dananao 大南澳 (Yilan County) was contrived by 
James Milisch, a German shipping and opium trader and his British companion, James Horn in 
1869. They formed an alliance with plains indigenes by giving salt, clothes and feathers and by 
Horn marrying the chief’s daughter, and later established a fortress regardless of local Chinese 
official’s dissuasion. In the end, they were forced to evacuate the eastern valley after several 
condemnations from Chinese officials. 13  However, before this incident, according to Yen’s 
research, disregard of the eastern part of Taiwan had brought some interests in the Western 
Europe in 1865 when a Berlin newspaper Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung publicized that 
a large part of Taiwan where mountain indigenes lived was “herrenloses land,” or a country 
without any recognized master and deference which could be tamed. 14  The German’s 
endeavour of possessing a colony in East Asia was soon spotted by an editor from the London 
and China Express with an opposed response in its editorial column and duplicated copies in 
the British Foreign Office and Embassy in Peking.15 Various forms of contacts or encounters of 
Formosan indigenes with outsiders in the nineteenth century will be discussed in the next 
section. Active Western power began to penetrate into the interior, eastern regions both 
culturally and territorially. Henceforth, this was to be further and more brutal encroachment 
facilitated by potential exploitation and profit in the mountains. 
 
                                                             
12 Nottinghamshire Guardian, 6 June 1873.  
13 Hsin-Hsien Pu, ‘Horn’s Reclamation Work in Formosa’, The Taiwan Folkways 5, no. 5 (May 1995): 1; Yen Sophia 
Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874. (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1965), 106–7. 
14 Yen did not succeed to obtain the exact date on this article in Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung from East 
Berlin Archive, but she identified approximate date between July 12 and 26, 1865. Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in 
China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 102–4. 
15 Ibid., 104–5. 
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1.2. Contacts with Foreigners   
 
Most mountain indigenous people appeared to be amicable and harmless toward 
foreigners when visiting their tribes and maintained peaceful relationships with them from the 
1860s after the treaty ports were opened. Sometimes they even seemed to favour foreigners 
when they welcomed and received them in their communities, which was commonly remarked 
by foreigner travellers to Taiwan in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Robert Swinhoe 
who was appointed the first British consular officer in Formosa from 1861 to 1873, noted during 
his visit in April 1862 to the Chin hwan or mountain indigenes of the northwest coast, near 
Tamsui River, there the “savage had patted me on the head, and wanted to hug me to swear 
eternal friendship, saying that we were of the right stamp with themselves, and ought to be 
allied in driving the shaven-headed rascals out of the country.” 16 In another of his visits to Atayal 
indigenes from the Kweijings tribe 奎輝社 (Taoyuan County), in 1863 he described the reactions 
of mountain indigenes when they first saw Europeans,  
The meeting was curious enough. They stood and stared at us in 
astonishment, though with no sign of fear. The interpreter told them 
that we were also foreigners like themselves, and had come to visit 
them. They sat down again and examined us, and exchanged pipes of 
tobacco.17  
Later, Swinhoe also recorded closely their facial tattoos, ornaments, clothes, men and 
women’s behaviour, their living styles, weaponry, etc. When Swinhoe squatted with them, one 
of the mountain indigenes put his arm around Swinhoe’s neck, pulled their face together and 
attempted to pour a bowl of rice wine into their conjoint mouths at the same time 18, which 
expressed their sincerity and recognized him as a friend. From Swinhoe’s account, the mountain 
indigenes revealed unusual friendliness toward Westerners and by contrast a strong animosity 
toward Chinese. Thomas Francis Hughes, member of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Custom 
and negotiator to build a light house in Eluanbi 鵝鑾鼻 (in furthest south of Pingdong County), 
wrote about the good nature and benevolence of mountain indigenes in the south toward 
foreigners during his short stay in southern Taiwan in 1872,  
                                                             
16 Shaven headed-the hair style Chinese had in Qing dynasty. Robert Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa 
(London: Frederick Bell, 1863), 70. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
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Foreigners have more than once penetrated into the savage territory 
eastward in a direct line from Takow; farther north, the savages in some 
districts have now become quite accustomed to the casual visits of 
Europeans, and on three or four different occasions small exploring 
parties have visited the tribes who inhabit the hilly regions in the 
neighbourhood of the South Cape. In almost every case the savages 
proved themselves ready to meet kindness with kindness, and in a great 
many instances the hand of friendship and of hospitality was readily 
extended to the foreign visitor.19  
Even when Japan sent expedition troops to southern Taiwan in 1874, the mountain 
indigenes who were not in hostile to the Japanese army established some sort of friendly 
contacts with Japanese and American officers near their camps for nearly a 6 months’ period. 
A Japanese official -Mizuno Jun 水野遵- and Lieutenant Wasson both noted they received 
hospitality, invitations to visit indigenous villages from mountain indigenes in the south who 
were not hostile and became acquaintances with them during their stay. They were also 
drinking, eating, singing and dancing together. 20 On two dining occasions, Lieutenant 
Commander Douglas Cassel and Isa 伊厝, the chief of Shamali drank together and consented 
to “Friendship” between them.21   
This affable demeanour of mountain indigenes toward foreigners was continuously 
reported by several British Consuls, who also revealed some advantages over the Chinese up to 
the 1880s and 1890s. For instance, in 1886 Consul Giles noted his and his wife’s experience with 
some mountain indigenes in the interior mountain areas when “strolling along in savage 
territory, accompanied by some half-dozen savages, men and women, who were delighted to 
see us … One of them knew a few words of Chinese, but his vocabulary did not run much beyond 
“Chinaman bad man. You no Chinaman; you good man,”22 He later also mentioned how the 
Chinese authorities were jealous of foreigners visiting the mountain indigenes and tried to stop 
                                                             
19 Thomas. Frances Hughes, ‘Visit to Tok-E-Tok, Chief of the Eighteen Tribes, Southern Formosa’, Proceedings of 
the Royal Geographical Society of London 16 (1872): 265. 
20 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, ‘Taiwan: A Periphery in Search of a 
Narrative’, 221–22, 254; Mizuno Jun 水野遵, ‘Taiwan Seibanki 臺灣征蕃記 [Notes on Pacifying Savages in 
Taiwan]’, in Taiwan Bainian Huahuo 臺灣百年花火, trans. Yang Nanjun 楊南郡 (Taipei: Yushan she 玉山社, 
2002), 21–22, 24–25. 
21 Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines 
of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 206–7, 212–13. 
22 TEPR 3/735-740. Report on the Trade of Tamsuy and Kelung during the year 1885. Consul. Herbert A. Giles. 
2/Mar/1886, 737 
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him and his party from visiting.23 Consul Nevil Perkins also had a similar or convivial experience 
with the mountain indigenes in the south,  
from personal experience it can be said that they are most hospitable 
and friendly to those who have the good sense to treat them as 
“brothers,” and willingly take their part in any athletic exercises, 
especially such as are new to them. They will listen with evident 
pleasure to foreign singing, solo or otherwise, and will return the 
compliment with their own pathetic chants, consisting of solo and 
chorus, all in the minor key, and by a display of their war dances in which 
they eagerly invite the unpractised foreigner to participate.24 
There were also reports which claimed that foreigners could have easier accessibility to 
camphor with the mountain indigenes than could the Chinese and were confident in dealing 
with the mountain indigenes on good terms. This could be seen in Consul Pelham Warren’ 
report in 1891,  
The forests deeper in the interior of the island and closely approaching 
the borders of the so-called savage districts are most abundant, and the 
camphor produced there is said to be of a superior quality. The 
monopolists are already working in these districts, the camphor-boiling 
being carried on chiefly by hakkas and semi-civilised aborigines, as the 
Chinese proper do not care to venture so far in. Foreigners, however, 
would have no difficulty in making their own arrangements, either with 
the pure aborigines or the semi-civilised ones, and could penetrate with 
perfect safety even further into the country than is now done. The 
aborigines have no dislike whatever to foreigners, but they cordially 
detest the Chinese who, they complain, are not fair in their dealings with 
them.25 
A similar claim could also be found in W. Holland’s report in Tamsui in 1892,  
a solitary foreigner can safely venture with a Chinese interpreter into 
territory which the Government troops do not dare to approach. If this 
rich and lovely island … were ever to fall into the hands of a civilised 
foreign power, there would be no difficulty in coming to friendly terms 
with the aborigines, who welcome a foreigner with the name of 
“brother”.26 
                                                             
23 TEPR 3/735-740. Report on the Trade of Tamsuy and Kelung during the year 1885. Consul. Herbert A. Giles. 
2/Mar/1886, 738 
24 TEPR 5/193-207, Report on Formosa by Mr. N. Perkins, Consul Nevill Perkins, 31/Jan/1895, 197  
25 TEPR 4/393- 421, Foreign Office. 1891. Annual series. No. 875. Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1890 on the Trade of Tainan (Formosa), Consul Pelham Warren, Tainan, 
6/Mar/1891, 402 
26 TERP 4/ 463-475, Foreign Office. 1892. Annual Series. No 1093 Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1891 on the Trade of Tamsui. Mr. W. Holland, Tamsui. 29/Apr/1892, 467-468 
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However, these suppositions could not prove the foreigners would obtain permission for 
exploiting mountain resources simply based on their friendly terms with the indigenes and their 
unrestrained access to the indigenous territories.  
With some plains indigenes’ and Chinese interpreters’ escorts, European missionaries, 
merchants and adventurers gained informal accesses to mountain indigenous tribes in the 
north and east regions without their heads being hunted. Can these contacts and irregular visits 
be regarded as moderate and “soft” encroachment from the west? This greatly contrasting 
experience itself indicates the enormous variety of situations in which each indigenous tribe or 
group found itself. To talk of “indigenous contact” too generally is simplicity, for different local 
environments, the pure chances of conflictual contact, and the prior experiences of local people 
all varied yet would have conditioned the attitudes of specific groups. This a theme taken up 
later in the thesis and in the conclusions. Also this notion of variability is true of the other side 
of the equation – “foreigners” came from a variety of places carried by a variety of motives. 
There is every reason to believe that the Japanese conflict was spurred by Japanese official 
interest in the island, similarly the Americans and Germans had complex motivations. 
Nevertheless, mountain indigenous people were not aware of serious menace from foreign 
visitors generally nor would they ever have predicted that these Westerners who they 
considered as their friends from the other end of the world, were to become the ringleaders of 
intrusions into their territories for commercially valuable camphor and tea.  
 
2. Exploration and Exploitation in Taiwan from the West 
 
The urge of European merchants, the Qing government and Japan targeted on exploiting 
and profiting from mountain resources in nineteenth century Taiwan and stimulated greater 
disputes between local officials, local and foreign merchants and indigenes, particularly with  
the mountain indigenes. For centuries, not only was the Qing government prohibiting Chinese 
settlers from entering mountain regions, but the Chinese also did not dare to risk their lives and 
set foot in the mountains; however, from the mid-nineteenth century, much more frequently 
European merchants, consuls and Chinese workers entered mountain regions and encountered 
indigenous people. This intense setting can be found in the report of B.C. George Scott in 1877,  
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The Chinese, had, and have had for many years, complete and secure 
possession of the whole country to the foot of the central range of 
mountains. These, from their ruggedness, and the dense forests with 
which they are clothed, afford secure retreats to the aborigines. On the 
western side of the mountains, however, they are gradually and surely 
being driven back. Year by year the Chinese advance further and further 
into the mountains, taking possession of hill after hill, cutting down the 
forests of camphor and hardwood trees, and cultivating the ground with 
tea, sweet potatoes, and other crops. Fights and raids along this ever 
shifting border is its normal condition.27    
In this section, I intend to emphasize how the relevance and significance of industries 
such as camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other resources (see Map 3:1) emerged after treaty ports 
opened, accompanied by the increased number of Chinese settlers and European merchants 
and their commercial expansion toward the hills and mountain areas in Taiwan, and how this 
provoked multiple indigenous revolts as part of European mercantile and Chinese and Japanese 
colonial schemes in the late nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 TEPR 2/276-295. Report on the Trade of the Ports of Tamsui and Kelung for the year 1877. Acting Vice-Consul. 
B.C. George Scott. Tamsui, 27/Mar/1878, 291 
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Map 3:1 Industrial Map of Formosa 
 
Source: James Wheeler Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, 
People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, 
Economical Plants, and Other Productions (London: Macmillan, 1903), 370 
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2.1. Camphor 
 
Camphor is a particularly good example for this thesis as it was a major input into the 
Western world’s second industrial revolution 1870-1914, led by new industries growing in 
Britain, the USA and Germany, industries increasingly based on specific scientific and technical 
advancements.28 These developments, especially in steel, shipping, chemicals and commercial 
services, coincided of course with the encroachment process in Taiwan. Led by the British, the 
expansion of Western industrialism was now to enter directly into the lives and cultures of 
indigenous peoples throughout the world. 
Camphor is an organic compound distilled from camphor trees (cinnamomun 
camphora).29 In Taiwan, camphor trees are most found in the northern, central and eastern 
mountains and hills where the altitude is between 4,260 to 5,900 feet and which mostly 
overlapped with mountain indigenous terrains and were initially used as material for 
shipbuilding and construction in the early Qing regime. Before the second industrial revolution, 
camphor was widely used in medicine to ease pain, as an insect repellent and antiseptic in Asia 
and the West. Chinese settlers in Taiwan were aware of plentiful camphor trees in the 
mountains and were capable of producing camphor from traditional Chinese stoves; still 
procuring, producing and selling camphor was limited to Chinese craftsmen who obtained 
official permission to hew camphor trees in Fengshan 鳳山 (Kaohsiung City) and Zhuluo 諸羅 
(Jiayi County) counties for repairing warships after the Yongzheng emperor authorised the 
establishment of military shipyards or jungongchang 軍工廠 in 1725.30 Chen suggested that 
since the foremen were the only legitimate loggers, as a matter of course foremen dominated 
most of camphor manufacture and trade which brought them major profit. Other illegal 
economic activities such as rattan trading, deer hunting, cultivation  of crops and other 
mountain resources were also controlled by the foremen because of their strategic positions 
and expertise.31 It was not yet developed into a large industry for exportation or manufacture 
until the late nineteenth century. 
                                                             
28 Inkster, ‘Review Article: Technology and Culture during the First Climacteric’, 356. 
29 Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “camphor “ http://www.britannica.com (Access 31st March, 2015) 
30 Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史 [A General History of Taiwan], 381; Antonio C. Tavares, ‘Crystals 
from the Savages Forest Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’ (PhD, 
Princeton, 2004), 56. 
31 Chen Guodong 陳國棟, ‘[Jungong Jiangshou] Yu Qilingling Shiqi Taiwan de Famu Wenti [軍工匠首] 與清領時
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In the case of camphor and Taiwan, the real beginning as described by Inkster, was the 
work of chemist Alexander Parkes in the city of Birmingham, fast becoming a hothouse of global 
technological change. Camphor was the pivotal component conferring stability and malleability 
to the nitrocellulose in the process of manufacturing the first thermoplastic substance – 
Parkesine, the early form of celluloid, invented and patented by Parkes in 1856. 32 Subsequently 
celluloid was invented and patented from a similar formula by an American -John Wesley Hyatt 
in 1869. Celluloid material was manufactured and extensively used in making “plastic”- billiard 
balls, buttons, dentures, toys, photography, movie films and safety glass in cars, ships and 
airplanes up to the early twentieth century before the invention of artificial camphor and 
development of the oil industry. Camphor was also added to incense, drugs, and smokeless 
gunpowder for military purpose. 33  So the greatly increased demand for camphor for mass 
production of new industries arose when the celluloid industry began to flourish from the 1870s 
in the West. 
Most of the natural camphor production in the world from late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century was conducted by Japan and Taiwan. According to Davidson’s camphor 
report from Chinese and Japanese customs reports, from 1891-1898, Japan and Taiwan 
exported a total of 65,869,696 lbs in world camphor production and in the same period Taiwan 
exported 40,572,320 pounds of camphor the result being that over 60 % of camphor in the 
world was from Taiwan. In addition, a great amount of the crystallised camphor exported from 
Japan was sourced in the camphor forests of Taiwan, especially after 1895. Moreover, Germany, 
America, Britain, France and India were the major camphor consuming countries developing 
the new technologies, and their average per annum consumption of camphor during 1893-1897 
was 8,006,116 lbs. (see Table 3:1) The average of camphor exportation from Japan and Taiwan 
in world camphor production in the same period was 8,547,052.8 lbs. 34  So, over 90% of 
Japanese and Taiwanese camphor for world production was purchased by the Western 
                                                             
期臺灣的伐木問題 [Naval Lumberjacks and Tree-Felling Activities in Taiwan under the Qing, 1683-1875]’, 331–
34. 
32 Ian Inkster, ‘Highly Fraught with Good to Man: Patent Organization, Agency, and Useful and Reliable Knowledge 
in British Machinofacture circa 1780-1851 and Beyond.’, History of Technology 31 (2012): 135–36. 
33 Dai Baocūn 戴寶村, Shijie Diyi. Taiwan Zhangnao 世界第一. 臺灣樟腦 [The Story of Taiwan Camphor Industry] 
(Taipei: National Taiwan Museum, 2009), 62–63; Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism and 
Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’, 9, 143.  
34 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 443. 
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countries. An increasing production and exportation of camphor from Taiwan grew from 
2,793,266 Ibs in 1891 to 6,935,285 Ibs in 1895; however, despite the increasing supply from 
Taiwan, the price continued to rise from $36 per picul in 1891 to $68.50 per picul in 1895.35 The 
price of camphor fluctuated due to the conflicts with mountain indigenes in camphor districts 
and the increasing demand for camphor in the celluloid industry from the 1890s. However, the 
significant rise in exports to these countries during 1898 – for instance, for Germany the rise to 
2.9 million from the earlier average of 2.2 million, and for the USA the rise from 1.8 million to 2 
million36 – during an especially difficult and violent time on the eastern frontiers of Taiwan, 
suggests that even frontier violence might not always reduce exports from Taiwan. It did 
increase prices. This poses an irony of our historical story – pressure on the indigenous people 
to allow greater freedom of movement and the resulting increase in resistance and warfare, 
might not have been necessary in commercial terms – Western industrialists were willing to pay 
high prices for their camphor imports. 
Table 3:1 Main Camphor Consuming Countries from 1893-1897 
Annual averages during these years. 
Nationality Amount (lbs) 
Germany 2,240,917 
America 1,835,533 
Britain  1,722,644 
France 1,204,847 
India  1,002,155 
Total  8,006,116 
Source: James Wheeler Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, 
Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical 
Plants, and Other Productions (London: Macmillan, 1903), 442. 
As seen above, foreign firms dominated the camphor trade for some years before the 
opening of the treaty ports, but foreign merchants only purchased camphor cheaply from local 
Chinese compradors at ports, near production areas. However, as Davidson noted local Chinese 
                                                             
35 1 picul = 133 Ibs Ibid., 442. 
36 Ibid., 443. Leading camphor consuming countries, for the single year 1898 
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compradors soon took over the camphor business by bribing local officials and converting it into 
a government monopoly after a “temporary lull in trade” caused by the enactment of the Tianjin 
Treaty which limited foreign trade because it only opened ports in Tainan, Tamsui and Keelung, 
which increased the cost of portage from camphor production areas and restrained foreign 
workers. 37  Competitive European merchants continued to pursue greater profits from the 
camphor trade after the opening of the treaty ports and to seek ways to break into camphor 
production and markets that were commanded by the local officials. A volunteer British surgeon 
and naturalist Dr. Cuthbert Collingwood surveyed the local camphor trade in a camphor 
production district on his visit in 1866, 
The trade is at present of little value to any one, except those to whom 
a monopoly is granted by the Chinese Government. The camphor 
Mandarin pays 40,000 dollars per annum for this privilege, and he 
purchases the camphor at the rate of 5 dollars per picul (of 133 lbs.), 
which he then sells for 27 dollars. One dollar as duty and some other 
expenses increase the price he has to pay, and 10 percent of the 
camphor is lost in the transit by evaporation owing to imperfect storage, 
for with the proverbial conservatism of their nation they will not adopt 
the plan of stowing it in tin boxes, by which it might all be saved. Still, 
however, the profits are very considerable. I believe that an enterprising 
young German merchant, Mr. Lessler, of Tam-suy, is about to bring the 
question of legality of this monopoly to issue in a court of law, and I trust 
that this important trade will soon be open to competition by European 
merchants.38 
Tension and disputes between European merchants and local officials continued 
throughout to 1890, but especially in 1868, when the Qing government confiscated $6,000 
worth of camphor that William A. Pickering, representative of Elles & Co. planned to smuggle 
in Wuqi 梧棲 (Taichung City).39 This incident aroused John Gibson, the British Acting Consul who 
sent a warship to Anping without consulting the British Minister in Peking – locally and in British 
diplomacy known as the Camphor War- and resulted in a “Camphor Regulation” which 
abolished the government monopoly and allowed foreign firms to apply for licenses for entering 
camphor districts to purchase and transport camphor without the Qing government’s 
                                                             
37 Ibid., 402. 
38 Cuthbert Collingwood, ‘A Boat Journey across the Northern End of Formosa, from Tam-Suy, on the West, to 
Kee-Lung, on the East; with Notices of Hoo-Wei, Manka, and Kelung’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical 
Society of London 11 (1867): 169. 
39 Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-
1945’, 81–82. 
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interference. 40  It becomes clear that the changes in regulation were made under the 
commercial and fiscal pressures arising from technological change in the West and the resulting 
increase in demand for camphor. 
After Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1895, Japan controlled the majority of 
camphor production in the world until artificial camphor was invented in the 1920s. As soon as 
Japan occupied Taiwan, a proclamation was issued by the Governor of Formosa in 1896 and 
declared her ownership of lands, mountains, forests, re-examined the camphor licenses and 
regulated camphor manufacture, which affected the British merchants greatly as R.W. Hurst 
reported.41 And in 1899 the Taiwan Sotokufu (local colonial government) initiated the new 
camphor monopoly, which stated that the Japanese government would be the only purchaser 
from the producers and obtained the entire control over camphor manufacture. 42  Liao 
suggested that 63% of world demand for re-export of camphor was from Japan in 1920-1928 
and 77% of the camphor produced was from Taiwan. Even up to 1928 when new sources from 
Japan and elsewhere were coming into operation, approximately 46% of camphor production 
in the world was from Taiwan.43 It is for this reason, as well as the fact that camphor demand 
was newly dependent on world-wide technological change and grew especially in areas of forest 
bounded by Atayal and other head-hunting indigenous tribes, that it becomes an exemplary 
case of the frontier between the modernity of the second industrial revolution and the physical 
reaction of indigenous peoples. It can be seen as a microcosm of how commercial forces both 
united and divided the entire world. The procurement of camphor and government policies on 
camphor increasingly brought direct and great impact on indigenes’ lives and countless conflicts 
are to be explored in Chapters 4-6. 
 
                                                             
40 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
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2.2. Tea 
 
Apart from camphor, tea was one of the substantial and profitable exports in late 
nineteenth century Taiwan, following the growing consumption of tea in the world.44 The tea 
industry commenced to thrive after treaty ports opened in 1860. A British merchant -John 
Dodd- discovered potential tea business while exploring the camphor district in 1865 and sold 
for a good price in Macao his first shipment of tea. Soon he made loans to farmers through his 
comprador Li Chungsheng 李春生 and imported saplings from Amoy to expand tea cultivation, 
fired his own tea in Banka, took larger premises in Twa-tu-tia and sold to America where 
Formosan Tea gradually established its fame. Other European merchants saw the prosperity of 
Formosan Tea and soon joined the Formosa tea trade. 45  With more and more European 
merchants’ involvement, later local compradors and merchants’ participation and competition 
stimulated the growth of the tea industry in Taiwan from small and domestic to immense and 
worldwide production.46 Davidson’s report of Formosa Oolong export to America and Europe 
shows: in 1866 tea export is only 180,824lbs. and it continued to increase annually, by 1886, it 
reached 16,171,605 Ibs and mainly was shipped to America.47 The growth of Tea export was 
nearly 90 times more in 20 years and it continuously grew throughout Japan’s regime. Moreover, 
Davidson pointed out the importance of tea export in northern Taiwan, by estimating that 86% 
of the annual export receipts were obtained from tea in 1897.48 Despite the fact that other tea 
production countries like India, Ceylon, Japan and China produced and exported more tea than 
Taiwan49 and possibly dominated most of European and American tea markets, the extensive 
development of the tea industry certainly reflected the vast scale of tea plantation development 
which had a great impact on indigenous territories. This is because the ideal environment for 
growing tea trees is situated on hills, close to or within indigenous areas in northern Taiwan 
where the temperature is between 20 to 30 degrees Celsius, average annual rainfall is less than 
                                                             
44 Raw tea divides into different types of tea in different processes of reproduction. Oolong 烏龍 and Paochung 
包種 were the main types of tea exported from Taiwan from 1860 to 1895. Black tea production began only from 
1928.  
45 John Dodd, ‘Formosa’, Scottish Geographical Magazine 11, no. 11 (1895): 569. 
46 Liu Zhiyun 劉至耘, ‘Qing Mo Bei Taiwan de Chaye Maoyi 清末北臺灣的茶業貿易 [The Trade of Tea in Norther 
of Taiwan since 1865-1895]’ (MA, National Chi Nan University, 2005), 43–46. 
47 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 395. 
48 Ibid., 394. 
49 Ibid., 372. 
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1500mm, there is moderate sunlight, and loose and acid soil that contained at least 2% organic 
compound. 50  A British Commissioner of Customs, Walter Lay, noted the expansion of tea 
plantations in the 1880 Tanshui Trade Report, “As fast as fresh territory is conquered from the 
savages, it is devoted to tea.”51  In Lin Mang-Hong’s analysis of tea production areas, tea 
production was very small in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, only Shuishalian 水
沙連 (Nantou County) grew the wild tea tree which was not easy to harvest within indigenous 
terrain and until 1850 only Shenkon 深坑 and Pinlin 坪林 regions (both in South New Taipei 
County) produced tea. The spread of tea plantations on hills from Shimen 石門 (New Taipei City) 
to Zhanghua County meant they gradually became major tea production areas after the 
opening of the treaty ports, though it did not extend to the south due to a higher temperature 
in Southern Taiwan and some unsuccessful plantations.52  
A report was made by a British Consul Thomas Watters, which gave more detail about the 
development of tea plantations in 1881 Taiwan, 
The cultivation of the tea shrub is extending far and quickly in this island. 
The farmers seem to think the shrub will flourish in any kind of soil, and 
at any elevation, and with any aspect. Experience has, however, already 
taught some that there are situations and circumstances in which it will 
not thrive. Hence several plantations have had to be given up, at least 
for the present, and it is likely that several others will have to be 
abandoned. But as these are given up others are formed, and in several 
cases, bad and useless plants have been replaced by others, young and 
healthy. There are tea plantations now on many of the hill which only a 
few years ago were inaccessible to any Chinaman. The savages who then 
haunted these hills have been driven back to the higher mountains, but 
in some districts there are tea farms in dangerous proximity to savage 
settlements. It is not easy to give much attention to the crop in such 
circumstances, and, indeed, many growers seem to plant the young 
shrub, and afterwards take no further care of it. Others weed and prune, 
and generally expend much labour on their plantation.53 
                                                             
50 Tea plantation and management, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
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51 Huang Fusan 黃富三, Lin Manhong 林滿紅, and Weng Jiayin 翁佳音, eds., Qingmo Taiwan Haiguan Linian 
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Here is another clear case of exclusion of indigenous people because of commercial interests 
driven by European and Chinese Tea merchants. They were forced to move from their original 
lands to high mountains or other places where they probably had to fight or negotiate with 
other tribes for new areas in which to settle. Indigenous lands were ill-treated and sometimes 
abandoned after some failure of tea plantation by the Chinese tea growers. So, it might be that 
in many cases even if indigenous people had wanted to move back to their territories, the lands 
would not have been suitable for farming and few animals would roam in their old hunting field.  
 
2.3. Indigo 
 
The expansion of indigo plantations and production in mountain areas from the 
nineteenth century especially when spare lands were used after logging camphor and rattan, 
also repressed indigenous living space. Indigo was another valuable export good and a growing 
industry in the nineteenth century. As Davidson reported on the production of Indigo in 1880, 
“indigo occupied in tonnage the third place among junk export cargoes, rice and coal alone 
exceeding it, and it was frequently first in value. The yearly Indigo export by junk at this time 
averaged about 21,00piculs, valued at some 150,000 yen.” 54  Plantations of indigo were 
introduced by the Dutch East India Company from China and Southeast Asia in  the seventeenth 
century, but the indigo plantations (indigofera 木藍) were always in the western plain areas in 
the south.55 Cai suggested that from 1800-1870, Chinese immigrants started to grow indigo 
(Storobilanthes flaccidifolius Nees or Assam Indigo), mountain indigo or 山藍 in the lower hills 
of the Xindian river valley, Jinmei River valley and Keelung River valley near Taipei basin toward 
the lower mountain field – Pinglin region, Shuanxi region, Dakekan River valley which were the 
mountain indigenes’ (Atayal group) regions, Yilan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Nantou and Jiayi mountain 
areas. By using Japan’s statistics in 1906, Cai suggested mountain indigo plantations could reach 
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Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 515. 
55 Cai noted the old places name such as Dajinpu 大菁埔, Jinpuliao 菁埔寮 in Tainan indicated indigo plantation. 
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2002), 53, 55, 58, 84–89. 
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up to 500 acres and nearly 40,000 indigo growers worked and settled in other mountain areas.56 
It is not difficult to imagine the numerous clashes between indigenous people and Chinese 
farmers who were much driven by profit. Moreover, in 1886, Liu Mingchuan established the 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau (Fukenjue 撫墾局 in Daxi 大溪 (Taoyuan County) where 
foreign and local merchants purchased camphor, tea, indigo and other resources.57 Davison also 
remarked, “Indigo was largely cultivated in border districts, and the production was 
consequently much dependent on the temper of the savages. The mountain indigo, which grew 
mostly in the hilly district, was still more under the control of the savages, and not infrequently 
the production was so lessened owing to the border warfare ...”58The complexity and density of 
northern mountain districts was seemingly unavoidable and continued to affect indigenes’ 
communities and the indigo industry. 
 
2.4. Other Commodities – Coal, Gold, Sulphur, etc 
 
Other natural resources like mining products - coal, gold, sulphur, copper and oil, etc, 
which again were mostly located in or close to hills and mountains that overlapped with or were 
near indigenes’ territories, were uncovered continually and turned into merchants’ and 
governments’ key development resources. For instance, the exploration of coal beds by 
Western interests in northern Formosa, in hills and mountain areas, led to the greater attention 
of Western countries as coal turned out to be a substantial energy opportunistic resource from 
the mid-nineteenth century when Western steam ships increasingly required coal and water 
supply stations through their trading routes in Asia after the Opium War. British and American 
groups continued to send teams to inspect the quality of coal in Keelung where the major coal 
production field was, and provided an ideal harbour for a stopping point, and urged authorities 
to obtain permission for coal mining 59  However, it was repeatedly rejected by the Qing 
                                                             
56 Ibid., 154–62, 165. An inclusive detail of suitable environment, season, methods for Assam indigo (山藍) 
plantation was given in p167-168.  
57Wen Zhenghua 溫振華, ‘Qingdai Taibei pengdi jingji shehui de yanbian’ ‘清代台北盆地經濟社會的演變 
(Economic and social changes in Taipei Basin during Qing)’(MA, National Taiwan Normal University, 1978), 137 
quoted from  Cai Chenghao 蔡承豪, ‘Cong Ranliao Dao Ranfang - 17 Zhi 19 Shiju Taiwan de Landian Ye  ‘從染料
到染坊 - 17 至 19 世紀臺灣的藍靛業 (From Dyes to Dye Houses - Indigo Indutry from 17th to 19th Century)’ 
(MA, National Chi Nan University, 2002), 160.  
58 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 515–16. 
59 Lieut Gordon was sent by British Navy in 1848 and later published, “Observation on coal in the N.E part of the 
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government as mining was forbidden from the Qianlong era (1735-1796) and was said to 
damage the dragon’s veins which was a superstition believed by the local Chinese. 60 
Nevertheless, illegal coal mining was commonly found and operated by local Chinese, and 
Western merchants could purchase from them. In the first few years after the opening of the 
treaty ports, coal export grew from 4,315 tons to 17,887 tons from 1864-1867 based on British 
Custom Trade Reports.61 Until 1870, the Qing government was no longer to uphold its coal 
mining prohibition because illegal coal mining became irrepressible especially with an increased 
demand for coal supply from Taiwan to the Fuzhou shipbuilding factory. 62  Other valuable 
minerals such as gold in north and eastern Taiwan (Danau 哆囉滿 in Hualian and Gezainan 蛤
仔難 in Yilan County) and sulphur around Datunshan 大屯山 (Taipei City) were found in 
indigenous regions and had always attained the great interest of colonists from the sixteenth 
century. However most gold investigation failed and people sent for gold were expelled or killed 
by indigenes. Gold, sulphur and other minerals were only properly accessible to indigenes and 
commonly used as trading goods between the plains indigenes and the Chinese before the mid 
nineteenth century.63 Gold mining resumed in Keelung River in 1889 after a long prohibition on 
mining by the Qing government and attracted thousands of Chinese gold miners, even Chinese 
miners who had previously worked in California and Australia.64 Disparate destruction of river 
courses, and farm lands was caused by miners’ immature mining techniques and immigrants, 
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operation of private coal mining by local Chinese. Commodore of U.S navy Matthew Perry also sent a priest 
named George Jones to Keelung for potential coal mining during his expedition 1852-1854. Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, 
Taiwan Sheng Wenhua Zhi 臺灣省文化志 [Taiwan Province Cultural Record], vol. 2 (Nantou: The Historical 
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60 Lin Chaoqi 林朝棨, Taiwan Kuangyeshi 臺灣鑛業史 [History of Mining Industries in Taiwan], vol. 1 (Taipei, 
1966), 571–72.  
61 TEPR 1/153-159, Trade Reports, Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock, Inclosure in No. 18. Tamsuy, Formosa, 
9/May/1867, 154 
62 According to Danshui sub-prefecture gazetteer, there were 92 illegal mines: 48 mines were operating, 23 mines 
were abandon and 21 mines were rest in 1870.  Chen Peigui 陳培桂, ed., Danshuitingzhi 淡水廳志 [The 
Gazetteer of Tamsui], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 172 (Taipei: 
Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 110–11; Lin Chaoqi 林朝棨, Taiwan Kuangyeshi 臺灣鑛業史 [History of Mining Industries in 
Taiwan], 1:574–75. 
63 Taiwansheng Tongzhi: Jingjizhi Kuangyepian 台灣省通誌: 經濟志礦業篇 [Annals of Taiwan Province: Economy 
- Mining], vol. 2, 4 (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 1969), 20–21; Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, Taiwan Sheng Wenhua Zhi 臺
灣省文化志 [Taiwan Province Cultural Record], 2:377–78, 395; Yu Yonghe 郁永和, Bihai Jiyou 裨海紀遊 [Records 
of Travels on a Small Sea], 24. 
64In 1890, 176.58kg of gold were exported to Hong Kong and other places via Tamsui customs. Taiwansheng 
Tongzhi: Jingjizhi Kuangyepian 台灣省通誌: 經濟志礦業篇 [Annals of Taiwan Province: Economy - Mining], 2:23; 
Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 464. 
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sometimes hoodlums converged in the area and induced conflicts. Despite this, the Qing and 
Japanese governments established a gold mining bureau and provided licences to Chinese 
miners and merchants to try to regulate it.65 Sulphur mining also resumed in 1863 for military 
purposes and Liu Mingchuang enacted a new sulphur monopoly in 1887 along with a camphor 
monopoly to increase revenue and increase the defence budget for the mountain regions, 
which suggested some possible further expansion of sulphur mining.66 Oil was discovered in 
Chuhuangkeng 出磺坑 (Miaoli County) in 1865 by British tea merchant -John Dodd- on one of 
his visits to the mountains, near indigenes’ borders, but his mining plan failed to proceed.67 He 
managed to extract some oil in wooden containers and dispatched these to a Cantonese shroff 
68 who was in Formosa at the time, whereat the Chinese government deplored his action and 
warned him about attacks from mountain indigenes. 69  No further actions for obtaining oil 
occurred until 1877, when Fujian authorities hired two American engineers and purchased oil-
well machinery. Nonetheless, this oil extraction project was mandatorily stopped after some 
limited result since the two American engineers refused to continue their contract after one 
year under difficult circumstances.70 
After openings of the treaty ports, many resources were rediscovered, effectively 
amassed with new farming or mining techniques introduced by foreign merchants and foreign 
investments continued to flow into these new developing industries. This also stimulated local 
Chinese merchants’ investment and local Chinese labourers’ involvement because of their 
experience in dealing with both plain and mountain indigenes and their eagerness for profits. 
Some resources did not extend and develop as much as the camphor and tea industries and it 
is difficult to measure the levels of disturbance caused by these new industries and how badly 
indigenous groups were affected, as some were driven out by the Chinese decades before or 
homogenised with them. It is certain that several scales of encroachment appended to these 
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new industries, such as land exploitation which was often ill-treated or abandoned by the 
Chinese making it commercially difficult to reuse for cultivation; roads opening; more Chinese 
labour and immigrants stationed or resettled; all of which directly and indirectly limited 
indigenes’ movements, restricted their hunting and farming areas and caused disturbance of 
their livelihood. Fighting was the only way to declare their sovereignty and defence of lands. On 
the other hand, connectivity of indigenes with outsiders, whether it was mutual or hostile, 
enhanced and created opportunities for goods exchange, the spread of Christianity and 
knowledge and experience of goods and weapons. 
 
3. From “Treaty Formosa” to Taiwan Province 
3.1. Ignorance of Local Chinese Authority Concerning Foreign Affairs. 
 
This section will briefly discuss the posture, the changes of policies of the Qing 
government as a colonist that affected both mountain and plain indigenous people while 
dealing with external and internal conflicts and engaging with some newly developed economic 
resources to rationalise its expenditure. The Qing government continued in its lack of 
attentiveness and its neglect in managing Eastern Taiwan, while European merchants, local 
Chinese merchants, landlords and farmers began to crave economic resources increasingly after 
the Tianjin Treaty was signed. However, the situation fluctuated after several incidents catalysed 
by Europe and Japan in Eastern Taiwan compelled the Qing government to re-evaluate the 
island’s substantive position for its coastal security from 1860-1894 after Zheng’s descendants 
capitulated to the Qing regime. As Professor Robert Gardella suggested, for this period, “For 
the first time since the seventeenth century, large sectors of Taiwan’s agrarian economy became 
closely meshed with the market mechanisms of international commerce.” He then continued, 
“For the first time since the late 1600s, Taiwan emerged as one of China’s pressing “national 
security” concerns.” 71  We see this in contrast to Formosan indigenous people, whose 
circumstances appeared to get worse and who faced greater pressure from the Qing 
government – the colonist who could never recognise or be respected by indigenous tribes. 
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Inexperienced local Chinese authority failed to contend with foreign affairs when foreign 
ships were wrecked and sailors were unaccounted for in southeast Taiwan, foreign missionaries 
and merchants suffered attacks or assaults, and commercial and taxation disputes arose with 
local officials in the inceptive period of signing and opening the treaty ports in Taiwan. The 
attitude of local authorities in Taiwan was often found to be lacking in attentiveness, 
perfunctory and inequitable, this resulting in remonstrance, military intimidation from the West 
and indemnification to the West. The Western powers soon imposed upon their favourable 
situation and trespassed on eastern mountain regions that had long been forbidden by the Qing 
government. For instance, when General Le Gendre sought the Chinese officials’ assistance in 
investigating and punishing the murderers of castaways from Rover that had been wrecked in 
southern Taiwan in 1867, the Chinese governor then refused to intervene and renounce his 
jurisdiction over the territories where mountain indigenes lived.72 Later in the same year, a 
Camphor Regulation was signed under the force of British military threat, nevertheless it was 
one of the British merchants who initiated the smuggling of camphor without licensing from 
the local Chinese authority.73 This regulation ensured the liberty of Western merchants and 
people to travel for business and leisure and missionaries held the right to reside and work in 
the island.74 Another provision was made by Qing official Zeng Xiande 曾憲德 and declared that 
on the occasion when Westerners entered a mountain region, were murdered by mountain 
indigenes, were indebted or deceived by camphor workers, similar problems were not allowed 
to be addressed to local authority.75 In other words, this provision officially relinquished Chinese 
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jurisdiction over the mountain regions and welcomed any Westerners to freely enter and trade 
in Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese officials refused to acknowledge the governance of eastern 
Taiwan by not accepting and hearing cases beyond the interior mountain regions although this 
was foreseen in 1867 when Wu Dating 吳大廷, the Circuit Intendant of Taiwan (臺灣兵備道) 
recklessly proclaimed that the terrain of the “raw savage” was not part of the Qing imperial 
domain, where the Qing imperial prestige and civilization could not reach, and suggested not 
to cross the indigenes’ border to General Le Gendre, U.S. consul at Amoy.76 Although the chief 
of 18 tribes of Paiwan - Tooke-tok 卓杞篤 not only renounced the authority of the Qing 
government in Taiwan but also refused to conciliate with Qing officials, when local officials were 
sent to negotiate after the Rover incident.77 General Le Gendre came to Taiwan and sought 
negotiation and assurance for the safety and aid of shipwrecked American and European sailors 
with Tooke-tok.78 This not only gave foreigners direct access to confer with Formosan indigenes, 
but also reflected the negligence of local Chinese authority in eastern Taiwan, which then 
induced Japan to send an expedition in 1874, the so-called Mudan incident. 
 
3.2. Indigenous Governance by the Qing Government from 1874-1895 
 
From the late nineteenth century, the Qing government launched dynamic and varied 
programs of self-strengthening for Taiwan and commanded Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨 in office 
(1874-1875), a former governor and director of the Foochow Arsenal and Dockyard, to develop 
China’s first modern naval defence project after the Mudan incident of 1874. To reinforce 
Taiwan’s security for Chinese settlers, and to manage central and eastern divisions of Taiwan 
where mountain indigenes lived the dual policy of “opening up mountains and pacifying the 
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indigenes” were Shen‘s priorities.79 Operations involved in opening mountain included building 
roads and fortresses from northern, central and southern lowlands toward mountains regions, 
clearing and burning woods and pastures, encouraging cultivators from China, providing them 
with military protection, establishing elementary administration and increasing military 
defences. 80  16,500 soldiers were transferred to Taiwan when Japan sent its expedition to 
southern Taiwan and later stayed on in “opening up mountains” operations.81 Placating the 
indigenes included setting up public schools, introducing Chinese languages, clothes, culture, 
and farming to indigenes. 82 Nonetheless punitive expeditions were often sent against indigenes 
when disobedience was found. A later governor of Fujian, Ding Richang 丁日昌 in office (1875-
1878) extended Shen’s operation on Taiwan’s naval and military defence and his policies on 
indigenes in central and eastern divisions with some adjustments, which he advocated to induce 
indigenes culturally and economically instead of through military subjugation. This consisted of 
not punishing indigenes who incited the previous revolts, introducing Chinese education and 
agricultural techniques, recruiting indigenes for mining and opening roads, albeit limited and in 
a few areas only. 83  Without any doubt, Shen Baozhen and Ding Richang inaugurated and 
contributed to Taiwan’s naval military defence by purchasing and transferring large amounts of 
advanced and modern warships and weapons, funding early technological constructions such 
as railways, telegraph lines and development in central and eastern Taiwan.  84  Varied 
disturbances and conflicts erupted when the Qing military and a great deal of Chinese 
immigrants or cultivators penetrated the interior mountain regions while logging camphor, 
rattans, planting tea and exploiting other valuable resources. Nevertheless, Shen and Ding’s 
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period of “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” scheme did not last long, but 
indeed halted for nearly 10 years after Ding’s departure.  
As mentioned earlier, since or even before the opening of the treaty ports in 1860, 
indigenous communities, especially mountain indigenes, started to face economic intrusions 
prompted by Western industrial progression and consumer cultures. Due to repeated 
dissensions caused by European, Japanese and indigenes in eastern and southern districts of 
Taiwan, the Qing government was compelled to recognize the importance of Taiwan and of 
managing indigenes in the mountain regions. The Qing government’s indigenous policies from 
1874 accelerated and legitimized the pillage of natural resources in indigenous lands. 
Indigenous people not only had to cope with some erratic conflicts with the crafty Chinese who 
coveted their lands incessantly, but were also confronted with the Qing government’s invasions. 
Pavel Ibis, an Estonian ensign, marked the strong sense of ownership of lands and antagonism 
amongst Formosan indigenes from his trip to Taiwan in 1875, 
They, it is true, remain in trade relations with other tribes, who supply 
them with everything necessary second hand, but they themselves 
rarely leave the native forests, as if afraid to lose their independence 
through encounters with more developed peoples. The necessity to 
defend their homeland and freedom against a constant pressure from 
the Chinese caused by the shortage of land for such a dense population 
in western Formosa has caused them [the natives] to further withdraw 
from all others, and has made them secretive and suspicious, even 
toward other native tribes.85 
Contacts and invasions increasingly confronted indigenous societies, at the same time, 
large amounts of armaments constantly flowed and transferred into Taiwan and were used to 
fight against them. Further investigation and analysis of how indigenes encountered conflicts 
and advanced military technology in warfare, and other contacts within indigenous cultures and 
societies, (at primary and traditional levels) under the pressure of the world economy filtered 
through the Qing government’s indigenous policies from 1860-1883 and will be the focus in 
Chapter 4. 
 The second phase of modernization in Taiwan which followed up Shen and Ding’s self-
strengthening scheme, was resumed and enhanced by Liu Mingchuan when he was appointed 
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as the first governor of the Province of Taiwan after separating it from Fujian Province in 1885.86 
Liu Mingchuan was ordered to command the defence of Taiwan in July 1884 after the Sino-
French War broke out in Vietnam in December 1883 and the later battlefield moved to northern 
Taiwan. During Liu’s command, the French failed to occupy Keelung and Tamsui, but imposed a 
blockade on Taiwan for over 6 months instead (October 1884-April 1885), and later retreated 
to Penghu. 87  After the French blockade, Liu Mingchuan urged the consolidation of naval 
defences by reinforcing major seaports with advanced artilleries, and a lot of substantial 
achievements were made throughout Liu’s 7 years in position (1884-1891), which widely 
propelled Taiwan into one of the modernized provinces under late Qing governance. 88  He 
actively bolstered a military force by purchasing modern warships and artilleries, recruiting the 
German Lieutenant, Baons to inspect cannon construction in Keelung and instruct Chinese 
soldiers89 and in establishing arsenals in Taipei, which were placed under a German engineer’s 
supervision for ammunitions manufacture and supply. 90  To develop and strengthen 
communication systems and military mobility for potential foreign invasions and internal revolts, 
numerous roads were built in central and eastern regions, telegraph lines were constructed 
from Tainan to Tamsui and Keelung, cables were laid from Foochow and Tamsui, the railway 
from Keelung and Xinzhu was completed and a postal system was established through strong 
collaboration with foreign firms and engineers.  91He also determined the project of the second 
“opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” and appointed Lin Weiyuan 林維源, of the 
local gentry, to establish the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 撫墾局 with 8 major offices 
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and 18 branches throughout the indigenous frontiers from north to south and east. These 
branches mostly were operated by local gentry leaders with diverse activities to placate 
indigenes, including educating them in Chinese and Confucian classics, introducing medical 
services and farming practices, etc.92 although again the impact was limited. Military outposts 
and guards were extensively set up within indigenous domains to secure Chinese settlements, 
and punitive military forces were often used on indigenes especially against the Atayal and Amis 
tribes in the northern and eastern regions.93 George Taylor offered his observation on this scene, 
“Chinese settlers are yearly increasing; military district; nearly every savage village has a 
Chinese guard station, and at every little creek along the coast soldiers will be found, whilst the 
importation of gunpowder is a capital offence.”94 However, Chinese forces struggled to subdue 
indigenous tribes even with the latest purchased artilleries, and clashes resulted in great 
casualties. (see below pp. 175-181)   
To sustain Taiwan’s revenue and expenditure on expensive military force and pacification 
and reclamation schemes (without Fujian’s subsidy) as an independent province, Liu enacted 
various reforms in Taiwan’s administration and finance, reforms that involved forming more 
administrative divisions, applying the camphor and sulphur monopoly 95 , encouraging tea 
plantation, raising a commercial tax revenue (lijin 釐金) from sugar export and foreign imports, 
which involved the local gentry’s participation as part of the self-strengthening campaign, in 
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particular with the Lin families in Banqiao and Wufeng.96 Indigenous territories were subjected 
to greater political and economic encroachment on account of the enforcement of Liu’s 
indigenous policies and new policies on ruling Taiwan, and their communities were thus 
challenged even before it was ceded to Japan in 1895, although the then governor – Shao Youlian 
邵友濂 (1891-1895) after Liu retired - abandoned most of Liu’s plan.  
As emphasised from the beginning of this thesis,97this phase (1884-1895) is marked as 
the watershed in the history of Taiwan and indigenous history, as Liu ’s modernization plan in 
Taiwan clashed intensively with indigenous societies. We shall see how advanced military forces 
of the Qing were defeated with mass casualty by Formosan indigenes who were heavily 
victimised and compelled to resist while Qing’s modern weaponry permeated Taiwan. Analysis 
will be made in Chapter 5 of indigenous conflicts with the Qing military and Chinese civilians and 
the engagement of weaponry will be demonstrated as representing a move of weaponry and 
warfare to a more modernised level. 
 
3.3. Encroachment by the Chinese 
 
The Chinese who settled in Taiwan certainly became the actual intruders or 
intermediators of these economic and political encroachments into the mountain indigenes’ 
territories. The Chinese persisted in depriving indigenes of lands unlawfully, as was frequently 
narrated by foreign travellers. For instance, Swinhoe noted in 1864, how  
The lines of demarcation between the territory of the Chinese and that 
of the aborigines are at once observable by the fine timbered hills that 
mark the hunting-grounds of the original possessors of the island. The 
Chinese territory is almost entirely denuded of trees, and cultivated on 
these interior hills mostly with the tea-plant, introduced from China. 
The absence of the primitive forest has naturally wrought a vast 
difference between the flora and fauna of the two territories.”98 
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French Vice Consul Mr. Guérin, who visited Taiwan in 1868, also talked about the deceptions 
the Chinese used on the mountain indigenes for obtaining lands, as he described,  
The Chinese pioneer tries to obtain what he wants by buying it, and his 
favorite tactics are persuasion; but if he encounters an obstinate refusal, 
he will try other means, at his own risk, of course. Thus, wood choppers 
scatter through the forests singly or in small groups, and they are an 
easy prey to marauders … if the savages refuse to make any concessions, 
the Chinese proceed in a large group, and half of them keep armed 
guard over the safety of the workmen. In this way there is no danger, 
and if the Chinese adopted this procedure all the time, the tribes would 
be condemned to retreat a little more each day.” 99 
Mizuno Jun depicted an incident which occurred when he visited Dakekan 大嵙崁 (Daxi District 
in Taoyuan County) in 1873 (before Japan sent the expedition to southern Taiwan), where some 
Chinese ambushed and captured three mountain indigenes by lying to them about foreigners 
bringing presents. Mizuno Jun was told that other memebers of the indigenes then came to the 
Chinese residences for return of the hostages and gave the Chinese 14.5 to 29 hectares of lands 
in exchange.100  
Besides, some fairly friendly relations among the mountain indigenes and the Chinese 
were also discerned. Some observations and experiences of relations between mountain 
indigenes and Hakka Chinese were made by Pickering, that mountain indigenes in the south 
relied on goods and weaponry supplied by Hakka Chinese.101 General Le Gendre also noted that 
“many of their emissaries (Hakkas) have pushed far into the country of the mountain indigenes, 
where they have settled and are laying up the foundations for a more extensive intercourse and 
trade” 102 when he followed an expedition to the south led by the local Chinese officials in 1874. 
Cases of mountain indigenes on friendly terms with Chinese and married to Chinese were 
common throughout the nineteenth century, and also known and noted in Chinese and English 
literature. In April 1847 Cao Shigui 曹士桂 – a subprefect of indigenous affairs in northern 
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Taiwan noted in his diary that he met a Chinese man– Li Xiu 李秀 and one of his four indigenous 
wives, who belonged to the Atayal tribe.103 Swinhoe also noted a Chinese man – Lin Bancheang
林萬掌- married to a Rukai indigenous woman from Kalees who conducted some trade with 
indigenes in southern Taiwan. 104 Chen Guodong also noted that the continuity of intermarriage 
between the Chinese men and mountain and plain indigenous women still existed up to the 
Japanese colonial period.105 The cases of trade and intermarriage with the mountain indigenes 
might be as well regarded as another form of encroachment from the western plain. These 
cases of Chinese intruding into mountain indigenous territories and inveigling mountain 
indigenes were commonly found throughout the late nineteenth century. The Western 
countries and the Qing government were the ones who further manipulated behind these more 
domestic yet brutal operations. 
Meanwhile, plains indigenes who desisted from the headhunting ritual and lost their 
lands in the western plains to lawless Chinese immigrants were situated in a complicated and 
hazardous circumstance. They were either forced into the mountains or to relocate to eastern 
regions (see Chapter 2, Map 2:4, p. 54), and then undergo attacks by mountain indigenes from 
time to time when they risked losing their heads from headhunting practices. Regularly they 
also conducted trade with mountain indigenes 106 and accessed mountain regions for logging 
camphor trees 107 and acted as middlemen for commerce or guides between Chinese and 
foreigners.108 For instance, plain indigene or Sisheshoufan 四社熟番 in the Yuli basin 玉里盆地 
(Tainan City) were known to trade clothes, ironware, sugar wine, salt, pigs with the mountain 
indigenes and this was recorded in the 1890s.109 Nevertheless, a variety of relations of the plains 
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indigenes with Chinese immigrants also developed into a complex network over time such as 
intermarriages (even though the Chinese were forbidden to marry indigenes by the Qing 
government110), mixed residence and so on, which assisted the movement and transfer of goods, 
ideas, information, weaponry, and so on. Several accounts of mixed residence of mountain 
indigenes, plains indigenes, half castes, and Chinese, especially Hakka Chinese, were reported 
in Pingdong County, in places like Liangkiau 瑯嶠(Hengchuan township), Tossupong 大樹房 and 
Sheomalee 射麻里 (Manzhou township).111 In some cases plains indigenes were hired as guards 
by them and given firearms to protect Chinese in the mountains, as noticed by a British naval 
surveying officer, William Blakeney when he arrived at the Southern Cape with Swinhoe in 
1858112 and a German botanist, Dr. Warburg who visited a church in Suao 蘇澳 (Yilan County) 
with Dr. Mackay in 1888.113 T.L. Bullock, a British Acting consul also described the employment 
of “water savages” (Thao tribes live near Sun-moon Lake in Nantou), “they live by hunting, by 
working for Chinamen, and by cultivating the little land which they have cleared for 
themselves”. 114  The continuous plains indigenes military scheme from the late eighteenth 
century, which was established by Imperial Commissioner Fu Kangan (also see Chapter 2, p. 55), 
served its function of security at the indigenes’ borders and to assist the Qing military in 
pacifying local raids and the mountain indigenes in the “opening up mountain and pacifying the 
indigenes” program. For instance, hundreds of plains indigenes military were sent to reinforce 
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the Qing army and stationed in the northern, central and southern division according to Xu’s 
analysis.115  
There were relationships and intricate networks among mountain indigenes, plains 
indigenes and the Chinese communities when the chances of political, economic and cultural 
intrusions were higher from the late nineteenth century. Various circumstances and degrees of 
interactions of mountain indigenes with plains indigenes and Chinese mainly depended on the 
areas involved, and were more often triggered or accelerated by commercial imperatives, 
driving Chinese immigrants to exploit and profit from camphor, tea, indigo and other mountain 
resources, or by colonial governants’ intervention. So, nineteenth century Taiwan was 
enveloped in a highly strung predicament by several belligerent ethnic groups. Such patterns of 
interaction or relations like trade, intermarriage, mixed residence, etc also constructed routes 
for circulating goods, information, knowledge and technologies. These will be discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The plains indigenes were the vehicles for this circulation or transfer and in 
some ways they might be the ones also who ensured the process of dissemination amongst 
indigenous societies through friends and foes alike and varied layers of relations.  
 
4. Formosan Indigenes under Japan’s Colonization (1895-1914) 
 
Traces of Japan casting her covetous eyes on Taiwan can be found in the early 
seventeenth century before Dutch colonization when Japanese pirates often used Taiwan as 
their base and made a few attempts to occupy Keelung.116 However, apart from the thousands 
of tons of sugar and deerskin exported from Taiwan to Japan by the Dutch as noted in an earlier 
chapter, linkage between Japan and Taiwan ceased when Japan decreed the Sakoku (or isolation) 
policy in 1639. Two and a half centuries later, Japan obtained authority over Taiwan without 
using any direct local military force after gaining victory in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 
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while European countries led by Great Britain rivalled to exploited abundant resources in 
Taiwan through commercial means. By all means, Japan desiderated the rich resources of sugar, 
rice, camphor, tea, forestry, mining and mountain products in Taiwan. Thus, ruling Taiwan as 
Japan’s first colony and controlling intractable mountain indigenes proved to be vital tasks for 
Japan after its revolutionary transformation from a “rural” country to a capitalist and 
modernized society.117 This section is going to outline the stages and policies of the Japanese 
government in its attempts to manage and to have full control over the indigenes and the ways 
in which these accelerated infringements on their domains and communities.   
At the early stage of Japanese indigenous management (1895-1902), Kabayama 
Sukenori 樺山資紀, the first viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府, the highest organ of 
Japanese government in Taiwan, authorised military governance and a placatory policy towards 
indigenous people, in order to avoid uprisings in indigenous districts and the risks of forming 
alliances and rebellions with the Chinese, before repressing the remaining Republic of 
Formosa’s defiance (1895-1896). Fuji Shizue specified that apart from militarized concerns at 
the time, placatory policies also targeted exploiting mountain resources as in a mandate carried 
by Kabayama, “to develop Taiwan, to tame raw savages is the priority task”. In Taiwan 
administrative reports, mountain indigenes were listed under agriculture and forestry and the 
Japanese dismissed mountain indigenous rights, but mainly focused on evolving colonial 
industries.118 Taiwan Sotokufu soon regulated ordinances to restrict the procurement of coal, 
sulphur, gold mining and most importantly camphor that were largely found in indigenous 
territories, and restored most of the infrastructure left by the Qing to supply frontier resources. 
To acquire the dominance of camphor and secure its profits, command over mountain indigenes 
turned into Taiwan Sotokufu’s key commission and this involved assembling frontier guards 
inherited from the Qing era to protect camphor workers and stoves from the mountain 
indigenes’ attacks, followed by the establishment of the Taiwan Camphor Bureau in 1899.119 
Meanwhile, to appease indigenes, particularly mountain indigenes, Japan followed approaches 
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Impact on the World (Canberra: Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 1984), 18–29. 
118 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of 
Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation) (Nantou: The Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province, 
2001), 2–3. 
119 Ibid., 29–33; Antonio C. Tavares, ‘The Japanese Colonial State and the Dissolution of the Late Imperial Frontier 
Economy in Taiwan, 1886-1909’, The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (May 2005): 371–72. 
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from the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau of the Qing government. Alcohol, food, cigarettes, 
clothes, utensils and medals were bestowed on many indigenous groups and Japanese 
authorities received indigenous chiefs in Taipei. A lot of research on indigenous cultures, lives, 
diseases, weaponry and local industries proceeded in this period before crucial subjugations 
began from 1902.120 Nonetheless, indigenous groups persisted with insurgences, especially the 
Atayal, Paiwan and Truku, and indigenous collaborations with Chinese rebellions in 1896-1897 
manifested the failure of Japan’s early placatory policies. (See Chapters 6)  
To pursue ultimate economic interests, policies on indigenes’ management were 
amended after the outbreak of the indigenous mutiny in Nanzhuang 南庄 (Miaoli County) in 
1902 originated by Ri Agui 日阿拐, a chief of the Nanshiriki village of the Saisiyat tribe, who also 
owned hundreds of camphor stoves with Taiwan Sotokufu’s permission. Kodama Gentarō, the 
fourth viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu, set up a Committee of Mountain Affairs 山地事務委員會 
under the management of the Police Bureau in 1903 and repressed indigenes by using military 
force, threatening withdrawal of salt and ammunitions supply, constructing and extending 
guards lines from Yilan to Nantou that sieged and limited indigenous territories.121 Duties of 
guards involved in the defence and protection of camphor workers from indigenes’ assaults 
included patrols along guard lines, liaisons between guard camps, repair and improvement of 
roads and cable, etc. 122  Landmines and electric wires were installed along guard lines and 
extended from Yilan, Xinchu, Taichung, Nantou, Douliu and Taitung, where the camphor trees 
were distributed and where experienced mountain indigenes’ attacked the most. 123 
Furthermore, from 1907 to 1914, the Viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu, Sakuma Samata implemented 
                                                             
120 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian  臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 ( The History of 
Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 3–4, 24–25; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Riben Digup Tongshi de Jianli 日本帝國
統治的建立 [Establishment of Imperial Japan’s Governance]’, in Gupjia, Quyu, Zuqun-Taiwan Houshan Qilai Diqu 
Yuanzhumin Zuquan de Lishi Bianqian (1874-1945)國家, 區域, 族群 - 臺灣後山奇萊地區原住民族權的歷史變
遷 (1874-1945) [Nation, Region, Ethnic Groups: The Historical Changes of the Indigenous Authority in the Region 
of Qílái Region in Taiwan] (Taitung: Dong Taiwan yanjiu hui 東台灣研究會 [Eastern Taiwan Research 
Associaition], 2008), 103. 
121 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of 
Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 52–56. 
122 Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 5 1 (Taipei: 臺灣總督府
警務局理蕃課, 1918), 357–58; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Riben Digup Tongshi de Jianli 日本帝國統治的建立 
[Establishment of Imperial Japan’s Governance]’, 104–5. 
123 Here was a clear introduction of very advanced technology into border conflicts. Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, 
Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy 
Formulation), 61–62. 
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twice the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” (五年理蕃計畫), which included 
missions on quelling indigenous tribes by using advanced armaments and confiscating 
weaponry held by them. Multiple strategies were manoeuvred, from the building of roads 
inside the interior central and eastern mountains, expanding guard lines to propel mountain 
indigenes further and enticement with salt, matches, iron and medical service as prizes, and 
providing police and military forces with modern armaments, communication, and 
transportation.124 These provoked numerous insurrections initiated by indigenes, especially by 
mountain indigenes, guard lines and camps were attacked and hundreds of guards and 
Japanese policemen were killed as detailed in Chapter 6. To avert genocide, indigenous tribes 
finally surrendered against Japan’s advanced weaponry, they also at least nominally lost their 
lands and firearms and were required to relocate to places for easier management and to 
receive Japanese education that brought to a seeming close the violent and brutal indigenes 
management. In Chapter 6, multiple indigenous warfare will be researched as well as changes 
in weaponry that Formosan indigenes held at a more “advanced” level for it was this that 
sustained their resistance during stages of merciless encroachment. 
 
5. Further Encroachment, Further Resistnace after 1860 
 
Formosan indigenous tribes and their living environment were put under pressure in 
these years, on the other hand, issues and management of the Formosan indigenes troubled 
egocentric and profit-seeking Qing and Japanese colonists. Here I would like to suggest that the 
components and capacities for indigenes to resist were transformed in the very process of 
fulfilling the demands of industrial developments in the West and world market from the 
second half nineteenth century. Therefore, this chapter emphasized the context and ma in 
features of the encroachment process in Taiwan, no longer just limited to Chinese agrarian 
interests, and the major impacts of economic interest, politics and policies on indigenes under 
late Qing and Japanese’s governances that further accelerated the encroachments from 1860. 
Until at last Formosan indigenous people succumbed to advanced military suppression in 1914, 
although we must also note that resistance to the Japanese went on until the outset of the 
1930s. Economic interest in Taiwan and shipwreck incidents in eastern Taiwan firstly conspired 
                                                             
124 Ibid., 86–88. 
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Europeans’ and Japanese’s attempts at procuring Taiwan after four of the treaty ports were 
opened. Meanwhile indigenous people formed some friendly relationships with Westerners 
such as those who married Europeans and experienced meaningful cultural engagement. 
Essentially, the imperatives of commercial interests of both European merchants and colonists 
in dominating and manipulating camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other industries in the 
mountains or close to the mountains, escalated greater intrusions from the western plain to 
the eastern mountain districts. Here we also pointed out the importance of exploiting these 
resources in industrial production and in a market generated on the other side of the world, 
and the increased local government revenue that lead to massive environmental disruptions, 
contravening indigenous lives directly and indirectly. This disruption could be seen in the report 
of Consul T. Watters in Tamsui, “the camphor trees are being gradua lly cut down and no new 
trees planted, and that the distance between the place of manufacture and the port is yearly 
extending.”125 The stance of the Qing government altered as it regarded Taiwan as a strategic 
place for its coastal defence and was urged to modernise from 1874 after varied threats and 
incidents from European countries and Japan in the eastern regions. The late Qing government 
enacted major changes in Taiwan modernization and indigenous policies that legitimised 
impositions on mountain indigenous territories in the central and eastern mountain districts 
and stimulated the opposition of mountain indigenes. The Qing armies had little success in 
pacifying indigenes and struggled throughout the period. Japan experienced similar 
consequences as had the Qing government under conditions of far greater economic 
exploitation.  
While the living and hunting space of indigenes continued to be compressed, they 
remained to withhold their geographical advantages from intruders. Such factor of terrain or 
climate were even more important in conflicts further north and east as expressed by Swinhoe, 
who emphasised the military significance of contrast in terrain:   
they have struggled hard and are still struggling against the ever 
encroaching Chinese settler, to maintain their territory and 
independence. The Plains have been entirely snatched from them as 
well as the lower hill ranges, but where the mountains are sufficiently 
                                                             
125 TEPR 2/737-744. Report on the Foreign Trade of the Ports of Tamsuy and Kelung during the Year 1880. Consul. 
T. Watters. Tamsuy, 28/Feb/1881. 
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covered with forest and of sufficient height to enable them to repel the 
usurper, they have succeeded in doing do.126  
This appears to have been be attained when the well-armed Americans of the Rover incident 
(see Chapter 4, p. 136): 
experienced immense difficulties in forcing a way through the thick 
jungle; the intense heat rendered it almost impossible to conduct 
operations in the middle of the day, and many of the party were 
attacked by sunstroke. The savages, who had taken up a position in the 
jungle behind rocks and other places invisible to the Americans, kept up 
a heavy fire whenever their foes appeared…. after a desperate 
engagement, the force was compelled to withdraw in some confusion 
to the ships, and soon departed from the island.127  
Again, we see variations between use of weaponry and effects of terrain in determining 
outcomes. Even where their arms appear not to have advanced far, groups of indigenous 
fighters could maintain effective resistance against such well-equipped forces as those of the 
Americans and the Japanese. House described how the Botans re-created natural advantage 
during the Mutan incident, forging an environment as  
nearly impregnable as any strong-hold possibly can be. The sides of the 
“Stone Gate” are two rocky acclivities which rise at sharp angles, and 
often perpendicularly, to a height of nearly five hundred feet on one 
side and four hundred and fifty on the other. The distance between 
them, at the base, is about thirty feet, which is entirely filled by a rapid 
stream that dashes in foam over rough rocks through the greater length 
of the pass, and is waist deep at its only fordable point. Except under 
pressure of the most desperate necessity, no one would ever dream of 
attempting to scale these heights; and in fact no earthly power could 
accomplish such a task if any attempt, however feeble, were made to 
defend them. The crag on the right hand pillar is topped by sharp spires 
not unlike the needles of the Chamouni valley [Switzerland] in form –
though of course much smaller- and certainly as forbidding in their 
defiance to intruders.128 
A very interesting estimate from ensign Ibis in 1877 refers to southern resistance on the small 
scale, 
The tribes of southern Formosa are the most warlike and venturesome 
of all… Although they do not number more than 2,000 men, they still 
                                                             
126 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 4. 
127 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 116. 
128 House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 119–20. 
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have the advantage of the northern portion of the countryside, a raw, 
completely wild region, only accessible at a few spots, where every river, 
every mountain path and every canyon is in and of itself a stronghold. 
Also, they never engage in open battle that could put them at a 
disadvantage, but rather follow the enemy by foot, unseen, 
unsuspected, and then shoot at him from the bushes, or weaken him 
through surprise attacks, or lure him into their hiding places, from which 
retreat is not possible without substantial losses. When one considers, 
then, that energy, cunning, and natural advantages are on the side of 
the attacker, it is easy to conclude that, on average, ten Chinese soldiers 
will not be enough against one native.129 
Yet even here we see clues as to use of weapon and tactics, the unexpected and 
exhausting manner in which the local environments were utilised by the Formosan indigenes. 
In this account, White noted the difficulty of crossing the forest and the importance of complete 
silence: 
 The intense silence of the forest, broken only by an occasional falling 
stone displaced in our way up the course, was very striking, and we 
could not help feeling how perfectly helpless the best drilled body of 
troops in the world would be, if left to their own resources in such a 
country, and opposed by merely a few poorly armed savages.130 
 
All the above does suggest that at most times, the point of conflict was associated with 
inherent advantages for the indigenous and achieved disadvantages for any outside antagonists. 
So, for the indigenous, local factors could not create victory where weapons were poor but they 
could militate against decisive victories for their opponents, however supplied and well -
equipped technologically.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
129 Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, 167–71. 
130 White, ‘A Visit to the Interior of South Formosa’, 198. 
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Chart 3:1 General Relations between Physical Environment and Cultural Assets as 
the Context of Indigenous Resistance from 1860 (cf. Chart 2:1 p. 63)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As infringement became stronger as presented in this chapter and Chart 3:1 shown 
above, features or assets of resistance of Formosan indigenes were greatly affected and 
amended from the mid-nineteenth century (Blocks A + C). In other words, the aptitude of 
indigenes to fight against intruders was converted and increased by extrinsic thrusts as at C. As 
mentioned earlier, the scale of natural resource exploitation spread from the western plains to 
central and mountain regions, new terrain might not be transmuted rapidly and indigenous 
people still gained some geographical defence and preserved some advantages when 
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confronting invaders. But then spaces were slowly constrained and this disrupted their ways of 
living and hunting. Mountain indigenes now faced predicaments like the earliest western plains 
indigenes – losing natural and geographical protection like hiding, guarding, setting up snares 
in forests and settings which they were familiar with, losing ownership of lands or territories 
now replaced by tea or indigo plantations and roads to transport camphor logs and other 
mountain resources. Damaging lands in such varied ways, this resulted in less surviving animals 
to hunt and suitable land to grow crops for indigenes’ self sufficiency and shortage of animal 
skins and meat to trade with the Chinese. Hostilities and tensions between neighbouring 
indigenous tribes augmented their already existing disputes over the unclear demarcation of 
territories, too. As their culture of headhunting remained to serve as insurance of prosperous 
harvests and hunting, as well as of their social status, and as a solution in disagreements, 
disasters elimination or revenge and to terrorize outsiders, then it followed that further 
commercial and political incursions could only embolden their customs. Lastly, the new arrival 
and the use of firearms (Block D) as relatively alien objects along with the opposition of 
indigenes to the colonists might have retained indigenes’ ascendancy and titles for lands. 
 
6. Firearms and Culture: the Argument and Hypothesis  
 
Heretofore, it becomes clear that from the mid-nineteenth century, Formosan 
indigenous people faced phases of comprehensive infringements from the western plain 
toward the central and eastern mountain areas under the combined pressure of new industrial 
technology and world market expansion and commercial colonists’ policies on developing 
eastern mountain districts, while Taiwan itself also encountered the external menace from the 
West which impelled Qing officials to initiate plans for modernizing Taiwan from 1874. The 
plans were influenced by the Self-Strengthening Movement in China itself and stressed the 
establishing of modern military technology, conciliating indigenous tribes and developing the 
rich resources in mountains.131 Nonetheless, commanding the truculent mountain indigenes 
became a primary issue for colonists. Hereafter, extending and transferring modern and 
                                                             
131 Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) was a series of institutional reforms, initiated after the defeats by 
the Western countries in China under the late Qing governance. The Qing officials strongly advocated the 
development of industry by introducing and importing Western military technologies and adopting scientific 
knowledge and training. It is often compared with the Meiji Restoration in Japan, but it was proved to fail with 
the defeat of Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  
112 
 
advanced military technology to Taiwan was not only to consolidate the defence of Taiwan, but 
also to mollify plural Chinese ethnic and indigenes revolts.  
Formosan indigenes showed distinctive characteristics in the second half of the 
nineteenth century when repelling unwanted visitors. As the historical record shows, 
indigenous people fought and resisted the Dutch and Chinese with their “primary” weaponry 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as noted in Chapter 2- bows, arrows, shield, 
swords, spears or darts and later some muskets, possibly from trading with the Chinese. The 
sorts of munitions indigenes later possessed were not only limited to traditional weaponry, but 
also flintlocks, Chinese matchlocks, Snider rifles, Reminton rifles, Mauser rifles and other 
breech-loading rifles were found and used in warfare by indigenes from the late nineteenth to 
the early twentieth century. It is clear that these modern weaponries were not invented or 
manufactured by Formosan indigenes. How did they procure such modern weaponries? What 
types of armament did indigenes possess to withstand colonists and intruders? Contemporary 
material documented how both the Qing and Japan grappled with terminating indigenous 
resistance and attacks, particularly with mountain indigenes and their headhunting culture. Can 
we argue that the use of modern weaponry, particularly firearms, assisted indigenous people 
to achieve some successes in warfare? How did indigenous people encounter and compete 
with the modern and advanced weaponry operated by the Qing and Japan from the mid-
nineteenth and twentieth centuries? What other factors were involved and combined with 
firearms that increased or maintained their effectiveness to fight against or attack interlopers? 
How did indigenous people perceive and respond to modern weaponry in their original cultures? 
How was modern technology applied and/or transferred into so-called “primitive” or even 
“savage” culture? 
The hypothesis of this theis is that the Formosan indigenes gained their access to 
modern firearms and developed and embedded firearms in their own cultures, which allowed 
them to resist effectively in the period of 1860 to 1914. Firearms were chosen as the major case 
study in this thesis because the indigenes of Taiwan did not appear to be merely “victims” for 
nearly one century from when modern technology interference arrived, unlike other 
indigenous cultures or colonies, but adapted and absorbed firearms into their hunting and 
head-hunting cultures to fight back instead and to preserve some of their independence. 
Firearms are also easier to carry and can be operated individually without much group discipline 
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and coordination of people, unlike cannons or other large armaments. Xu’s book on the military 
and society of Taiwan under Qing governance explicitly identifies major features of the 
development of military force by Qing officials, Chinese civilians and indigenes in Taiwan by 
using large amounts of Chinese historical material. He also discussed the effectiveness of 
administration and jurisdiction of the Qing, and how collaboration with rewarded local militia 
or Yimin (義民) and restrictions on iron, saltpetre and sulphur were the latent factors of “social 
stability” in Taiwan. Evidence on modern weaponry – mostly firearms – indicates how they had 
permeated indigenous societies and been used in warfare, even though he suggested that the 
Qing officials were of predominant status in large military weaponry transfer from China and 
through the later establishment of a munitions factory in Taipei.132 Finally he examined and 
analysed the strength of the military and co-operation between Qing armies, Chinese civilians 
and indigenes in internal conflicts of Chinese ethnic rivalries and indigenes ’ rebellions and 
external collisions with European countries and Japan.133 Another existing analytical treatment 
by Chen suggested that Formosan indigenes formulated their subjective choices of using 
firearms and composed their culture of firearms in order to retain their original hunting and 
headhunting activities, rather than under the imperatives of aggression, military expansion or 
attempt to construct a sovereign state. 134  Nevertheless, the transformations/transition and 
adaptation of modern military technology by recipients/operators, (not devisers nor those who 
received any military training) like the Taiwan indigenes remain unexamined as a social or 
cultural process operating within dynamic altering commercial and international circumstances. 
It is important to identify and recognize the circumstances of the indigenous people of Taiwan, 
whose resources and knowledge of technological application were limited, in the late 
nineteenth century – a transmutation era toward modernization when procuring firearms, and 
which represented interaction between global technology and indigenous cultures, and how 
such weaponries were further applied in warfare within indigenous cultures. This is a significant 
aspect of our present treatment which also focuses more on the global and Chinese context of 
indigenous history and use of firearms. The next 3 Chapters will be focusing on firearms as a 
                                                             
132 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of 
Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 213–21. 
133 Ibid., 1–11. 
134 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang -Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru 、
liutong Yu Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 (The Aborigines with Modern 
Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society)’, 90–91. 
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modern and foreign military technology that engaged in most conflicts of the indigenes and as 
we shall argue, could only effectively do so through a process of cultural change and adaptation, 
which is the subject of more detail analysis in Chapter 7.  
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Part II 1860-1914: Conflict and Resistance of the Indigenous People 
Chapter 4 Conflict at the Traditional Level 1860-1883: Clash of Cultures and 
Firearms 
The strategic position of Taiwan and its rich resources soon caught upon European 
countries’ attention and later claimed their lucrative interests as evidenced by the compulsive 
Treaty of Tianjin. This acceleration of encroachment was launched from the western plains to 
the eastern mountain regions under the pressure of commercial imperatives from the West 
from the 1860s, to be followed later by the colonial government’s persecution of the mountain 
indigenes’ territories, resources and lives from the 1890s. Clashes between cultures and 
resistances from the mountain indigenes were inevitable. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to 
explore the circumstances of mountain indigenes when encountering intrusions or incidents 
and the nature of the weaponry that mountain indigenes held in the period of 1860-1883. This 
period will be designated the “traditional level” of conflict, when cultures of European, Chinese 
and indigenes clashed at the beginning of the modernity process. The definition of “traditional 
level” in this thesis symbolises that the types of weapon such as knives, spears, arrows, bows 
and even firearms were in a primary stage which Formosan indigenes inherited from previous 
centuries.  
It is little known when matchlocks1 began to transfer into mountain indigenous societies, 
but the use of matchlocks became the popular armament among the Chinese military, the 
Chinese civilians and plains indigenes from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. The 
mountain indigenes were seemingly influenced by and adapted to this trend from the mid-
nineteenth century, therefore the use of matchlocks within mountain indigenes will be marked 
                                                             
1 Matchlock is regarded as the general term for Arquebus, Musket and Chinese matchlocks or 鳥銃, which were 
all muzzle loading types of firearms. They require a slow burning fuse to ignite the priming powder before 
loading the powder, which was wrapped by paper or cloth into a small ball, into the tubes. It was commonly used 
in Europe from the late 1400s to mid-1600s and in Japan from 1543 to mid-1800s. Matchlocks were introduced 
to China in 1500s, during the Jiajing era of the Ming Dynasty from Japan. For the development of matchlocks in 
China, see Chapter 2, p 48, and footnote 128-130. Although the parts of matchlocks were fairly simple and easy 
for repair, there were restriction and disadvantages of matchlocks, which effected the efficiency in warfare. For 
instance, the slow process when reloading, the safety of fuse when warrior usually carried gunpowder, the 
weather restricted the ignition or made the powder damp, difficulty in igniting outdoor, the smoke or fire could 
expose the warrior’ position, etc. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 28–29; Liu Xu  劉旭, Zhongguo 
Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China], 118, 153–56.; 
Further information on the development of matchlocks and muzzle loading firearms, see  Flatnes, From Musket 
to Metallic Cartridge, 28–75. 
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as an element of the traditional level of weaponry. The first section of Chapter 4 will focus on 
the collisions between mountain indigenes and foreigners, which resulted in  military 
expeditions from the West and Japan and the growing conflict mountain indigenes mounted 
against plains indigenes, the Chinese civilians, and the Qing military, in order to assess the 
nature of the military technology of mountain indigenes in 1860-1883. The second section will 
discuss the armament, mostly firearms that the Western military, foreign visitors, the Qing 
military and Chinese civilians used, which provided the environment of firearms for the 
mountain indigenes. Our third section will give details of firearms that mountain indigenes 
possessed and their direct access and possible accesses to procurement of firearms.  
 
1. Clashes with Westerners, Japanese and Chinese from 1860 
 
This section will firstly discuss how the indigenes encountered collisions initiated by 
foreign nations – Western nations and Japan. It focuses on the involvement of the firearms that 
mountain indigenes possessed in warfare, and also the engagement, experiences and 
knowledge of foreign weapons gained from foreign soldiers from 1860 to 1883. Then it will 
move to consider the antagonisms that the mountain indigenes confronted with plains 
indigenes, the Chinese civilians, and the Qing military, who were dispatched for “opening up 
mountains and pacifying the indigenes” by the Qing government. These internal conflicts 
continued to increase and became intensive under the demand for resources from the 
mountain regions for the world market and as the Qing government determined to open up 
eastern regions of Taiwan.  
 
1.1. External Conflicts   
 
Rover Incident 1867 
 
Contacts of indigenes with Europeans in the nineteenth century were also initiated as a 
series of violent incidents, which mostly took place in southern Taiwan. As referred to in Chapter 
3 (pp. 72-74), a number of unanticipated Western ships were wrecked on southern coasts 
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where mountain indigenes lived. Instinctively, it was inevitable for Formosan indigenes to 
regard these unknown ships and uninvited castaways that survived and reached the shores as 
potential threats. These ships were often known or reported to be pillaged and survivors were 
abused or treated as slaves by the indigenes or the local Chinese, which concerned the Western 
countries and the security of their trading routes. Insistent military action was demanded of 
Peking by the U.S. after 14 people were killed from an American merchant ship Rover by the 
Paiwan indigenes from Koalute tribe (only 1 Chinese sailor survived and escaped to Takao) near 
Kwaliang Bay 南灣 (Pingdong County) in early March, 1867. The first British Warship Cormorant, 
which was detained at Takao at the time and commanded by Captain George E. Broad 2, was 
soon dispatched on 25th March to the scene to search for any possible survivors with Charles 
Carroll, Acting British Consul in Taiwan-fu and Dr. Patrick Manson.3 Indigenes naturally assailed 
any strangers and his troops were no exception. Without preparation for encountering any land 
combat, his troops were forced to evacuate back to the ship with 1 soldier injured. Quoting the 
China Mail of 6th April, 1867, Le Gendre’s note from 1874 recorded that, 
 The position of the foe being only indicated by the smoke from their 
muskets, and they themselves being quite hidden in the dense brush, 
Captain Broad wisely determined not to risk the lives of his men in the 
pursuit of an invisible enemy in a jungle, where every advantage would 
have been on their side. The boats were, therefore, ordered off, the 
retreat being covered by the cutter, from which was kept up a fire, which, 
from the cries of the savages, evidently told. Their bullets and arrows, 
however, now fell quickly around the boats, all of which were struck in 
several places, one ball passing right through both sides of the whaler, 
only a few inches below the seat on which were sitting Captain Broad 
and Mr. Carroll. In the same boat, the stock of one of the marines’ rifles 
was shot through as he was in the act of firing it.4 
 
A few weeks later, the public in Europe soon read this outrageous news about how a British 
military expedition was forced to withdraw from the island and was driven out by indigenes 
who held muskets in Formosa, when The Illustrated London News also reported this mission 
                                                             
2 Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 20–21. 
3 ‘美國公使蒲安, 蒲安臣致奕訢照會（關於美船在臺灣南部被擊事）’ (A note written by Anson Burlingame, 
The US envoy, to Yi Xin (about the American ship attacked in southern Taiwan) in24/04/1864  quoted in Zhu Shijia 
朱士嘉, Shijiu Shiji Meiguo Qinhua Dangan Shiliao Xuanji 十九世紀美國侵華檔案史料選輯 [Selected Historcal 
Records of American Invasion on China in the 19th Century], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua 中華, 1959), 276–77; 
Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 179; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 
1867-1874, 4, 79–80. 
4 Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874)  in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 80. 
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and gave a similar account on 15th June, 1867, 
No sooner, however, were one or two of the party on shore than a sharp 
cross-fire from muskets was opened from two points, accompanied with 
a shower of arrows. The enemy being invisible and unapproachable, it 
was deemed advisable to withdraw, and orders were accordingly given. 
Though the mission had been intended for a peaceful one, yet, knowing 
the blood-thirsty nature of these savages of Formosa, Captain Broad had 
directed the cutter to lie about thirty yards from the shore, to keep a 
look out for any hostile demonstration; so that, while the crews of the 
other boats were re-embarking and shoving off, the cutter was enabled 
to return the fire of the natives, and, judging from their cries, not 
without effect.5  
 
Both accounts show that indigenous people were using muskets very effectively in this action 
and managed to press intruders right at the shore with further harassments at the very 
beginning of our period.   
General Le Gendre, the U.S consul at Amoy thereafter hustled and sought the Qing 
officials’ assistance in Taiwan, although the response he received from the Qing authorities in 
Taiwan suggested they were impotent. (Also see Chapter 3, p. 94) A few months later, on 1th 
June 1867 another retributive expedition was sent and accompanied by two American warships 
– Hartford and Wyoming under the command of Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell.6 In the reports of Rear 
-Admiral Bell to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy in Washington D.C., he stated that 181 
officers and privates and a few attendants such as William Pickering and British Consul Charles 
Carroll, who provided varied assistance, joined in this mission. On the 13th June, the 
Commander of the Hartford – G. E. Belknap and Lieut – Commander Alexander S. Mackenzie 
led men to Kwaliang Bay where victims of the Rover had been murdered. Admiral Bell then 
gave a vivid description of how indigenes fought in this battle:  
The savages, dressed in clouts and their bodies painted red, were seen 
through our glasses, assembling in parties of ten or twelve on the 
cleared hills about two miles distant. Their muskets glistened in the sun, 
indicating the kind of arms they carried; their movements were visible 
to us on board during the most of the day. As our men marched into the 
hills the savages knowing the paths boldly decided to meet them, and 
                                                             
5 ‘H.M.S. Cormorant on the Coast of Formosa’, The Illustrated London News, 15 June 1867, 599–600, Reed Digital 
Collection. 
6 ‘The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the 
Savages of the Isle.’, The New York Times, 24 August 1867 in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 49. 
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gliding through the high grass and from cover to cover, displayed a 
stratagem and courage equal to our native Indians. Delivering their fire, 
they retreated without being seen by our men, who charging upon their 
covers frequently fell into ambush.7 
 
From this passage, Formosan indigenes appeared to be well prepared with their muskets in 
combat position, albeit not wearing defensive accoutrements and soon demonstrated their 
strategic and tactical abilities to perplex and to muddle their adversaries. Ano ther closer 
observation from Pickering who followed a skirmish with Commander Mackenzie,  
We could perceive no signs of any inhabitants, and progression was 
difficult; the country was covered with thick jungle, excepting a break 
here and there, where we came upon open spaces of grass and rocks. 
We had not penetrated a mile from the beach when our unseen foes 
fired a volley upon us, but did no harm … the lurking savages began to 
fire upon us from all quarters, both before and behind whilst chasing 
them was difficult and futile.8  
 
This clearly showed that by firing at the U.S. soldiers, Formosan indigenes might have 
deliberately driven their enemies to a certain area where they could have obtained the 
predominant position of the enemies’ movement without killing and being seen or injured. 
Commander Belknap gave an account of how fast indigenes’ movement were,  
the wily foes had fallen back with wonderful rapidity and/ made known 
their escape by loud halloos from the thickets beyond. Only occasional 
glimpses of the enemy could be caught, their presence being generally 
discovered by sudden shots from the bushes and flashes of sunlight 
reflected from their bright barrelled muskets.9  
 
This tense and imminent motion of indigenes generated a lot of unpredicted and effective 
strikes. A sketch published in Harper’s Weekly on 7th September 1867 portrayed this expedition 
as below.10 (Figure 3:1) The appearance of indigenes in this combat seems shadowy, groups of 
                                                             
7‘The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the Savages 
of the Isle.’ in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 50. 
8 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 181. 
9‘The Pirates of Formosa: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the Savages 
of the Isle.’ in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 54. 
10 An expressive narration was provided with this sketch – “In order to avenge the murder of a number of 
shipwrecked seamen of the bark Rover by the savage Malays of Formosa, Admiral BELL, on June 13, made a descent 
on that island with a force of 181 men and officers. They advanced a mile into the interior, encountering a few 
savages, who continually ambushed them in true Indian fashion. After penetrating a mile into the jungle, Losing 
Lieutenant- Commander MACKENZIE killed, and a dozen or fifteen men prostrated by sun-stroke, killing none of 
the savages, and failing to destroy their huts, the troops returned on shipboard and abandoned the expedition. 
Rear Admiral BELL concludes his report with the recommendation that the Chinese authorities be required to 
occupy the island with a settlement of their own; and this is to be effected, he says through our Minister at 
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Western musketeers only shot aimlessly into the forest. Within a few hours, the indigenes 
succeeded in expelling their enemies out of their territory, not long after they had landed on 
the beach. The expedition failed, Lieut-Commander Mackenzie was shot dead in this fight, and 
a group of soldiers suffered from severe sunstroke. Commander Belknap pulled back the entire 
troop to their ship in the afternoon on the same day, not even finding out where the Koalute 
village was.11 As the first encounter of indigenes with Western armed forces after two hundred 
years when the last Western power was dominant on the island, muskets clearly assisted 
Formosan indigenes in the south to surprise and prevail over Western advanced military and 
thus maintain their ascendancy on land.  
 
Figure 4:1 Expedition sent by the U.S. after Rover shipwrecked in 1867  
 
Source: 'The Formosa Pirates', Harper's Weekly, 7 September 1867, 
572.https://archive.org/stream/harpersweeklyv11bonn#page/572/mode/2up  
                                                             
Pekin”.‘The Formosa Pirates’, Harper’s Weekly, 7 September 1867. 
11 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 182; ‘The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the 
United States Naval Forces with the Savages of the Isle.’; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 51, 55. 
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The second expedition commenced on 10th September 1867 under the command of Liu 
Mingdeng 劉明燈, the Regional Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵) from Taiwanfoo who was 
stationed at Fang-liao with General Le Gendre after General Le Gendre persuaded the Governor 
– General of Fujian and Zhejiang, Wu Tang 吳棠 to send military force to Taiwan. 12 Meanwhile 
Tooke-tok, chief of 18 indigenous tribes or Langqiao shiba she 琅嶠十八社, which comprised 
mostly the Paiwan and Puyuma indigenous tribes in southern Taiwan, had received news from 
the Hakkas that 8,000 men were being sent by the Qing government to Liangjiao to slaughter 
indigenes, and he had soon gathered 1,100 indigenes seemingly all armed with firearms and 
15,000 Amis indigenes with bows and spears.13 Mountain indigenes in southern Taiwan rapidly 
assembled their men and procured a large amount of firearms in some sort of readiness as soon 
as they got the information of an upcoming attack inland. However, according to Le Gendre’s 
note Commander Liu led 1,000 men in this expedition instead of 8,000 men as Tooke-tok was 
previously informed, only 750 men were equipped with good European rifles and were 
“inadequate to the task before them, and before taking the field”, and enrolled 1,500 local 
militias who were previously experienced in fighting with indigenes.14 Fortunately, no actual 
confrontation or combat arose between Chinese troops and indigenes in this expedition. Le 
Gendre eventually made contact with Tooke-tok and obtained an agreement to secure 
castaways in the future through Pickering’s assistance and his private contacts with the local 
Chinese and the mountain indigenes in the south.15 In accordance with Pickering’s record on 
the pre-war preparation of the Paiwan and the Amis indigenes, Tooke-tok demonstrated his 
capability of gathering large amounts of firearms and summoning a large number of men within 
                                                             
12Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 87–91; C.W. Le Gendre, Taiwan fanshi wuchan yu shangwu 臺灣番事物產與商務 
(Indigenous Affairs and Products in Taiwan), 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 46 (Taipei: Taiwan 
Bank, 1994), 89–94; Mingqing gongcang Taiwan dangan huibian 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編 [Compilation of 
Archives in Ming and Qing Court Relating to Taiwan] (Peking: Jiuzhou chubanshe 九州出版社出版, 2009), 
vol.182, 273–283, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; Sophia Su-fei Yen, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874. 
(Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1965), 132–136. 
13 Pickering noted that the ‘Amias’ (possibly Amis) were servants or salves under Tooke-tok’s command. 
Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 190; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 
1867-1874, 99, 103. 
14 Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 116–17; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, 
Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other 
Productions, 119. 
15 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 190–93; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern 
Taiwan, 1867-1874, 103–6. 
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his own vassal tribes and neighbouring tribes. Although the types of firearms that Tooke-tok’s 
men held were not clear, we could possibly presume their weapons were muskets as they were 
the same indigenes that the British and the American soldiers had encountered and were forced 
to retreat from in the previous incident. Besides, the number of Chinese soldiers and the local 
militia (2,500) was significantly less than the indigenous warriors (16,100) and the Chinese 
soldiers (750) seemingly had less “good European rifles” than the indigenous warriors. Although 
the Chinese soldiers carried some “good European rifles”, which were noted as insufficient by 
Le Gendre, it seemed to be very likely the Chinese troops would have been defeated by the 
indigenes if a war had broken out. 
 
Mudan Incident - The 1st Expedition of Japan in 1874     
 
However, the consensus between General Le Gendre and Tooke-tok did not continue 
when 66 Ryukyu castaways reached the south western coast of Taiwan and 54 survivors were 
killed by Mudan indigenes (Paiwan) in December 1871. Since the dominion of Ryukyu Islands 
between China and Japan was unclear at the time, Soejima Taneomi 副島種臣, Foreign Minister 
of the Meiji government of Japan went to Beijing in the spring of 1873 and requested that the 
Qing government be held responsible for this incident and to recompense victims’ families. But 
the Qing government once again denied its jurisdiction over mountain indigenous people’s 
territories in eastern Taiwan as in the previous incident of the Rover.16 (Also see Chapter 3, p. 
94) Japan demonstrated its attentiveness to Taiwan by sending out troops to punish the Paiwan 
indigenes from the Mudan 牡丹社 and Kusakut 高士佛 tribes in April 1874 despite strong 
opponents from some foreign envoys in Tokyo including the British and American ministers, 
Harry S. Park and John A. Bingham, and internal remonstrance within the Japanese government 
including the Minister of the Right, Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視 and Japanese Councillor, Kido 
Koin 木戶孝允, who later resigned on this matter.17 The character of General Le Gendre was 
rather controversial because he not only encouraged Japan to send the punitive expedition to 
                                                             
16 Edward Howard House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa (Tokio: s.n, 1875), 7–14; Gordon, Confrontation 
over Taiwan, 81–89; Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 156-157-190; Lin 
Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相 [Truth of the Mudan Incident] (Taipei: 
Boyang wenhua 博楊文化, 2006), 14–21, 30–31. 
17 Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 203, 205–7, 214; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, 
Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相 [Truth of the Mudan Incident], 42–45, 50–52. 
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Taiwan when he met Soejima but he also offered his consultant services to the Japanese 
government as a “second rank official” before and during the expedition after he left his 
position as U.S. Consul at Amoy regardless of Bingham’s objections.18 
In early May, 1874, around 3,500 Japanese soldiers led by General Saigō Tsugumichi, 
several Japanese officers and two former American navy officers – Lieutenant Commander 
Douglas Cassel and Lieutenant J. R. Wasson – disembarked at Liangjiao 琅嶠 and stationed at 
Sialiao 射寮 in southern Taiwan. (see Map 4:1) As soon as they arrived, Lieutenant Cassel 
arranged to meet with Isa 伊厝, the chief of Shamali, who General Le Gendre put Cassel in 
contact with, and chiefs from other tribes to express their wish at not causing conflicts with 
other neighbouring tribes, apart from punishing the Mudan and Kusakut tribes. 19  Still, 
according to Lieutenant Wasson’s report, indigenes living near the Bay of Tuilasok River, possibly 
the Koalut tribe (龜仔角社 or 社頂) , fired on their boats several times while they were 
inspecting and examining the bay.20 On 17th, 21st and 22nd of May, 1874, Mudan and Kusakut 
indigenes commenced firing and fought against Japanese troops in several combats near 
Sekimon 石門 which resulted in the loss of 7 Japanese soldiers and at least 30 men wounded in 
total. 14 indigenes were killed, including the chief of Mudan – A lok 阿祿 and his son, and many 
were wounded.21 In fact, firearms were mostly used by Mudan and Kusakut indigenes to attack 
Japanese troops while they were hiding between rocks or in hills. Wasson reported afterwards 
that when a large amount of indigenes’ arms were eventually captured, including spear, sword 
and bows and arrows,  
injuries among their [Japanese] soldiers were mostly from gunshot 
wounds, showing that the savages relied almost wholly on their firearms; 
which though only rude matchlocks, are quite effective at short range. 
Wounds, however inflicted by them unless in some vital part, are not so 
dangerous as would be the case of those from rifled guns, these being, 
                                                             
18 Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 83–86, 94–96. 
19Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) and Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to 
Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 205–7, 225–
29; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. 
Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 133–34. 
20 Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines 
of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 229. 
21 Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874)  and Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to 
Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 208–209, 
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of course, smooth bore.22  
 
Even though the chief of Mudan and his son were killed in the battle in May, the Japanese 
military determined to annihilate Mudan and Kusakut tribes and mobilised their troops to 
besiege Mudan tribes from three different routes (Hong kang 楓港, Sekimon 石門 and Chiksha 
竹社) from the 1st of June. Each platoon reported encountering some onerous assaults from 
the indigenes.23 Firearms were frequently operated by the hostile indigenes in attacks and 
ambushes on Japanese troops. For instance, Japanese soldiers encountered some shooting 
from vulgar fortifications next to Sekimon24, a few shots were fired from the thicket as the 
soldiers approached the Mudan tribe 25 , and there was sudden fire from an ambush on an 
attempt to enter Kusakit village, which took 3 Japanese soldiers’ lives and wounded 2 men.26 In 
the end, Mudan, Kusakut and some villages were taken and burned down by Japanese troops 
and the chiefs of the Tuilasok 豬朥束社, Mudan, Kusakut, Shamali, Koalut, and Mantsui 文率
社 received flags and papers of protection from Japanese officials sometime later in June. The 
Qing government was unaware of the intentions of the Japanese government in occupying 
Taiwan and proclaimed its objections only late in April when Japanese military action began to 
take place in southern Taiwan.27 The Qing government soon assigned Shen Baozhen as Special 
Imperial Commissioner for Taiwan Affairs with soldiers, weaponry and ships to negotiate with 
the Japanese and to investigate regions of indigenes in southern Taiwan from mid-May.28 After 
several parleys between Chinese and Japanese officials with the coordination of Thomas Wade, 
a British diplomat in China, the Qing finally agreed to pay Japan 500,000 taels indemnity for the 
cost of the expedition and the compensation of victims’ families and to enforce its control over 
indigenes’ territories for future coastal security in exchange for withdrawal of Japanese military 
                                                             
22 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines 
of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 236. 
23 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Ibid., 242–48; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe 
Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相 [Truth of the Mudan Incident], 65–67. 
24 House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 120. 
25 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 147. 
26 Ibid., 148. 
27 Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 98–99. 
28Qingshigao Taiwan Ziliao Jiji 清史稿臺灣資料集輯 [Collections of the Drafted Qing History on Taiwan], Taiwan 
Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 243 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1970), 99–101; Yen 
Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 216–19; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian 
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garrisons in southern Taiwan before 20th, December, 1874.29   
 
Map 4:1 Map of indigenous tribes in Southern Taiwan in 1870s 
 
Source: Robert Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-
1874: Western Sources Related to Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan (Taipei: Zhong yang yan 
jiu yuan Taiwan shi yan jiu suo (Institute of Taiwan History Academia Sinica), 2005, viii  
 
Though the real skirmishes took less than two months, the usage of firearms by the 
southern indigenes signified their strengths across a range of battles against Japanese military 
                                                             
29 Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 278–84; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe 
Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相 [Truth of the Mudan Incident], 115–16. 
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forces. In the end Japan claimed victory in conquering the Mudan and Kusakut tribes only by 
burning down their villages, which indigenes might have abandoned or left behind before 
Japanese troops arrived, but they did not succeed in apprehending any antagonistic indigenous 
people or to annihilate the entire Mudan and Kusakut tribes.30 Instead, Japanese troops were 
confronted with serious gunfire from hostile indigenes when marching toward their territories 
and also suffered from the difficult climate, geographical conditions and disease. We shall 
return to some factors later in this thesis.  
 
1.2. Internal Conflicts 
 
Late nineteenth century Taiwan was like a hub of strife, which might well have allowed 
armaments to permeate every corner of mountain societies. The existent conflicts between 
indigenous tribes themselves, between indigenous tribes and different Chinese ethnic groups 
and between Chinese ethnic groups themselves from the eighteenth century, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, not only extended to the second half of nineteenth century, but became aggravated 
to various levels and complex warfare by peremptory exploitation of natural resources and the 
Qing government’s more interventionist policies on indigenous people in eastern mountain 
regions, which have already been described in Chapter 3. According to the lists of uprisings in 
Taiwan from Xu Yuliang and Xu Xueji’s research, there were at least 11 skirmishes initiated by 
the mountain indigenous that were recorded in the Qing official records and literature in the 
period of 1860-188331although the actual number was higher than this. The distribution of these 
11 skirmishes (red circles) will be seen in Map 4:2, which shows the beginning of encroachment 
from the western plains toward the eastern mountain regions. This section will focus on the 
conflicts the mountain indigenes had with the plains indigenes, the Chinese civilians, the Qing 
military in the “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” scheme and the involvement 
of mountain indigenes in the Chinese uprisings in the period of 1860-1883.  
 
                                                             
30 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, ‘Taiwan: A Periphery in Search of a 
Narrative’, 247. 
31 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of 
Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 561–64; Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lǜying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green 
Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], 106–8. 
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Map 4:2 Conflicts of mountain indigenes with foreign countries and the Qing military 
1860-1883 
 
Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/taiwan-physical-maps.html  
*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigenes with others were marked in red 
circles by Pei Hsi Susan Lin  
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The mountain indigenous people were the first ones to bear the brunt when boundaries 
and territories between indigenous tribes were cluttered by the plunderers of natural and 
economic resources and through the resettlements of Chinese from mainland China and the 
plains indigenes who commenced four major resettlements from the western plain to the 
central and eastern regions of Taiwan from the early nineteenth century. (See Chapter 2, pp. 53-
54) The consequence of cluttered tribal boundaries and territories naturally impelled sporadic 
feuds among Formosan indigenes. Foreign visitors who travelled to varied parts of interior 
Taiwan independently recorded the occurrences of feuds between indigenous tribes in their 
journals or reports. Captain Bonham Ward Bax, British commander of the H.M.S. Dwarf, referred 
to the dissension of plains indigenes with their mountain indigene neighbours when he visited 
south of Sau-o-Bay 蘇澳灣 (Yilan County) on the northeast coast of Taiwan in 1871.32 Bullock 
noticed that 10 to 15 plains indigenes of Posia 埔里 (Nantou County) in central Taiwan were 
killed annually by the mountain indigenes in the forest or near the edge of forest. 33 Similar 
experience was recorded by Professor Steere on his way to the west coast from Poisa in 1873: 
plains indigenes had to abandon their recent settlement with ditches and terraces for irrigation 
after being attacked by mountain indigenes.34 Pickering and General Le Gendre also wrote about 
the prolonged disputes between plains indigenes and mountain indigenes in southern Taiwan.35 
Le Gendre noted that the provision of arms and ammunition of Tooke-tok’s family was due to 
the numbers of feuds with their nearby indigenous tribes and Chinese villagers,  
by which the family he heard, had of late years been much reduced in 
pecuniary circumstances by keeping a considerable armed force on 
hand, to settle differences between his own people, among who many 
feuds had broken out. He also had much fighting to do, both with the 
Chinese of Chasiang [Checheng 車城], and the savages of the north. In 
fact, there had been a general war in that region, which had lasted until 
all sides, having exhausted their resources in buying arms and 
ammunition, and in paying indemnities to the relations and friends of 
those who had been killed in battle, were forced to make peace.36 
                                                             
32 Bax, The Eastern Seas, 91–94. 
33 TEPR1/394- 400. Report of a Journey into the Interior of Formosa made by Acting Assistant Bullock, in 
company with the Rev W. Campbell, of the English Presbyterian Mission and Mr. J.B. Steere, Collector in Natural 
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35 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 66; Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 27. 
36 Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 103. 
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Charles Carroll in 1871 noted the indigenes were gathered in parties and equipped with firearms, 
spears and bows due to the ceaseless combats between tribes in southern Taiwan.37 A scene of 
tribal warfare was also drawn by a group of art students led by Zhang Sigui 張斯桂, a 
commissioner of a naval colleage38, who was appointed by Shen Baozheng around 1875. (see 
Figure 4:2) The narratives next to this drawing could be roughly translated as,  
Skirmishes usually occurred between two or more indigenous tribes. 
They so often killed their own race that the indigenes did not flourish. 
Firearms were the best among their weaponry, arrows and bows the 
second, and the knives and spears the basic.39  
 
In this drawing, it shows that firearms were one of their primary weapons in tribal warfare and 
they could keep themselves some distance from the other indigenes by using firearms like 
arrows and bows, instead of having direct contact with their enemies when using knives and 
spears. These cases of tribal conflicts were widely and frequently reported by foreign travellers 
and the Qing officials in Taiwan. These might have suggested that the essence and demand for 
weaponry among indigenes societies was likely continuous and fundamental.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
37 Carroll Charles, ‘Rambles among the Formosan Savages’, The Phoneix 9 (1871): 133–34. 
38 According to Chen Zheng-Ren’s 陳宗仁 research on the background of Zhang Si-Gui, he and Willian A.P Martin, 
who was a missionary in China and later became the chief instructor of Tongwen Guan 同文館 or school of combine 
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also visited the indigenous tribes several times, searched for coal and extract sulphur. See Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, 
ed., Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu  晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 13–28. 
39 It is unclear who were the mountain indigenes and plains indigenes because some indigenous men have tattoo 
in this illustration although Chen suggested this scene was drawn from the painter’s imagination. Ibid., 98. 
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Figure 4:2 Warfare between indigenous tribes  
 
Source: Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Fanshi hudou tushuo '番社互鬪圖說' (Illustration 
of tribal warfare) Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late 
Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 98. 
Innumerable and relentless warfare between indigenes and Chinese were anticipated as 
the mutual antipathy intensified. Professor Steere spoke of “no day of the year in which there is 
no bloodshed between the two people”40 along the border of indigenes on several occasions 
and depicted the readiness of mountain indigenes to ambush the Chinese who once entered or 
approached the hills: “The savages are continually coming out and lying in wait for the Chinese, 
and the Chinese are in no way particular how they get the savages in their power and revenge 
themselves.”41 A small battle between two dozen mountain indigenes and a group of Chinese 
settlers broke out in 1877 in the interior of Toa-Kho-ham or Dakekan (Daxi District, Taoyuan 
County), which became the trading centre of camphor, tea, indigo and various mountain 
                                                             
40 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 150. 
41 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 315. 
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resources later. Dr. Mackay witnessed this fight and recorded the scene vividly:  
The band had divided into two companies and attacked different points. 
One company had already secured their prize and were making their 
escape with three heads … The savages fled beyond the cleared land, 
reunited their forces, then turned viciously upon their pursuers. A battle 
ensued. It was a wild and bloody scene. Both sides were armed, but the 
rapidity with which the savages dropped on their backs lifted one foot, 
steadied their levelled matchlocks between their toes, and fired was 
something marvellous … But the Chinese were no cowards, and at last 
fearless of death, dashed forward and drove the savages back into their 
mountain retreats.42  
 
Mackay thus described an expert usage of the matchlock that was entirely novel, illustrating the 
manner in which Western weaponry had become embedded in indigenous fighting culture as 
early as the 1870s. This type and level of warfare among indigenes and Chinese settlers emerged 
in an endless stream, particularly the numerous raids of mountain indigenes who acted against 
Chinese camphor workers, tea and indigo growers and any exploiters near or in the mountain 
regions. Dr. Mackay recounted that the mountain indigenes often buried themselves behind the 
boulder, in the shrubbery, next to the solitary paths in the field, or at the gateway of mountains 
and assailed at the back of unguarded rattan and camphor workers or farmers who were 
exposed in nearby mountains.43 The production of camphor was affected greatly by several 
series of fights between mountain indigenes and the Chinese despite the seeming cause of 
fights being mainly elicited by the Chinese crossing the borders and exploiting the lands of 
indigenes. The evidence can be found in the Report on the Foreign Trade of the Ports of Tamsuy 
and Kelung during the Year 1879, where it is stated that the  
Chinese who collect the camphor have to go further into the interior for 
it every year, and the supply is always uncertain, owing to the 
constantly recurring collisions with the aborigines. At present it can 
hardly be obtained at all, the savages having, rather more than a month 
ago, attacked a party of Chinese camphor gatherers on the borders of 
the savage territory near Tokoham, and killed twenty-eight of them, an 
act which has led, I am told to severe fighting in that neighbourhood, 
and has for the present put a stop to all production of camphor.44 
                                                             
42 George Leslie Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions , ed. James A. MacDonald 
(Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1896), 274–75. 
43 Ibid., 270–71. 
44 TEPR 2/559-573. Report on the Foreign Trade of the Ports of Tamsuy and Kelung during the Year 1879. Acting 
Consul. Colin M. Ford. Tamsuy, 19/Mar/1880, 562  
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The equivalent incident that obstructed the process of collecting camphor was reported again 
in the year of 1881, when the consulate referred to 
the enhanced difficulty of obtaining and transporting the camphor. In 
the district from which mainly it is obtained the savages, last year, were 
acting on the aggressive. There were several serious fights during the 
year between them and the Chinese, in which the latter suffered 
severely. As the hills are cleared the difficulty of obtaining and 
transporting the camphor increases, and as matters are now the trade 
in this article is not likely to flourish.45 
 
Besides, the dual policy of “opening up mountains and placating the indigenes” enacted 
by a former governor and director of the Foochow Arsenal and Dockyard – Shen Baozhen in 
1874 (see Chapter 3, pp.94-95) - after Japan sent the expedition to southern Taiwan, obviously 
provoked even more rivalries with indigenous people. Following the project of opening up the 
mountains which included building roads and fortresses carried out in the north, central and 
south of the mountain regions from 1874 to 1883, there were at least 9 major incidents of 
turmoil involving several mountain indigenous tribes. This means every year one of the 
mountain indigenous groups initiated at least 1 rebellion against the Qing military, which give 
us sufficient ground for understanding the encroachment the mountain indigenes might have 
experienced. For instance, in the south division, the mountain indigenes of Paiwan from the 
Shitou tribe 獅頭社 (Pingdong County) killed Chinese villagers and attacked the Qing soldiers 
in 1875, which brought the Qing army to pacify the mountain indigenes of the Shitou tribe and 
its 12 allied tribes for a period of over 3 months. 46  Chinese warriors were ambushed by 
thousands of Atayal mountain indigenes with firearms while opening roads in Dananao 大南澳 
(Yilan Country) in northern Taiwan in 187447 and a Qing army led by Luo Dachun 羅大春 (the 
Commander of Fujian Province) who was charged with the opening of the northern mountain 
                                                             
45 TEPR 3/133-142, Report on the Foreign Trade of Tamsui and Kelung for the Year 1881. Consul. T. Watters. 
Tamsui, 6/Mar/1882, 135 
46 An Estonian ensign, Pavel Ibis also reported that the mountain indigenes attacked and murdered several 
Chinese soldiers on the wild way to Long-kiau even though the reinforcement of over 2,000 men were sent could 
not save the situation in the middle of 1875. Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: 
Ethnographic Travels]’, 167–71; Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [ Gazetteer of Hengchun 
County], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 75 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 
1958), 287; Luo Dachun 羅大春, Taiwan Haifang Bing Kaishan Riji 臺灣海防並開山日記 [Journal of Coastal 
Security and Mountain Opening of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on 
Taiwan) 308 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1872), 70–72. 
47 Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 
(Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 120 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 196–97. 
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regions, encountered resistance from the Truku tribes in 1876.48 Acting Vice-Consul A. Frater 
reported that the mountain indigenes attacked a large camp, upon which 1,000 foreign drilled 
soldiers were sent from Foochow for reinforcement. 49 This suggests some really large scale 
battling. In the central mountain regions, the mountain indigenes of the Amis tribes rebelled 
against the Qing army led by Wu Guangliang 吳光亮, the Chief Commander in Taiwan in 1877.50 
Acting Vice-Consul B.C. George Scott also reported on this feud and said,  
Since the arrival of the troops that state of things has entirely ceased. 
The aborigines have now established themselves lower down the hills 
than ever, and are bitterly hostile to the soldiers and civilians alike, 
attacking them both indiscriminately on every favourable 
opportunity … At the end of October or the beginning of November the 
savages surprised the fort at Hwa Lien Chiang, and slaughtered or 
placed hors de combat more than 100 of the garrison.51  
 
Plains indigenes of the Kavalan tribe also formed an alliance with the mountain indigenes of 
the Sakizaya tribe in 1878 to revolt against the Qing army because Chinese entered and 
cultivated plains indigenes’ land under the Qing government’s encouragement. 52 Since the 
opening of treaty ports which were not determined nor acknowledged by the indigenous 
people in Taiwan, mountain indigenes were more largely forced to engage in different scales 
of combat. They strove against the oncoming Chinese who were avid for the profits from the 
mountain resources and fought against the Qing government and its military force that had so 
neglected the existence of the eastern regions of Taiwan for nearly 200 years. The distribution 
of internal conflicts or incidents expanded from the western plain areas to eastern mountain 
                                                             
48 Luo Dachun 羅大春, Taiwan Haifang Bing Kaishan Riji 臺灣海防並開山日記 [Journal of Coastal Security and 
Mountain Opening of Taiwan], 48–49. 
49 TEPR 2/135-145, Report on the Foreign Trade at Tamsui and Kelung during the year 1876. Acting Vice- Consul. 
A. Frater, Tamsui, 26/Feb/1877, 141 
50 It is commonly called the Dagankou incident (大港口事件) by Taiwanese historians. Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taidong 
Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊 [Journal of Taidong], 68; Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, Taiwan Fanzheng Zhi 臺灣番政志 
[Chronicles of Indigenes Policy in Taiwan], 2:617–18; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清
政府對後山的統治 [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan]’, 144. 
51 TEPR 2/276-295. Report on the Trade of the Ports of Tamsui and Kelung for the year 1877. Acting Vice-Consul. 
B.C. George Scott. Tamsui, 27/Mar/1878, 290 
52As the result, both plain and mountain indigenes were defeated and were nearly annihilated by the Qing army. 
It is often called the Jialiwang incident (加禮宛之役) by Taiwanese historians. Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺
灣通史 [A General History of Taiwan], 316; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清政府對後
山的統治 [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan]’, 157–59. 
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areas, which increased the intricate level of battles within the tough conditions of geography 
and the involvement of multiple indigenous tribes. 
 Chinese ethnic groups did not keep themselves unoccupied, but continued their battles 
with each other and with rebelling against the Qing government. According to the research on 
the Green Standard Army and the disturbances in Taiwan of Xu Xueji, there were at least 15 
“unrests” that involved Chinese in Taiwan from 1860-1884 and they included conflicts between 
Chinese ethnic groups, affrays amongst robberies or pillages and revolts against local officials 
and military.53 One of the mass uprisings and the longest during the reign of Qing governance, 
led by Dai Chaochun 戴潮春 in 1862 broke out throughout western central Taiwan and it took 
the Qing government nearly 4 years to appease this revolt. According to Dr. Xu’s analysis of 
military force in Taiwan in the midst of the Dai Chao-Chun incident, the number of troops based 
in Taiwan and reinforcements sent from Fujian Province was questionable and insufficient. 
When the plains indigenes military force joined the Qing military this had great impact on the 
success of pacification, and the firearms held by the camp of Dai Chaochun prolonged this 
revolt.54  
These different scales of warfare did require armaments for varies parties and Taiwan 
did not produce iron and steel. However, the weaponry that was used by the mountain 
indigenes has rarely discussed and was rarely mentioned at that time. Under this highly 
belligerent environment in which mountain indigenes were vastly exposed and engaged, the 
requirement of weaponry would have been augmented and the weaponry would be further 
circulated. It is significant to try to uncover the types of weapon that mountain indigenes used 
and the possible access to military technology that mountain indigenes had in order to compete 
with foreign and Chinese invasions from 1860-1883. These will be demonstrated in the next 
section. 
 
2. Firearms in Taiwan 
                                                             
53For the Green Standerd Army, see Chapter 2, footnote 105, p.55. Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lǜying 清
代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], 106–9. 
54 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of 
Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 274. 
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Increasing warfare explains the growing demand for armaments involving many parties. 
The occurrences of varied scales of external and internal warfare that Formosan indigenes 
confronted was also now situated in the era of modern military technology that was largely 
equipped by the Western nations, and in the primary phase of developing modern military 
technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement in China from circa 1861. 55  Large 
amounts of armament were operated and transferred to Taiwan to quell all sort of revolts and 
fights. The mountain indigenes thus experienced diverse military technologies on numerous 
occasions.  
This section will focus on the period of 1860 to 1883 and might be marked as an 
acceleration of the traditional level of conflict that mountain indigenous people contended with. 
Firstly, it discusses the firearms that foreign nations developed and foreigners carried into 
Taiwan, especially when the American and Japanese troops were sent to punish the indigenes 
in the Rover Incident in 1867 and Mudan Incident in 1874. Secondly it will give some examples 
of firearms that the Chinese army, local militia and Chinese civilians held for defence and when 
fighting against indigenous people. Regardless of what types of weapon that foreigners, the 
Qing military, local militia, Chinese civilians and the plains indigenes had, they all exerted of 
impact on the perceptions of mountain indigenes concerning weapons directly and indirectly.  
 
2.1. The Firearms of Foreigners within Taiwan. 
 
Disparate modern weapons carried by Westerners not only brought impacts on Qing 
military and Chinese societies, but also started to influence the culture of weapon s in the 
warfare that indigenes engaged with and within indigenous societies. Vice – Admiral Sir H. 
Keppel described the rapidity of the Snider rifle56 in the operation of the camphor war in 1868 
led by Lieutenant T. P. Gurdon, which made the Chinese believe that a much larger force was 
opposed to them.57  
                                                             
55 For the Self-Strengthening Movement, see Chapter 3, footnote 131, p. 111 
56 Snider rifle or Snider-Enfield was designed by an American engineer Jacob Snider in converting muzzle-
loading .577 Enfield rifle musket to metallic cartridge in 1866 after investigating a series of muzzle loading 
muskets in the British Board of Ordnance from 1864.  It was patented in 1864 and served in British army. It was 
found superior to Dreyse needle-gun and introduced to Portugal and Japan. The Snider rifle could fire 21 rounds 
per minute, but the Dreyse needle-gun could only fire 7 rounds per minutes. John Walter, Rifles of the World 
(London: Arms and Armour, 1993), 261; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 139–40.  
57 TEPR 1/185-241. Correspondence Respecting Missionary Disturbances at Che-Foo and Taiwan (Formosa), Vice- 
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The “new breech-loading rifles” were used by the Prussians to chastise the offense of 
Formosan indigenes for the first time in 1858 when a group of Prussian sailors of the 
transporter Elbe landed on the southern Formosan coast and were confronted by the indigenes 
with firearms in accordance with Davidson’s claims.58 Davidson also suggests that it was the 
first ever application in battle of the new “Zündnadel” rifles (Zündnadelgewehr) or Dreyse 
needle-fire rifle,59 which had been recently launched by the Prussians, and the principle of 
Zündnadel rifles were later adopted by other governments. 60  Disputes that Westerners 
encountered with Formosan indigenes were initiated with the series of shipwrecks from the 
first half of nineteenth century. Western envoys and nearby warships were sent to search 
possible castaways, but they did not reach many favourable outcomes or came under severe 
assaults from indigenes with firearms (see Chapter 3, pp.72-74 and Chatper 4, pp. 116-122). 
Two American warships – Hartford and Wyoming were sent to punish the indigenes under the 
command of Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell on 10th June, 1867 after the occurrence of the Rover 
Incident in southern Taiwan. In terms of Western weaponry, 181 soldiers were armed with 40 
Plymouth Muskets,61  80 Sharps’ rifles 62  and both warships were loaded with 40 rounds of 
ammunition.63 Furthermore, as we have seen in this chapter (pp. 122-127), in 1874 Japan sent 
                                                             
Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty. Inclosure 1 in No. 7, “Princess Charlotte,” Hong Kong, 
6/Jan/1869, 204. 
58 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 114–15. 
59 Dreyse needle-fire rifle was invented by a German gunsmith Johann Nikolaus von Dreys in 1841. It was the first 
rotating bolt for loading a rifle at the breech. The unique design of bolt action rifle, which had higher rate of fire 
than muzzle-loaders, not only lead the later development of repeater and automatic weapons, but also help 
Prussia military to obtain its predominant position from its neighbouring nations for over two decades. It was 
widely issued until 1848 and the entire Prussian infantry was furnished with needle-guns by 1859. The method of 
loading could be lying down or kneeling behind cover. Smithsonian, Firearms The Illustrated History (DK, 2014), 
108–9; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 125–27. 
60 Footnote 1. in Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial 
Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 115. 
61 In the original material, it said “Plumaith muskets”, which is believed to be the 1861 Navy Plymouth Musket. It 
is a single shot, 69 calibre muzzle loaded, manufactured by Whitney Arms. 
http://relicman.com/weapons/zArchiveWeaponMusketNavyPlymouth.htm  
62 Sharps rifles are breech loading rifles, which were patented by Christian Sharps in 1848 and were improved by 
Richard Lawrence in 1850s. It was notified by the US Secretary of War as a valuable firearm for military service, 
but it was only largely purchased and employed by the US Cavalry in the outbreak of Civil War in 1861. Nearly 80 
regiments were furnished with Sharps rifles. Among the best marksmen recruited from the New England and the 
Midwest during the Civil, each marksman could place 10 shots in ten-inch circle at 200 yards. Britain also 
purchased 6,000 .577 calibre Model 1855 Sharps in 1856-1858 and they were mainly supplied to cavalry 
regiments in India. They were frequently used in skirmishes and in front of regular infantry. Walter, Rifles of the 
World, 254–55; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 123–24. 
63 H.H. Bell’s Expedition to South Bay. Dispatch No. 53, Series of 1867. US. Flagship Hartford. Shanghae, China, 
June 19, 1867. Reported by H.H. Bell, Rear-Admiral. In Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 49. 
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an expedition to southern Taiwan and claimed to punish the indigenes of Mudan for murdering 
the castaways from Ryukyu Islands. In the letter of Cassel Douglas to General Le Gendre and 
the report from Wasson to Okuma it is shown that Gatling guns 64 were also transferred to 
southern Taiwan to prepare for battling with indigenes. 65 Japanese soldiers impressed several 
chiefs in southern Taiwan who were not hostile to them with Gatling guns, and explained the 
use of the weapon in one of the meetings.66 To a certain level, this action might have been a 
chance for the Japanese soldiers to threaten the mountain indigenes regarding their superior 
military power over them. The Winchester rifle67 was carried by Douglas Cassel and other 
officers when visiting the village.68 As reported during the inspection of the Qing officials, the 
military of Japan were equipped with 8 big bronze cannons, 1 flying-wheel canon (Feilunpao飛
輪炮), more than 10 small bronze cannon and more than 80 boxes of Western firearms.69 
Firearms held by the Japanese soldiers were mostly breech loaders. 70  In the Gazetteer of 
Hengchun County, it is recorded that the indigenes were killed by breech loaders operated by 
Japanese soldiers who pretended to be drowned and lay prone in the water. 71  American 
journalist Edward House, who accompanied the Japanese expedition, also reported that 
                                                             
64 The Gatling gun was patented by Richard Gatling in 1862. It was a reliable rapid-fire water-cooled weapon 
worked by applying multiple revolving barrels and manufactured during the American Civil War. Smithsonian, 
Firearms The Illustrated History, 138. 
65Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) and Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to 
Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 204, 223; 
Ochiai Taizō 落合泰藏, ed., ‘Mingzhi Qinian Musanshe Shijian Yizhi 明治七年牡丹社事件醫誌 [Medical Reports 
in Mudan Incident 1874]’, trans. Dai Linzheng 戴麟徵, Taiwan Shiliao Yanjiu 臺灣史料研究 Historical Material 
Studies 5 (1995): 98–99. 
66 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) Ibid., 248. 
67 Winchester rifles were a series of rifles improved from Henry rifles by Oliver Winchester, who purchased New 
Haven Arms Compan in 1857 and changed its name to the Winchester Repeating Arms Company in 1866. The 
Model 1866 was used and marked as reliable rifle on the American frontier. It also played an important role in 
Russo-Turkish War as the Turkish government bought 40,000 Winchester rifles model 1866 and 4 million 
cartridge in 1871. The Model 1873, which was based on the Model 1866, was a great success in market and 
continued to work until the First World War. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 147–48; Walter, Rifles of 
the World, 293. 
68 Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) and Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to 
Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 206. 
69Qing gong yue zhe dang Taiwan shiliao 清宮月折檔臺灣史料 (Monthly Court Report of Qing on Taiwan) Vol. 2, 
1768, 1796, quoted in Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會[Military 
Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 354; Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔
存, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 ( Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 39 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 
150–52. 
70 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, Liwenzhonggong Quanji 李文忠公全集 [Collections of Li Hong-Zhang], vol. 4 (Taipei: 
Wenhai 文海, 1962), 303–4, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Shen Wensugong Du 沈文肅公牘 
[Correspondence of Shen Baozhen] (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 1998), 90–91. 
71 Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [ Gazetteer of Hengchun County], 285–86. 
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American gentlemen demonstrated the capacities of the Winchester rifles to the indigenes they 
had friendly contact with and the Japanese officer also gave Snider rifles to three indigenous 
chiefs as presents. 72  
Firearms were one of the most common items that foreign travellers carried with them 
when they travelled to unknown places. Chinese officials also noted that the Westerners 
carried Western firearms and took pleasure in walking and hunting, but they were required not 
to take firearms when traveling and to obtain hunting licenses from the consul or local 
governors. 73 Firearms sometimes functioned as “devices or tools” for foreigners to connect or 
to establish liaisons with indigenes on some occasions. Robert Swinhoe depicted the very first 
experience of mountain indigenes of the Kweijing tribe with his Sharps rifle and breech loading 
pistol when he first visited their village in 1863,  
After expressing admiration at our guns, they wanted to rush out and 
see us fire them … The elder savage ran to a distance, seized a plank, 
and put it up for a target, setting a leaf in the centre for a bull ’s eye. I 
fired at it, and strange enough, though the shot scattered all around, 
yet not one hit the bull’s eye. The savage smiled, picked up his 
matchlock and took up his position at my distance from the mark. His 
match lock, -a Chinese one, - was loaded with ball. He fired as the 
Chinese do from the elbow, and hit the target about nine inches from 
the centre. The distance was about forty yards. The board was about 
three inches thick, ye the bullet went right through it. I loaded my gun 
with a cartridge and doubled the distance. The shot covered the mark. 
This astonished the savage somewhat, but he was much more taken 
with my Sharp’s rifle, at the breech loading process, and when I have 
the sight its full elevation and fired along the river the splash of the ball 
in the distant water, drew a cry of astonishment from both savages and 
Chinamen. They took a fancy for the rifle, and wanted to barter for it. 
The breech loading pistol also took their fancy, but they found great 
difficulty in pulling the trigger.74  
 
Pickering also noted that he was armed with revolvers and double-barrelled fowling-pieces 
when he first visited “the savage” (mountain indigenes) of the interior75 and fired a six-shooter 
                                                             
72 House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 66–67. 
73Shen Bao-Zhen 沈葆楨, ‘標題: 附件三，附呈同知黃維煊條說’ (Appendix 3:  A statement presented to Wei-
Hsuan Huang) in 16/12/1867 in (18671216) in Zhang Zimu 張自牧, Jindai Zhongguo Dui Xifang Ji Lieqiang Renshi 
Ziliao Huibian 近代中國對西方及列強認識資料彙編 [Collections of Contemporary China’s Views toward the 
West], vol. 2, 3 (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1984), 753–54. 
74 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 6. 
75  The type of double-barrelled fowling-pieces carried by Pickering was unclear in Pickering’s description. 
Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 98. 
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Spencer’s rifle and a revolver before entering the Ban-tau-lang tribe of the Rukai group (萬斗
籠社 or Wanshan 萬山 in Kaohsiung County).76 Professor Steere demonstrated his skill at using 
six-shooters to terrify fifty to sixty of the Buhwan 霧番  of the Atayal, who followed and 
surrounded them on their way to visit Bu-hwan in 1873, as Rev. Campbell reported,  
In sight of us all he rose, picked up a few leaves, fastened them on a 
tree about twelve yards off, returned to the stone where he had been 
sitting, raised his six-shooter, sent all its bullets in quick succession 
through the pinned-up leaves, and then quietly sat down. The effect 
was as if the Bu-hwaners had suddenly received a galvanic shock, and I 
never saw a more amazed and cowed lot of warriors than those who 
now stood before us. They were all ordered to walk in front which they 
did, till they gradually slunk off …77 
 
Firearms were a major focus for interaction and barter. The increasing experiences of 
the indigenes of Formosa with different types and models of Western firearms through warfare 
with the Western forces and expeditions or some of their individual contacts with foreigners 
was obviously significant. This was bound to encourage or to influence their perceptions of 
modern weaponry in warfare and later affected their procurement of modern or advanced 
firearms and the integration of firearms within their communities. It also seemingly went hand 
in hand with their own growing experience with firearms and their increased ability to adapt a 
variety of handguns and rifles to novel fighting conditions. 
 
2.2. Possession of Guns among the Qing Army, Militia and Civilians, Use in 
Internal Conflicts     
 
The popularity of the Chinese matchlock among the Qing military and Chinese civilians 
lasted for a long time, especially the development of artilleries and firearms that had stagnated 
from the period of the Jiaqing emperor of Qing (清 , 嘉慶 1795-1820). 78  However, the 
                                                             
76 W. A. Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867’, The Messenger and Missionary Record of 
the Presbyterian Church of England 3 (1878): 69–71. Six-shooter is a type of revolver, which contains six chambers. 
This allows the shooter to fire several times without reloading. It was patented by Samuel Colt in 1835 in US. The 
famous model is the Model 1873 or the Peacemaker, which is in production until today, and it is widely used by 
civilians, police, and criminals in the US although it was originally made for the US Army. Ian V. Hogg, The Complete 
Handgun: 1300 To the Present, Reprint (New York: Gallery Books, 1986), 36–45. 
77 William Campbell, Sketches from Formosa (London: Marshall Brothers, 1915), 115–17. 
78 In Chapter 2, pp. 66-68, I wrote about the primary weaponry like knives, arrows and bows and matchlocks 
were introduced and manufactured to Taiwan briefly in the 17 th and 18th century.  For more information about 
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armaments in China began to shift after the two defeats of the First and Second Opium War to 
the British and French in 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 and the subjugation of the Taiping Rebellion 
during 1850-1865. The weapons that Qing military and Chinese civilians carried, particularly the 
small arms that the Qing largely purchased, manufactured and supplied into the Qing army 
during the Self-Strengthening Movement (Ziqiang yundong自強運動 or Yangwu yundong洋
務運動 , 1861-1895), started to have effects on indigenous people due to the persistent 
conflicts with indigenous tribes and revolts in Taiwan.  
Referring to Xu’s analysis of the use of firearms of the Qing military in Taiwan, the Qing 
government did not introduce any new armaments, but continued to use matchlocks in warfare 
until the establishment of the Ever-Victorious Army (Changshengjun 常勝軍) to fight against 
the Taipings.79 Despite the fact that the Ever-Victorious Army was the first Qing army furnished 
with Western rifles and cannon and trained by Western drill instructors that succeeded in 
subjugating the Taiping rebellion, Western military technologies were not popularised within 
the Qing army until 1880.80 The armaments in Chinese Taiwan also remained at a traditional 
level which can be seen in the Gazetteer of Tamsui which was edited in 1868. It recorded the 
armaments the Green Standard Army were furnished with, which included types of canon, 
Chinese matchlocks, knives, bows and arrows. 81  In the report of Lieutenant Thornaugh P. 
Gurdon, who received a request in 1868 to seize Anping 安平 (Tainan City) from the British 
Acting Consul, John Gibson, due to the unsettlement over the camphor trade (see Chapter 3, 
pp.84-85), the Chinese matchlocks were in use and demolished, as he stated that,  
I have the honour to state for your information that when captured by 
me the town of Amping had mounted on its fortifications forty-one guns, 
and there were in store ready for mounting no less than 101. The above-
mentioned guns vary in size, but the greater number consisted of 18 
and 12 pounders. I also destroyed while in possession of Amping about 
4,000 stand of arms, consisting of gingalls, matchlocks, bows, and 
arrows, swords and spears.82  
                                                             
the decline of weaponry development from the Jiaqing era can be seen in  Liu Xu  劉旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao 
Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China], 156–59.  
79 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of 
Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 209–10.   
80 Tian Zhenya 田震亞, Zhongguo Jindai Junshi Sixiang 中國近代軍事思想 [Military Ideology in Contemporary 
China] (Taipei: Taiwansheng shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣省商務印書館, 1923), 92–93. 
81 Numbers of Chinese matchlocks were also recorded: Tamsui  626 pieces (340 remained), Bangka 910 pieces 
(258 remained), Hobei 910 pieces (213 remained) Chen Peigui 陳培桂, Danshuitingzhi 淡水廳志[The Gazetteer 
of Tamsui ], 165–66. 
82 TEPR 1/185-241. Correspondence Respecting Missionary Disturbances at Che-Foo and Taiwan (Formosa), 
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This generally shows that the armaments the Qing army held at one of its most important 
fortresses and in treaty ports in southern Taiwan were backward and unchallenging. The most 
traditional of all, the destroyed weapons such as Chinese matchlocks, knives and rattan shields 
were reissued and carried by the soldiers to Taiwan by the Governor of Fujian Ying-Gui (英桂, 
閩浙總督署福建巡撫) in the aftermath of the Camphor war after reviewing weaponry in 
1870.83 The armament of the Qing military in Taiwan continued to remain primitive - using 
bows, arrows and gingalls or Taiqiang抬槍84 which were rated as sturdy and strong according 
to the review of two Regional Commanders of Taiwan – Yang Zaiyuan 楊在元 in 1871 and Lin 
Yihua 林宜華 in 1872.85 
However, the demand rose and a greater mixture of munitions started to flow into 
Taiwan due to the increased conflicts or warfare in the regions of mountain indigenous 
territories, especially in the course of the Mudan Incident in 1874 (see this chapter, pp. 122-
125). Instead of sending 3,000 men of a foreign gun brigade from Beiyang Fleet (北洋水師) 
and 2,000 men of a foreign gun brigade from Nanyang Fleet (南洋水師) to transfer to aid 
Taiwan from the appeal of Shen Baozheng, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, the Viceroy of Zhili and 
                                                             
Lieutenant Gurdon to Commodore Jones. Inclosure 5, “algerine,” Takow, Formosa, 2/Dec/1868, 202. However, 
the number of destroyed guns was reported differently from a Hong Kong newspaper, which translated by Zongli 
Yamen (總理衙門, a governmental organization that managed foreign affairs in late imperial China). According to 
the news, over 150 canonns, 11, 000 guns and large amount of ammunition were destroyed by the British 
military. ‘抄付摘錄繙譯台灣中外相鬧新聞紙’(A copied summarized translation of the newspaper of  the 
conflicts between the inside and outside of Taiwan) in 05/02/1869 in Institute of Modern History, Academia 
Sinica, Qingji Jiaowu Jiaoan Dang 清季教務教案檔 [Documents on the Missionary Affairs in the Late Qing]. 
83 Ying Gui 英桂,  the inspector general of Fujian 福建巡撫, ‘製補福建臺灣水師協標三營被洋人違約生事焚燬
庫儲砲械摺’(Making and repairing the folders of the arms stored in the three camps of Xie Biao of Fu-jian 
Taiwan Navy which were burned up by the contract breaking westerners) in Tongzhichao junji dang E 同治朝軍
機檔 E (Tongzhi Military classified archives E) in Junjichudan zhejian 軍機處檔摺件 (Archive of the Grand Council) 
(Taipei: 故宮博物院, n.d.), No.102816. http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/. 
84 Gingall or 抬槍 was a type of very crude large matchlock, which has the same ignition system like matchlock 
and required 2 to 5 people to operate. It was first used during the Ming Dynasty and it was generally used by the 
Qing military until the late 19th century. Liu Xu 劉旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 
[History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China], 120.; 
http://www.chinesefirearms.com/110108/history/jinglin.htm  
85 Yang Zai-Yuan 楊在元, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan, Fujian 福建臺灣鎮總兵, ‘為巡閱全臺營伍地方情
形恭摺奏祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial is sent to Your Majesty for the approval of the inspection of all the camps 
around Taiwan) in Tongzhichao junjidang F 同治朝軍機檔 F (Tongzhi Military classified archives F.)  Junjichudan 
zhejian  軍機處檔摺件 (Archive of the Grand Council) (Taipei: 故宮博物院, n.d.), No.106274. 
http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.; Lin Yi-Hua 林宜華, the acting garrison commander of Taiwan, Fujian 署理福建臺灣鎮
總兵, '為巡閱全臺地方水陸營伍情形恭摺由驛馳奏仰祈聖鑒事' (A memorial is sent express to Your Majesty 
for the approval of the inspection of all the local army and navy camps around Taiwan) in , Tongzhichao yuezhe 
dang 同治朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era). 
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Minister of Beiyang of the late Qing government, authorised instead the sending of 6,500 men 
with foreign firearms led by General Tang Dingkui 唐定奎 from the Anhui Army.86 Professor 
Richard J. Smith suggested that the Anhui Army (Huai jun 淮軍), commanded by Li Hongzhang
李鴻章 , largely purchased Western weapons and expanded from 1,000 rifles to over 40,000 
thousand soldiers with 10,000 Western rifles in 1862 and employed a dozen Western drill 
instructors who were mostly from the Ever-Victorious Army.87 Liu Xu also mentioned in his 
book – Zhongguo gudai huoyao huoqi shi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and 
Weaponry in China] that the major firearms that the Anhui Army were equipped with were 
British manufactured Henry Martini rifles and German manufactured Mauser rifles. 88 
Thereafter, battles with mountain indigenes during the scheme for the opening up of the 
eastern mountains from 1874 (see this chapter, pp. 132-134) also prompted the transmission 
of modern firearms to eastern Taiwan. For example, Shen Baozheng reported the arrival of 
the Anhui Army to assist in the “opening mountain” project 89  and foreign breech loader 
firearms were shipped to Taiwan to assist the subjugation of the revolt of the Shitou tribe 獅
頭社 and several tribes in southern Taiwan.90 Zeng Yuanfu, Regional Commander of Taiwan 
(曾元福, 台灣鎮總兵) recruited 500 local men trained by Westerners and equipped with 
foreign firearms in 1874. 91  Ding Richang, the Governor of Fujian (1875-1879), in 1877 
requisitioned military reinforcement from Guangdong with Henry Martini rifles to Taiwan due 
to an unsure intended attack by Spain.92 A British Acting Consul. G.M.H. Playfair in Taiwan 
                                                             
86 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 97–100; Wenqing 文慶, Guzhen 賈楨, and Baojun 
寶鋆, Choubanyiwushimo 籌辦夷務始末 [Preparation on Managing the Foreign Affairs], 7:2172–73; Xu Yuliang 
許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the 
Qing Dynasty], 353. Anhwei Army were equipped with western canon, firearms and trained in western military 
strategy. 
87 Richard J Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China (Millwood, 
N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978), 187. 
88 Liu Xu 劉旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in 
China], 200. Lu Fang-Shang also mentioned in Li Hong-Zhang’s letter to Zongli Yamen in 1874, how he purchased 
100,000 Martini rifles and issued to several provinces and regarded the Maritini rifles as the best British 
manufacture firearms. The Remington rifles and Snider rifles came as the second. This showed the Qing court 
were not aware of the German military technology very well in the 1870s. Lǚ Fangshang  呂芳上, ‘Cong Renshi 
Dao Rentong :wanqing Zhongguo Chaoye Dui Deguo Junshi Nengli de Renzhi  從認識到認同:晚清中國朝野對德
國軍事能力的認知, 1861-1890 [From Understanding to Recognization: The Awareness of the Qing Court toward 
the German Military Capacity in China]’ (MA, National Taiwan Normal University, 2011), 54–55. 
89 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 133–36. 
90 Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Fujian Taiwan Zuozhe 福建臺灣奏摺 [Shen Baozhen’s Memorials on Taiwan], 26–28. 
91 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 97–100; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi 
Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 112. 
92Liu Kun-Yi 劉坤一, the governor general of Guangdong and Guanxi 兩廣總督, ‘總兵調署要缺邀請免赴臺灣
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reported on this matter and reported on some 4,000 or 5,000 troops drilled with English and 
French weapons and Chinese instructors. He also noted, “it is the thought that the Governor 
will use the troops against the aborigines, either as a means of awing them into good 
behaviour or in actual warfare.”93 If we look at the armaments of Hengchun garrison in 1879 
in Hengchun County Gazetteer, foreign muzzleloaders, breech-loaders, Winchester repeating 
rifles, revolvers and Chinese matchlocks were furnished.94 In the year of 1882, the Governor 
of Fujian Chen Yuying (岑毓英, 福建巡撫) purchased 1,700 foreign breech loading rifles and 
ammunition in Guangdong and took them to Taipei for defence. 95 Thousands of foreign 
firearms were transferred and carried by Chinese soldiers for reinforcement to Taiwan.  
Matchlocks were also extensively used by Chinese militia, bandits, and civilians and in 
local uprisings in Taiwan, which together might have been of great significance. Despite the 
components of Chinese militia in Taiwan being rather complex, involving various Chinese 
ethnic groups, gentry, vagrants, in different periods of time and area96, some weapons the 
Chinese militia used were given by the Qing officials and some were privately and illegally 
possessed, and in themselves contributed to the phenomenon of an overflowing of guns in 
nineteenth century Taiwan. As early as 1842, a British passenger named Robert Gully on the 
British brig and opium carrier Ann which was wrecked near Tamsui, wrote about the 
matchlocks that Chinese militia carried,  
the soldiers in many instances carried a very superior kind of matchlock 
to any I had seen in China before, and they were cut outside, six square, 
and as well as the bore were quite smooth and bright. Some again were 
wretched-looking beings with rusty spears, shields, and old caps, 
without any stiffening in the borders. These I conjectured were the 
militia, the others regulars.97 
                                                             
摺’(A memorial of being free from going to Taiwan considering the invitation of the garrison commander’s 
assignment of the main position ) in Liu Kunyi  劉坤一, Liuzhongchenggong (Kuyu) Yiji 劉忠誠公(坤一)遺集 
[Memoir of Liu Kungyi], ed. Ou Yangfu  歐陽輔 (Taipei: Wenhai 文海, 1968), 1611–15, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.   
93 TEPR 2/119-132, Report on the Trade of Taiwan for 1876. Acting Consul. G.M.H. Playfair. Taiwan, 31/Mar/1877, 
126 
94 Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [ Gazetteer of Hengchun County], 88–89, 90, 95. 
95 “籌解黔饟片”( Notes about the preparation and the guarded transport of Soldier’s salary to the Qian county.) 
in Cen Yuying 岑毓英, Cengxiangxungong (Yuying) Yiji 岑襄勳公（毓英）遺集 [Collections of Ceng Yu-Ying] 
(Taipei: Wenhai 文海, 1976), 1915–16, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/. 
96 Xu also demonstrated brilliantly the development of 4 types of Chinese militia in Taiwan in Qing regime: civil 
corps (Mintuan 民 團), guards near mountain indigenes’ territories (Ai 隘), local groups (Jiedshou 結首) and 
secret societies(Huidang 會黨). He also emphasised the importance of armed Chinese militia in assisting local 
uprisings. See Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會[Military Affairs and 
Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 98–144. 
97 A Journal Kept by Mr. Gully and Captain Denham During a Captivity in China in the Year 1842.Edited by a  
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Chinese militia or Yimin義民 were given firearms, weapons, tents, etc. by the Qing officials or 
recruited by local gentry to aid and quell local riots. 98 In accordance with findings of Xu, 
firearms were operated by Chinese settlers in ethnic conflicts in the early 1800s despite the 
prohibition of using matchlocks under Qing regulations. Some affluent families like the Lin 
family of Lungjing (龍井林家) and the Lin family of Wufeng (霧峰林家) in Taizhong County 
collected and even forged firearms secretly.99 Matchlocks were also commonly utilised in the 
Dai Chaochun rebellion (1862-1865) and by Chinese local bandits in the 1870s.100 Hundreds of 
matchlocks, knives, spears and different sizes of cannon from comrades of Dai Chaochun were 
captured during the subjugation as reported by the Circuit Intendant of Taiwan - Ding Yuejian
丁曰健  (臺灣兵備道 ). 101  Francis White who worked for the Imperial Maritime Customs 
                                                             
Barrister (London:Cahpman and Hall, 1844) quoted in  Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : 
History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical 
Plants, and Other Productions, 106; Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 67. 
98 Anonymous, Anping Xian Zaji 安平縣雜記, 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 52 (Taipei: 台灣銀
行經濟研究室, 1959), 103–6. 
99 Lin, Wencha 林文察 from the Wufeng Lin Family lead 2,000 men to Zhejian and Fujian Provinces to suppress 
the Taiping Rebellion. Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs 
and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 207–9. 
100 Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 臺灣文獻叢刊 ( Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 
130, n.d., 861; Shen Bao-Zhen 沈葆楨, an officer in charge of Taiwan’s coastaldefences and international affairs
辦理臺灣等處海防兼理各國事務臣, '為查拿布袋嘴匪徒事' (Reporting the arresting of mobsters in Bu Dai) in 
Guāng Xù Cháo Yuè Zhé Dàng 光緒朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guangxu Era) (Taipei: 故宮博
物院, n.d.), http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; Lee He-Nian 李鶴年, the governor general of Min and Zhe 閩浙總督, '為奏
剿平彰化匪首廖有富事' (Reporting the extermination of  Liao You-Fu Liao, the head of the mobsters in Chang 
Hua ) in 同治朝軍機檔 G (Tongzhi Military classified archives G) , 軍機處檔摺件 (Archive of the Grand Council), 
No.114850. Local bandit led by Cai Xianlao 蔡顯老 and weapon included foreign guns, matchlocks, spears they 
smuggled were captured in Jiayi County by Qing Army in 1874. 
101  Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, ‘為剿
破葭投老巢撲滅逆匪巨股彰化大肚溪以北一律肅清恭摺馳陳仰祈聖鑒事’(A memorial sent express to Your 
Majesty for the approval of the eradication the rebel bandits of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of 
the Dadu River in Zhanghua.) in 同治朝軍機檔 B (Tongzhi Military classified archives B) , 14/01/1864 in 軍機處
檔摺件 (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 093059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 
臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學
政, '為會師克復彰化縣城生擒偽副元帥江有仁等逆暨內山官軍擊賊獲勝克復貓【猫】霧【捒】巡檢地方並
攻克水【陸？】要隘情形合詞恭摺馳陳仰祈聖鑒事' (A joint memorial sent express to Your Majesty for the 
approval of the realignment, recovery of Zhanghua county and capturing of the fraudulent Vice Marshal Jiang 
You-Ren and his gang. Also, on success on the defeat of the proditors and the recovery of the Babuza regional 
patrols and passes) in 01/02/1864 in 同治朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era); Zeng Fu-
Yuan 曾元福, the to-be Garrison Commander of Fujian Taiwan 署福建臺灣鎮總兵記名提督, Ding Yue-Chien 丁
曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 福建臺灣道, '為掃穴犁巢生擒逆首偽西王陳
啞狗弄兒克復沿海地方及扼守山隘迭獲偽太子戴能戴如川並股首張三顯等多名暨殄除各股悍賊全臺平定
恭摺馳陳仰祈聖鑒事' (A joint memorial sent express to Your Majesty for the approval of the complete destroy 
of the rebel base, capturing of the rebel leader, son of Chen Nong, and the recovery of the coastal areas and 
mountain passes. Also, on capturing the sham Crown prince Dai Neng, Dai Ru-Chuan and the rebel leader Zhang 
San-Xian, eliminating all the rebel gangsters and restoring the order in Taiwan.) in 19/08/1864 in 同治朝月摺檔 
(Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era). 
145 
 
Service in 1866-1867, wrote about the matchlocks that were used by local Chinese settlers 
which belonged to militia who lived near the mountain indigenes’ territory, but remained on 
friendly term with them in Lakuli 六龜里 (Kaohsiung City). As he described it,  
Their matchlocks, which were kept in excellent order, were fitted with 
a stock much like that of a European gun, and the barrels must have 
been constructed of good metal, the charge of powder alone being 
more than a hand's breadth. It is true they kick a good deal, but this 
appears to be no disadvantage, and they make very fair practice at a 
hundred yards, the target being a mark cut on the trunk of a moderate 
sized tree.102 
In fact, it was also generally known that even Chinese male civilians in Taiwan carried 
matchlocks for defence. Lieutenant Alexander Wylly Habersham, U.S. Naval officer on the 
U.S.S. John A. Kennedy first landed on the east coast of Taiwan in 1853 -according to Rev. 
Campbell, this visit might have been the first meeting of Westerners and East coast aborigines 
since the Benyowsky visit in 1771103 - and reported that almost every male Chinese was armed 
with matchlocks, arrows and bows.104 Before Robert Swinhoe became the first Vice-Consul in 
Formosa, he accompanied a British warship Inflexible in search of survivors from shipwrecks 
around Taiwan in 1858. When they reached Soo-au or Sawo 蘇澳 (Yilan County) he saw that 
the Chinese carried matchlocks to defend themselves, “from the savages they keep in pay a 
kind of a sharp-shooting militia who patrol the hills. These men, many of whom came to see 
us, were armed with very fine matchlocks, kept in splendid order, and with knives worn in 
their girdles.”105 In some areas, especially near the mountain indigenes’ territories, carrying 
matchlocks was essential for the male Chinese farmers to prevent or at least reduce the 
chances of getting ambushed by the indigenous people. Mr. Thomas Francis Hughes who was 
responsible for the negotiations to build the lighthouse at Olunanpi in 1872106, mentioned that 
the inhabitants in Chia-siang 車城 (Pingdong County), “from the sturdy peasant at his plough 
to the youngest herd-boy in the fields, were armed with matchlocks, spears, or bows.” 107 
                                                             
102 Francis White, ‘A Visit to the Interior of South Formosa’, The Cycle: A Political and Literary Review 17 (27 
August 1870): 198. 
103 Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 69. 
104 Alexander Wylly Habersham, The North Pacifyic Surveying and Exploring Expedition; Or, My Last Cruise. 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1857), 173. 
105 Swinhoe, ‘Narrative of a Visitor to the Island of Formosa’, 153–54. 
106 Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 80. 
107 Hughes, ‘Visit to Tok-E-Tok, Chief of the Eighteen Tribes, Southern Formosa’, 266. 
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Lances and firelocks108 were held by parties of Chinese men near the territories of mountain 
indigenes as Professor Steere observed in his trip from Jiayi County to Zhanghua County in 
1873.109   
The technique of forging firearms was also brought by the Hakkas and large amounts 
of firearms were manufactured in southern Taiwan, as reported in The China Review110 and by 
some foreign visitors like naturalist Cuthbert Collingwood. The Chinese who lived in Sau-o told 
them that their matchlocks were forged at Amoy and they “allowed us to examine their 
matchlocks, which we were told were manufactured at Amoy; and their ammunition, 
consisting of very coarse powder, with a finer grain for the priming, and bullets-some round, 
some oblong, and some rectangular.”111 General Le Gendre noted that gun manufactory was 
established and powder was stored and procured from the Chinese importers at Chasiang by 
the Hakkas in Poliac 保力.112 Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀 stayed shortly in Fangliao 枋寮 in 
his second investigation from southern Kaohsiung to the Hengchun regions and witnessed that 
firearms were manufactured in Chinese villages to prepare for the upcoming warfare. 113 A 
court case in 1878 also reveals that the Chinese manufactured foreign firearms, powder and 
bullets in northern Taiwan.114 
This all strongly illustrates that the existence and the practices of matchlocks and other 
primitive weapons like spears, knives, arrows and bows, were not only operated with by the 
Qing army, but were also distributed and popularized among diverse Chinese groups or 
individuals– gentry families, militia, bandits, even peasants. Although several modern firearms 
                                                             
108 Firelock is a type of muzzle loading firearms.  
109 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 29–30. 
110 “The Hakkas – or, as they are called in Fukien dialet, the Khaelang – are not very numerous, still they have not 
been absorbed by the more numerous races they live amongst, for they retain their own language, peculiarities of 
dress and feature, and probably character. They till the soil like their neighbours, but are much superior to them 
as artificers in iron; they make guns and knives for the savages, and, if one can believe the country stories, are very 
handy at using their own manufactures.” From a former resident who lived in Taiwan for 5 years, A Gossip About 
Formosa in The China Review, Vol. 2, No.1, 40-47 Sep 1873 in Zhang Xiurong 張秀蓉, A Chronology of 19th Century 
Writings on Formosa : From the Chinese Repository, the Chinese Recorder, and the China Review, 435. 
111 Collingwood, ‘Visit to the Kibalan Village of Sau-O Bay, North-East Coast of Formosa. Including a Vocabulary of 
the Dialect’, Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London 6 (1868): 136. 
112Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 75. 
113 Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀, ‘Rijun Gong Tai Ji Xianfeng Zai Langqiao-Huashan Ziji: Taiwan Jishi 日軍攻臺及
先鋒在琅嶠-樺山資紀: 臺灣記事 [Pioneer of Japanese Military in Liang-Kiao - Journal of Kabayama Sukenori on 
Taiwan]’, in Taiwan Bainian Huahuo 臺灣百年花火, trans. Yang Najun 楊南郡 (Taipei: Yùshān shè 玉山社, 2002), 
34. 
114 ‘Danshui Xinzhu dangan 淡水新竹檔案 [Danshui and Xinzhu County Archive]’ (National Taiwan University, 
n.d.), http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw.16509/1, 12/03/1878. 
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or breech-loaders such as Henry Martini and Winchester repeating rifles were transferred by 
the decree of Shen Baozheng and furnished by the Hengchuan garrison (see p 31), these 
Western firearms did not seem to be prevalent among the earlier Qing military nor the Chinese 
groups or individuals. Apart from the modern firearms the Westerners brought, the foreign 
firearms like Henry Martini rifles, Mauser rifles, breech loader rifles that had been equipped 
and transferred by the Qing army began through various avenues to appear in the society of 
Taiwan. A great mixture of traditional and modern firearms started to penetrate the Chinese 
communities. These communities interwove through numerous contacts and countless 
conflicts over resource exploitation with the mountain regions of the indigenous people. 
 
3. Types of Firearms in Plains and Mountain Indigenes’ Hands 
 
In Chapter 2, Section 4 above, Armed, Alarmed and Aware: The Nature of Resistance 
(pp. 66-69), I described the “primary stage” of arms of the indigenes before the nineteenth 
century which consisted mostly of bows, arrows, shields, swords, spears or darts and some 
experiences of muskets, harquebuses, Chinese matchlocks, when confronting the earlier 
colonists and the encroachment of Chinese settlers from the seventeenth century. Even so, the 
impact of firearms and the possession of firearms was mainly limited to plains indigenes in the 
western plain of Taiwan.115 This situation remained the same until the early nineteenth century 
before the opening of treaty ports in Taiwan. For instance, plains indigenes of Alishi 阿里史 
carried Chinese matchlocks and resettled to Yilan County in the year of 1820. 116  There is 
recorded a complaint about mountain indigenes who attacked Chinese villages with Chinese 
matchlocks, made by a villager living in Dabeipu 大北埔  (Miaoli County) in 1849, which 
according to Xu’s finding might be the earliest record of mountain indigenes holding firearms.117 
The use of firearms among the Formosan inidgenes, mostly Chinese matchlocks, was also 
                                                             
115 Plains indigenes had bartered firearms and gunpowder with Chinese people illegally according to the 
governmental reports of Qing in the early 18th century. Plains indigenes were granted some rights to hold 
Chinese matchlocks when joining indigenous military to support Qing army on guard and in subjugations since 
the pacification of the Lin Shuanwen incident in 1787. See Chapter 2, pp.54-55 
116 See  Yao Ying 姚瑩, Dong Cha Ji Lue 東槎紀略 [Sketch of My Assignment to Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 
臺灣文獻叢刊 ( Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 7, n.d., 69. 
117 The Tam-Hsin Files 淡新檔案, Volume 1: Administration 第一編行政, Category 7: Reclamation 第七類撫墾, 
Section 1: Tribal Affairs.第一款社務, Case Number: 17101-17115 案碼: 17101-17115, National Taiwan University 
Library 台灣大學圖書館藏, 119558-119559 quoted in Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代
臺灣軍事與社會[Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 208. 
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commonly recorded by foreigners around the 1850s, when the Western ships were active in 
trade with China between the First and Second Opium Wars. For example, The Chinese 
Repository and Davidson both reported the survivors of a British ship Larpent, which was 
wrecked in southern Taiwan in 1850, engaged in some gun fights and encountered fifty of the 
natives who were clearly armed with matchlocks.118 Another report about the weapons the 
Formosan indigenes carried, which included sword, matchlock, arrows and bows, was made by 
an American naval officer, Lieutenant Alexander Wylly Habersham, who landed on the east 
coast of Taiwan on a mission searching for stranded castaways in 1853.119 As we have seen 
above, a group of Prussian sailors from the transporter Elbe were assaulted by indigenes with 
firearms in 1858.120 Although these reports, which were written by Westerners, did not specify 
whether the indigenes they encountered were the plains indigenes or the mountain indigenes, 
these sources that indicated matchlocks were generally used by the Formosan indigenes for 
defence.  
Nevertheless, when further economic and political encroachment accelerated toward 
the eastern regions of Taiwan, where most mountain indigenous people lived , and created 
conflicts or warfare that indigenes were forced to engage with, what types of weapon did 
mountain indigenes possess to fight against invaders? How did mountain indigenes obtain their 
weapons? Several journals and reports noted in Western and Chinese languages the firearms 
that both plain and mountain indigenes possessed after the opening of treaty ports in 1860 and 
before the French attacked northern Taiwan in 1884.121 Below, first, I would like to discuss the 
firearms that the plains indigenes possessed, briefly being due to the character of plains 
indigenes who often acted as middle men between the mountain indigenes and foreign visitors, 
the Qing Army and the Chinese civilians. (See Chapter 3, p 109-111). Secondly, I begin to focus 
more explicitly on the firearms that mountain indigenes possessed based on the record of 
                                                             
118 Art. V Journal of Occurrences: Loss of the English ship Larpent on Formosa; …. The Chinese Repository, Vo. 20, 
No.5, p285-286 in Zhang Xiurong 張秀蓉, A Chronology of 19th Century Writings on Formosa : From the 
Chinese Repository, the Chinese Recorder, and the China Review, 172.; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and 
Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, 
Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 112. 
119 Habersham, The North Pacifyic Surveying and Exploring Expedition; Or, My Last Cruise., 159. 
120 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 115; Carrington, Foreigners in 
Formosa, 1841-1874, 151. Also in page 78-79. 
121 Especially the custom and lives of Formosan indigenes were largely recorded by foreign visitors and 
missionaries, this is probably because foreigners were not prohibited from entering mountain regions, unlike the 
Chinese.  
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foreign visitors and the Qing official records on warfare and conflict. Finally, I would like to 
suggest how mountain indigenes obtained firearms and the possible routes.  
 
3.1. Firearms in the Plains Indigenes’ Hands  
 
Matchlocks seemed to be commonly used by the plains indigenes. In fact, by the 
nineteenth century the plains indigenes were largely assimilated to Chinese and some plains 
indigenes were enlisted in the indigenes military under the Qing governance in Taiwan. This 
might suggest that the level of firearms among the plains indigenes might be the same as the 
Qing army, the Chinese militia, and Chinese civilian that is, on a traditional more or less level. 
It was unclear if the plains indigenes who enlisted in the Qing army were issued any modern 
firearms when the Qing government transferred them to Taiwan from 1874. However, there 
were traces of plains indigenes carrying matchlocks for general protection when they guided 
and guarded the Western visitors to the mountain areas. For instance, the Rev. William 
Campbell mentioned that 58 of Sek-hwan (also meant plains indigenes) who were furnished 
with firearms and long knives guarded them to Polisia 埔里社 (Nantou County) in 1872, which 
required passing through desolate and dangerous areas in which the “head hunting savage” 
loitered. 122  Professor Steere also described the Pepo-whans (also plains indigenes) of 
Bankimseng 萬金庄 (Pingdong County) armed with lances and fire-locks to protect themselves 
from attack when they went to their fields near the mountains.123 Arthur Corner also narrated 
the matchlocks and knives carried by a party of Sek-hoan or plains indigenes who accompanied 
them through the woods when he visited Chipchip (集集, Nantuo County) in 1876.124 Although 
it is difficult to know to what exact extent the plains indigenes had conflicts or contacts with 
the mountain indigenes, the firearms that plains indigenes possessed might have had some 
impact on the mountain indigenes.  
 
3.2.  Firearms in the Mountain Indigenes’ Hands 
 
                                                             
122 Campbell, Sketches from Formosa, 37. 
123 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 304. 
124 Arthur Corner, ‘A Journey in Formosa’, The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal 7, no. 2 (1876): 121. 
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Weapons of mountain indigenes such as arrows and bows, swords, spears and 
matchlocks or other types of firearms were frequently noticed by foreign visitors in several 
accounts. For instance, Swinhoe described the bows and arrows used by the Kalees of the Rukai 
and Paiwan tribes. 125 An English traveller Michael Beazley noted the apparatus southern 
mountain indigenes were armed with when he and his friends met on their way to South Cape 
(南岬, Pingdong County):   
A great many of them were armed with matchlocks, and they held their 
lighted port fires ready in their hands. The rest were armed with bows 
and arrows, and all had the disheartening long knives at their waists. I 
have never seen firearms kept in such beautiful order as these 
matchlocks. The barrels and locks were as bright as silver, and the stocks 
were of a wood as white and hard as holly.126  
Matchlocks were used by the “savages” (referring to mountain indigenes) on the east coast 
occasionally as their weapons as described by an employee of the Imperial Chinese Maritime 
Customs service, E.C. Taintor, at Tamsui. 127  The Pilam or Puyuma indigenes carried the 
matchlock rifle, “the barrel of which is four feet, and the stock is only one foot”.128 Firelocks 
were held by the Paiwan indigenes of the Sabaree tribe 射麻里129 and Tsuiwhan or water 
savages from the Thao tribe. 130  French Vice Consul Mr. Guérin described the firearms that 
Atayal indigenes carried in 1868,  
There is a long gun with a fuse, and in front of it two or three powder-
horns are suspended from strings of false pearls. In back the man carries 
a coat which is folded into the net, a bag for balls, and a parchment case 
containing eight powder charges in eight bamboo holders. Then around 
his wrist is a cord, a lighter with a fire-stone, and some banana marrow 
instead of tinder.” 131 
                                                             
125 “Their bows are of the rudest description: they are made of tough wood, and have a notched rest in the 
middle for the string when loose to rest in. Their arrows are made of a strong kind of jointed reed, are about 2 ¼ 
feet long, and have neither feather nor notch wherewith to plant it on the string. The iron head, shaped like a 
nail, a lance-head, or a shark’s tooth, is stuck into one end of the reed, and fastened tight in with a binding of 
string. They are sharp, but carry true only to a very short distance.” Robert Swinhoe, ‘Additional Notes on 
Formosa’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 10 (1866): 128. 
126 Beazeley, ‘Notes of an Overland Journey through the Southern Part of Formosa in 1875, from Takow to the 
South Cape, with Sketch Map.’, 16. 
127Taintor, ‘The Aborigines of Northern Formosa’ in Henrietta Harrison, ed., Natives of Formosa: British Reports of 
the Taiwan Indigenous People, 1650-1950 (Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, 2001), 134. 
128 Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 130. 
129 Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 31. 
130 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 31–32. 
131 Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’î Le de Formose.’, 555. 
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General Le. Gendre observed the muskets that Paiwan indigenes carried when he met Tooke-
tok, 
They all carried muskets, the barrels of which shone like mirrors. The 
locks were made almost exactly in the same manner as I have seen them 
in ancient Japanese arms; but the stocks were similar to those of our 
American pieces.132 
The Paiwan indigenes in southern Taiwan from Sabari 射麻里 and Tuasók 豬朥束社 furnished 
themselves fully with muskets and other types of weapon when going to Chinese territories, 
as detailed by Ibis,  
They have their weapons, like all of the tribes, similarly obtained from 
the Chinese. They are: 1. an uncomfortable musket of about 4 feet in 
length with a very short butt; 2 spears, usually a 6-inch-long blade 
attached to an 8 to 10-foot-long shaft; 3. a straight knife (about 2 feet 
long and 1 1/2 inches wide) in a sheath of wood, which only covers one 
side of the knife but is on the other covered with rope or wire; 4. a bow 
of about 3 to 4 feet in length, and along with that arrows of bamboo 
with iron tips (with or without barbs). The bullets, powder poured 
roughly into bamboo sticks, and lead-pieces are carried in a fine net on 
the back. A neat horn with fine powder for the pan hangs on a chain at 
the neck. The musket is wrapped around the upper body, the knife is 
always stuck under the belt, and the spear rarely leaves the hand, so 
that a troop of natives presents a rather picturesque image. Their 
travels into the Chinese settlements or even into a neighbouring village 
always occur in the full outfit.133  
 
Thus a British Custom officer William Hancock recorded that the mountain indigenes loaded 
their matchlocks and lighted their fuses when they conducted their expedition from Taipei 
into the southeast mountains in 1882. 134 
Some accounts depicting the types of firearms and actions of firearms of mountain 
indigenes were documented in conflicts or warfare with indigenes that occurred from the 
1860s, especially in Qing official reports in Chinese regarding the battles during the scheme of 
“opening up mountains”. Indigenes in the south were using muskets to fight against troops of 
                                                             
132Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874)  in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 122–23. 
133 Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, 196–200. 
134 Hancock, ‘A Visit to the Savages of Formosa’, 376; Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 70–
71. 
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H.M.S Cormorant135 and Hartford and Wyoming136 in the course of the Rover Incident in 1867 
as reported by the participant officers, Admiral Bell and Commander Belknap. (See pp. 117-120) 
Large numbers of primitive matchlocks were operated by the Mudan and Kusakut indigenes of 
the Paiwan and later captured by the Japanese troops, which also caused the gunshot wounds 
among the injured soldiers in the punitive expedition by Japan in 1874, as Lieutenant J. R. 
Wasson noted.137 The Paiwan indigenes of the Mudan tribe carried better firearms than the 
mountain indigenes in the north, the barrels were forged by steel, which was similar to the 
Japanese matchlock, as report by Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀 in his investigative trip a few 
months prior to the Japanese expedition. 138  
Weapons that mountain indigenes carried or which were captured in battles during the 
“opening up”, began to be reported on in Qing official reports. In 1874, Chinese matchlocks 
were carried by hundreds of “vicious indigenes”, who attacked Qing troops in Dananao (Yilan 
County) as the Qing Commander directing the opening of the north mountain region, Luo 
Dachun reported (also see p. 133). 139 From the location, the indigenes were possibly from the 
Atayal tribes. In the course of subjugation of the Shitou tribe revolt in 1875, Qing troops were 
ambushed by hundreds of Paiwan indigenes when entering Nanshihu 南勢湖  (Pingdong 
County). Shen Baozhen described shots that were like rain fall and hundreds of firearms, swords, 
gunpowder were seized by the Qing army. 140  Ding Richang stayed in Hengchun (Pingdong 
County) for one evening on one of his inspection trips in Taiwan in 1877 and recorded the 
firearms that the Paiwan indigenes of 18 tribes used in the area,  
Shengfan (mountain indigenes) included olds and youngs, all carried 
rough guns and swords. Although they used matchlocks, they were 
quite accurate, shining and smooth as mirrors and were several times 
better in comparison with the old firearms that Qing troops possessed. 
Furthermore, chiefs of the tribes carried Snider rifles which were given 
                                                             
135 Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874)  in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 80; ‘H.M.S. Cormorant on the Coast of Formosa’, 599–600.   
136 ‘The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the 
Savages of the Isle.’; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 54. 
137 Wasson, James R., ‘ Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines 
of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 236. 
138 Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀, ‘Rijun Gong Tai Ji Xianfeng Zai Langqiao-Huashan Ziji: Taiwan Jishi 日軍攻臺及
先鋒在琅嶠-樺山資紀: 臺灣記事 [Pioneer of Japanese Military in Liang-Kiao - Journal of Kabayama Sukenori on 
Taiwan]’, 37. 
139 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 135. 
140 Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Fujian Taiwan Zuozhe 福建臺灣奏摺 [Shen Baozhen’s Memorials on Taiwan], 29–32, 
40–44; Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 199–201; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai 
Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 327.  
153 
 
as gifts from the Japanese. I had ordered the officials of Hengchun 
Prefecture to investigate the origin of foreign guns and enacted 
interdiction. However, the interdiction became slack since the placating 
indigenes scheme, arms of Shengfan were more sufficient than before, 
supplied by crafty men without getting traced.141  
 
This is verifiable, in a letter from Douglas Cassel, Lieutenant Commander in the United States 
Navy to Charles Le Gendre in 24th May, 1874. He noted that General Akamatsu Noriyoshi 赤松
則良, Rear Admiral in the Japanese Navy, gave breech loading rifles to the son of Took-tok – 
Zhulei 朱雷, brother of A-lok 阿祿 and Isa 伊厝, chief of Shamali.142  
 
3.3. Access to Firearms of Mountain Indigenes (1858-1883)  
3.3.1. Direct Access 
 
Mountain indigenes obtained firearms and the knowledge of firearms by commerce, 
mostly with Chinese, by being given as gifts from foreigners or possibly by plundering in warfare. 
These were the direct routes of getting firearms in the period of 1860 to 1883, according to 
some observations of foreign visitors’ journals or reports and the Qing official reports. Trade 
was one of the major economic activities of mountain indigenes in Taiwan. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2 (pp. 39-40), luxury goods and goods that could not be found or easily produced 
became items that indigenes bartered with the Chinese. Moreover, the material for forging 
firearms is iron which was not an available material in eastern Taiwan, and Chinese settlers 
were restricted in transferring or carrying iron and armaments, including matchlocks from 
China to Taiwan, although it becomes obvious that the effectiveness of these restrictions was 
another matter.   
The truth it seems is that mountain indigenes could fairly easily purchase matchlocks 
and ammunition from their neighbouring Chinese settlers, especially from the Hakkas who in 
some manner forged firearms in southern Taiwan. For the nearby mountain and plains 
                                                             
141 Ding, Richang, ‘為微臣巡查臺灣南路鳳山恆春等處並察勘旗後砲臺謹將沿途所歷情形恭摺陳明仰祈聖鑒
事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty for the approval of my inspection of Fengshang and Hengchun in Southern 
Taiwan and survey of Cihou fort and its surroundings) in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Qing 
Guangxuchao Zhongri Jiaoshe Shiliao 清光緒朝中日交涉史料 [Official Documents of the Guangxu Reign] (Taipei: 
Wenhai 文海, 1963), 9–10, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/. 
142 Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines 
of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 207. 
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indigenes, Poliac, where mostly Hakkas congregated, was the trading centre for firearms and 
ammunitions, which were apparently superior to those carried by the Chinese soldiers. 143 
General Le Gendre reported closely the involvement in firearms of indigenes in southern 
Taiwan as preliminary to the two punitive expeditions. The Paiwan chief of the 18 tribes in 
southern Taiwan rapidly purchased a large provision of arms, ammunition and a small iron gun 
from the Hakkas, who also warned him to prepare for an incursion of the Chinese troops in 
1867 after the Rover incident (also see pp. 121-122). 144  The Rukai indigenes of Kalees 
exchanged powder, shot, articles of clothing and matchlocks with the people who lived in 
Chasiang, who were also engaged in the commerce of firewood.  145 Mudan tribe also procured 
their supply of shot, powder and arms from the Chinese and half-castes of Ponglee or Fangliao
枋寮, Chetongka 莿桐腳 and even Chasiang or Chechang 車城 during the punitive expedition 
of Japan in 1874. 146   
This pursuit of firearms and the ammunition trade were also found in different parts of 
Taiwan in this period. For example, in central Taiwan, the Buhwan of the Atayal groups in Tur-
u-wan, in the mountains east from Po-li-sia, told the Rev. Campbell that Chinese barterers 
supplied them with flint-lock guns to a limited extent, in return for skins, deer horns and other 
goods. 147  An equivalent trading activity of firearms can also be found in northern Taiwan. 
Mountain indigenes in the north obtained matchlocks, blades, powder, shots and other articles 
for daily use from the Chinese in exchange for their hemp, venison, deer horns, skins, mats, and 
baskets. 148 Equivalent interchanges between the mountain indigenes and the Chinese or plains 
indigenes could be seen in some Chinese literature or official records. For instance, around 10 
Chinese bandits carried knives, firearms, bullets and ammunition to the tapangu tribe 達邦社 
of Tsou groups and traded for velvet, venison, deerskin, bear gut and other mountain products 
in the 1870s.149 A court case on the illegal ammunition trade in Dan-Xin Archive 淡新檔案 
                                                             
143 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present, 119; Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) 
in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 75. Pickering, Pioneering in 
Formosa, 180; Hughes, ‘Visit to Tok-E-Tok, Chief of the Eighteen Tribes, Southern Formosa’, 267. 
144 Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 99. 
145 Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 37. 
146Le Gendre, C. W. , “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in  Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of 
Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 108. 
147 Campbell, Sketches from Formosa, 60–61. 
148 Taintor, ‘The Aborigines of Northern Formosa’, 24. 
149 Anonymous, Taian Hui Lu Ren Ji 臺案彙錄壬集 (Taiwan Archives, Seventh Collection), 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary 
Collectanea on Taiwan) 227 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1957), 88, http://hanji.sinica.edu.tw. quoted in Chen Zong-Ren 
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recorded how fange 番割 150  sold mountain indigenes Chinese matchlocks, knives, spears, 
ammunition, bullets, nitre and sulphur in the area of Hualian in 1875.151 A drawing in one 
illustration of indigenes in the late Qing Taiwan displayed this scene also around the 1870s, 
although it is unclear if the firearms and other item were brought by the Chinese or plains 
indigenes. See Figure 4:3 where firearms can be clearly seen for trade on the extreme right 
handside.  
Figure 4:3 Commercial Activity between Indigenes and Chinese 
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of 
Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), 138–139 
 
                                                             
陳宗仁, Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), 138–139. 
150 fange 番割 were the Chinese who spoke indigenes languages, crossed indigenes’ borders, changes his hair 
and dress and married to indigenous women. They often traded with the plain and mountain indigenes and 
exploited and occupied their lands unlawfully. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 (Taiwan 
Bank), Taian Huilu Jiaji 臺案彙錄甲集 [Taiwan Archives, First Collection], 119. 
151 ‘Danxin Dangan 淡新檔案’. 14407/1, 05/04/1875 
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Such exchange activities of firearms, gunpowder and other articles occuring between 
the mountain indigenes in the north and Chinese also involved obtaining consent for entering 
mountains for coal, camphor and other profitable mountain resources. This is noted by John 
Dodd,  
 Some friendly border tribes are not disinclined to allow squatting on 
new territory for a consideration, and a verbal agreement is often 
entered into, “signed, sealed and delivered” over the contents of a jar 
or two of samshu, called by the aborigines Poon-niek Ku Tsiah, literally 
meaning “firewater.” The terms are usually something of this kind: That 
in consideration of the Chinese providing them at certain periods of the 
year with a few necessaries such as rice, salt, and a few domesticated 
pigs, a quantity of Chinese gunpowder and perhaps a matchlock, etc., 
etc., with a jar or two of samshu [rice wine] thrown in, permission is 
granted to squat within certain limits – to fell timber, make charcoal and 
camphor-and to kill deer and other game in the immediate vicinity.152    
Another dispatch also evidently supported the notion that the access to firearms of mountain 
indigenes was connected with the Hakkas, also linked with the camphor manufacture,  
The Hakkas, or Chinese immigrants, not being the agricultural Fuhkien 
men, form a strongly marked and important feature of Formosan 
population. It is they who carry on the barter trade with the savages, 
whom they supply with guns, powder, and knives, mostly of their own 
manufacture, receiving in exchange skins, hardwood, camphor, and the 
native cloth. They are the camphor manufacturers also, and have many 
thriving villages on these border marches, where they live independent 
of the Chinese administration.153 
Thus were clearly linked together the elements of camphor commerce, Hakka involvement and 
arms selling that have been suggested in this and earlier chapters of the thesis. It becomes clear 
that the internal “Taiwanese” story of arms use along the eastern borders cannot – then – be 
separated from the international commercial and industrial forces outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Mountain indigenes procured some of their firearms and ammunition from the Hakkas who 
maintained the techniques of forging firearms whilst also being leading agents in the 
international trade and industry surrounding the whole system.  
                                                             
152 John Dodd, Journal of a Blockaded Resident in North Formosa during the Franco-Chinese War, 1884-1885 
(Hong Kong: Daily Press Office, 1888), 217. 
153 TEPR 3/259-270. Report on the Island of Formosa, compiled from Official and other Sources. Inclosure 1. Mr. 
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In this context it is well worth asking whether it was possible for the mountain indigenes 
to learn to forge firearms despite the limitation of lack of iron. The answer could be positive as 
Professor Steere recounted how the mountain indigenes of the Kale-whan, living in the 
mountains east of Takow, forged “a heavy and rude gun barrel and a hut in the  village was used 
as a blacksmith shop.” 154 Although the gun barrel might be the cannon barrel and this might be 
the only evidence yet that suggests the existence of manufacturing a gun barrel amongst 
indigenes in this research period, it could be sufficient for us to judge that the indigenes in 
southern Taiwan could also have the skill for repairing or modifying firearms (e.g by shortening 
stocks) for dense forest usage despite lacking skill in iron production themselves.  
As we have already seen above, mountain indigenes also took great interest in the 
modern firearms carried by foreign visitors. An interesting account of the response of the 
mountain indigenes experiencing the Sharps rifle and breech loading pistol is described by 
Swinhoe in 1863 (see p.138). 155 A similar experience also occurred to Pickering when the Rukai 
indigenes of Bantaulang were amazed by his rifles and revolver and eager to affiliate with him,  
All the savages gathered round me, and we spent some time in trying 
my rifle and revolver at a mark. They seemed thunderstruck at the great 
distance the rifle would carry, and at the rapidity of loading and firing. 
They said that with one white man and such weapons they would soon 
rout the Sibucoons [施武郡社] and make themselves masters of the 
surrounding country. They asked me to live amongst them, and procure 
ammunition and arms from what seemed to them the greatest place in 
the world, Taiwanfoo. They all persisted in trying the gun.156 
Traces of mountain indigenes in the north attaining knowledge of firearms when making 
contact with Chinese at the borders was observed by John Dodd,  
In the north and centre of the island, I have met savages belonging to 
inland tribes who have never seen a Chinaman, and only know from 
hearsay of their existence. All, however, of the border tribes have come 
in contact with the hardy Chinese pioneers, and have acquired thereby 
certain knowledge, such as the use of firearms, of gunpowder, of the 
beneficial effect of salt as a condiment, and of the soothing influence of 
                                                             
154 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 312. 
155 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 6. 
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tobacco (which plant seems to be indigenous like hemp, camphor-tree, 
&c.157  
The first two accounts show their attentiveness to the performance of modern firearms without 
fear and their willingness to know the power of modern firearms. Their understanding and 
recognition of modern firearms through their individual contacts with foreigners might be 
earlier than the general Chinese settlers in Taiwan in this period. This last account noted by John 
Dodd was rarely found. However, even if they did acquire some knowledge of firearms and 
ammunition from the Chinese, it would be of the traditional Chinese matchlocks generally held 
by the Chinese people in Taiwan.  
Another form of getting firearms for the mountain indigenes was as gifts, which were 
mostly given by foreign visitors. “Modern” firearms were given as gifts to Tooke-tok by General 
Le Gendre after signing an agreement -although they could not function. 
Having handed the paper to Tauketok and retained the rough copy for 
myself, I gave the chief one hundred and eighty yards of red camlet, a 
small pistol, a single barrel shot gun, (unserviceable) and a spear, 
presented by Messrs. Tait & Co. and Messrs. Elles & Co., both of Amoy; 
an ivory spy-glass and case, by Mr. I. Alex Man; some beads, and a 
quantity of rings, bracelets, and a case of gin, by myself. The only 
serviceable gun I had, a fine Enfield,158 I gave to my faithful guide, a 
resident of Sialio, and a member of the militia forces enrolled by Chentai 
Lew, in 1867, for the defence of the district against the aborigines.”159 
 
In the letter from Douglas Cassel, he noted that General Akamatsu Noriyoshi, Rear Admiral in 
the Japanese Navy gave breech loading rifles to the son of Took-tok – 朱雷, brother of A-lok 
and Isa, chief of Shamali, to gain their trust and so as not to attack their boats and soldiers while 
they were surveying in South Bay and Tuillasock river,   
Upon going away [Admiral] Akamatz told me that he wished to give the 
chiefs a greater proof of our confidence in them, and therefore we 
would present to them the three breech loading rifles which were in the 
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party, with all their accoutrements. He desired this so strongly that I 
acceded to it, and the guns were transferred to their new owners.160   
This was confirmed in the report by Wasson to Okuam who also wrote that, “We remained 
some time longer talking of unimportant matters and showing them how to use the firearms 
that had been given them.”161 (see Figure 4:4)  
Figure 4:4 Mudan Incident, 1874. Lieutenant-general Saigō Jūdō providing firearms to Paiwan 
Indigenes in the Mudan Incident, 1874. 
 
Source: National Taiwan Museum, No. AH001396  
http://collections.culture.tw/ntm_cms/metadata.aspx?GID=13080 
In addition to trafficking in ammunition along with firearms that the Formosan indigenes 
practised with the Chinese, powder was also given as a gift by foreigners as when General Le 
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Gendren visited Tooke-tok in March 1872.162 The chief of Saprek 射不力, Taurang was given 
gunpowder, shots, and bullets by Pavel Ibis, the Estonian ensign after he had dinner and 
received a chunk of venison and some earth nuts from the chief with hospitality.  163  
Other possibilities of obtaining firearms directly could have also occurred during warfare 
and being enlisted in Qing troops, as were some plains indigenes. Capturing enemies’ firearms 
during conflicts was one way of directly accessing firearms and experience of firearms for 
mountain indigenes. For example, carbines and the Springfield rifle were reported missing in an 
expedition led by Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell during the Rover Incident in 1867.164 Weapons were 
taken away from a dead Japanese soldier after some Japanese soldiers were ambushed by the 
“invisible assailants”. 165  It was very likely these missing modern rifles were taken by the 
mountain indigenes after their successful skirmishes. However, it is rather difficult to trace the 
firearms missing in warfare or to enumerate them. 
 
3.3.2. Possible or Indirect Access 
 
Another possible or indirect route for mountain indigenes in obtaining firearms could 
be from plains indigenes, since they often traded with the Chinese. However, both plains and 
mountain indigenes do not have written historical records, therefore we can only presume that 
to some extent mountain indigenes might have obtained firearms from plains indigenes in trade 
or were influenced by plains indigenes based on the contacts and conflicts they had.166 If this is 
tenable, it is necessary to investigate the source of firearms of plains indigenes. An English 
photographer, John Thomson noted when traveling with Maxwell in 1871 that matchlocks, 
spear-heads, gunpowder, and cloth in use among the plains indigenes were Chinese 
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manufactured and traded irregularly with the Chinese in southern Taiwan.167 He also mentioned 
that the priming powder that plains indigenes used in the area of Kasanpo 甲仙埔 (Kaohsiung 
City) was English, which was supplied by the Chinese.  168  British Consul Herbert J. Allen also 
noted pepos or plains indigenes living in Posia trafficked knives, matchlocks, and gunpowder 
with Chinese in his trip with Rev. Mackay and Rev. Richie in 1875. 169 
Involvement of foreigners in the gun trade with the plains indigenes can be seen in the 
case of aiming to occupy Dananao (Yilan County). A Foreign merchant like James Milisch, who 
also acted as a consul for the Hanseatic Cities of the German Union and James Horn, a camphor 
dealer, who also married the daughter of a plains indigenous chief, reinforced a valley in the 
south of Su-ao with some Chinese settlers and plains indigenes furnished with firearms. 
Apparently Milisch and Horn provided much capital in buying firearms and sold them to the 
plains indigenes and Chinese settlers.170 
It is also reasonable to assume that plains indigenes who enlisted as Qing troops might 
have possessed the firearms, especially more firearms were transferred to Taiwan to supress 
revolts, and plains indigenes aided the Qing troops to defend and to subjugate (p. 134). 
However, if we wish to estimate the types of firearms that transferred to Taiwan in this period, 
the firearms that plains indigenes might have been given would be most probably only Chinese 
matchlocks and at best a very limited number of more modern firearms. 
Intermarriage between Chinese or foreigner and local indigenous women (see Chapter 
3, pp. 74, 101-102) might have also contributed some supply of firearms to mountain indigenes 
indirectly, which can certainly be suggested. For instance, Lin Bancheang, who was married to 
a Rukai indigenous woman from Kalees, was known for owning weapons and trading with 
neighbouring mountain indigenes.171 Their descendants or so called Tushengnan 土生囡 (the 
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locally-born offspring of Chinese men and indigenous women) were intermediaries, who not 
only acted as interpreters, but also operated in trade with the Formosan indigenes. This makes 
increasing sense. A description about Tushengnan in Liang-Kiao shows they were known to be 
good with rifles, which were owned and treasured by everyone, and they also rarely missed 
targets.172 They could have possibly traded firearms with the mountain indigenes, introduced 
their rifles and influenced the perception of firearms of indigenes. Another possibility for 
mountain indigenes obtaining firearms is from those Chinese militias in Taiwan who were given 
firearms by the Qing officials to quell local riots and also lived near mountain indigenes’ 
territories.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Mountain indigenes in Taiwan possessed mostly matchlocks and other primitive 
weapons such as swords, knives, spears, arrows and bows in the period of 1860 –1883 
according to the findings for this chapter. It appears that the use of matchlocks from the 
eighteenth century for plains indigenes and from the early nineteenth for mountain indigenes 
extended to the second half of nineteenth century. Primitive weapons continued to be 
operated by the mountain indigenes along with the matchlocks in the late nineteenth century 
and all the evidence points to such matchlocks being kept in excellent condition and held in 
high status. Therefore, at this stage in our estimation, sources of conflicts and their level had 
remained at a broadly traditional level. Moreover, the mountain indigenes gained the 
matchlocks and ammunition mostly from trading with the Chinese who coveted the resources 
in the mountains or obtained their permission to enter mountains for exploitation. In some 
cases, firearms and ammunition were given by the foreigners as gifts and represented 
“friendship” between them. The actual number of firearms that mountain indigenes traded or 
received is difficult to trace or have been small, however, it reveals the fact that the activity of 
trading firearms was occurring among indigenous societies in many parts of Taiwan from the 
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south to north. This reveals another paradoxical circumstance situated in northern Taiwan: 
Firearms that mountain indigenes bartered and experienced were obtained precisely from 
those Hakkas and foreigners who were also most involved in camphor exploitation. 
Nevertheless, mountain indigenes were largely involved with matchlocks and other basic 
weapons, and started to increase their proximity to, their notions and experiences of modern 
firearms, through their various and broader contacts and increasing conflicts with invaders, 
directly and indirectly. In fact, the weapons that mountain indigenes held started to shift with 
the contacts they made and the combats they encountered, as we shall see further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Part II 1860-1914: Conflict and Resistance of the Indigenous People 
Chapter 5 Sources of Conflict 1884-1895 at Modernised Level 
 
Formosa, under the civilized rule of China, has a grand future before her. 
The hills over which the savages are now sparsely scattered would grow 
thousands of tons of that delicate flavoured tea over which even now 
New York purchasers are writing in such hopeful terms. So the savages 
have to go. They can, if they like, take grants of land, paying no taxes for 
a certain number of years, and being all the time taught agriculture free 
of charge, through an agency specially established for that purpose. But 
if they do not like, and many prefer the old free jungle life and the 
excitement of daily chase, then it becomes a question between their 
unerring but scattered matchlocks and the bristling breech-loaders of 
half drilled Chinese troops. 1 
 
So, in the mid-1880s British Consul Herbert Giles saw the armed relations between Chinese and 
indigenes at a time when he genuinely considered Chinese reformed rule to be progressive and 
enlightening. He neatly captured the dualism of matchlocks and breech-loaders, not 
unexpected from the argument of the last chapter, but as that chapter also emphasised, the 
actual situation was more complex and the power relations more nuanced. In these later years 
of scaling-up of Chinese penetrations to the east and commercialisation under the modernising 
governship of Liu Mingchuan, how far could the force of arms support continued indigenous 
resistance in the face of increased Chinese numbers, more modern weaponry and the 
undermining effects of new commercial persuasions? 
As such global forces built up, riotous striving continued to storm the eastern regions of 
Taiwan. The lives of mountain indigenes were persecuted from the ongoing encroachment of 
the commercial imperatives from the West and the second campaign of “opening up the 
mountains and pacifying the indigenes” of the Qing government from 1885. Ceaseless conflicts 
among mountain indigenes and Chinese, and the resistances of indigenes to the Qing military, 
became larger in scale. In the meanwhile, Taiwan encountered external crises when the French 
military attacked and later locked-in Taiwan by naval blockade from 11th August, 1884 to 29th 
April, 1885. This was, of course, to be followed by the far more devastating Japanese invasion 
of Taiwan in 1895. The devices in warfare appeared to have improved to a more modernised 
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level among all parties. How did mountain indigenes manage to contend with the superior 
weaponry which began to flow to Taiwan? Did those modernised weapons exert any influence 
on the firearms that mountain indigenes held and their cultures of firearms? The aim of Chapter 
5 is to investigate the character of the impacts of modern armaments upon the warfare 
between mountain indigenes and external invaders in the period of 1884-1895.   
This period may be marked as a more “modernised level” of conflict, based on the level 
of weaponry that operated in Taiwan and the scaling up of Chinese penetration and 
commericalisation under the governor of the new system, Liu Mingchuan. Particularly, the 
armaments that transferred to Taiwan were mainly the innovations of military technology from 
the Western nations and those that were purchased by the Qing government in the Self-
Strengthening Movement. The first section will focus on the foreign invasions in Taiwan – the 
Sino-French War 1884 and the Japanese invasion 1895 and the worsened internal conflicts, 
particularly in the mountain indigenes regions or the back mountains (Houshan 後山) as the 
Qing officials called them. Types and various degrees of internal conflicts included those 
between indigenous groups, with the Qing military during the second phase of the “opening up” 
program from 1885, with the Chinese camphor workers, and with the Chinese farmers and 
settlers who often crossed the borders. The second section will demonstrate the weapons that 
the French, Japanese and the Qing militaries used and transferred and which the Chinese militia 
and civilians operated with in the wars, which might have had most direct impact on the 
possession and knowledge of firearms amongst the mountain indigenes. The third section will 
discuss the firearms and weapons that plain and mountain indigenes possessed during those 
years and their accessing of modern firearms directly and indirectly, particularly in the outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese invasion of 1895. This is probably the period when 
mountain indigenes captured and stored most of their modern firearms for the unknown and 
possible threats and intrusions later on.  
 
1. A Tumultuous Decade   
 
This section will firstly and briefly outline the influence of the Sino-French War, 1884 in 
Taiwan and the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1895 after the Qing government ceded the 
sovereignty of Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. These two foreign invasions 
determined the recognition of the importance of Taiwan to the Qing government and the 
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sovereignty of Taiwan as a colony to Japan later on. Although the battle fields were mostly in 
the north and the west of Taiwan, in the aftermath, mountain indigenes in central and eastern 
regions suffered from the ruthless militarized pacifications of the Qing and the Japanese 
governments. Here, I would like to focus on the possible involvements or responses of mountain 
indigenous people in such external warfare. It is not my prime purpose to discuss the cause of 
the warfare, the entire military actions or the development of diplomacy between France and 
China and between Japan and China during the wars. Secondly I would like to demonstrate the 
disarrayed state of affairs and the increasing resistance of mountain indigenes toward the end 
of Qing’s governance within Taiwan. As the result, numerous modern weapons were transferred 
to Taiwan to fight against foreign invasions and quell local resistances and at times these 
overflowed unchecked into eastern regions.    
 
1.1. External Conflicts 
 
          The Sino-French War & French Blockade in Taiwan, 1884 
 
Conflicts between France and China over the protectorate of Annam, now known as 
“Vietnam”, detonated in Tonkin during 1883. Chinese troops – the Black Flag Army, former 
rebels in the Taiping Rebellion now supported by the Qing government, led by Liu Yongfu 劉永
福 defeated the French military in the battle of Paper Bridge in the Red River Delta in the spring 
of 1883 and in the battle of Langshan 諒山 at the border of China and Annam in June, 1884. 
This was despite the French Prime Minister Jules Ferry advocating control over Annam as a 
French colony and convincing the French parliament to sanction 3.7 mil lion francs for the 
military campaign. In the course of negotiations between France and China, France firstly 
blamed the Chinese government for violation of the Convention or Tianjin Accord in May, 
1884,2 which was not ratified by the Chinese government, after their defeat in Lang-shan. Later 
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the new French envoy - Jules Patenotre ordered the impounding of Keelung and Tamsui in 
northern Taiwan and the blockade of Taiwan.3 
Under the tension in Vietnam, the Qing government began to reinforce its military 
defence along its south-eastern coast regions, including Taiwan. Liu, Ming-Chuan was 
appointed as imperial commissioner of Taiwan for the preparation against a probable French 
incursion in July, 1884. To covet the coal supply in Keelung and the strategic posit ion of Taiwan, 
French warships commanded by Admiral Courbet, firstly attacked Keelung on the 11 th August, 
1884. Taiwan began its nearly 1 year of French military menace. During this period, at least 7 
battles were launched against Keelung and Tamsui from northern Taiwan and the Penghu 
islands respectively, and then French marines extended their blockade mission to southern 
Taiwan.4 Hundreds of Chinese soldiers and armaments tried to deploy at Taiwan from various 
regions of China.5 For instance, in one batch, 5,000 Mauser rifles and 500 Snider-Enfield6 and 
several Hotchkiss guns or rifles were transferred to Taiwan.7 The armaments of the French and 
Chinese army will be discussed in Section 2 in this chapter. Local militia led by several local 
gentries such as Lin Chaodong 林朝棟, Chen Xiaoling 陳霞林, Chen Xinian 陳熙年, Lin Weiyuan
林維源 and Lin Rumei 林汝梅, who also provided financial support to the Qing government, 
co-operated with the Qing army closely while fighting against the French army.8 In the end, the 
French military force never succeeded in occupying northern Taiwan after several defeats, but 
then retreated and occupied the Penghu islands in March 1885. An armistice treaty was signed 
in April 1885 after Sir Robert Hart, the British inspector-general of Chinese Maritime Customs 
mediated between France and the Qing government. It finally ended the French blockade of 
Taiwan.9 This campaign also prompted the Qing government to perceive the importance of 
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Taiwan in its coastal defence and declared an independent “Taiwan  Province”, this in turn 
leading to much improved Qing governance under Liu Mingchuan.   
However, the participation of the Formosan indigenes in fighting against the French 
army was less noticed or written of, only a little evidence was found in a journal report by the 
German Botanist Dr. O. Warburg, who visited at Christmas, 1887. He talked about how the 
deeds of the Chinese troops who vanquished the French troops might in fact be accredited to 
“the armed mountain and frontier population, the descendants o f the aborigines, then the 
Hakkas, a tribe from south China … The whole art of warfare, the scalping, the nightly cunning 
raids, the aggressive procedure, point to the share that the Malay-Polynesian blood of the 
former aborigines had in the defence.”10 Though the involvement of mountain indigenes was 
probably minor or tends to go unrecorded in Chinese sources, the areas in Keelung and Tamsui 
where most of the battles took place were lived in by the plains indigenes of Ketagalan or were 
on the borders of the mountain tribes. 11  In that the plains indigenes were immensely 
assimilated with the Chinese over time, it is possible that they would have been actively anti-
French. This might go somewhere towards explaining Dr. Warburg’s narrative. Nevertheless, it 
generated the large flow of modern weaponry conveyed to Taiwan in the Sino-French War and 
later used in the second phase of “opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” 
imposed by Liu Mingchuan from 1885.  
           Colonisation - The Second Invasion of Japan 1895 
 
A decade later, Taiwan’s fate was disrupted by another and far greater external warfare 
of China with Japan, nominally over the control of Korea in 1894. It is known as the First Sino-
Japanese War. The entire military actions took place in the Korean Peninsula, Liaodong 
Peninsula, Yellow Sea and Penghu Islands. Ultimately, Taiwan was victimised or sacrificed in this 
war when China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 2nd May, 1895 and ceded Taiwan to Japan 
as her first colony in Asia. Undoubtedly, it was a shock for the Qing courtiers and the officials of 
various provinces of China who were strongly opposed, as much as the same to the officials and 
the local gentry in Taiwan itself.12 Two weeks later, the former Qing governor – General, Tang 
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Jingsong 唐景崧 established “The Republic of Formosa” in opposition to the coming Japanese 
occupation and became its President with the support of the local gentry in Taipei on 15 th May, 
1895. Liu Yongfu became the Grand General of the Army and conducted various resistances 
against the Japanese invasions in southern Taiwan.13  
The Japanese military first landed in Cape San Diego, in northern Taiwan and Japan soon 
seized Taipei in around 10 days. The first president of the Republic of Formosa had already fled 
to China.14 The Japanese continued to fight against local rebellions led by local militia in Taoyuan, 
Xinzhu and Miaoli where most Hakka militia were fortified, and Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag army 
recruited in Taiwan in Zhanghua, Yunlin, Jiayi and Tainan and from the mainland. The entire 
military resistance to Japan lasted over 5 months and eventually many gentry and their families, 
even Liu Yongfu himself fled to China.15 Local Chinese militia and some regular army of Qing 
such as the Black Flag Army, Cantonese braves or Yueyong 粵勇, and the Anhui Army were the 
major armed forces in fighting Japanese troops.16 Numerous modern weapons were poured 
into Taiwan, many lost in Taiwan as there was much weapon robbery and abandonment, and a 
lot more besides under these disorderly circumstances. For instance, the American journalist, 
Davidson reported that a Chinese gunboat Chinghoi arrived in Takow with treasure and 5,000 
rifles and ammunition to supply the Black Flag and another 5,000 rifles landed in Tamsui around 
the 8th May.17 Discussion concerning the armament of the Japanese, local militia and the regular 
army of Qing will be presented in Section 2 of this chapter.  
Nevertheless, the responses of the mountain indigenes to the invasion by Japan were 
                                                             
of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan] (Taipei: Taiwansheng shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣省商務印書館, 1992), 78–86. 
13 However, Zhang has questioned the origin of the establishment of “The Republic of Formosa”, he suggested 
that the Qing government considered that Tang, Jingsong was forced by the local people to establish the Republic 
of Formosa. Zhang also referred to Davidson’s personal experience in Taiwan at this time and suggested the 
establishment of the Republic of Formosa was entirely organised by the officials in Taiwan. Taiwanese people 
were not aware of this change until the public notice revealed the circumstances. Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu 
Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan] (Kaohsiung: Gaoxiongshi wenxian weiyuanhui 高雄市
文獻委員會, 2003), 38–39. 
14 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 295–312. 
15 Local officials such as Lin, Chaodong 林朝棟, Yang, Ruyi 楊汝翼 and Qiu, Fengjia 丘逢甲 fled to China with 
their treasure. Yi Shun-Ding 易順鼎, Hun Nan Ji 魂南記 (Diary of the southern souls), Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 
臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary collectanea on Taiwan)( 台灣銀行經濟研究室), 27 quoted in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, 
Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan  劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan], 45. 
16 Weng Jiayin 翁佳音, Taiwan Hanren Wuzhuang Kangrishi Yanjiu 台灣漢人武裝抗日史研究 [Study of Taiwan 
Chinese Resistance to Japan] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 1986), 60–69. 
17 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 349. 
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rather problematic and can not readily be generalised. In the report of Davidson, who arrived 
with the Japanese troops in 1895, he wrote about how both the Japanese and Liu Yongfu 
attempted to gain the allegiance of the mountain indigenes in Miaoli, but the mountain 
indigenes seemingly refused to cooperate with the Chinese rebels. Indeed, according to 
Davidson, the mountain indigenes were “extremely anxious to join the warfare against the 
Chinese insurgents. Regardless of the fact that their request was refused [by the Japanese 
officers], a small party came down a few days later, fully armed and prepared to accompany the 
Japanese.” After the Chinese messenger Wu and a group of soldiers attacked them. The alliance 
between mountain indigenes in Miaoli and Japanese troops did not last, they could no t even 
agree upon the killing of Chinese in the area.18 In the Tainan Intelligence Report written by 
Consul R. W. Hurst it was mentioned how Liu Yongfu was “cultivating friendship” with savages 
and “he expects to make use of them against the Japanese.” 19  Another occasion when 
mountain indigenes showed their intention of assisting Liu’s troops was when “a band of 
savages from the south made a pretence of joining Liu. They were encamped in the city, and 
only received food in return for their service”, but they disappeared after two of their 
companions died which they took as a bad sign.20 Another Chinese source suggested that 
thousands of mountain indigenes were recruited and given military training by the plains 
indigenes, Lin Chaodong, Qiu Fengjia 丘逢甲 and Wu Guangliang 吳光亮 and ambushed the 
Japanese troops on some occasions.21 If this was correct, the mountain indigenes were very 
likely to receive modern weapons and operate them in the war. Overall, the level of mountain 
indigenes involvement in this warfare between Chinese and Japanese troops is uncertain in 
various parts of Taiwan. Davidson also reported some amiable receptions of mountain 
indigenes in mid Formosa, which is the opposite of the Chinese sources. A formal meeting of 
mountain indigenes was held near Tokoham 大嵙崁 (Taoyuan County) with Kashiguchi, chief of 
the Agricultural and Industrial Bureau and Rear Admiral Tanaka, Prefect of Taipei in August. 
Mountain indigenes were given some presents of knives, red handkerchiefs, red woollen cloth, 
                                                             
18 Ibid., 343. 
19 TEPR 5/ 236 -258, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended June 30, 1895, Military and Secret, Consul R. W. 
Hurst, Tamsui, 15/Jul/1895, 257-258 
20 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 353. 
21 ‘臺南戰記略’ (A brief account of the Tainan battle) in Anonymous, Liudajiangjun Pingwo Zhanji 劉大將軍平倭
戰記 [Journal of General Liu on Battling with Japan], n.d., http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw. 
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etc.22 Moreover, an affiliation between Japanese and plains indigenes in southern Taiwan could 
be found again in a report by Consul R.W. Hurst in September 1895 when a Japanese transport 
Kobe-maru traveling northward by the forts of Anping, “landed a force of 200 men at Pangliao 
[Fangliao 枋寮, Pingdong County] a place about 25 miles south of Takow, with the object of 
communicating with and forming a Treaty of Alliance with a chief of the Pephoans whom the 
exactions of Liu had driven to rebellion.”23Another partnership was formed by the mountain 
indigenes of the Puyuma and the Amis after Pan Wenjie 潘文杰, the chief of the Tuilasok tribe 
豬朥束社 from the Paiwan group, joined the Japanese troops to battle with the remaining Qing 
troops led by Yuan Xizhong 袁錫中 and Liu Deshao 劉德杓 in Leigonghuo 雷公火 (Guanshan 
關山, Taidong County) in 1896.24 If we could agree that the contacts that mountain indigenes 
made towards foreigners, Westerners in particular, were generally amicable, and linked this 
with the above evidence, it is highly possible that mountain indigenes were physically engaged 
and gained modern firearms from both the Japanese and the Chinese during the war.  
 
1.2. Aggravated Conflicts within Indigenes’ Regions in Taiwan Province   
 
The occurrence of combat between mountain indigenous tribes and the Chinese troops 
that executed the second “opening up” attempts, and battles with the Chinese civilians who 
desired to profit from the further mountain resources at the borders, increased in our period 
(1884-1895). The number of battles of mountain indigenes in the Qing governance reports 
reached around 20 (see the places where the conflicts took place in red circles Map 5:1), which 
nearly doubled that of the previous much longer period (1860-1883).25 Most battles happened 
                                                             
22 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 343. 
23 TEPR 5 259- 283, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended 30 September 1895, Army and Navy, Consul R.W. 
Hurst, Tainan, 30, Sep 1895, 281 
24 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., ’恆春支廳長相良長鋼往台東地方出差之覆命書’ (Confirmation letter of the 
inauguration of Sagara Tsunashige, Hengchun branch director to the Taitung office) in   September 1896 
(V00071\A05), Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料
彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization)  (Nantou: 
Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 1998), 61–114.For a paper which discuss the indigenous people’s 
involvement in the Japanese invasion in eastern Taiwan in 1895-1896, see Wang Xuexin 王學新, ‘Riju Chuqi 
Taidongdiqu Kangri Zhanshizhon Yuanzhuminzuqun Xiangbei Zhi Fenxi (1895-1896) 日據初期臺東地區抗日戰事
中原住民族群向背之分析(一八九五至一八九六) [An Analysis of the Central Plains People’s Supoport or 
Opposition during the Early Period of Japanese Conlonial Period (1895-1896) in Taitung County]’, 臺灣文獻 47, no. 
4 (1996): 129–48. 
25 I have referred to the the cases of turmoil in Taiwan during the late Qing regime which was listed by Xu, Xueji 
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in the central and eastern regions of Taiwan. These ceaseless conflicts generated the flow of 
modern weaponry, particularly those centred on warfare with the Chinese troops and civilians 
who gradually replaced and furnished themselves with modern firearms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
and Xu, Yuliang. Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lǜying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan 
during the Ching Dynasty], 99–11; Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會
[Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 556–64.   
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Map 5:1 Conflicts of mountain indigenes during the Qing military 1884-1895 
 
Source : http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/taiwan-physical-maps.html  
*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigenes with others are marked in red 
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circles by Pei Hsi Susan Lin  
1.2.1. Conflicts between indigenes  
 
Disputes between indigenous tribes were still frequent in this period. Reasons for the 
disputes between indigenous tribes were diverse and complicated, sometimes they fought over 
hunting territories, murder cases, or hatred from previous generations. Following the 
increasing economic encroachment and the mountain resource exploitation, the living space of 
mountain indigenes constantly shrank, frictions between neighbouring tribes became greater 
as a result. The British lighthouse keeper George Taylor recorded a dispute between Tipun 知
本社 and Nickabong 呂家社 of the Puyuma group Taidong County,  
About three years ago, irritated no doubt by some act of more than 
ordinary superciliousness, they threw off their old allegiance and 
declared themselves independent. Bloodshed followed, and at present 
whoever gets the drop fires. Two days before our arrival they had 
fought a battle, the day and ground having been agreed upon in a very 
chivalrous manner. The result was most disastrous to the Nickabong 
who left 149 men on the field, the Tipuns losing only eight. This had 
embittered matters; the Nickabong accusing the Tipun Chief of 
treachery in the matter of an ambush, which, opening fire on the 
Nickabong flank, was the main cause of their defeat. Unceasing hostility 
was declared, and they threatened to carry fire and sword into Tipun 
itself if ever they got a chance.26 
This was a huge loss of men for the Nickabong tribe. Ambush was still their major tactic in 
battles. Sometimes disputes between indigenous tribes attracted Qing military’s attention and 
drew military support from the mainland for pacification. For instance, in June 1885, Liu 
Mingchuan reported how three Paiwan tribes (Shuaimang 率芒, Dondi 董底, and Qijiashan七
家山, in Pingdong County) were at war and a Qing official intervened to halt the fights, 
however, the conciliation fell through and resulted in another fight. Apparently, this was due 
to the Qing official supposedly siding with one of the Paiwan tribe the Qijiashan, and the other 
two tribes, Shuaimang and Dondi, then turned to attack one of the Qing military stations with 
hundreds of indigenous men. In the end, reinforcement from the Qing military was sent to 
appease this rivalry. 27  These battles did not seem to resolve disputes or end the hatred 
                                                             
26 According to Taylor, Nickabong was founded by the Tipuns long time ago. Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern 
Formosa’, 146–47. 
27 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 434–39. 
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between the tribes, but these perpetual hostilities between tribes might have sustained their 
fighting capabilities and their demand for weapons over the years.  
 
1.2.2. Conflicts in the Second Phase of “Opening up the mountains and pacifying 
the indigenes" from 1885 
 
Prolonged resistance of mountain indigenes was inevitable, particularly as Liu 
Mingchuan was determined to enforce the second opening up phase through and set up the 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau (see Chapter 3, p. 89). Cases of mountain indigenes 
assaulting the Qing military troops and stations during opening roads in mountains and the 
expeditions of Qing armies that were sent to quell mountain indigenous tribes, arose at least 
two to three times every year in this period. Chinese local officials may have been loath to 
report all such cases, but foreign officials were a different matter, concerned as they were with 
the commercial impacts of such conflicts. British Consul Herbert A. Giles reported on the 
inception of the “opening up” project in 1886 that,  
General Liu is carrying on operations against them which can only have 
one end; he is overwhelming them with numbers. Every now and again 
he sends in two or three thousand men, who come back minus one or 
two hundred, killed by the deadly fire of the savages’ matchlock, and 
having accomplished nothing.28 
 
The Qing armies struggled to fight effectively against mountain indigenes despite their large 
numbers and modern armaments.  
Most affected mountain indigenous tribes mainly lived near the borders of indigenes 
areas in northern, southern and eastern Taiwan. Many mountain indigenous tribes submitted 
themselves to the Qing army although their compliance was indefinite. The Atayal tribes had 
incurred the brunt of most of the Qing military’s punitive expeditions in the period of 1885-
1891. The Atayal tribes that distributed themselves over the border of the mountain areas of 
the entire northern Taiwan, were subjected to the Qing military pacification several times each 
year.29 In 1887, the Qing military led by Lin Chaodong fought against 500 Atayals from the Lileng 
                                                             
28 TEPR 3/735-740. Report on the Trade of Tamsuy and Kelung during the year 1885. Consul. Herbert A. Giles. 
2/Mar/1886, 737' 
29Within the Atayal groups regions, the Qing military pacifications (1885-1891): In 1885, the Malai eight tribes (馬
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tribe 裡冷社 and Baimao tribe 白毛社 in Taizhong City and captured several firearms and other 
weaponry. One of the officials was shot dead in this battle.30 Among these punitive expeditions 
within the Atayal groups region, the most severe battle which resulted in hundreds of dead 
Qing soldiers, was in 1889.   
In September 1889, nearly 300 men were killed by the Atayal indigenes in Nanao 
Township, Yilan County including the Deputy General of the Anhui Army, Liu Chaodai 劉朝帶, 
who led 500 men to construct a road through the region. Liu Mingchuan himself later 
commanded 4,000 men to withstand and pacify the Atayal’s resistance for a period of 6 
months.31  This is a very large number of men for a considerable time. The Paiwan in the south 
and the Amis, Puyuma and the Pepo of Siraya in the east and southeast also initiated several 
armed disturbances. The Dazhuan tribe incident (Dazhuangshe shijian 大庄社事件) in 1888 
which involved 6,000 indigenes from the Amis, Puyuman indigenes and the Pepo of Siraya, was 
the largest resistance of indigenes in eastern Taiwan under the Qing regime in the late 
nineteenth century. The reason behind this increased resistance was the extractive land tax 
scheme in the eastern region which was enacted by Liu Mingchuan to raise Chinese revenue, 
together with the example of Hakka opposition. The Puyuma, Amis and the plains indigenes of 
Siraya formed a strong and powerful alliance and fought with firearms from within the bamboo 
forests, which caused great casualties. Troops furnished with foreign armaments and 
ammunitions and two warships from Beiyang Fleet (Beiyang jiandui 北洋艦隊 ) were 
despatched to reinforce the troops on the ground. As the result, the entire expedition lasted 
for 2 months and hundreds of plain and mountain indigenes were killed or escaped into the 
mountains.32  
                                                             
來八社) in Quchi, Xindian District, New Taipei City (屈尺, 新店區, 新北市) and the Wuron tribe (武榮社) in 
Zhuolan township, Miaoli County (卓蘭鎮, 苗栗縣) 
30 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 222–23. 
31 Jiang Shizhe 蔣師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 904–8; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘
傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 234–35; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai 
Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 
342–43. TEPR 4/ 339-347, Foreign Office. 1890. Annual Series. No. 679 Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade 
and Finance. China. Report for the Year 1889 on the Trade of Tamsui. Acting Consul G.M.H. Playfair. Tamsui, 
6/Feb/1890, 344-345. 
32 Jiang Shizhe 蔣師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 891–98; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘
傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 225–27; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, 
‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清政府對後山的統治 [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan]’, 171–84. 
TEPR 4/239- 246, Foreign Office. 1889 Annual Series, No. 518. Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the year 1888 on the Trade of Taiwan, Acting Consul G.M.H. Playfair, Taiwan, 
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In comparison with the 1st “opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” 
scheme ordained by Shen Baozheng, certainly, mountain indigenes seemed to encounter 
relentless and greater suppression in the second, which was just prior to real search for profit 
from the camphor, tea, and other resources in the mountains, and designed to modernize 
Taiwan as an independent province under the late Qing governance. Chinese under-reportage, 
in such circumstances, may well have been, as indigenous resistance represented their inability 
to pursue wider modernization, something symptomatic of the entire Chinese empire. 
 
1.2.3. Conflicts in Commercial Product Regions  
 
Conflicts within industrial resource regions were especially widely reported by British 
Consuls in this period. In fact, the existence of raw and profitable materials was the major cause 
of the growing conflicts, particularly the hacking of camphor trees in the late nineteenth century. 
Cases of mountain indigenes attacking camphor stoves and murdering camphor workers and 
gold miners were extremely common. For instance, in 1885, an Atayal called Malaishimei 馬來
詩昧 killed 19 camphor workers and assembled his neighbouring Atayal tribes into a resistance 
movement which required the Qing army to pacify.33 In 1887, the Atayal in Sanxia District, New 
Taipei City killed several woodcutters and guards and one of the Atayal indigenes hanged the 
victims’ heads at the tribal entrance as though they were to symbolically as well as physically 
challenge the authority.34 British Consul H.A. Giles reported on the style of conflict during his 
service,  
The wood cutter pushes venturesomely afield over the savage 
boundary … the savages have made a raid, the extent of which is gauged 
by the number of missing heads. Then troops are moved rapidly to the 
frontier, and the work of pacification begins again. On one occasion 
during the past autumn the aspect of affairs was very serious. The 
savage succeeded in cutting off and surrounding a portion of the 
Chinese forces. Many of these were killed, and the general in command 
                                                             
25/Feb/1889, 243; TEPR 249-260, Foreign Office. 1889. Annual Series. No. 575. Diplomatic and Consular Reports 
on Trade and Finance. China. Report for the Year 1888 on the Trade of Tamsui. Acting Consul Fredk. S.A. Bourne. 
Tamsui. 20/April/1889, 258 
33 Chen Yan 陳衍, Shiyishiji-Xingdi Taibei Neishan Jiajiuan Ji 石遺室集-行抵臺北內山加九岸記 [Noted on the Trip 
to Taipei Jiajiuan], vol. 15, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 309 (Taipei: 
Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 140; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu 
Mingchuan], 215. 
34 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 221–22. 
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was shot through the cheek; and but for the timely arrival of the 
Governor in person, at the head of a large body of troops, it is probable 
that not a man would have escaped.”35 
 
Mostly importantly, the production and the price of camphor both grew substantially 
from 1891-1895 (see Chapter 3, pp. 82-84). This measures a great demand for camphor in the 
world market which encouraged the camphor production. Meanwhile the difficulties of 
procuring camphor because of frontier violence in Taiwan raised the price of camphor. The 
major difficulty for procuring camphor was the mountain indigenes who maintained the ritual 
of headhunting and their strong consciousness of defending their lands (see further Chapter 7 
below). The mountain indigenes seemed to obtain some predominance and certainly 
obstructed the camphor trade in these years. Nearly every year from 1891, British Consuls were 
actively reporting on the outbreaks of mountain indigenes and the damage caused by the 
mountain indigenes on camphor production. For example, in 1891, W. Holland reported,  
In the autumn, when an outbreak took place among the savages, who 
unable to distinguish between the Chinese caretakers of the camphor 
stoves build with foreign capital and their usual foes, attacked the 
Chinese generally and destroyed numbers of stoves. Nothing could be 
done, the Chinese being quite unable to protect the stoves or punish 
the savages,36 
 
In 1893, the Acting Consul L.C. Hopkins described the risk of the camphor trade, as the “no 
advance, no camphor” system became dominant,  
however, there may be plenty of advances without any returns, either 
in cash or camphor, if the savages should elect to come out of the grass, 
as it is locally termed, and raid the spot with fire and spear, leaving the 
stoves a heap of ashes with a fringe of Chinese corpses.37 
Until 1894 and 1895 before Taiwan ceded to Japan, the circumstances remained the same, as 
the Takekan 大嵙崁 – the collecting and distributing centre of camphor, woods and tea centre 
- was reported in a “disturbed and unsafe condition. Almost no camphor can be got from 
                                                             
35 TERP2/101-105, Foreign Office. 1887 Annual Series. No.124 Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1886 on the Trade of Tamsui (Formosa), H.A. Giles. 1/Mar/ 1887, 102 -103 
36 TERP 4/ 463-475, Foreign Office. 1892. Annual Series. No 1093 Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1891 on the Trade of Tamsui. Mr. W. Holland, Tamsui. 29/Apr/1892, 467-468 
37 TEPR 4/599-612, Foreign Office. 1894. Annual Series. No. 1395. Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1893 on Trade of Tamsui. Acting Consul L.C. Hopkins, Tamsui, 22/Mar/1894, 
605 
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there”.38 Despite the Qing authority having levied the protection tax, to pay for the frontier 
guards who supposedly provided some protection of the camphor workers, this did not seem 
to stop the mountain indigenes attempting to destroy the camphor stills in 1895 in Chipchip 
or Jiji Township, Nantou County.39 Even gold miners were exterminated by savages in one of 
their head-hunting expeditions in the winter of 1895.40 
 
1.2.4. Conflicts between Mountain Indigenes and Chinese Civilians 
 
Moreover, the ultimate antagonism between mountain indigenes and Chinese was 
perpetual, sometimes Chinese treated mountain indigenes in various crude ways once they 
entrapped and captured them. 41  From time to time, Chinese civilians who lived near the 
borders were shot to death and their heads were taken by mountain indigenes. Liu Mingchuan 
reported that in 1885, 28 heads of Chinese plebeians, both male and female, were cut off and 
4 were shot dead by the mountain indigenes in that year in Zhaolan Village 罩蘭莊 (or today’s 
Zhuolan Township 卓蘭鎮 Miaoli County ).42 The Paiwan groups in southern Taiwan were 
another example of bellicose indigenes who often quarrelled with their nearby Chinese. The 
Qing governance had to send punitive expeditions to quell indigenes’ revolts every year during 
1889-1892. According to the Governor Shao Youlian (1891-1895), 300 Paiwan indigenes from 
the Sapetiq or Shebuli tribe 射不力社 (Fengshang Township, Kaohsiung County) sieged and 
fought against the Chinese villagers. Hundreds of plain indigenous soldiers were recruited as 
                                                             
38 TEPR 5/ 84-107, Tamsui Intelligence Report for June quarter 1894, Consul L.C. Hopkins, Tamsui 2/Jul/1894, 86-
87 
39 TEPR 5/ 165-176, Foreign Office. 1895. Annual Series. No.1555. Diplomatic and Consular Report on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1894 on the Trade of Tainan. Consul R.W. Hurst. Tainan, 12/Mar/1895, 171  
40 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 466. 
41 In the late 19th century, beheading and eating indigenes seemed to be a common behaviour of the Chinese, 
despite the fact that they did not have the headhunting ritual. Various resources such as Mackay, British Consul, 
Chinese literature all reported on this brutal manner of the Chinese. See Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun 
Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [ Gazetteer of Hengchun County], 287; Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史 [A General 
History of Taiwan], 454; Arthur Corner, ‘Journey in the Interior of Formosa’, Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society of London 19 (1875): 515–17; Mackay, From Far Formosa : The Island, Its People and 
Missions, 276. TEPR 4/ 451- 461, Foreign Office. 1892. Annual Series. No. 1061. Diplomatic and Consular Reports 
on Trade and Finance. China. Report for the Year 1891 on the Trade of Tainan. Consul Pelham Warren. Tainan, 
29/Mar/1892, 458; TEPR 5/193-207, Report on Formosa by Mr. N. Perkins, Consul Nevill Perkins, 31/Jan/1895, 
196 
42 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 199. 
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guides to assist in pacification by the Qing officers and the Qing army also used cannon and 
modern weaponry to bombard the Paiwan villages. In the end, the Qing military conquered the 
resisting tribes, killed 80 Paiwan indigenes, and captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of 
spears and knives in 1892.43 British Consul Pelham Warren also reported on this incident and 
noted the Paiwan indigenes’ tactics in ambush and firing at Qing soldiers and concluded they 
could have defeated the Qing military,  
There has been no actual fighting, but numbers of the soldiers and camp 
followers have been cut off by the aborigines and murdered. On several 
occasions when attempts have been made to advance into the hill 
country the troops have been fired on from ambushes and forced to 
retire without having seen the enemy … It seems probable that the 
Chinese force will be withdrawn without anything having been 
accomplished and the district will once more be quiet and will remain 
so until some fresh act of treachery on the part of the Chinese again 
stirs up the aborigines.44 
On the contrary, conflicts between Chinese ethnic groups and the Chinese rebellions 
against Qing governance were relatively small, only a brawl in Balisha 八里沙 (Yilan County) 
over lands and a resistance of Qing government’s land tax led by a local gentry  Shi Jiuduan 施
九緞 in Zhanghua in 1888.45 There were 3 cases of local ruffians who resisted the capture of the 
Qing government with their firearms. 46  Numerous gingalls and foreign firearms were 
confiscated when a gangster named Wu Jinyin 吳金印  and his members were arrested. 47 
Nevertheless, the local bandits was another issue as they were armed and obstructed the trades, 
which was reported by the British Consul Pelham in 1890.48  
                                                             
43 Guangxuchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guāngxù Era]; Chen Yan 陳衍, 
Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 241–42. 
44 TEPR4/489-495, Tainan Intelligence Reports for the three months ending 31st Oct, 1891, Consul Pelham 
Warren, Tainan, 31/Oct/1892, 489-490. “The troubles with the aborigines in the Hengchiun district have been 
arranged temporarily and the troops withdrawn. The losses in the campaign were all on the Chinese side, and 
practically nothing was accomplished, the savages making their own terms.’ Some echo of troubles followed but 
not much.” TEPR 4/504- 509, Tainan Intelligence Report for the three months ending January 31st, 1893, Consul 
Pelham Warren, Tainan, 31/Jan/1893, 504 
45 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 272; Jiang Shizhe 
蔣師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 878–87. 
46 The head of local bandit of Jiayi - Yan, Baicai 顏擺彩 and the head of local bandit of Changhua – Xu, Tianding 
許添丁 opened fire and rejected the capture in 1885;  Wu, Jinying 吳金印 led a revolt  against the Qing 
government in 1886  in Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir  of Liu 
Mingchuan], 387–88, 389. 
47 Ibid., 392. 
48 TEPR349- 357, Foreign Office. 1890 Annual series. No. 703. Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and 
Finance. China. Report for the Year 1889 on the Trade of Tainan. Consul Pelham L. Warren. Tainan, 20/Feb, 1890, 
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In summary, Taiwan moved into an even more tumultuous decade in 1884-1895 when 
the battles between France and China in Vietnam diverted to Taiwan in 1884 and when Japan 
invaded in 1895. Mountain indigenes were not the causes of foreign nations battling with Qing 
government in Taiwan, but they were forced to be ruled by Japan without any choices in the 
end. Mountain indigenes had far less direct involvement in these two battles with France and 
Japan than in the earlier episodes covered in Chapter 4 although we have shown that the 
evidence is confused. Mountain indigenes refused to assist Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag, but some of 
the mountain indigenes chose to join or formed alliance with the Japanese army during the  
1895 invasion. Also, due to the outbreak of war with France and Japan and a series of military, 
communication, and transportation modernisations urged by Liu Mingchuan (see Chapter 3, pp. 
96-99), large amounts of modern armaments and troops were transferred from China to Taiwan, 
which will be discussed in the next section. Throughout the second opening up project, warfare 
of indigenes among themselves, with the Qing army and the Chinese at the borders in the north, 
east and south Taiwan became larger in scale and more frequent. Regions which combined 
commercial products and mountain indigenes territories turned into an unruly and violent state. 
Not only were the Qing troops furnished with modern guns from fighting against the French 
and the Japanese, instances of Formosan indigenes and Chinese civilians holding foreign 
firearms were increasingly common in battles. These frequent battles certainly escalated the 
demand and the diffusion of weaponry, especially as firearms were relatively small and did not 
require complex transportation by roads or railways. Mountain indigenes were also forced to 
engage in procuring more modern weapons in order to protect their own lands.  
 
2. Firearms in Taiwan  
 
Due to the numbers of campaigns in this period, plentiful weaponry was largely 
demanded by and transferred to various parties and individuals in Taiwanese society. These 
were the direct or indirect sources of firearms that flowed into mountain indigenes’ societies. 
This section will be discussing the types of firearms of the foreign troops, the Qing troops and 
the Chinese civilians or cultivators that transferred and operated in battles and conflicts in 1884-
1895 Taiwan. I will also explore the weapons, particularly firearms, which emerged in Taiwan 
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from the Qing government’s purchase. I intend to show that the level of firearms became 
modernised among the Qing troops, Chinese civilians and plains indigenes and the large 
number of these modernised firearms largely dominated in conflicts and spread throughout 
Taiwan. This directly helped and influenced the mountain indigenes when possessing firearms 
and using them in battles.  
  
2.1.  Weapons Held by the Foreign Troops 
  
Before the French and the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1884 and in 1895, some 
German crew were stationed in the South Cape following the completion of the lighthouse in 
1883. According to Warburg (see above) who visited Taiwan in 1888, the lighthouse had “a 
crew of 16 men and two eighteen-pounders, two Gatling machine cannons and a 5-inch mortar, 
furnished with provisions and water tanks for three months” and was equipped and under the 
German military commander which cost over 300,000 dollars. 49  It is uncertain when the 
German military began to station at the lighthouse in South Cape, the region where the Paiwan 
indigenes were living. There is no evidence that the Paiwan indigenes were in any sort of 
contacts with the foreign soldiers and no record of any conflicts between the Paiwan indigenes 
and the German military. However, if the Paiwan indigenes had remained on good terms or in 
interaction with the foreign soldiers as they did in the previous years with General Le Gendre, 
Pickering, the Japanese soldiers etc. (see Chapter 3, pp. 75-78), it is possible that the Paiwan 
indigenes obtained some knowledge of armaments that were furnished at the lighthouse.  
 
The Sino-French War, 1884-1885  
 
The specification of weapons that the French military furnished during the Sino-French 
War in the battles fields of northern Taiwan was very little mentioned in the Chinese literature, 
although the Chinese officials reported how the French military used cannons and torpedoes in 
attacks during the war. 50  However, there are descriptions of the small arms carried by the 
                                                             
49 He also noticed a Chinese detachment next to the German military station to protect the lighthouse although 
the Chinese troops did not do their job properly as he stated “but in reality the lighthouse, or the three unarmed 
Europeans protect the whole Chinese force.” Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in 
Formosa]’, 374–87. 
50 Yang, Changjun 楊昌濬, ‘王詩正率部將抵台北’ ( The Arrival of Troops led by Wang Shi-Zheng) in Mingqing 
Gongcang Taiwan Dangan Huibian 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編[Compilation of Archives in Ming and Qing Court 
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French soldiers during the war, when they were prowling the streets in Keelung with small 
arms51 and the “foreign firearms” were captured by the Chinese troops.52 Another way of 
finding the type of small arms that the French army were equipped with is to look at the Franco-
Austrian War, 1859 and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871. According to Oyvind Flatnes, the 
small arms that the French army possessed were Minié rifles or rifle muskets in Northern Italy 
in 185953 and the French Model 1866 Chassepot rifles in the Franco-Prussian War, but later the 
French adopted the Model 1874 Gras rifle,54 which was a metallic cartridge version of the 
Chassepot in 1874.55 In addition, Lefaucheux revolvers 56 were also carried by some French 
officers in the Franco-Prussia War.57 The Lebel repeating rifle replaced the Gras rifles amongst 
French military in 1886, therefore it is quite possible that the French army were equipped with 
Gras rifles in Taiwan during this period. John Dodd was probably the best spectator, who 
recorded the deployment of the French and the Chinese troops during the war. In August of 
1884 he mentioned how the French navy used large guns such as Gatling or Mitrailleuse guns58 
against the Chinese soldiers, who were working on digging entrenchments, but they did not 
                                                             
Relating to Taiwan], 263–65; Xu  Yuliang  許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會
[Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 361–63. 
51Choppin Rene, Beiqi Huiyilu: Qingfa Zhanzheng Yu Fuermosha, 1884–1885 北圻回憶錄：清法戰爭與福爾摩
沙, 1884–1885 [Souvenirs Du Tonkin：La Guerre Franco-Chinoise et Formose,1884–1885], trans. Couderc Julie 季
茉莉 (Taipei: National Museum of Taiwan History, 2013). 
52 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Wenji 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan] (Hefei City: 
Huangshan shushe 黃山書社, 1997), 93–97; Fajun Qingtaidang Bubian 法軍侵臺檔補編 [Editions on the French 
Invasion of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 204 (Taipei: 
Taiwan Bank, 1964), 71. 
53Use of Minié rifle involved the application of Minié ball, a cone-shape projectile which WAS smaller than the 
barrel bore for inserting in a muzzle loading rifle. When the powder in the barrel ignited, the powder gases 
forced rapid rifling. This was invented by the French Army captain Claude-Étienne Minié and later improved by 
the French Army captain Henri-Gustave Delvigne in the late 1840s. The Minié ball system improved the reloading 
speed and accuracy in muzzle loading rifles, which were then adopted and employed by the British and 
Americans in the 1850s. It was extensively used by the French and British troops during the Crimean War and by 
the American in Boshin war 1868-1869. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 88–92, 97–101. 
54 Gras rifle was a conversion of Chassepot rifle from needles-guns to metallic cartridge, which could use the 
same bullet as the 11mm Mauser. It was an invention of General Basile Gras in 1874.Ibid., 143. 
55 Chassepot rifle is breach loading rifle with a sliding bolt after an improvement of German Dreyse needle-fire 
rifle, by a French gunsmith Antoine Alphonse Chassepot in 1866. The bolt is connected with a rubber which 
would expand and seal the chamber for solving gas leak problem when firing a shot. Ibid., 13, 127–30. 
56 Lefaucheux revolver is a pinfire system invention by Casimir Lefaucheux and applied by his son Eugenes in mid 
1850s. The 11mm Lefaucheux revolver was the first metallic cartridge revolver with 6 round cylinder adopted in 
the French navy in 1858, but it never issued to the army. However, they were widely purchased and adopted by 
Sweden, Demark, Italy, and The Confederate State Army during the American Civil War. Ibid., 156–57. 
57 Ibid., 157. 
58 Mitrailleuse is a mechanically loaded machine gun with multiple barrels, which can fire multiple rounds 
manually. It was the invention of Belgium Captain Fafschamps in 1851 and improved by Belgian engineer Joseph 
Montigny in 1863. It was used in Franco-Prussian War (1870-18710 by the French artillery. James H. Willbanks, 
Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact  (ABC-CLIO, 2004), 32–38. 
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make much impact. 59  On 8th October, 1884, he also reported that machine guns were 
positioned in the bows of the boats when the 500-800 French men made their attempt to land 
at Tamsui.60 
Numerous small arms and different models and manufactures of small arms were 
transferred to Taiwan for defence. Even though the French warships blockaded any 
reinforcement and weapons from China for several months, the Qing government managed to 
send reinforcement and weapons with the assistance of British and German sh ips and Chinese 
junks. British Consul W. Donald Spence in Takow reported the military supply during the 
blockade,  
During the blockade, beside the junk trade with the west coast ports, on 
which I have written, communication was maintained between Formosa 
and the mainland by foreign steamers running to Peilam (Beinan 卑南, 
Taidong County), a port on the east coast, outside the blockaded line. 
By this route, throughout the winter of 1884-85, reinforcements of men, 
ammunition, and treasure were thrown, in great quantity, into the 
island, and it was not till April that the French discovered that their 
blockade was useless.61 
 
A British Consul, Alexander Frater at Tamsui sent to Harry S. Parkes, also direct to the foreign 
office, information that Germans and the British were definitely supporting the Chinese against 
the French and transporting armament for the Chinese officials,62 for instance,  
the British Steamer ‘Ingeborg’ as having brought from Shanghai 
munitions of war, portions of which were intended to be carried on in 
her to Foochow. News having come on the 26th by a junk of a fight 
between the French and the Chinese on the 23rd at the Foochow, it was 
thought prudent to discharge the whole of the cargo here. It consisted 
of the following: 9 cases Krupp guns, 63  88 cases rifles, 12 cases 
accoutrements, 528 cases cartridges, and 43 cases dynamite.64  
 
                                                             
59 Alsford, The Witnessed Account of British Resident: John Dodd at Tamsui, 59–60. 
60 Ibid., 96–97. 
61 TEPE 3/ 741- 756. Report on the Trade of Taiwan for the year 1885. Acting Consul. WM. Donald Spence. 
31/Jan/1886,746 
62TEPR 3/393-396. State of affairs at Kelung and Tamsuy. Officiating Consul A. Frater. 25/Aug/1884, 395 
63 It is unclear which model of Krupp guns that the Qing government transferred. However, Krupp guns were a 
series of steel made artilleries manufactured and largely purchase by the Russian, Austria and Qing China in 
1860-1880. During the Sino-French War, Li Hong-Zhang purchased over 200 breach loading Krupp guns for the 
Anhwei Army and adopted by the Chinese navy. Lǚ Fangshang 呂芳上, ‘Cong Renshi Dao Rentong: wanqing 
Zhongguo Chaoye Dui Deguo Junshi Nengli de Renzhi 從認識到認同: 晚清中國朝野對德國軍事能力的認知, 
1861-1890 [From Understanding to Recognization: The Awareness of the Qing Court toward the German Military 
Capacity in China]’, 48–50. 
64 TEPR3/397-401. State of affairs at Kelung and Tamsuy. Officiating Consul A. Frater. 30/Aug/1884, 399 
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Another account from John Dodd also confirmed that the German steamer Welle, “arrived with 
a cargo of ammunition, torpedoes, telegraph wire, etcetera” in August 1884.65 He reported that 
the Krupp guns were moved from the fort in Keelung in August and employed to open fire on 
the French ships in Oct, 1884.66 In the Chinese official reports, thousands of reinforced troops, 
guns, and ammunition were transferred to Taiwan. For instance, 3,000 Mauser rifles and bullets 
were carried by Wang Guiyang 王貴揚, the Provincial military commander, and his men to 
Taiwan in July 1884.67 1, 000 Lee rifles68 and 500 soldiers from Anhui troops were delivered to 
Taiwan by junk in November, 188469 and later in December, a thousand Winchester rifles were 
conveyed to Liu Mingchuan, ordered by Zeng Guoquan 曾國荃, the Viceroy of Liangjiang.70 The 
Viceroy of Liangguang, Zhang Zhidong 張之洞  purchased 2,000 Kentucky rifles 71  and ten 
thousand pounds of ammunition and sent them to Taiwan to aid. 72 Liu Mingchuan described 
the weapon supply and soldiers’ pay from China in 1885,  
According to the correspondence, the Fujian Fleet Commander, Peng, 
Chu-han had claimed the supplies most frequently. The supplies were 
mainly sent from Nanyang Fleet. The second was Beiyang Fleet which 
delivered more than 5,000 Mausers,73 16 sets of Krupp guns, and more 
                                                             
65Dodd, Journal of a Blockaded Resident in North Formosa during the Franco-Chinese War, 1884-1885.in  Alsford, 
The Witnessed Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui, 47, 54. 
66 Alsford, The Witnessed Account of British Resident: John Dodd at Tamsui, 46, 52, 72. 
67In 1884, Li, Hungchang also enjoined all the Anhwei armies furnished with Hotchikiss M1879 and Mauser 
M1871. If the troops were using Mauser rifles, the model should have kept consistent. Gu, Tinglong. 顧廷龍,Dai, 
Yi. 戴逸 edited,  ‘副總署復陳法越兵事’ (Departmental Deputy’s reply to the war affairs between France and 
Vietnam)  in 李鴻章全集-信函五 冊 (Li Hong-Zhang Collection: Letters) 1884, 33: 360 ; Liu Ming-Chuan 劉銘傳, '
恭報自津起程日期並遵旨會商情形摺' (Reports began after the departure of Tianjin and documents on the 
circumstances of discussion in accordance to the given instruction) in 08/07/1884 in Liu Ming-Chuan Wen Ji 劉銘
傳文集 (Collections of Liu Ming-Chuan), 80-90. 
68 The types of Lee rifles transferred to Taiwan were unclear mostly in our Chinese language sources.  However, 
according to our reference Rifles of the World, the Qing government acquired substantial quantities (8,000- 
10,000) of Remington – Lee rifles and carbines in the 1880s. Remington Lee rifles is a designed by James Paris Lee 
and his employee Louis Diss and patented in 1884 for protecting a magazine that retained cartridge when 
detached from the gun. This feat was incorporated in an improved rifle. John Walter, Rifles of the World (Krause 
Publications, 2006), 243–45. 
69 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuang Sugon Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 182–183. 
70 For the information on the Winchester rifles see chapter 4, footnote 67. Zhongguoshi xuehui 中國史學會 
[Chinese History Academy], Zhongfa Zhanzheng 中法戰爭 [The Sino-French War], vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1957), 205. 
71 Kentucky rifle was first developed from a German rifle, the Jaeger, precision built, highly accurate hunting 
weapon. It was improved and design by many men who use the Jaeger’s basic design. Kentucky rifle allowed 
hunters to carry powder and bullets for several days’ shooting and could be shot at amazing distances with great 
striking powder. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 52–54. 
72 Zhongguoshi xuehui 中國史學會 [Chinese History Academy], Zhongfa Zhanzheng 中法戰爭 [The Sino-French 
War], 6:139–40. 
73 The model of Mauser the Qing government sent to Taiwan was unclear in our source. John Walter , the author 
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than 200,000 of taels financial aid. Guangdong sent 500 Sniders rifles, 
3,000 Kentucky rifles, and 30,000,000 taels financial aid. These areas 
were all in an emergency and needed help. The supplies just arrived at 
the right time and saved the injured and the dying. From March (April, 
1885), Zhang, Zhidong, the associate commissioner, continually brought 
more than 100,000 taels and 3,000 breech loading rifles.74  
Modern armaments like Mausers, Krupps, Snider, Winchester, Kentucky and Lee rifles were 
largely transferred to Taiwan. Nevertheless, we do not know how many armaments stayed in 
Taiwan after the war, but it is very likely that a large amount of armaments stayed and were 
distributed in various parts of Taiwan for defence. Particularly the first governor of Taiwan 
Province, Liu Mingchuan strongly advocated the military modernization and a series of 
mountain indigenes revolts were about to break out during his project of opening up the 
mountains. Further discussion will be presented in Section 2.2 later.  
           Weapons in the Invasion of Japan, 1895  
 
More than 15,000 Japanese soldiers and 233 warships which also included steam boats 
and boats led by General Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀 arrived at the Diaoyutai Islands in 
readiness for resistance on the occupation that was in fact part of the international treaty. 
According to Zhang, Japanese troops were furnished with modern accoutrements: Murata 
rifles75 were both carried by the infantry and the cavalry; Spencer rifles 76 were carried by 
Impedimenta troops; the artillery included mountain guns or pack guns, field guns, machine 
guns 5 different styles and brass breech loaders. Also 11 Japanese warships all carried French 
steel cannons, quick-firing guns, British steel made cannon, quick-firing guns, Yokohama steel 
made quick-firing guns and machine guns, as well as Yokosuka arsenal (Tokyo) made cannon 
and machine guns and Onohama (Kobe) made cannons.77 The Japanese machine-gun made in 
                                                             
of Rifles of the World suggested M1871 rifle was the model the Qing government ordered from Waffenfabrik 
Mauser in 1875. It is single shot metallic cartridge rifle, which was by the Prussia army after they replaced the 
Dreyese. John Walter, Rifles of the World, 301–2; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 129–43. 
74 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuang Sugon Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 377–378. 
75 Murata rifles were a series of bolt action rifles manufactured and modified by the Japanese for the first time 
after combining feature of the French Gras and German Mauser rifle, which were mainly purchased from Europe. 
It was developed rapidly after the Satsuma rebellion (1877) and used well into the Russo-Japanese War. Arsenals 
were built in Tokyo and Osaka. It was converted from French the Chassepot needle rifles and used by the 
Japanese Standard Army. Walter, Rifles of the World, 207–8; Shigeo Sugawa, ‘Japanease Weapons’, Japanease 
Weapons, accessed 19 February 2016, http://www.japaneseweapons.net/.  
76 Sibicishi danfaqiang 司比瑟式單發槍 could possibly be the Spencer rifle as its closest pronunciation. 
77 Huang Xiuzheng 黃秀政, Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong 台灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 [Relinquishment 
of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan], 146–49. 
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Osaka was like the Maxim gun78 and Murata rifles made in Tokyo were used in battles in Taiwan 
for the first time, although the Japanese machine gun was often jammed according to 
Davidson’s description and observation when he accompanied Japanese soldiers in the war.79  
According to Huang and Li’s research on the Japanese invasion in 1895, at least 33,000 
soldiers were in Taiwan to overturn the newly setup government of resistance – the Republic of 
Formosa. The components of the troops were from the Black Flags, the Xiang Army or Xiangjun 
(湘軍), Cantonese braves or Yueyong (粵勇) from the mainland China and local Taiwanese 
braves that were newly recruited and allocated in the various strategic points of Taiwan for the 
upcoming battle with Japan.80 Davidson in 1903 gave great detail of the defence disposition and 
installations in Keelung and Tamsui and the equipment. I will only summarise and focus on the 
Chinese armaments from Davidson’s descriptions. In Keelung, there were each 12 inch, 10 inch 
and two 8 and 6 inch Armstrong guns81, 30 or 40 small Krupps guns (6 ½ centimetres) and some 
machine guns from the Nanjing Arsenal. In Tamsui, there were each 12 inch, 10 inch Armstrong 
guns, two 8 inch Krupps guns and another 8 inch and 6 inch Armstrong guns protecting a long 
trench along the mountain side, 3 miles from the river on the south bank. Small arms that were 
furnished to troops were the Winchester repeating carbines which were held by thousands of 
                                                             
78 Maxim gun is a fully automatic gun invented by Sir Hiram S. Maxim in 1883. It was the first time the power of 
the cartridge was used to perform all the operation of extraction, loading and firing. Howard L. Blackmore, Guns 
and Rifles of the World (London: Batsford, 1965), 89. 
79 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 318, 322. 
80 Huang Xiuzheng 黃秀政, Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong 台灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 [Relinquishment 
of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan], 138–40; Li Weiyu 李瑋裕, ‘Lun Taiwan Minzhuguo Beilu Kangri 論台灣民主
國北路抗日 [A Study on Resistance to Japan in North Area for the Republic of Formosa]’ (MA, University of 
Taipei, 2012), 37–41. 
81 Armstrong gun was the first breech-loading field guns, which rifled and fired elongated shell farther and more 
accurate than muzzle-loaders, designed by William Armstrong and manufactured by Elswick Ordnance Company 
and the Arsenal at Woolwich in 1855. Further information see Marshall J. Bastable, ‘From Breechloaders to 
Monster Guns: Sir William Armstrong and the Invention of Modern Artillery, 1854-1880’, Technology and Culture 
33, no. 2 (1992): 213–47. 
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soldiers, Mauser, Lee, Remington82, Spencer, Peabody83 and Martini-Henry84, which were in use 
among European military. However, he also noticed some backward weapons from the Spanish, 
the Dutch and the early Qing governance which in ‘one uniform condition of rust and rottenness, 
were carried to the fortifications, some blunt Chinese long knives, pistols like horse pistols with 
single fire-percussion cap, some modern handgun handles carved as “American revolver made 
in Belgium” which were dangerous to fire off among the Chinese troops. Davidson gave some 
information on the weaponry that local Chinese braves carried; they were a great mixture which 
ranged from a contained blunderbuss without proper ammunition through to modern rifles that 
no one could use, even pikes and spears. 85  Mauser rifles, Remington rifles and sufficient 
ammunitions were held by the Black Flag soldiers when they arrived at Takow in Feb, 1895.86 
Reinforcements began to be sent to Taiwan after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. 
Steamers like Arthur and Martha joined in transferring troops and ammunition to Taiwan.87 Liu 
Young-Fu recruited 2 battalions to Taiwan and was given 24,000 tael, 500 Mauser rifles and 200 
Henry-Martini rifles in August, 1894. 88  Governor Tang Jingsong purchased 20 Armstrong 
cannons, 0.2 million Armstrong cartridges, 13,200 Mausers rifles, 7.4 million Mausers’ rifles 
cartridges, 3,000 Remington rifles, 0.9 million Remington rifle cartridges, 2,000 Lee rifles, 2 
                                                             
82 The model of Remington rifles was unclear in our source. Remington rifles were a series of rifles with bolt-
action, pump-action, semi-automatic, single- shot and automatic system, manufacture by the Remington Arm 
Co., Inc., which is one of the oldest gun maker until today. Remington Rolling block was developed by employees 
of E. Remington &son, Joseph Rider and Lenoard Geiger Ridder and became perfect military firearms with strong, 
reliable and simple action. The production took place in 1865-1866 and contributed to the Civil War. Flatnes, 
From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 134–38. 
83 Peabody rifle is a breech-loading firearms, which was a pivoting-block action designed and patented by Henry 
O. Peabody from Boston, US in 1862. It had strong mechanism base on taking off the strain of firing on the rear 
inner face of the receiver. The pivoting-block prevented the action opening prematurely. A series of Peabody 
rifles were largely purchase by Canada, Fran, Romania, Mexico in the late 1860s. The Peabody Martini made 
good use for the Turks because of it was powerful and accurate at long range in the Russo-Turkish conflicts 1877-
1878. Walter, Rifles of the World, 210; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 141. 
84 Martini- Henry rifle was a breech-loading single- shot rifle, which was named after Friedrich von Maritni, a Swiss-
Hungarian weapon constructor and Alexander Henry, an inventor of rifling after combining Peabody’s mechanism.  
It replaced the Snider in 1871 and was adopted and used by the British Army from the late 1860s for over 30 years. 
Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 141–42. 
85 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 285–89. 
86 F.O. 228/1199, Hurst to O’conor, 16/Feb/1895, P64-64, 68-74 quoted in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu 
Taiwan  劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan], 28. 
87 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, 
Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 268. 
88 Tan, Zhonglin 譚鍾麟, '為遵旨籌辦防務情形恭摺縷陳仰祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent express to Your Majesty 
for the approval of the planning and preparation of the military defence) in 25/Aug/1894 in Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica, Qing Guangxuchao Zhongri Jiaoshe Shiliao 清光緒朝中日交涉史料 [Official Documents 
of the Guangxu Reign], 339. 
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million Lee rifle cartridges, 600 Winchester rifles and 0.26 million Winchester rifle cartridges, 
and various powder and mines which cost 465, 309 taels.89 9,000 rifles and 1 million cartridges, 
all landed at Tainan.90 Liu Young-Fu brought 1.6 million cartridges, 0.5 million percussion caps, 
2,000 rifles, 960 shot, 160 bombs, 100 cases of gunpowder and 100 Winchester repeating 
rifles91 in late 1894, as British Consul R.W. Hurst reported. Liu Young-Fu also recruited 1,100 
Black Flag army soldiers from Guangdong and transported 160 rifles and 146,000 rounds of 
ammunition on 7th January, 1895.92 Foreign Customs seemed to be merciful to the Republic of 
Formosa and permitted foreign owners of vessels with European nations’ flags to transport 
troops and ammunitions from Guangdong, Fuzhou and Shanghai after the establishment of the 
Republic of Formosa.93 A Chinese gunboat Chinghoi landed in Takao with some treasure and 
5,000 rifles for the Black Flag army on the 8th May and 50,000 rifles were landed in Tamsui 
around the same time.94 This could be verified and rectified in the British Consul R. W. Hurst’s 
report in Tainan in July 1895: 2,000 rifles and 400 boxes of cartridge brought by the Chinghoi on 
the 8th May, and 412 cases of rifles and cartridges, 1,021 packages of cartridges from Tamsui.95 
Regardless of much opposition from the Qing courtiers and officials in assisting the inevitable 
outcome of ceding Taiwan to Japan, weaponry and funds continued to be dispatched to Taiwan, 
particularly from the dedication of Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, the viceroy of Liangjiang. 10,000 
foreign firearms and 300,000 tael were dispatched to Taiwan with the Qing courtiers’ implicit 
consent.96  
Davidson also suggested that the depository of weaponry in Taiwan was sufficient 
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because the Taipei arsenal with modern machinery and powder mill continued running. 
However, this account was questioned by Huang in 1992, who argue that the weaponry supply 
to Taiwan was not enough or in great shortage based on Taihai sitonglu 臺海思痛錄 [Records 
of Taiwan Strait's Unforgettable Grief] written by Li Jingsong 黎景崧 who was one of the local 
officials and led the troops to fight against Japanese military and Dongfan bingshiji 東方兵事
紀 [History of eastern military affairs] written by Yao Xiguan 姚錫光, a late Qing official.97 This 
might be a distinguished source, however, military supply would never be enough if we look at 
the predicament of Taiwan at this time. Taiwan was clearly in state of pandemonium. Davidson 
described the scene at the station in Keelung when the Japanese was approaching, “the place 
was strewn with guns, and ammunition, boxes, spear, banners, broken furniture.” 98 The same 
thing happened when the Japanese military arrived at Takoham and fought in Yunlin.99 On the 
record of foreign residents referred to by Zhang, soldiers were generally ill-disciplined, they 
engaged in pillage, harassed and attacked foreign residents, etc.100 Lots of guns and ammunition 
were actually misapplied or destroyed by the soldiers. For instance, the powder magazine of 
the artillery battery exploded in Takow while the Xiang Army scrutinized the asset before 
consigning it to the Black Flag in Feb, 1895. 80 people died and the structure of the artillery 
battery was seriously damaged. The cause of this explosion was due to the soldiers who ignited 
the powder while they were smoking opium or tobacco in one of the powder rooms.101 Chinese 
junks and British ships were often fired at by Chinese soldiers from the Black Flag. Two British 
warships Tweed and Redbreast and a British tug were shot at several times by the station troops 
of the Black Flag when entering Takow port.102 Before Japanese occupied Taipei, the powder 
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mill exploded and the Chinese soldiers were firing at the steamship Arthur which carried many 
Chinese officials and soldiers with their treasure.103 Chinese soldiers were even selling their 
rifles in Taipei as Davidson describes,  
The several thousand Chinese soldiers, now engaged in a more 
profitable profession, were willing to dispose of their rifles for a few 
cents, and large numbers of old muskets were thrown into the rice fields 
outside the city as worthless. Brand new Winchester repeating carbines 
could be purchased for a dollar or less, and it is absolutely no 
exaggeration to say that cases of cartridges and ammunition were lying 
about the streets practically ad libitum, and could be had by anyone who 
cared to carry them away.104  
 
Moreover, once the Chinese officials abandoned Taipei, the local Chinese started to plunder 
the guns and powder from the Taipei arsenal and ammunition factory, which lasted for nearly 
2 days.105 British Acting Consul L.C. Hopkins reported on this occurrence on 6th June at Tatutia 
and Tamsui as he witnessed that Prism powder lay around and the Chinese villagers were 
walking through it and on it. They were carrying away everything they could move, wrenching 
pieces of brass, iron work, breech blocks or carriages. The large powder magazine at 
Dalongpeng 大壠塝 was blasted.106 Davidson also noted the robbers were selling such weapons 
as a brand new Gatling gun to Chinese merchants for a few dollars and a Krupp breech–loading 
mountain gun was sold for two dollars.107 We may conclude that supply of arms was not the 
principle problem: failure of military organization was the real problem, contra Huang (1992). 
This distinction is of some importance here as we are suggesting that the anarchy of those 
months served as a window of opportunity for the unofficial flow of arms throughout Taiwan 
(see Chapter 7, pp. 301-309).  
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In summary, during the last year or so before Taiwan was ceded to Japan, we see an 
accelerated movement of modern weaponry pouring into Taiwan from the Japanese military 
and the Qing military. Not only was the Western model of weapons successfully adopted by the 
Japanese military such as Spencer rifles, British and French steel cannons, but also some 
weaponry manufactured by the Japanese appeared in the warfare such as Murata rifles from 
Tokyo, machine guns and cannon from Yokohama, Yokosuka, Onohama, Osaka, etc. The 
weapons that the Qing military held, as illustrated earlier, emerged as chaotic and a complete 
farrago such as Armstrong and Krupps guns from Nanjing Arsenal, Winchester repeating 
carbines, Mauser, Lee, Remington, Spencer, Peabody, Martini-Henry, some old Spanish, Dutch 
and Chinese firearms, knives and pistols, during the unstable condition in Taiwan when the 
Republic of Formosa was newly established and there were problems of supply from the Qing 
government in China. Such domestic anarchy must have accelerated the uncontrolled spread 
of weaponry in Taiwan.  
 
2.2. Possession of Guns among the Qing Army 
 
Apart from the substantial modern armament that the Qing government transferred to 
Taiwan to confront foreign armies, Liu Mingchuan urged to marshal the coastal defence and the 
military modernisation program in the wake of the Sino-French War. Since Liu was appointed 
the first provincial governor of Taiwan province, he imported new cannon and rifles, built 
arsenals, powder mills, railway, telegraph, etc mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, pp. 96-99). The 
amount of modern weaponry in Taiwan probably reached the highest point in this period. This 
also served to diffuse the availability of firearms in every part of Taiwan during the second 
opening up period and before ceding to Japan. Two British Consuls in Tamsui and Taiwan (Tainan) 
respectively reported the large scale of military expansion in 1885.108 Consul Herbert A. Giles 
commented that,  
large guns have been purchased, and contracts for more have been 
made with a well know German firm. Troops have been landed in 
unusual numbers-many to fill up the gaps caused by the fever and 
dysentery of last season, but still many more than are in any way needed 
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at the present peaceful juncture.109 
 
Up to 1889, 31 Armstrong cannons were purchased and 10 artillery batteries were 
repaired and built in Keelung, Tamsui, Anping, Qihou 旗後 (Kaohsiung City) and Penghu under 
the supervision of a German engineer. 110 In the inventory for founding the Taipei Arsenal and 
ammunition factory by Liu in 1887, a series of machines were purchased for repairing rifles and 
manufacturing bullets for Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Hotchkiss rifles111 and Snider rifles which 
were left from the previous reinforcement. Liu purchased another 3,000 Lee rifles, 600,000 
bullets for Lee rifles and 150,000 bullets for other breech-loaders. 112  In 1892, the second 
governor of Taiwan, Shao You-Lian expanded the Taipei Arsenal and ammunition factory due 
to the increasing demand of ammunition for repressing the indigenes. 113  Davidson also 
revealed how the modern Krupps, Gatling guns and some old Chinese jing-galls were also found 
in the arsenal.114  
So far, we know the small arms the Qing army possessed were mainly Mauser rifles, Lee 
rifles, Hotchkiss rifles and Snider rifles and the supply of ammunition was sufficient. However, 
it is uncertain how much modern armaments were used by the Qing soldiers in quelling the 
mountain indigenes revolts as such. If few, this might have restricted the possible access, the 
experience and the knowledge of modern firearms for mountain indigenes when they 
encountered the Qing army. In the journal of Hu Zhuan 胡傳, the inspector of garrisons of 
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Taiwan Province from 1891, he reported that several garrisons in Taidong were furnished with 
old muzzleloaders, a garrison in Jiayi furnished with Lee rifles, the frontier army in Zhanghua, 
Dakekan and Su-Au furnished with breech-loaders, the garrison in Tamsui furnished with 
Mauser rifles, Lee rifles and Hotchkiss rifles in 1892. He also gave rewards to soldiers who 
performed well in target practices due to the low rate of soldiers hitting the targets.115 In the 
report of Shen Maoyin 沈茂蔭, the governor of Miaoli County from 1892, he gave account of 
60 foreign rifles and 355 Chinese matchlocks among the military stock in the Miaoli County 
Gazetteer.116 It is uncertain if these foreign rifles and the Chinese matchlocks were also used by 
the Qing military in pacifying the Atayal resistances in 1885 and 1886 in the same Miaoli County, 
but they might well have had some influence on the mountain indigenes like the Atayal and the 
Saisiyat indigenes who lived in these areas.  
 
2.3. Possession of firearms among the Chinese militia and civilians  
 
Chinese militia were largely recruited by the Qing officials in Taiwan in this period to 
fight against the French and the Japanese and to repress the mountain indigenes along with the 
insufficient Qing army transferring from China. These Chinese militias were equipped with 
firearms that they forged by themselves, powder, knives and spears and were given powder by 
the Qing government as in various accounts in the Qing official reports.117 Foreign firearms and 
breech-loaders were given to the Chinese militia by the Qing government for the defence in 
Keelung from French invasion. For instance, funds and foreign firearms were given to Wang 
Tingli 王廷理, a local gentry to recruit 300 local braves to reinforce the Qing army in Keelung.118 
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Zhang Licheng 張李成, a local recruited 500 local braves and was given 200 breech-loaders to 
assist the defence.119 Old muzzleloaders were reported to be used by Lin ChaodDong and his 
men and judged not good enough to fight against the French army. 120  Xu suggested that 
tuanlian 團練121 or generally-called Chinese militia, contributed and received orders to assist 
the Qing army during the outbreak of the Sino-French War, even though Liu, Ming-Chuan had 
some doubts about their effectiveness in combat and their capacity with weapons.122 After the 
Sino-French War, the local gentry in northern Taiwan such as Lin Weiyuan, Lin Chaodong started 
to engage with Liu Mingchuan’s reform. The Chinese militia led by the local gentry were 
regimented as a defence corps, which received Qing government’s orders, military training and 
modern weaponry.123 Particularly, the Chinese militia led by Lin ChaodDong, also called the 
Dong Army or Dongjun 棟軍 were active and became the major force in the second “opening 
up” phase and the Japanese invasion. If Xu considered the Chinese militia assigned to regiments 
as a defence corps furnished with modern armament, the Chinese militia could then have been 
equipped with Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Hotchkiss rifles and Snider rifles. Rifles the Chinese 
militia held at stations near the indigenes’ territories were authorized by the Qing government 
and supplied with ammunition according to the British Acting Consul L.C. Hopkin in 1893,  
It is requested that a preliminary issue of 15 rifles to each company be 
made [120 for 432 men?] together with ammunition, for use during the 
process of establishing posts. Later on, when the regular patrol of the 
mountains is in working order, a rifle to be issued to each member of 
the force, and 20 cartridges per rifle monthly.124 
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Another source through which the Chinese rebels procured their firearms in the Japanese 
invasion was reported in The Japan Weekly Mail, Aug, 8th, 1896,  
 having been instructed to watch the movements of Lui Chao-tung, Lin 
Toh-hsin, and U O-chin, we found, after continuous observation, that 
Chao-tung opened a shop by the sea-shore in Yen-hai-tsun, and that 
Toh-hsin and O-chin were despatched to Canton and Hongkong, where, 
in the course of month, they obtained several hundreds of pistols and 
carbines which they caused to be packed in boxes for purposes of 
transport. Their professed business being to trade in deer-skins with the 
native tribes, they caused three boats manned by natives to leave the 
island, for the purpose of receiving the arms, but what part of the coast 
they chose for landing, we have not been able to find out. It appears 
that they arrived from the south with the weapons towards the end of 
June, and succeeded in getting them transhipped at some Chinese port, 
the name of which all our endeavours have failed to elicit. They had 
procured 600 breech-loading carbines of German make and 300 pistols, 
together with a supply of ammunition.125  
 
Moreover, foreign firearms and old Chinese gingalls were also found and possessed 
among the local bandits in the Qing army suppression in this research period. Liu Mingchuan 
reported how many foreign firearms, powder, knives and weapons were seized when Yan Baicai 
顏擺彩 and his 28 fellows - who gathered 500-600 people and were involved in looting, murder, 
rape, and resisting the Qing government in the areas of Zhanghua, Jiayi and Tainan – were 
eventually captured in 1885. The bandit chieftain Xu Tianding 許添丁 and his fellows were 
involved in a series of looting and murder near the border of indigenes, and opened fire at the 
Qing military when resisting being taken into custody in 1885. Several foreign firearms and 
gingalls were found with the bandit chieftain Wu Jinyin and his 7 fellows when they were caught 
in Jiayi, 1886.126  
Weapons were known to be possessed by the Chinese civilians, especially by the Hakkas 
and the types of weapon ranged from traditional ones to modern ones. Matchlocks were also 
commonly held by the bellicose Chinese villagers, as the Grand Secretary, Zhou Derun 周德潤 
stated in his proposal of an expedient term within which firearms could be manufactured by 
the Tainan machine factory for the Chinese villagers to help save Taiwan from the French 
invasion.127 Dodd also noted the involvement of Hakkas in the Sino-French War,  
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At Tamsui are to be seen a number of Hakka hill-men said to be 
employed by the Government to fight the French. These men are armed 
with their own matchlocks, which they prefer, in their ignorance, to 
foreign rifles. They are as a rule good at shooting at stationary objects 
within a decent range, and are very handy with their knives when 
victorious in all encounters with savages.128 
 
Dodd also remarked on his view of the matchlock as “a very primitive description, [the Hakkas] 
are brave and inured to fighting” 129and described their fighting positions, as almost the same 
as those of the mountain indigenes Mackay had described (see Chapter 4, p. 131),  
the hill-men's mode of loading and discharging their guns, I may add 
that their ordinary method of taking aim is to place the lower end of the 
butt of their matchlocks against their right breast, high enough to 
enable the curved end to rest against the cheek and they eye to look 
straight down the long barrel, on which are no sights of any kind. They 
have a habit, too, of discharging their guns from their hip, and I have 
seen them make good practise at short distances. One of the most 
curious ways of taking sight and firing at an enemy can be witnessed any 
day up in the savage borders. The man lies on his back, raises his head 
sufficiently to be able to look along the barrel, places the muzzle 
between his toes, takes a deliberate aim, and makes as a rule better 
practise than by lying on his belly and taking aim in that position. The 
toes keep the long weapon steady, very little front is shown, and experts 
on a level piece of ground, covered perhaps with tufts here and there of 
rank grass, would puzzle European troops considerably on landing in a 
strange country, where an upright enemy would be looked for instead 
of a horizontal one.130 
 
In fact, the firing positions of the mountain indigenes and the Hakkas were exactly the same. It 
is unclear how to identify the origin of this firing position, but nevertheless it proved to be 
effective during warfare.  
During the last civil rebellion of these years in 1888 led by Shi Jiuduan 施九緞, a large 
amount of firearms were held by the Chinese civilians and many open gunfights were held in 
                                                             
De-Run) in 31/10/1884 in Zhongguoshi xuehui 中國史學會 [Chinese History Academy], Zhongfa Zhanzheng 中法
戰爭 [The Sino-French War], 6:29–33. 
128 Alsford, The Witnessed Account of British Resident: John Dodd at Tamsui, 66–67. 
129 Dodd also gave details on the appearance of matchlocks and how the Hakkas loaded their matchlocks. “This 
matchlock is a long barreled gun, fixed into a semi-circular shaped stock, with a pan for priming powder, and an 
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neccesary. They pour a charge of powder down the muzzle, on top of that they drop two or three slug shot or long 
pieces of iron- no wads are used. They fill the pan with priming powder and pulling the trigger the light drops into 
the pan and off goes the gun, if it happens to be a fine bright, dry day; it. however , it is raining hard, they have 
some difficulty in discharging their weapons" Ibid., 107. 
130 Ibid., 107–8. 
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resisting the Qing military.131 In the Anpingxian Zaoji 安平縣雜記 [Miscellany of Anping], it was 
noted that the Chinese civilians were free to purchase knives, spears/rifles and sticks, that 
firearms and bullets were given by the government for the guards they selected in villages in 
the late Qing governance.132 Davidson also noted that the Hakka army who used to fight with 
matchlocks and defeated the French were hired by the Qing government and given modern 
weapons like single and repeating Mausers, Lee and modern repeating Winchester carbines in 
preparation against the Japanese attack in 1895.133 Winchester rifles and much ammunition was 
left with the Hakkas in southern Taiwan when Liu Young-Fu retreated to China.134  
We might generalise, then, that the types of weapon held by the Chinese militia and the 
civilians appeared to be mostly modernized such as Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Winchester rifles, 
etc. in comparison with mainly matchlocks in the previous period (1860 -1883). It is uncertain 
how many modern firearms the Chinese militia were actually given by the Qing government 
and particularly the number given to Chinese militia who were regimented as defence corps. 
However, the number should probably not be exaggerated as there were signs of matchlocks 
still in use among the militia and civilians, and the Qing government might have needed to take 
precautions from the previous Chinese rebellions and ethnic conflicts by lowering the 
effectiveness of a potential opposition.  
The weapons foreign troops actually held might have had less influence on the mountain 
indigenes because the major battle fields of the Sino-French War and the Japanese invasion 
were not in the indigenes’ territories except for a short intense time in the latter case, and the 
mountain indigenes had less direct involvement or confrontation in these two warfares in 
comparison with the Rover incident, 1867 and the Mudan incident, 1874 (in Chapter 4), but 
more in the aftermath impact. However, military technology in Taiwan itself became 
modernised. Since the breakout of the Sino-French War extended its battlefields to Taiwan and 
the Sino-Japanese War, large amounts of the modern armament such as Mauser’s rifles, Krupps, 
Snider, Winchester, Kentucky, Lee, Remington, Spencer, Peabody and Martini-Henry rifles were 
all known to have been transported to Taiwan by various agents (see pp. 184-186, 188-189). 
We have strongly suggested (pp.187-192) that after the arrival, anarchy reigned in the 
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distribution and possession of modern firearms. In Liu Mingchuan’s modernization scheme for 
the new Taiwan province, modern firearms were not only transported to Taiwan, also arsenal 
and ammunition factories were established to secure the provision of modern firearms. 
Firearms that the Chinese militia and civilians held had a pervasive tendency toward 
increasingly modern models especially Mauser, Lee, Hotchkiss, Sniders, and Winchester rifles. 
This is due to the Chinese militia becoming increasingly regimented as a defence corps and given 
military training and modern firearms. This might counter-indicate that the prospect of modern 
weaponry transfer to indigenes’ societies was relatively high through an array of problematic 
transfer agents.  
The Chinese militia were largely engaged in repressing the inimical indigenes in the 
second pacification period. The Chinese civilians had always had the contacts and conflicts with 
the indigenes. Besides, in the last two years under the Qing governance before ceding to Japan, 
Taiwan turned into an anarchic province and state where the ill -disciplined and negligent Qing 
soldiers sold their firearms cheaply and the Chinese civilians plundered whatever they could 
find in the arsenals and ammunition factories and sold them cheaply. For instance, in the 
Japanese official report, a Chinese bandit was known to hide hundreds of r ifles and powder 
within varied villages and tribes before he surrendered in July 1896.135 We would like to suggest 
that in this period (1884-1895) Taiwan became a province where excessively large numbers of 
modern armaments were situated, transferred, and without much public order and security.  
 
3. Firearms among the Formosan Indigenes  
  
How did mountain indigenes respond or react to these developments when their 
territories were unceasingly sabotaged and infringed by the utilitarian and profit driven Qing 
government and Chinese with their modern firearms? As I discussed earlier in Section 1.2, there 
were increasing conflicts within indigenes’ regions between the mountain indigenes and the 
Qing military due to the second pacification program and the camphor commercial exploitation, 
                                                             
135 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '臺東北部巡迴日誌' (Diary of the northern tour in Taitung), September 1896 
(V04507\A021), Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史
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which linked together, firstly, internal and secondly, colonial processes with, thirdly, global 
commercial ones. And I have also discussed the mass modern firearms transferred and operated 
by the Qing military, the Chinese militia and the Chinese civilians in battles in this period (in 
Section 2). What types of weapon did the mountain indigenes most likely hold to resist 
encroachments? Were their weapons influenced by the modern weapons? If they were, how 
did they have the access to these modern weapons and the knowledge of modern weapons 
usage?  
 
3.1.  An Assortment of Firearms – Plains Indigenes  
 
Plains indigenes’ weapons appeared to have shifted toward a diverse and modern level. 
In Mackay’s narrative concerning the 40 plains indigenes who accompanied his party when 
visiting Toa-o (Daao 大澳) in 1890,  
several of whom had Martini-Henry or Remington rifles, some carried 
old American muskets, the most swung over their shoulders Chinese 
matchlocks, and others held long spears in readiness.136 
 
 This could be affirmed in Dr. Warburg’s account that plains indigenes who acted as guards were 
furnished with “well-kept muskets and spears” when Warburg visited a church in Saobay with 
Dr. Mackay in 1888. 137  Warburg also noted that the plains indigenes were equipped with 
muskets in their rice field for defence.138 Here we can see the mixture of traditional and modern 
firearms based on their different methods in loading powder or bullets, carried by the plains 
indigenes. However, it is rather difficult to find out from our sources the general or average level 
of firearms in plains indigenes’ hands because their characters and circumstances were varied 
and different due to their early assimilations with the Chinese settlers and their conscription to 
the Qing military in Taiwan. And most of the significant resistance occurred in the mountain 
indigenes’ territories in this period. Nevertheless, they did not seem to lose their connections 
with the mountain indigenes in both friendly and hostile terms.  
 
3.2.  An Assortment of Firearms – Mountain Indigenes 
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137 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’, 374–87; Otness, One Thousand 
Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 163. 
138 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
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Firearms continued to be the general weapon that mountain indigenes held and 
exerted in attacks in this period. Liu Mingchuan inspected the mountain indigenes and 
described how they “lived in interior mountains and exercised in combats and were extremely 
adept in marksmanship.”139 The Atayals of the Sulu tribe 蘇魯社 in Miaoli were reported to be 
talented in firing firearms and shot on their targets every time when they fought against the 
Chinese militia led by Lin Chaodong in 1886.140 Several Chinese official reports revealed that 
firearms were held by the mountain indigenes in assaults or firearms were seized by the Qing 
military in quelling the mountain indigenes. For instance, in 1885 at the beginning of this 
period the Paiwanese of the Shuaimang tribe and Dongdi tribe used their matchlocks against 
the Qing army and 12 men died.141 Numbers of firearms and weapons were caught and around 
20 Atayals of the Lileng tribe 裡冷社 were shot dead by Lin Chaodong’s army. The battles 
lasted for nearly half a month and Lin, Chaodong lost over 30 men in 1887.142 The Puyuma 
indigenes from the lujiawang tribe 呂家望社 fired at the Qing military in 1888, Liu described 
how the bullets were fired like rain-fall and the indigenes prostrated themselves low in 
bamboo forest with their firearms.143 Another incident occurred in Suao and Hualian port 
division that was in progress of opening roads in 1889. 270 men amongst 500 men, including 
the assistant general of Yilan defense corps, Liu Chaodai were ambushed and shot dead by 
many Atayal indigenes from the nearby tribes – Laogoushi tribe (老狗社  or 留興社  in 
Nanao).144 Mackay also noted that the repeating rifles were carried by the “mountain savages”, 
next to the Amis tribe who also struggled from the “unscrupulous greed and destructive vices 
of the Chinese”.145 The Qing military captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of darts and 
                                                             
139Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 416–17. 
140 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Wenji 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan], 139–46. 
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144 He was a nephew of governor Liu Ming-Chuan Jiang Shizhe 蔣師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan 
Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 904–8. 
145 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 248, 251. 
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knives belonging to the Paiwan of the Sepediq tribe in a suppression in 1892.146 During the 
Japanese invasion, 3,000 Remington rifles were handed over to the indigenes ’ representatives 
as the North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette and Hong Kong Daily Press 
reported successively.147  
These resources indicate that it is very possible that these modern weapons quite 
commonly flowed into indigenes’ hands. Traditional weapons such as musket, Chinese 
matchlocks, spear, knives, etc. appeared to be possessed by the mountain indigenes 
continuously and mundanely in this period. The Puyumas of the Tipun tribe or Katripulr 知本 
used muskets to kill several Chinese who attempted to cut the trees as George Taylor, the 
lighthouse keeper, was told by the chief of Tipun in his trips during the 1880s.148 Edmund 
Hornby Grimani described how the mountain indigenes were, “a rough murderous-looking lot, 
extremely muscular and always armed, sometimes with spears, or bows and arrows, or even 
muskets.”149 Hundreds of primitive manufactured firearms or tuqiang 土槍 were submitted 
from approximately 10 tribes from the Atayals of Dayegan or Thyakan in Xinchu County when 
Liu Chao-Dai and his men pacified the revolts in 1888.150 A survey was done in the 1890s and 
reported in the Draft for the Xinzhu Xian Gazetteer, the Atayal men from the 16 tribes of Beishi
北勢 and Nanshi 南勢 were all furnished with Chinese matchlocks and the numbers of the 
Atayal men were nearly 400 in total.151 The Paiwan chief – Pan Wenjie from the Tierasock tribe 
豬月勞束社 and 50 of his indigenous men all possessed firearms when inducing the Puyuma 
group to assist the Japanese troops to fight against the rest of the Qing soldiers in Taidong. 152 
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The Qing military also captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of spears and knives from 
the Sapetiq tribe from the Paiwan group after pacifying one of the resistances in 1892.153  
Thus far, then, we see a mixture of modern and traditional firearms among the 
mountain and plains indigenes’ in and before this period. Plains indigenes’ characters and 
circumstance were varied and complicated. According to our material, it did not show exactly 
how widely the mountain indigenes’ weapons had reached the modern level and traditional 
firearms almost certainly remained, but the mixture of modern and traditional firearms might 
have also given them the best strength in combats as the Qing military appeared to greatly 
struggle in attempting to quash the mountain indigenes 
.  
3.3. Access to Firearms of Formosan Indigenes (1884-1895)  
 
The acquirement of firearms and the knowledge or experience of the firearms of the 
mountain indigenes certainly had direct and adjacent links to their contacts with the Chinese 
in this period. However, it seems there may have been less direct influence from the foreigners 
in Taiwan. This of course is probably due to their having far less conflicts with the foreigners, 
and their general civil contacts with foreigners were mostly limited to missionaries and 
travelers who they had been friendly with and had some barter with along the internal frontier. 
The process of getting firearms for the mountain indigenes was continued in their original 
trading connections with the Chinese regardless of their mutual hatred and constant conflicts 
and the prohibition of the Qing government.154 A good clear statement by Dr. Warburg noted 
how the firearms of indigenes were given by the Chinese who purchased their lands from the 
Qing government,  
The colonization happens in the way that the government sells the land, 
the valleys of the Savages that maybe really once were conveyed for 
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liquor, to rich Chinese. These then hire Pepohwans and Hakkas as 
colonists and furnish them with guns.155 
Dr. Myers recorded the exchange of weapon between the Amis and the Chinese in his service 
at Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs Service in Kaohsiung and on the staff of the Mansion 
Memorial Hospital in Tainan in the 1880s,  
Silver dollars and cotton fabrics, gunpowder, lead, arrow heads, firelock, 
knives, etc., are obtained from the Chinese in exchange for deer horns, 
rice, grated potatoes, barley, jerked deer flesh, dried fish, pork, pigs, 
fowls, etc.156 
 
Hu Zhuan also disclosed how the knives, firearms, powder the mountain indigenes held in 
Taidong were all given by the Tongshi 通事157 or exchanged with the Chinese for antlers, 
animal skin, horns or bear bile.158 He also spoke about the indigenes’ keenness on purchasing 
new types of foreign firearms,  
In the past, fan only possessed iron pistol, knives and spear; now they 
have recognised the latest type and ingenious nature of foreign guns 
owned by the Qing military and purchase them with high price without 
hesitations.159  
 
The procurement of firearms for the indigenes was often closely associated with the Chinese 
and the trading of camphor and other mountain resources. On the report of British Consul 
Lionel Charles Hopkins in 1884, the Hakkas, “carried on the barter trade with the savages, 
whom they supply with guns, powder, and knives, mostly of their own manufacture, receiving 
in exchange skins, hardwood, camphor, and the native cloth.”160 This exchange venture could 
also be seen in John Dodd’s notes on the camphor districts, which were mentioned in Chapter 
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4 (pp. 156-158). Powder was also supplied by the Chinese. For instance, the Hakka rebel – Liu 
Tianwang 劉添旺 who joined a revolt with the plains indigenes of Siraya and the mountain 
indigenes of the Amis and the Puyuma in 1888, witnessed that the gunpowder was purchased 
from a Chinese – Shi Aman 施阿蠻 in Lugang, Changhua County.161 Chinese villagers from 
Nanzhuang, Miaoli County (竹南一保田尾庄), included a Chinese civilian Huang Ati 黃阿蹄 
who married an indigenous woman, all caught for trading gunpowder with the neighbouring 
indigenes in 1889.162   
Furthermore, several materials suggested that the modern firearms and ammunition 
had reached the hands of indigenes by the 1890s. Particularly so, from the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese invasion, when the state of affairs in Taiwan was unsettled 
and various weapons were accumulated amongst the Qing government, the newly founded 
Republic of Formosa, and the Chinese militia in the preparation of warfare (see pp.192-196). 
The mountain indigenes seemed to gain many chances of procuring modern weapons in this 
disorder and anarchic circumstance. In the Intelligence Reports of Tainan, written by Pelham 
Laird Warren in 1890 about how the Qing soldiers sold their rifles to the indigenes,  
The troops are utterly demoralised and useless, their own officers are 
reported as supplying them with opium and keeping back their pay, they 
sell their rifles and ammunition whenever they get the chance, and the 
said rifles and ammunition ultimately find their way into the hands of 
the savages.163    
Rifles carried by 6,000 to 7,000 Chinese soldiers were also taken by at least a thousand 
mountain indigenes in an insurrection in 1891, which obstructed the camphor trade as 
reported by W. Holland, a British Consul in Tamsui,  
Many Chinese soldiers have been killed, their rifles carried off, and it is 
said that a small mountain gun was captured by the savages, who are 
evidently well able to hold their own. Nor is this to be wondered at if 
the quality of the troops they meet is considered.164 
Davidson reported how the mountain indigenes joined Liu Yong-Fu’s troops in the name of 
repelling the Japanese invasion and carried off arms and ammunition from Liu after two of 
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their fellows died, which they treated as a bad portent.165 Unknown indigenes’ representatives 
received 3,000 Remington rifles as mentioned earlier although the group of indigenes who 
received the rifles was unspecified and the source of these rifles was unnamed in the news. 
166 Over 1,000 soldiers of the Black Flags who were left in southern Taiwan and escaped “inland” 
after Japan took over Takow in 1895 were “cooped up in the town closely hemmed in on every 
side by savages who are eager to make very short work of them, and are reduced to the utmost 
straits for arms, ammunition and provisions.” This was reported by the British Consul Joseph 
H. Longford in Takow in May 1896. 167 However, the indigenes did not appear to have the skill 
of forging their own firearms, except that there is a source from George Taylor suggesting that 
the Tipuns might have found an expert blacksmith to forge firearms and agricultural tools for 
them. 168 
Plains indigenes military or Fantun (番屯) capability might have also been furnished 
with the modern weapons transferred to Taiwan by the Qing government in this period (see 
also pp. 108-109, 192-193). In 2008 Xu suggested that the system of indigenes military, which 
was composed of the plains indigenes mainly, was transformed and operated as a defense 
corps, which replaced the original Chinese defense corps from mainland China, after the 
establishment of Taiwan as a province in 1885.169 As shown in his journal, Huang Fengchang
黃逢昶, propounded to recruit plains indigenes who were valiant and tough to assist the 
Chinese military in the French invasion.170 Liu Mingchuan also made remarks on the refined 
and courageous character of plains indigenes military and that their fighting capacity was far 
better than the Green Standard Army. 171 The plains indigenes military also assisted the Qing 
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army in the second pacifying phase on several occasions such as in the 1886 the revolt of the 
Atayal of the Sulu tribe and the Manabang tribe 馬那邦社172 and in 1892 the revolt of the 
Sapetiq or Shebuli tribe (also see p. 179). If Xu was correct about how the development of 
plains indigenes military had integrated with the Qing corps and we also know that the plains 
indigenes military assisted in several internal warfare in Taiwan, it is distinctly possible that 
the plains indigenes military had increasingly closer access to the modern firearms.  
We may summarise that the condition of armament of the mountain indigenes was in 
the diversified or mixed phase in the period of late Qing governance. This phase comprised 
the traditional weapons such as knives, spear, matchlocks or muskets and modern firearms 
such as Remington rifles, repeating rifles, etc. I have also tried to demonstrate how some 
traces of firearms flowed into the hands of mountain indigenes from trading with the Chinese 
soldiers, militia and civilians who were largely furnished with modern types of firearms as well 
as through instances of combat with Chinese and Japanese. This all contributed to the 
modernised level of firearms that Formosan indigenes possessed in this period and henceforth.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The period of 1884-1895 is the phase in which the mountain indigenes accessed a 
diffusion of modern military technologies, when numerous types and different sizes of 
armament were operated by the French and Japanese troops and also transferred to Taiwan 
by the Qing government during the invasions of France and Japan. Although the direct 
involvements of the mountain indigenes were probably limited, their exposure to modern 
military armament in Taiwan would have influenced their perceptions when procuring or 
operating firearms. Especially within the warfare between the indigenes, with the Qing military 
and with the Chinese civilians they continued their demand for weaponry. According to our 
material, the level and the types of firearms among the mountain indigenes appeared to follow 
the trend of firearms that the Qing military, the Chinese militia and civilians operated with a 
mixture of traditional and modern levels of weapon. It is uncertain how many modern firearms 
                                                             
Dynasty], 95. 
172 Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史 [A General History of Taiwan], 450. 
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went into the mountain indigenes’ hands. However, their connections in trade with the 
Chinese did not seem to stop, and the wars they fought against the Qing army and the 
disarrayed state of Taiwan before ceding to Japan seemed to provide their principal sources of 
firearms.  
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Part II 1860-1914: Conflict and Resistance of the Indigenous People 
Chapter 6 Sources of Conflict at a Modernised-Advanced Level: Early Japanese 
Colonization 1896-1914 
  
Indigenous societies and cultures were subjected to ultimate persecutions from 1895 
when Japan began to colonise Taiwan as its first colony in Asia. Japan revealed herself as the 
first capitalist country in Asia, who not only escaped from the Western nations’ invasive 
colonialism, but also became a newly and aggressive colonist after defeating China in the Sino -
Japanese War in 1894-1895 and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. Japan was like 
most of the Western nations – Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, who impulsively 
exploited economic resources and imposed their control on treaty ports from their colonies.1 
Inevitably Japan benefited from inheriting and continuing to develop the incomplete 
transportation and communication systems left by the former Qing government, which 
accelerated the entire process of exploiting and controlling mountains resources in Taiwan. 
Particularly the mountain indigenes’ territories and living encountered the utmost challenges 
that triggered more and extensive conflicts with the Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府, the highest 
organ of Japanese government in Taiwan. For the Formosan indigenes, whose inhabitants had 
fought against the Chinese settlers and the Qing military for centuries, this meant now having 
to contend with the efficiency and higher technology of Japanese governance. In the previous 
Chapters 4 and 5, I have given evidences of how indigenes first possessed traditional firearms 
and then maintained a mixture of traditional and modernised firearms, and also analysed the 
various possible routes of obtaining firearms for the indigenes under the Qing governance. 
Since the colonial government had now been replaced by Japan with its superior resources and 
armaments, how did indigenes battle with the Japanese police and military forces after 1895?   
This chapter will be focusing on the source of conflicts for the mountain indigenes in the 
early colonization of Japan in Taiwan from 1895 to 1914. This period will be seen as the 
                                                             
1 In fact, the Japanese were far more interested in securing basic natural resources from their colonies than was 
the case of the other powers. Generally, the Japanese state felt far more the pressures of time and circumstance. 
Attempting to catch up quickly with the existing powers the Japanese state put colonisation at the forefront of 
their national development project, especially from the late 1880s. See Inkster, Japanese Industrialisation: 
Historical and Cultural Perspectives, 64–67, 95–99, 122–25. And Chapter 5. K Yamamura, ‘Success Illgotten? The 
Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan’s Technological Progress’, Journal of Economic History 37 (n.d.): 113–35. 
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“advanced level” of conflict according to the level of armament operated at various levels of 
fighting in Taiwan. 1914 is selected to be the concluding year because it was the last year of 
General Sakuma Samata’s Indigenous Management Scheme, which wielded a strong project of 
military subjugation of the indigenous groups, and indeed most of indigenes’ firearms were 
seemingly confiscated (for qualifications to this statement see later in the chapter).  
It is also the period of the First World War that saw territorial gains to Japan which 
would make that nation the most dominant state in east Asia.2 Firstly, I would like to begin with 
emphasising the greater encroachment of Japan toward indigenes’ territories by illustrating the 
construction of communication systems and the indigenes’ management structure, which was 
aimed to pursue total control of the mountain resources, in the early Japanese colonization 
scheme. These were the major causes of multiple rebellions of mountain indigenes. Secondly, 
I will discuss mainly the rebellions of mountain indigenous people against Japanese rule and 
the conflicts among indigenous people that involved the use of firearms. Thirdly I will discuss 
the weapon possessed by the Japanese police and military, the Chinese guards and the 
mountain indigenes and the access to firearms among the mountain indigenous people under 
the Japanese rule. The involvements of plains indigenes in conflicts or rebellion became far 
weaker and were also less recorded.  
 
1. Critical Incursion into Mountain Indigenes’ Territories under Japanese 
Colonization 
 
The remaining pressure of economic exploitation and the policies on mountain 
indigenes was brought into force by the Japanese government, as well as their full intent to 
develop communications and transport between the west and the east on the island, following 
on from the fact that Japan received Taiwan as its first colony in 1895 and was determined to 
make it pay and for it to be seen as an outpost of Japanese Meiji industrial modernisation. Japan 
played the sole role of encroacher and exploiter in the mountain indigenous territories, 
particularly in the central and the eastern mountains. This can be seen in the report of British 
Consul A.M. Chalmers in 1906,   
                                                             
2 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (White Plains: Taylor and Francis, 
2013), 54; Geoffrey Hudson, ‘The Bofors Gun’, Journal of Contemporary History 4, no. 2 (1969): 165–79. 
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Strenuous efforts are being made by the authorities to enable Formosa, 
as the chief camphor producing country, to meet the world’s growing 
demand for this commodity. Active measures have been taken during 
the last two or three years to bring under subjection the head-hunting 
savages who inhabit the forest regions and terrorise the Chinese natives 
engaged in collecting the raw camphor. Except in the savage territory 
the camphor trees are nearly exhausted, but vast forests still remain 
unexplored in the mountains, and during 1906 it is estimated that 46 
square ril (287square miles) of forest and arable land have been wrested 
from the savages. From all directions the police cordon round the 
aborigines is being drawn gradually closer, and in a very few years there 
should be free access to all parts of the interior of the island.3 
As we shall see, that last expectation was by no means fulfilled.  
 
1.1. Implementation of Communication Systems 
 
Indeed, Japan aimed to penetrate every corner of Taiwan by implementing her efficient 
communication systems such as railways, telecommunication and police systems and guard 
lines, which triggered various scales of conflict between the mountain indigenous groups and 
accelerated indigenes’ rebellions. A comprehensive map of Taiwan was placed within the British 
Diplomatic and Consular Reports by Consul Wileman for the year of 1908 and showed the 
completed railway on the western plain region and the projected railway on the east region. 
(see Map 6:1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 TEPR 6/251-269, No. 3803 Annual Series. Diplomatic and Consular Report. Japan. Report for the Year 1906 on 
the Trade of North Formosa, Consul A.M. Chalmers, 257 
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Map 6:1 Map of Island of Formosa in 1908 
 
Source: TEPR 6/363-388, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Japan. Report for the Year 
1908 on the Trade of the Consular district of Tainan (South Formosa), Consul Wileman, 364  
  
In this map, we can see in 1908 how the indigenes’ territories and the mountain resources were 
planned to be enclosed by the completed and the projected railway system, which functioned 
in transporting mountain resources to the plains and sending reinforcement when quelling the 
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indigenous tribes was required by the Taiwan Sotokufu. Moreover, the savage frontier, redrawn 
by the Japanese authorities, also proved their infiltration into the mountain indigenous regions. 
Within 40 years, the Taiwan Sotokufu achieved and gained the absolute formal domination of 
mountain indigenous groups and mountain resources, which was never carried off under the 
Qing governance for over 200 years. This can be seen in another map which was made by the 
Taiwan Sotokufu in 1935. (See Map 6:2)  
 
Map 6:2 Map of indigeneous groups for 1935 
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Source: Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府警務局理蕃課 (Taiwan Government-General), 
Gaoshazu Diaochashu-Fanshegaikuang 高砂族調查書-蕃社概況 [An Investigation of the 
Indigenes in Taiwan: The Overview of Indigenous], ed. Zhou Huimin 周惠民 (Taipei: Institute of 
Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 2011). 
In this map, the distribution of all the mountain indigenous groups has been drawn in different 
colours and all the tribes were located and named. Roads, where the red lines are, and railways 
were built and interwoven within the mountain indigenous terrains. To construct railways and 
roads, measuring the areas and making maps became an important task for the Taiwan 
Sotokufu.4 The inspections or explorations were sent and mostly led by the Japanese officials, 
police, technicians, and anthropologists such as Mori Ushinosuke 森丑之助, Inō Kanori 伊能嘉
矩, and Ryuzo Torii 鳥居龍藏 to investigate the landscapes, mountain resources and the 
mountain indigenous groups. According to Zheng An-Xi’s research on the advance and changes 
of guard lines in the mountain indigenes’ territory during Japan’s governance from 1895-1920, 
which is based on the rich material from the Taiwan zondufu gonwenleizuan 臺灣總督府公文
類纂 (Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction), Taiwan nichinichi shimpō 臺灣日日新報 
(Taiwan Daily News), and Riju shiqi Yuanzhumin xingzhengzhigao 日據時期原住民行政志稿
or also called Riban shikô 理蕃誌稿 (Records of Indigenes' Management), plenty of exploration 
teams were sent to the regions of the Atayal, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan and Rukai. Particularly the 
Paiwan and Rukai regions were the most visited for the purposes of construction of roads and 
telecommunication and the investigation of the indigenes within those regions.5 He also noted 
how Mori Ushinosuke visited the Atayal and the Bunun 18 times each in the period of 1896-
1915 for his anthropological research or to assist the Japanese official exploration or the 
indigenes’ pacifications,6 and exploration teams were sent to the mountain regions 146 times 
in total during 1896-1920. 7  These explorations certainly caused some hostilities with the 
mountain indigenes and prompted conflicts with the local ethnic groups or some attacks from 
                                                             
4 For the information about the maps on the indigenes’ territories made by the Japanese official, see  Zheng Anxi  
鄭安晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian  1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 
1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s 
Governance from 1895-1920]’ (PhD, National Chengchi University, 2011), 66–68. 
5For the details of the times and the places of  the Japanese’s mountain inspections, see  Ibid., 30–85. 
6 Zheng, ‘Rizhishiqi Fandi Aiyunxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian (1895-1920) 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 
(1895-1920)’, 30–53. 
7 Ibid., 71–85. 
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the indigenes, although most of the exploration teams were accompanied by the indigenous 
tongshi 通事 chiefs and indigenous fellows and sometimes welcomed by some indigenous 
tribes. For instance, in June 1909, two surveying technicians were assaulted by the mountain 
indigenes on their way to Luchangdashan 鹿場大山 (Miaoli County).8 In December 1909, two 
Japanese policemen were killed by the Chinese tongshi, who was later shot dead by the 
mountain indigenes of the Bunun group from Laipunuk 內本鹿 (Taidong County).9 In 1910 the 
Atayal indigenes from the Slamaw group 沙拉茂群 resisted the road construction, which forced 
the Commissioner of Nantou Province to terminate the plan.10 In June 1911, another measuring 
technician was attacked by the indigenes and seriously injured when land surveying in 
Madingkeliu Mountain 馬丁克留山 (Taidong County).11 Soft control was not easy to come by. 
  
1.2. Mountain Indigenes’ Management during Early Japanese Colonialism 
           
Chapter 3 (see pp. 103-106) described the mountain indigenes’ management by the 
Taiwan Sotokufu through authorising military governance and a placatory policy, which targeted 
the resource exploitations in the beginning. Later it changed to using advanced technology and 
proficient military force to pacify the rebellious mountain indigenes under General Sakuma 
Samata’s “Five Year Indigenous Management Schemes” (五年理蕃計畫) from 1907-1914. 
Indeed, Taiwan Sotokufu later gained total control over the mountain indigenes after numerous 
pacifications till the 1930s and conducted throughout numerous investigations on the mountain 
indigenous societies, something never achieved or attempted during the Qing’s governance. 
Taiwan Stotkufu was increasingly cognizant of the positions, the numbers, the names and the 
populations of mountain indigenous tribes, the relationships between mountain indigenous 
tribes and with the Chinese civilian, camphor workers and guards, the mountain indigenous 
                                                             
8 Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 臺灣日日新報社, ‘蕃地測量’(The indigenes land surveys) , 臺灣日日新報 (漢文
版 Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper (Mandarin version) , 20/04/1909 version in Ibid., 60. 
9 Taiwan sôtokufu keisatsu honsho RBSK, ed., Riban Shikô 理蕃誌稿 (Records of Indigenes' Management), trans. 
Jintian 陳金田 Chen, vol. 2 (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 1977), 31–39 quoted in Zheng, 
‘Rizhishiqi Fandi Aiyunxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian (1895-1920) 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 (1895-1920)’, 
51. 
10 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 2:104–6. 
11 Zheng Anxi 鄭安晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推
進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the 
Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’, 62. 
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customs, the crops and temperatures within mountain indigenous territories, and so on. All this 
was rendered in detail in the Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction and in Records of 
Indigenes’ Management. 12 Taiwan Sotokufu established varied institutions for mollifying the 
mountain indigenes and investigating the mountain indigenous tribes and mountain resources 
such as: 11 Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus (bukonsho 撫墾署) and 17 branches 
(Chuzhangsuo 出張所) in remote areas in 1896-1898;13 the Indigenous Affairs Research Society 
(Fanqing yangjiuhui 蕃情研究會) 1898;14 the third division – Indigenous Affairs (Fanren Fandi
蕃人蕃地 ) in the 17 Provincial Affairs Bureaus (Banwushu 辦務署) in mountain regions and 
branches (Chuzhangsuo 出張所) or police stations in remote areas in 1898-1901; the Provincial 
Affairs Sub-Bureau (Banwuzhishu 辦務支署 ) was established under the Provincial Affairs 
Bureaux, which were conducted by the Japanese police,15 and the Committee of Mountain 
Affairs (Shandi shiwu weiyuanhui 山地事務委員會) in 1903, which was conducted by the Police 
Bureau. 16 Through these branches and police stations, we can see that the Taiwan Sotokufu 
put out feelers to the mountain indigenes’ territories and inserted its policing systems into 
indigenes’ management. As a matter of fact, police forces were depended upon and at times 
considered indispensable by the provinces who wished to develop the camphor, mining, tea 
industries. An example could be found in the report of Yilan province in 1903,  
Camphor and mining were the major industries in the province, but the 
location of these industries are all in the indigenes territories. Therefore, 
it is prior and essential to get the aid of the police force for thriving the 
industries.17   
 
 One of the crucial methods in Japan’s mountain indigenes’ management was the 
                                                             
12   Lists of investigation in indigenous regions included: the names, locations, populations of the indigenous 
tribes, the relationships between tribes, sizes of tribes, condition of the road between tribes, social classes within 
tribes, living status, cultivations, guns, ammunition, disease, exchange items, etc. This could be found in Chen 
Jintian  陳金田, trans., Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿 
[Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], vol. 1 (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 1977), 25–27. 
13 Ibid., 1:19–20, 43. 
14 Ibid., 1:73–77. 
15 Ibid., 1:77–78; Zheng Anxi 鄭安晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃
地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes 
Territory during the Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’, 24–29. 
16 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:223–36. 
17 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., '明治 36 年一至六月份宜蘭行政事務轄內概況報告' (Administrative Reports of 
Yilan Jurisdiction from January to June 1903), (V04730\A005) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 
Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas 
in Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2001), 200–201.   
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elaboration of guard lines or Aiyongxian 隘 勇 線, which accelerated even further 
encroachments onto the mountain indigenes’ territories than ever occurred before. In the 
report of Counsellor Mochiji Rokusaburō 持地六三郎 to the viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu Kodama 
Gentar 兒玉源太郎 in 1902, he suggested,  
To manage the mountain resources, solving the issues of indigenes 
should be the priority. It is to threaten them first and then assuage them. 
Threatening the indigenes is to make them frightened and flinch and 
assuaging them is to genuinely accept Japan’s superiority. Formosan 
indigenes remain in the primitive state and close to beasts. They have 
fallen behind the civilisation for several thousand years. Their thought 
and sentiments are in great differences … The methods for threatening 
the indigenes are: to form guard squads [Aiyongdui 隘勇隊] and 
proceed on the offensive, to manipulate the indigenes to control the 
indigenes, to reward the Chinese when killing the vicious indigenes and 
the offices of local government conduct the acts of exchanging articles 
in order to control the lives of indigenes.18 
 
Actually, these methods were to create more hostilities and turbulences among the mountain 
indigenous tribes and the Chinese ethnic groups rather than secure full control over the 
mountain indigenous tribes. Then, Taiwan Sotokufu established the regulations of setting the 
guard lines in 1904,19 which were under the management of the Police Bureau in 190220 and 
moved the guard lines forward. When Sakuma Samata became the Viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu 
in 1906, he continued to push the guard lines eastwards in his indigenous management 
scheme.21 As the outlines of the policy of managing mountains described in 1907,  
First, the developments of camphor, forest and mining in the northern 
regions were the main targets and later in the southern regions. Second, 
when expanding the guard lines in the northern regions, the officials 
should try to deliver the purposes and the promise of Taiwan Sotokufu 
to the indigenes. Unless it is necessary, the Taiwan Sotokufu would not 
send military force for pacification … Fourth, within the guard lines in 
northern regions, there should be enough equipment to pacify and 
encounter the indigenes and placate the indigenes and for stopping 
disturbances. The indigenes living outside of the guard lines will be 
encouraged to move into the guard lines.22 
 
                                                             
18 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:164. 
19 Ibid., 1:284–94. 
20 Ibid., 1:147–48. 
21 Ibid., 1:400–404. 
22 Ibid., 1:405. 
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In the research of Zheng Anxi, he noted how on the guard lines, the Taiwan Sotofuku also put 
up guard stations, guard roads, guard huts, electric and non-electric barbwires, landmines, 
fences, fortresses, searchlights, batteries, small power stations, telephone cables, etc.23 This 
advanced equipment on the guard line imprisoned the indigenes’ movement and put them in 
great danger, especially in erecting the deadly electric barbwires and landmines on the borders. 
He also calculated the number of times the guard lines were propelled further into indigenes’ 
territories: 9 times in Taipei region, 11 times in Taoyuan region, 29 times in Xinchu region, 8 
times in Miaoli region, 8 times in Taizhong, 8 times in Nantou region, 16 times in Yilan  region, 9 
times in Hualian region and 3 times in Taidong region.24 This tells us that the guard lines were 
pushed forward where the camphor and other forestry industries developed and this was 
precisely where the indigenes were mostly like to revolt. Examples of indigenes’ aggression 
against camphor workers, guards and farmers will be discussed in this chapter, Section 2. 
These series of measures were clearly designed to exploit the resources in the 
mountains without being killed by the mountain indigenes and to pacify the mountain indigenes 
in the longer term. However, in doing so, of course, the environments, the hunting territories, 
the farming areas and the right to reside of the mountain indigenes were limited, destroyed or 
lost under the management of the Taiwan Sotofuku and the measures implemented in the 
mountain indigenous territories. Although under the control or coercion of Japanese some 
mountain indigenous tribes assumed the good-will of Japan and showed them hospitality or 
formed alliances with them in fighting against the former Qing governance in earlier years. From 
what has gone before, however, it was inevitable for the mountain indigenes to initiate 
rebellions and resistances in such changed and accelerating circumstances. With the traditional 
and modern firearms possessed by the mountain indigenes from the previous years, it was a 
fateful choice to fight against the Japanese invasions and to cause problems and difficulties to 
the camphor and tea workers, miners, guards, the Japanese policemen and military in defence 
of their lands and their cultures.  
                                                             
23He also discussed these facilities and the specifications of these facilities on the guard lines.  Zheng Anxi 鄭安
晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-
1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s 
Governance from 1895-1920]’, 109–21. 
24Zheng also combined his historical research on the guard lines with actual field work and used the GIS system 
to draw the locations of guard lines in the contemporary areas of Taipei, Taoyuan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Taizhong, 
Nantou, Yilan, Hualan and Taidong. The details of propelling guard lines and the map of guard lines can be read 
inZheng’s PhD thesis in Chapter 3 and 4. Ibid., 147–360. 
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2. Mountain Indigenes’ Resistance 
 
Numerous rebellions originated with the indigenes when the Japanese military police 
and civil police were busy with pacifying the Chinese Republican rebellions in  the early years. 
Although there were also many mountain indigenous tribes who chose to submit themselves, 
some of them could not tolerate any further encroachments or the confiscation of their firearms 
and were ready to withstand the Japanese throughout the period even to 1930. Based on the 
list of mountain indigenes’ rebellions against the Taiwan Sotokufu given in Ta:in taeboeh Sawan 
Kas'ames, there were 53 rebellions from 1896-1914 as I have shown in the red circles of Map 
6:3. 25  The number of mountain indigenous rebellions was nearly triple the 20 indigenous 
rebellions in the late Qing period 1884-1895. The sites where rebellions occurred were closer 
to central and eastern Taiwan and more frequent and repeated than in the previous Qing 
governance. In addition, among these resistances from 1896-1914, in accordance with Ta:in 
taeboeh Sawan Kas'ames’ list,26 the number of resistances for each group were: the Atayal 
revolted 28 times; the Truku 6 times; the Seediq 5 times; the Bunun 5 times; the Paiwan 4 times; 
the Saysiyat 3 times; the Tsou and the Rukai only once. 27 It bears repetition to again point out 
that the resistance was by far the greatest in the camphor territors of the Atayal peoples who 
dominated the north-east of the island.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas’ames 達英. 拿答佛.撒萬. 葛斯阿門, Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu Kangrishi Tuji 臺灣原住
民族抗日史圖輯 [Collection of Historical Photographs of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance against 
Japanese Occupation 1874-1933] (Taipei: Taiwan yuanzhumin 臺灣原住民, 2010), 10–11. 
26 Ibid. 
27 However, in the period between 1915 to 1933, the Bunun revolted the most – 24 times; the Atayal revolted 5 
times, the Seediq 2 times and the Paiwan only once. The region where the indigenes resisted the most in 1896-
1914 has seemed to move from northeast, where the Atayal group lived to central eastern mountains, where the 
Bunun group lived.  
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Map 6:3 Map of indigenous rebellions 1860-1914 
 
Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/taiwan-physical-maps.html  
*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigenes with others marked in red circles 
by Pei Hsi Susan Lin  
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Nevertheless, it is highly possible that the actual number of indigenes ’ revolts on varied sizes 
and scales was indeed higher than in these mapped revolts, which have been calculated and 
based only on the Japanese official and police reports. For instance, in Wang Xuexin’s research 
on Fanhai 蕃害 [damages caused by the indigenes] in Yilan region alone in the early Japanese 
colony, the number of Fanhai was 603 times, which included the indigenes’ headhunting, 
murders and cause of injuries in 1896-1903. He also quantifies that number of heads that the 
indigenes in Yilan region hunted in those years as 560, which were mostly from individuals 
entering the mountains (260 heads), night raids (105 heads) and camphor workers (50 heads). 
The places that the indigenes targeted for attack were in the field (163 times), as Japanese or 
Chinese individuals were entering or passing the mountains (151 times), in Chinese civilians’ 
houses (87 times) and around camphor stills (84 times). 28  This shows that the indigenes’ 
resistances were far more than the “official” 53 rebellions as Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas'ames 
suggested, and this is only in the Yilan area. In addition, their major targets were not just the 
camphor workers, but also whoever trespassed on their lands.  
The Japanese army in Taiwan lost many men in quelling rebellions. There were 370 
soldiers and military policemen who died in battle fields, which was 45.2% of men who died in 
casualty in the period of 1897-1902 as reported in the profile of hygiene in the army in Taiwan.29 
Although this number also included men lost in quelling the Chinese rebellions, it shows that 
the sacrifice involved in controlling Taiwan was huge for the Taiwan Sotokufu and this was 
before the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” which focused on the military 
pacifications. Another source from Zhang Xu-Yi’s research on the resource control for the 
Taiwan Sotokufu and the mountain indigenes’ headhunting custom, is a list of numbers of 
casualties for the period of 1896-1929.30 For the focus period in this chapter (1896-1914), 5,421 
people died from the mountain indigenes’ assaults, which included Japanese policemen and 
                                                             
28 Wang Xuexin 王學新, ‘Rizhi Chuqi Yilan Diqu Fanhai Zhi Yanjiu 日治初期宜蘭地區蕃害之研究 [The Study of 
the Indigenous Detriment in Yiland Region in the Early Japanese Colony]’, in Rijiu Shiqi Yilan Diqu Yuanzhumi 
Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 [Historical Collection and Research on the 
Indigenes in Yilan Regions during the Japanese Colonization] (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2001), 484–485,487. 
29 Wang Xuexin 王學新, ed., Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原
住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese 
Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2003), 1395. 
30 Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Zongdufu Ziyuan Zhangwo Yu Yuanzhumin de Shoushou Guanxi 台灣總督府資源
掌握與原住民的首狩慣習 [Control of Taiwan Sotokufu Resources and the Headhunting Customs of Indigenes]’ 
(Diwujie Taiwan xinshengdai lunwen yantaohui: Taiwan de guojia jiangou yu ziyuan fenpei 第五屆台灣新生代論
文研討會: 台灣的國家建構與資源分配, Taipei: Taiwan yanjiu jijinhui 台灣研究基金會 [Taiwan Research Fund], 
1993), 6. 
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administrator and civilians. In this section, I intend to exemplify the use of firearms amongst 
mountain indigenes in conflicts between tribes, in assaults on the camphor workers and guards 
and in some rebellions against the Taiwan Sotofuku in order to derive a more non-Japanese 
dominated approach. 
The reasons why the mountain indigenes initiated rebellions were mostly because of 
the camphor, tea, mining exploitations, communication and transportation constructions, the 
expansion of guard lines, inappropriate mountain indigenes’ management, etc. These together 
resulted in restrictions and the contraction of indigenes’ living and hunting areas, which created 
more tension between the hostile neighbouring tribes. Mori Ushinosuke, the Japanese 
anthropologist once experienced the hostilities between the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe 力里社
of the Paiwan group and the Bongari tribe 望嘉社 of the Paiwan group during his research. He 
noted that after a mountain indigenous man from the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe was beheaded 
by the Bongari tribe on his way to deliver post,  
both tribes are from the same group, but they were long at feud with 
each other over the hunting and fishing territories for decades. It is very 
common between tribes in the areas so they hunt each tribes’ heads. 
Due to this incident, the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe have been preparing 
for revenge. Everyone in the village carried the same hatred and noticed 
every movement of the Bongari tribe.31  
 
 In 1911, the Rukai indigenes of the Raibuan tribe 泰埔安社 or 大武安社 shot the Bunun 
indigenes of Laipunuk tribe 內本鹿社 in their sleep when they stayed together in their hunting 
hut after both tribes agreed on sharing the hunting territories. This was ordered by another 
Budain tribe 霧台社 from the Rukai group. 32  Incidents such as these show the prolonged 
hostilities and tensions between tribes when trespassing or hunting. Firearms were generally 
used by the indigenes in their hunting and headhunting expeditions and often occurred in open 
fields. For instance, in May 1898, 50 Truku indigenes hid near the Cikasuan tribe 七腳川社, shot 
dead two indigenes and took their heads for revenge.33 Later in November around 10 Truku 
                                                             
31 Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳：森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations 
of Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], 201–2. 
32 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 2:206. 
33 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., 3.'明治 31 年 6 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告' (Reports on the 
Indigenes affairs from Taidong County, June 1898), (V04574\A12) in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin 
Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of 
Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 1998), 307. 
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indigenes were engaged in a gun fight with the Amis indigenes from the Cikasuan tribe and the 
Amis indigenes of Fata’an tribe 馬太鞍社 were fired at 4 times by the Truku indigenes of the 
Tkdaya sub-group 木瓜蕃 and lost 1 man when logging.34 Cases of indigenes being attacked by 
the other indigenes while working in the farm or fishing were regularly found in the Japanese’ 
official reports. For instance, in December 1898 in the Taiwan Sotofuku documents on eastern 
Taiwan affairs, around 20 Tafalong indigenes 太巴塱蕃 of the Amis group encountered several 
firearms assaults, which were believed as carried out by the Truku indigenes of the Tkdaya sub-
group when fishing. 35 In 1899, 32 indigenes from the Lanas na Kabalaen 加禮宛社 of the 
Kebalan group were shot and raided by 10 Truku indigenes and then had to fight back with 
firearms when working in their lands;36 a mountain indigene from the Amis group were shot 
dead and his head was taken while ploughing,37 3 Amis indigenes were attacked by 7 indigenes 
of the Tkdaya tribe firing from the thatch,38 and etc. These incidents are frequently reported 
annually in different parts of the outlying mountain indigenes’ territories.  
Mountain Indigenes’ attacks were usually called Fanhai 蕃害, which means damages 
caused by the indigenes, despite the fact that the encroachments the colonists instigated were 
more truly the ones causing damages in mountain indigenous areas. The mountain indigenes’ 
headhunting custom continued to be the major issue concerning camphor production, as the 
British Consul E.F. Crowe reported in 1906,  
There was a considerable shortage in the production of camphor last 
year, due to a certain extent to the fact that the more easily accessible 
trees have been nearly all cut down, while the head-hunting savages are 
still powerful enough to prevent camphor workers from advancing very 
far into the forests. Some camphor districts also shut down because the 
prices paid by the Monopoly Bureau did not cover expenses.39  
 
                                                             
34‘明治 31 年 12 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  from Taidong 
County, December 1898), (V04596\A18) in Ibid., 316.  
35 ‘明治 32 年 1 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes Affairs from Taidong 
County, January 1899), (V04600\A10) in Ibid., 340. 
36‘明治 32 年 3 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  from Taidong 
County, March 1899), (V04600\A12) in Ibid., 345–46. 
37‘明治 32 年 6 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  from Taidong 
County, June 1899), (V04600\A15) in Ibid., 353.  
38‘明治 32 年 7 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  from Taidong 
County, July 1899), (V04600\A16) in Ibid., 355. 
39 TEPR 6/205-224, No. 3646 Annual Series. Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Japan. Report for the Year 1905 on 
the Trade of North Formosa, Acting Consul E.F. Crowe. 10/May/1906, 211 
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For example, camphor and tea workers were attacked by indigenes at various sites: in May 1897, 
a camphor still was raided by the Atayal indigenes of Shiyakaro 石加祿社 and 4 camphor 
workers’ heads were taken and one was injured by gunshot:40 in October 1897, a tea worker 
from Shigu village 十股庄 (Xinzhu County) was fired at and his head was taken by the indigenes. 
Wood loggers in Neiwuanchuan 內灣川上游 were killed by mountain indigenes, Japanese 
military policemen and Chinese in Shangpingzhuang nanwei 上坪庄南尾 were attacked by 
mountain indigenes;41 in December 1897, some were injured with gunshots, but most were 
shot dead and lost their heads;42 in 1898, camphor workers near Yangtianhu 仰天湖 (Miaoli 
County) were attacked by the Saysiyat indigenes and one of them was beheaded with 6 bullet 
wounds on his arm and back.43 Particularly, the Nanzhuang Incident (南庄事件) broke out in 
1902 because camphor agents delayed and refused to pay rent or shangongyin 山工銀 to the 
mountain indigenes in Nanzhuang for exploiting and making camphor in their districts. A series 
of acute uprisings led by the chief of Pangasan tribe 南獅里興社 of the Saysiyat group – basi’ a 
bawnay or Ri Agui 日阿拐 with other Saysiyat tribes and Atayal tribes raided Japanese 
policemen and hundreds of guards, destroyed camphor stills, guard stations and cables, and 
besieged the Nanzhuan branch of Xinzhu Province. Several Japanese infantry companies, an 
artillery platoon, military troops, police forces and Chinese and plains indigenes guards were 
sent for pacification.44   
Guards at the guard lines or at the camphor stills also often became their targets and 
with the expansion of guard lines the situations sometimes became way out of control. For 
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of Indigenes’ Management), 1977, 1:144–145; Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao 
Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in 
Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1407–1428; Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism 
and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’, 231–233; Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan 
Yuanzhumin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 ( The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy 
Formulation), 41–51. 
225 
 
example, more than 50 mountain indigenes raided the police station at Xiaonanze 小南澤 and 
10 guards were struck by bullets in June 1903. 45 In 1907, the Atayal indigenes in Dakekan district 
attacked guards following an expansion of guard lines in Xishuikeng 洗水坑 (Taian township, 
Miaoli County) and Chatianshan 插 天 山 (Taoyuan County), which was also called the 
Zhengtoushan Incident 枕頭山之役. Over 2,000 men, including soldiers and guards were 
deployed to reinforce, and more than 200 men died in this incident, which really is a misnomer 
as it lasted for 107 days.46 In 1908, 19 indigenous guards of the Sikasoan tribe from the Amis 
group escaped from Japanese authorities due to bad labour conditions and unpaid wages, and 
caused the death of a Japanese policeman, which triggered another Japanese military 
pacification. The Sikasoan tribe gathered the Patulan tribe 巴托蘭社 and the Truku indigenes 
from the Tgdaya group to attack guard lines, police stations and to destroy telecommunications. 
As a result, most of the male mountain indigenes from the Sikasoan tribe were killed and the 
survivors were forced to relocate their entire tribe although their land and firearms were 
officially confiscated.47 In 1912, the mountain indigenes of Atayal groups attacked the guard 
lines near Lidongshan 李崠山 (Qianshi township, Xinzhu County) with their firearms, and the 
Japanese artillery such as field guns, mountain guns, Gatling machine guns, etc were pushed 
over the cliffs, and ammunition was robbed from the guards and the storage.48  
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48 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:303–5. 
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Figure 6:1 Two guards carried firearms to protect camphor workers 
 
Source: Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, The National Geographic 
Magazine, March 1920, 266. 
Such occurrences of mountain indigenes raiding the Japanese policemen, Chinese and 
plains indigenous guards and civilians with their firearms took place frequently. Among these 
incidents, as already sketched there are some drastic ones. In the Xincheng Incident 新城事件 
in 1897, thirteen Japanese soldiers were killed by the Truku indigenes for showing their 
disrespect of the mountain indigenous customs. A garrison in Hualian port and a warship based 
in Penghu were sent to Xincheng and gathered 600 Amis indigenes’ assistance, but even with 
such large-scale help they struggled to pacify the Truku indigenes and retreated in May 1897. 
Ever since, the mountain indigenes of the area have called the Japanese “Murata” in general, 
meaning to emphasise the weakness of the Japanese soldiers, as Murata was the name of the 
Japanese-invented rifles that the troops used.49 Again, the Beipu incident in 1907 began when 
a Hakka camphor worker Cai Qinglin 蔡清琳, ringleader in charge of the guard He Mairon 何麥
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榮 and the Saysiyat chief of Say kilapa 大隘社 - taro’ a ’oemaw 趙明政 formed alliances and 
assembled more than 100 people to assail Japanese police stations, where they obtained their 
ammunitions supply and in doing so killed 55 Japanese policemen, administrators and 
civilians.50 In the Dakekan Incident 大嵙崁事件 in 1910 Atayal indigenous tribes from the 
Dakekan group noticed signs of invasion from the Japanese in constructing roads and attacked 
the police stations. Eventually, nearly 3, 000 men were sent to quell the mountain indigenes, 
bombarding them with advanced armaments like mountain guns, firing guns, mortars and 
repeating firearms .51 Not long after, 300 Amis indigenes carried their firearms, spears, bow and 
arrows and prepared to raid Chenguanao branch in July 1911, which is thus called the 
Chenguanao Incident 成廣澳事件.52 In addition, several significant incidents were originated 
by Truku indigenes in firing and killing camphor workers from 1895, and although several 
military expeditions were sent for pacification, mostly these failed. In 1914, more than 6,000 
men, various types of firearms, machine guns, warship and aircraft were deployed to repress 
2,000 Truku indigenes, which is commonly known as the Truku Incident 太魯閣事件.53 It seems 
clear that the scale, quality and intensity of conflict had altered measurably after 1895. 
 
3. Firearms in Taiwan under the Japanese 
 
The armament of Japan was certainly at the advanced level after Japan began to 
modernise her military forces with the assistance of France, Britain and Germany in the Meiji 
Restoration 1868-1912.54 Within the eastern context, the victories from the Sino-Japanese War 
                                                             
50 Ibid., 1:480; Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗
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1895 and the Russo-Japanese War 1904 had corroborated the success of Japan in adapting 
Western military technologies. In this section, firstly I would like to discuss the firearms and 
other armaments the Japanese policemen and military used in attempting to pacify the 
mountain indigenes’ revolts in the mountain regions and the firearms the Chinese guards, 
camphor workers and civilians carried for defending themselves when working in or living near 
the mountain indigenous borders. However, I will not discuss the firearms that Chinese use in 
revolting against Japan in Taiwan, but only briefly on the Chinese’ activities near or in the 
mountain areas. This is because the Chinese civilians were generally forbidden to enter the 
mountain areas, except camphor, tea, mining and other industries’ workers and guards in 
mountains. Also most of the rebellions originated by the Chinese had less involvement of 
indigenous groups, except perhaps in the Beipu Incident, and sometimes the mountain 
indigenes actually assisted Japanese police to catch the Chinese outlaws. 55  Second, I will 
present some examples of mountain indigenes possessing firearms and the numbers and the 
types of firearms carried by the mountain indigenes based on the Japanese official and police 
reports in the period of 1896 – 1914. Finally, I will also discuss the access and the possible access 
to firearms for the mountain indigenes in these later years.  
 
3.1. Weapons in the Japanese and the Chinese’ Hands 
 
The majority of Japanese troops were furnished with modern armaments and 
instruments by the time Japan took over Taiwan. According to Edward Drea, Enfield rifles 
became the standardized armament furnished by the regular infantry in Japan by 1874, the old 
Snider rifles were used by the conscripts and some French bronze cannon and several Krupp 
steel guns were proved to be effective in the Satsuma Rebellion, 1877. Japan not only 
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commenced copying and modifying foreign weapons largely to Japanese requirements in order 
to gain independence from importing weapons from the West, but also required their engineers 
to improve roads and bridges for developing the national transportation network in Japan.56 A 
lot of Japanese types of modern armaments were produced under this circumstance. The wars 
that Japan encountered with China in 1895 and Russia in 1904-5 and the numerous resistances 
in her colony Taiwan, became the experimental fields for Japan in testing newly developed 
military technologies and for justifying the cost of the Meiji industrialization program. 
Murata rifles seemed to be the small arms the Japanese soldiers generally carried.57 In 
the report of road exploration in the mountain indigenes’ regions in Nanao (南澳, Yilan County), 
a Japanese second lieutenant fired his Murata rifle two or three times in front of a group of 
indigenes from the Laogou tribe 老狗社 of the Atayal group and an indigene man tried to test 
fire with the Murata rifle. 58 Other types of shotgun, repeating rifles and telescope or binoculars 
were shown to the chief of Gihen 宜亨社 (Wulai District, New Taipei City) by the Japanese 
officials who also told them they were the true efficient instrument from high civilization.  59 By 
1900, all the officials of Taiwan Sotoku, policemen, and guards were permitted to carry firearms 
when they were on duty 60  although staff from the Camphor Monopoly Bureau were only 
permitted after 1913.61 In 1902, a record of requesting 3 Murata rifles and 300 shots was made 
to the Japanese administrator in Chuchi police station (屈尺派出所, Xindian District, New Taipei 
City) for their self-defence due to the location of the police station being near the indigenes’ 
borders. 62 In the Japanese pacifications, the ammunition shop owner and camphor agency Kata
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Bureau, 1896), Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 台灣日日新報 in 04/10/1896, p 2 in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 
(Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes 
Management), 12. 
60 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:129. 
61 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 2:346. 
62 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '准予深坑廳轄內屈尺總務課員派出所配備村田式步槍及彈藥案 ' (Approval of 
General Affair Division staff to the police station to carry Formula Murata rifle and ammunition in Neiquchi, 
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賀田組 was given 200 firearms for defence.63 Larger armaments and landmines which were 
newly introduced to the Police Department, were also transferred to the mountains for defence, 
such as mortar and mountain guns. In the notification of managing artillery and ammunition in 
Riban shikô in 1907, mortars, mountains guns, field guns, Gatling guns and Nordenfeild guns64 
and various types of ammunition were required to be registered.65 Firearms, artilleries and 
hand grenades were used in pacifying the Atayal indigenes in the Zhengtoushan Incident of 
1907. 66 Mortars were used in pacifying the Sikasoan incident in 1908.67 This gives us a general 
notion of large armaments installed in the mountain regions. There was another record 
concerning the 10 mortars, size 20m and 1000 ammunitions which were borrowed from the 
army, 4 mortars and 500 ammunitions given and installed near the mountains of the Taizhong 
and Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureaux in April 1902. 68  In the official documents of Xinzhu 
Province ( Xinzhu County), Bofors guns 69  were transferred to Taizhong, Miaoli, Xinzhu and 
Shenkong Provinces in March 190370 and mountain guns were requested by the chief of Xizhu 
Province and installed at Shangping 上坪 (Zhudong township) and Neiwan 內灣 (Hengshan 
township ) in October 1903 because of several mountain indigenes’ headhunting expeditions.71 
Among these documents and reports, clear instructions in operating and maintaining the 
                                                             
Shenkeng County, May 1902), (V04708\A021) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: 
Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of 
Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management) , 390–391. 
63 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:637. 
64 In the original resource, it is recorded as ‘Nordenfeild guns’, but it should be Nordenfelt guns. Nordenfelt gun 
had a row of multiple barrels, which was invented by Heldge Palmcrantz in 1873 and named after a Swedish 
banker, Thorsten Nordenfelt, who supported his invention. It was adopted by the British Royal navy in the late 
1870s and several countries. It could fire up to 1,000 a minute. Willbanks, Machine Guns, 156. For the detailed 
information on Nordenfelt machine guns, also see Thorsten Nordenfelt, The Nordenfelt Machine Guns: Described 
in Detail and Compare with other Systems; also their employment for Naval and Military Purposes. (The Naval 
&Military Press Ltd, 1884) http://www.naval-military-press.com/pdf/1843428431.pdf   
65 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:438–39. 
66 Ibid., 1:460–62. 
67 Ibid., 1:657. 
68 Ibid., 1:137–38. 
69伯勞牡懷爾山砲 was the name of ‘mountain gun’ from the translated resource from Japanese language. It is 
prononsed as ‘Burodoeru’, which could be Bofors guns, but the types or models of Bofors guns were unclear 
from our source.  Nevertheless, Bofors guns were a series of artilleries manufactured by A.B Bofors, a Swedish 
arms company. For the history of the Bofors gun, see Terry Gander, The Bofors Gun (Pen and Sword, 2013). 
70 Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民
史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 
1317–1319. 
71 Ibid., 1321–26. 
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armament and the regulations on registering and reporting faulty armaments and ammunition 
registration were enclosed. In 1908, 4 sets of 47mm quick firing guns 72  with 4,000 
ammunitions/shells and 4 Maxim guns with 200, 000 ammunitions/shells were transferred to 
Keelung and installed on the patrol ship to bombard the Truku indigenes from the sea and to 
stop smuggling by junks.73 Landmines were also buried in Yilan, Shengkeng, Taoyuan and Miaoli 
near the mountain indigenes’ borders in 1904 after they were manufactured and improved in 
Taipei. 74  
The Chinese guards and camphor workers were all furnished with firearms from the 
Qing reign. They seemed to be allowed to carry their firearms when they continued to do their 
duties as guards and camphor workers in the early Japanese colonization. For example, 
according to the Japanese investigation in 1896, 441 firearms were held by 420 guards and 
camphor workers and another 30 guards from Guangtaicheng agency 廣泰成墾號, who were 
employed by another camphor agent Lin Zhengfan 林振芳.75 And there were more than 400 
camphor stills, where most stored firearms and ammunition, and hundreds of people claimed 
themselves to be camphor workers in the region of Shitoushan 獅頭山 (Miaoli County). 76 In 
other words a good variety of modern firearms were available around the frontier and near 
indigenous settlements.  
The types of firearms the guards carried on the guard lines and the Chinese civilians 
carried generally were varied, but overall they seem to have been at a modernised level. In the 
report on the affairs of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1896, it  was recorded that 
735 rifles were stored in guard stations, which included both older muzzle loading and new 
breech loading rifles and 184 guards were stationed in the areas of Dahu 大湖, Nanhu 南湖, 
Xinkaizhong 新開庄, Guizhulin 桂竹林, Bajiaolin 八角林, and Shitanzhuang 獅潭庄 in Xinzhu 
                                                             
72 四十七密米保式重速射砲 was the original translation from the Japanese material. It could be 47mm Quick 
firing guns or 47mm boat gun, which were similar to QF 3-pounder Hotchkiss and possibly adopted by the 
Japanese navy.  
73 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:508, 646. 
74 Ibid., 1:305. 
75 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治29 年6 月份苗栗之廳機密報告' (Confidential reports of Miaoli County, June 1896), 
(V00079\A012) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙
編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 44. 
76 ‘明治 29 年 7 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 
July 1896), (V00084\A011) in Ibid., 78. 
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Province.77 Their ammunition seemed to be sufficient and supplied by the state as in the survey 
on the guards of Beigang xi 北港溪 in Maoluo east fort 貓羅東堡 (Guoxing Township, Nantou 
County),  
each guard obtained a gun, for the guards who used rapid guns, they 
would be given 30 shots; for the guards using rifles, they would take 
302.4g of powder and 604.8g bullets. There were another 10,000 shots 
of bullets and ammunition that were stored in the guard stations for 
emergency. All the expended ammunitions on the defence of mountain 
indigenes would be provided on request.78  
 
Guards and camphor workers were supplied with firearms and ammunition, such as the guards 
in Taizhong County in 1898 and in 1899 the camphor workers at the Balisha Camphor Bureau.79 
Advanced firearms were also carried by the Chinese brave regiments or Zhuangding tuan 壯丁
團 such as in the organization of braves in Yilan, varied types and number of firearms were listed 
and given to the braves at 8 forts in Yilan Province for quelling any disturbances caused by the 
local bandits in January 1898.80 Based on my own calculation, there were in total 45 Mauser 
rifles, 22 muzzle loading rifles, 19 breech loading rifles, 14 Western firearms of other sorts, and 
in addition there were 1 Box cannon, 4 revolvers, 2 Martini rifles, 8 Gatling guns, 1 eight-shot 
rifle81, and 1,877 items of ammunition.82 Snider-Enfield rifles83were operated by the camphor 
workers in Sanjiaoyong 三角湧 (Sanxia District, New Taipei City) as a Japanese manufacturer 
representative Hirai Seizirou 平井勢次郎 applied for 150 Snider-Enfield rifles, 5,000 bullets and 
                                                             
77 ‘明治 29 年 8 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, August 
1896), (V00084\A002) in Ibid., 401. 
78 ‘屬於林紹堂等三名麾下隘勇隘丁之傭使方法內訓’ (Internal instructions on the commission and training of 
the military and civilian outpost to the subordinates of Lin Shao-Tang group), (V00094\A006) in Ibid., 1242. 
79 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:190. 
80 The establishment of Chinese braves was from 1898 in Hoko regulations which was adopted from the baojia 
system (保甲制度) from the Qing. The main function of local braves was to assist the Japanese policemen to 
stabilize public order and deliver other administrative works. By 1903, there were 1,518 Chinese brave regiments 
and 134,613 braves. To read more about the functions of the Chinese braves, see Cai Xiumei  蔡秀美, ‘Zhimin 
Tongzhiwang de Jianbing —paichusuo Yu Baojia 、zhuangdingtuan 殖民統治網的尖兵—派出所與保甲、壯丁
團 [The Pioneers in Colonist’s Web - Police Station, Baojia and Braves]’, Taiwanxue Tongxun 臺灣學通訊 Taiwan 
Studies Newsletter, 2015, 15–17. 
81 It was unclear what type of 8 shot rifle is in our source, however, Mauser 71/84, Lebel Model 1886, Murarta 
1889 are all 8 shots.   
82 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '宜蘭壯丁團編制' (The establishment of Yilan braves, January 1898), (V00294\A007) in 
Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical 
Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 443–445. 
83 Snider-Enfield is a British made breech-loading rifle. See Chapter 5, footnote no. 6 
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other rifle accessories after camphor stills were attacked by the mountain indigenes in his 
region. 84  
Chinese civilians generally carried firearms and other weapons in fear of encountering 
any unexpected mountain indigenes’ attacks as mentioned in the previous chapter on the late 
Qing. (see Chapter 4 pp. 143-147 and Chapter 5 pp. 194-199) Chinese civilians who carried 
firearms near the mountain areas were reported in the official documents, as in 1897 when a 
Japanese official visited a village near the camphor district in Nanzhuang南庄 and reported on 
how the Chinese carried firearms for defending themselves from the mountain indigenes.  85 In 
the same year, it was reported that Chinese farmers in Dakekan 大嵙崁 areas carried firearms 
and fired them from time to time using quilts to protect themselves when going to work in their 
lands every morning. 86Although, in these reports there is no specification of the types of 
firearms, the level of firearms seems the same as in the mixed traditional and modernised level 
of Chapter 5. Nevertheless, as soon as Taiwan Sotokufu obtained its dominance in Taiwan, the 
viceroy ordered a prohibition on the Chinese entering the mountains and official confiscation 
of the firearms and ammunition from the Chinese.87 
 
3.2. Firearms in Mountain Indigenes’ Hands  
 
Firearms appeared to be the normal, customary and habitual armaments that the 
mountain indigenes carried and possessed in accordance with the official records on the 
mountain indigenous regions of Taipei, Tauyuan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Yilan and Dongtaiwan diqu 
(which includes Hualian, Taidong and Pingdong County).88 Apart from the use of firearms by 
                                                             
84 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '核准平井勢次郎申請之貸與及攜帶槍械彈藥以防蕃案 ' (Approval of Hirai Seijiro’s 
application for borrowing and carrying guns and ammunition in defence of the indigenes, June 1907), 
(V05031\001) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃
園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 396–401.  
85 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '台北縣 知事提報巡視新竹支廳之所見概要' (The Governor of Taipei-ken’s summery 
and report on the inspection of Xinzhu Branch, April 1897), (V04518\A009) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin 
Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of 
Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1159.  
86 ‘有關新竹縣轄內警察分署派出所新設案永松瑞枝等兩名之覆命書’ (Confirmation letter on two new 
recruitments including Nagamatsu Mizue in the police station in Xinzhu-ken),  (V04529\A006)  Ibid., 1296.  
87 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:7. 
88 Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期
臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas 
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mountain indigenes in conflicts between tribes, they were also important in attacks upon 
Chinese camphor workers and in rebellions against the Japanese governance (see Section 2, 
pp.219-227). Several scenes of mountain indigenes carrying and operating firearms in battles 
were often noted by the Japanese officials. For instance, the male and female Atayal indigenes 
of the Mosu tribe 墨宿社 and Siyanlaowashe tribe 四煙老瓦舍 from the Mnibu group 溪頭群 
(Yilan County) carried their Chinese matchlocks, knives and spears when the Japanese officials 
and polices met them and offered propitiation in November 1895.89 The Japanese officials were 
also advised not to wear hats or they would be mistaken as Chinese and shot to death.90 370 
Amis indigenes who participated in fighting against the remaining Chinese troops in Leigonghuo 
雷公火 (Guanshan Taidong County) in 1896, carried their firearms, swords and exchanged 
greeting with Japanese troops.91 The Japanese administrator had also encountered an intended 
attack in October 1896, that 15 or 16 Atayal indigenes were hidden behind the huge rocks and 
had laid their firearms, side by side, and were about to shoot at the Japanese administrators 
when visiting the Nanshi group 南勢群 (Miaoli County). 92 The submitted mountain indigenes 
from the Nanzhuang group 南庄 (Miaoli County) of the Saysiyat group were reported to carry 
firearms on their shoulder, carried a knife at their waist, held bullet and powder, which was 
similar with the mountain indigenes in 1896. 93 In 1897, some Japanese administrators also 
                                                             
in Japanese Colonization : Policies on Indigenes Management ); Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Yilandiqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and 
Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization); Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and 
Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization); Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Yilandiqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and 
Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization); Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and 
Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization). 
89 For some thoughts on female participation in headhunting cultures, see chapter 7, section 3.3  
90 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '宜蘭支廳會見蕃人報告' (The Yilan branch report of the meeting with the indigenes, 
29th November 1895), (V00035\A013) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜
蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese 
Colonization), 66.  
91 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '臺南知事轉陳相良支廳長所陳卑南隨軍情況報告' (The Governor of Tainan reply to 
the Hengchun branch director Sagara’s report on his trip with the troops in Beinan, June 1896), (V04505\A29) in 
Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 
(Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization) , 156. 
92 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 29 年 10 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, October 1896), (V00084\A004) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli 
Areas in Japanese Colonization), 428. 
93 ‘明治 29 年 12 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 
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reported witnessing a 15-strong party of an Atayal chief and his indigenous fellows from the 
Skaru group 石加祿群 who carried 5 short firearms and spears on a headhunting expedition in 
the evening94 and reported also on the case of a Atayal indigenes -Waishyutayai from the Klapay 
group- who fired firearms at Chinese and a firearm and daggers were found after some military 
police and Chinese chased after him.95 Further discussion of the occasions in which indigenes 
casually carried and possessed firearms will be analysed in analysing cultural context in Chapter 
7. 
 
3.2.1. Numbers of firearms among the Formosan Indigenes  
 
Calculating the number of firearms that indigenous people held is very ambitious and 
must lead to uncertain results, especially during the late Qing period because the Qing 
government was uninformed and unconcerned about the mountain indigenes’ populations and 
the states of affairs in the mountain areas, and of course vice-versa was the case for most of 
the time. However, the number of firearms has been reported on after various incidents of 
pacification of the mountain indigenes and confiscations of their firearms under the Japanese 
governance after 1895, and numerous exploration teams and expedition were sent into the 
mountain indigenous regions. In the report of the Taipei Governor or Chiji 知事 – Murakami 
Yosio 村上義雄 in February 1899 on the indigenous affairs in Jingwei 景尾 and Sanjiaoyong 三
角湧 (Jingwei and Sanxia Districts, in New Taipei City) where the Atayal groups lived, the 
military firearms were commonly used by the Shengfan 生番 or mountain indigenes and each 
family had at least 2 or 3 firearms, some up to 10 firearms.  96 Some astonishing findings were 
reported in the 1900s and uncovered the large number of firearms possessed by the mountain 
indigenes. In the report of Kanokogi Kogorou 鹿子木小五郎 on his inspection in Taidong 
Province, he listed the number of firearms, household and male populations (see Chart 6:1)  
                                                             
December 1896), (V000163\A036) in Ibid., 473. 
94 ‘明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau, October 1897), (V0063\A024) in Ibid., 154. 
95 ‘明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Ibid., 162. 
96 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 32 年 2 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至 事務及情況報告' 
(Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, February 1899), 
(V04594\A009) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃
園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 101. 
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Chart 6:1 The number of the indigenous households, population, male population and 
the possession of firearms in 1906 
Indigenous 
Groups  
Number 
of 
firearms 
Number of 
Household/
population  
Number of 
firearms 
owned by 
each 
household* 
Number of 
male 
indigenes  
Number of 
firearms 
owned per 
each male 
indigene*  
Tsarisian 傀儡
蕃, Rukai 
165 433/2,127 0.38 537 0.31 
Siw-ku-lan ’Amis 
秀姑巒阿眉蕃, 
Amis  
1,110 1,554/8,274 0.71 1,346 0.82 
Puyuma  1,055 1,273/6,675 0.83 1,256 0.84 
Manuan in 
Takbanuaz 
group 巒社群, 
Sibukun in 
Isbukun group 
郡社群, Bunun 
291 522/5,263 0.56 296 0.98 
Nan-Shih ’Amis 
南勢阿眉蕃, 
Amis   
1,363 1,298/5,361 1.05 1,716 0.80 
Haian group 海
岸阿眉蕃, Amis  
690 897/5,673 0.77 674 1.02 
Beinan group 卑
南阿眉蕃, Amis  
1,498 1,197/8,559 1.25 1,453 1.03 
Tkadaya group 
木瓜蕃, Truku   
213 125/425 1.70 144 1.48 
Truku group 太
魯閣蕃, Truku   
3,747 1,402/5,474 2.67 1,901 1.97 
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Tjavualji 太麻里
蕃, Paiwan  
2,270 1,930/8,166 1.18 1,108 2.05 
Total  
12,402 
10,850/57,4
24 
1.14 10,431 1.19 
Source: Kanokogi Kogorou 鹿子木小五郎, 臺東廳管內視察覆命書[Confirmation on the 
inspection of the Taitung Office], Taipei:Chengwen, 1895, 1-2 quoted from Chen Zongren 陳
宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang -Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru 、
liutong Yu Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 (The 
Aborigines with Modern Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of 
Gun in Aboriginal Society)’, Tai Da Lishi Xuebao 臺大歷史學報 (Historical Inquiry) 36 (2005): 
82. 
* The Number of firearms owned by each household and the number of firearms 
owned by each male indigenes were both calculated by Chen Tsung-Jen, Taiwanese historian 
This report, then, reveals that the mountain indigenous groups in eastern Taiwan obtained 
large amounts of firearms. Every household on average had 1 gun and each male indigene on 
average possessed 1 gun. The Truku indigenes from the Truku group and the Tjavualji indigenes 
from the Paiwan group owned the most firearms per capita. Another similar report in 1910 on 
the number of firearms of the Tauda sub-group of the Truku group also showed that indigenous 
households owned 1 gun on average and in this case we have detailed evidence of the type of 
armament. (see Chart 6:2) The fact that in several cases, especially in the last three groups of 
Chart 6:1, gun ownership per adult male was consideratebly over 1, suggest that either some 
male did use more than 1 gun of their own or that guns were also used, owned by others in the 
tribe – for instance young boys or even women. No direct evidence has been found on this 
possibility. 
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Chart 6:2 The number and types of firearms, households, population and male indigenes of 
the Tauda sub-group of the Truku group in 1910 
Tribe Names Busiyau 
ブシヤ
ウ 
Kababann 
カババン 
Kabarahu 
カバラフ 
Mukowaisi 
ムコワイ
シ 
Bugaaru 
ブガア
ル 
Total 
Fi
re
ar
m
s 
Mauser 
1898/ 5 
shots 
  1    
Mauser 
1871/single 
shot 
2 26 14 20 15 77 
Chinese 
matchlocks 
1 7 2 5 4 19 
Snider 2 5  8 7 22 
Murata 
hunting 
rifles 
 5    5 
Murata 
military 
rifles 
  1   1 
Total  5 43 18 33 26 125 
B
u
lle
ts
 &
Po
w
er
ed
 
Mauser 
1898/ 5 
shots 
  15   15 
Mauser 
1871/single 
shot 
43 549 273 410 294 1,569 
Chinese 
matchlocks 
 11 8 11 5 35 
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Snider 33 76  144 119 372 
Murata 
hunting 
rifles 
 97    97 
Murata 
military 
rifles 
  16  35 51 
Total  76 733 312 565 453 2,139 
Number of 
household/popul
ation  
8/42 35/207 28/139 34/194 18/130 
123/7
12 
Number of males  10 55 29 41 28 163 
Guns per male  0.5 0.78 0.62 0.8 0.92 0.77 
Source: Chen Jintian 陳金田, trans., Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民
行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], vol. 2 (Nantou: 
Taiwan Historica, 1977), 72, 76–77. 
Here, the data shows that at least every household had on average one firearm and 17.3 items 
of ammunitions among these 5 tribes from the Tauda sub-group of the Truku. 77% of male 
indigenes would have firearms with 13.1 items of ammunition. Also the highly modern Mauser 
single shot represented some 60% of the total and required approximately ¾ of the total 
ammunition possessed by the tribes. Amongst the Kababan of column 2, there were 0.47 
Mauser single shot weapons per adult male.  
 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
Chart 6:3 The number of firearms possessed by the mountain indigenes in 1908 
Indigenous Groups Number of firearms Population Ratio of gun/owner 
(%) 
Atayal 10,841 29,149 37 
Paiwan 5,901 21,224 28 
Tsou 612 2,291 27 
Puyuma 1,055 6,564 16 
Ami 4,652 29,380 16 
Bunun 2,407 15,794 15 
Rukai 1,791 1,3423 13 
Saysiyat 29 762  4 
Yami 0 1,667  0 
Total 27,288 120,254 23 
Source: Ibid., 2:7. 
Chart 6:3 shows the Atayal group owned firearms the most and the Saysiyat group owned the 
least. Large distribution of firearms seems to be in the north where most of the Atayal group 
live and where rebellions were likely to occur; in the south firearms were held largely by the 
Paiwan group who were in far less conflicts – this suggests the incident of conflict depended 
more on the commercial and territorial challenges that we have outlined earlier in the chapter. 
In accordance with Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas'ames’ list of indigenes resistance from 1896-1908, 
which ended in the same year as the figure above (although it did not include the number of 
firearms reportedly confiscated from the Truku and the Seediq groups)97, the Atayal revolted 
13 times, with which we can compare; the Truku and Seediq 4 times each; the Saysiyat 3 times; 
the Paiwan 2 times; the Bunun, the Tsou and the Rukai revolted only once. Now if we compare 
this with the 1908 ratio of gun/owner in Chart 6:3, the Atayal owned the most firearms and 
also resisted the most frequently. However, the Saysiyat owned the least firearms and resisted 
3 times, which was more than the Paiwan (2 times), who owned the second largest number per 
                                                             
97 Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas’ames 達英. 拿答佛.撒萬. 葛斯阿門, Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu Kangrishi Tuji 臺灣原住
民族抗日史圖輯 [Collection of Historical Photographs of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance against 
Japanese Occupation 1874-1933], 10–11. 
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capita of firearms among all the indigenes groups. The Paiwan as our example here were less 
challenged by the commercial force of camphor, tea, coal, etc than were the Atayal. It would 
appear in this period that gun ownership allowed successful rebellion, but the firearms 
ownership did not itself determine the amount of rebellions. 
Moreover, in Chen Tsung-Jen’s research and findings, the number of the male mountain 
indigenes was 30,129 and the number of firearms that the Taiwan Sotokufu collected and 
confiscated was 31, 579 in the much later year of 1928, which certainly indicates that if every 
male indigene is reported having had at least one gun, then the confiscation for the years 1910-
1914, during the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” (五年理蕃計畫) 98 was not 
effected very fully, throwing some doubts on the Japanese confiscation figure and thus on all 
of the officially-generated figures. Shizue Fuji also suggested that by the year of 1929, most of 
the mountain indigenes did not possess firearms and only 354 firearms were confiscated.99 
Nevertheless, there lies the central point that the number of firearms that were not seized by 
the Japanese police prior to 1828 and were clearly hidden by the mountain indigenes might be 
even larger than the number suggested here, as some mountain indigenous rebellions 
continued to break out to the 1930s. So very clearly the armaments impact of pacification and 
confiscation was very low indeed, at the end of the period the mountain indigenes still held an 
enormous number of firearms, many of these appear to have belonged to an advanced category 
for that period, (Mauser, Snider) and a disproportionate number were in the hands of these 
headhunting and hunting groups that were causing most trouble for the Japanese throughout 
the whole period.  
 
3.2.2. Types of Firearms 
 
The sorts of firearms in the mountain indigenes’ possession certainly rose to a modern 
or advanced level generally in comparison with the traditional and the mixed traditional and 
modern levels in the late Qing period shown in Chapters 4 and 5. Chinese matchlocks were less 
seen in the Japanese’ official reports. Of course in the first few years under Japanese 
                                                             
98 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang -Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru 、
liutong Yu Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 (The Aborigines with Modern 
Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society)’, 80–81. 
99 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of 
Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 97. 
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colonization cruder weaponry dominated, such that in 1897 the director of Balisha Pacification 
and Reclamation Bureau 叭哩沙撫墾署 reported the Atayal indigenes of Laoguo tribe tribe 
used matchlocks and coarse powders which he had never seen.  100 Of course, from what we 
have already seen, it is quite possible that this was either a false report or that tribal males 
succeeded in hiding their better modern weapons. The evidence above suggests that there was 
something of a military revolution in eastern Taiwan during the 1890s decade. A lot of Western 
and modern firearms were reported by the Japanese administrators, policemen and 
anthropologists. Various types of modern firearms were recorded in the Taiwan Sotokufu 
official document redaction, in the areas of Taipei, Taoyuan, Xinchu, Yilan, and eastern Taiwan 
generally. Mauser firearms that were possessed by the mountain indigenes, particularly in the 
Truku groups, were noted the most amongst these records, as we see clearly in Chart 6:3 and 
6:4. Comparing these early figures from the table, we can see that modernity and frequency of 
gun showed a tendency – mountain indigenes modernised in the 1890s, remained modernised 
into the 1920s, and Japanese policy had not much impact on that trend.  
In summary, expensive and bloody efforts by the Japanese ended with modern weaponry 
in the hands of mountain indigenous groups who were the mostly likely to oppose Japanese 
movement into the east, especially in the camphor and other commercially valuable regions.  
Moreover, according to our sources, the types of firearms were : Chinese matchlocks, repeating 
rifles, Mauser single shot, Mauser repeating 5 shots, Rolling block single shot, Spencer rifle, 
Mauser 1871 breech loading rifles, Enfield, Snider rifles, Murata rifles, Remington, and 
Winchester repeating rifles.101 Although the number and the exact model of these firearms in 
the mountain indigenes’ hands remain uncertain, the majority of these modern-to-advanced 
firearms were those also held by the Qing troops as I have shown in Chapter 5 and the Japanese 
military police in this Chapter Section 3. In the report of the director of the Dahu Pacification 
and Reclamation Bureau 大湖撫墾署, “the indigenes possessed varied types of firearms, there 
were old Chinese matchlocks to new models of repeating rifles, which were less than 4 models.”  
102 In 1897, Mauser single shot, Mauser repeating 5 shots and Rolling Block single shot, which 
                                                             
100 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '叭哩沙署長提出南澳蕃地道路探險書' (The Nan-Ao Expedition plan proposed by the 
Commissioner of Balisha, February 1897), (V04533\009) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization), 339–340.  
101 The detail of each fire arms listed here were mostly in footnotes in chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
102 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
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was manufactured just from 1862, were possessed by the Atayal indigenes of the Yaauewaarii 
tribe 馬裡叭社  and branded with Wufujian “五撫檢 ”, which meant “examined by the 
Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 五指山撫墾署  (Xinzhu County)” by the 
director of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in November.103 In 1898, the Dahu 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau reported, “most of the male indigenes [the Atayals from 
the Dahu group] must carry firearms, there are three types of firearms: Mauser, Spencer rifle 
and old typed Matchlocks”104 and the Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 大嵙崁撫
墾署(Taoyuan County) also reported that the Mauser repeating 5 shots and other military 
firearms from the late Qing period were mostly possessed by the indigenes in these regions 
under the Dakekan Fukenshu’s control (possibly from the Atayal group). 105 There were also 
cases of the Atayal’s deputy chief of Dadahan tribe 打打罕社 from the Mnibu group requesting 
to exchange his silver coins, which were given by the Japanese, for the bullets for their 
Mausers106 and other Atayal indigenes from the Baiku tribe 擺骨社 (バイクッ), also from the 
Mnibu group sending their broken Mausers to the Tiansongbei Chuzhang branch 天送埤出張
會所 (Yilan County) for repair.107 Such instances show how the Atayal indigenes owned modern 
firearms almost mundanely in some regions even in the 1890s. In 1900, Wuzhishan Pacification 
and Reclamation Bureau reported that most of the Mauser single shot were found in the 
indigenous tribes of the Atayal groups and only 2 or 3 Mauser repeating 5 shots in each tribe 
108 and the Atayal indigenes in Yiland County were reported to carry old model repeating rifles 
                                                             
Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli 
Areas in Japanese Colonization), 421.   
103 ‘明治 30 年 11 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau, November 1897), (V00272\A015) in Ibid., 215–16.   
104 ‘明治 30 年新竹縣轄各撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in Hsinchu-
ken jurisdiction, 1897), (V00272\A001)in Ibid., 681. 
105 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年大嵙崁撫墾署事務成績報告' (Reports of Dakekan Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, 1897), (V00272\A011) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: 
Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of 
Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management) , 34. 
106 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年 11 月份叭哩沙撫墾署事務報告' (Reports of Balisha Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, November 1897), (V00163\A013) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization), 125. 
107明治 30 年 11 月份叭哩沙撫墾署事務報告' (Reports of Balisha bureau of Reclamation, November 1897), 
(V00163\A013) in Ibid., 126. 
108 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '五指山撫墾署轄內中央分水嶺附近發現新蕃社報告' (Report on the discovery of 
new indigenous tribes near the drainage divide in the Central Mountain Range in the jurisdiction of Wuzhishan 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, July 1900), (V04574\A016) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao 
Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in 
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(5 shots), Mauser 1871 breech loading rifles, which was the rifle that the Anhui Army 
furnished,109 and so on, and the number of firearms was growing.110 
 In Yilan County, one of the Atayal indigenes from the Slamao tribe carried a Mauser 
gun, engraved with the number 109 after examination by the Japanese administrator.111 The 
same year, the governor of Taidong reported that the Enfield and Mauser were possessed by 
the submitted Truku indigenes that were in shortage of bullets and powder.112 After the Beipu 
incident 北埔事件 1907, the Snider rifles, the Murata rifles and its bullets owned by the 
Saysiyat indigenes from the Daai group 大隘社  (Wufeng township, Xinchu County) were 
confiscated by the Japanese and taken in exchange for money.113 The Provincial Director of 
Shengkeng and the chief commissioner of police in 1909 made an agreement that only the 
bullets for Murata and Mauser rifles would be given to the mountain indigenes because of their 
diversity of firearms. 114  Another documentation that showed the types of firearms and 
ammunition that indigenous tribes possessed was the survey framed by the Commissioner of 
Civil Administration (Minzheng Zhangguan 民政長官) in 1909. It listed the Mauser, Murata, 
Remington, and Chinese matchlock and requested to submit such a survey in June and 
December of every year.115 This way the Taiwan Sotokufu at least nominally had complete 
technical understanding and knowledge of indigenes’ capacities in armaments, but that seems 
to have been some way from actually doing much about such ownership. Winchester repeating, 
Mauser single shot, Remington rolling block and Murata single shot rifles were found in the 
exploration into Truku tribe territory in 1911.116 Remodelled Murata rifles were also given to 
                                                             
Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1218. 
109 See Chapter 5, footnote no. 66&72 
110Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 33 年 1 月份宜蘭廳有關蕃人蕃地支事務及情況報告' (Reports on the 
Indigenes affairs from Yilan County, January 1900), (V04625\A015) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao 
Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in 
Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 253.  
111 ‘明治 33 年 2 月份宜蘭廳有關蕃人蕃地支事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  from Yilan 
County, February 1900), (V04625\A016) in Ibid., 256. 
112 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '臺東廳長太魯閣蕃巡視之始末及蕃況報告' (The Director of the Taidong County’s 
detailed report on the inspection of Truku indigenes and its current status, received on 25th April 1900), 
(V04625\A25) in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史
料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization) , 390. 
113 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:480–81. 
114 Ibid., 1:580. 
115 Ibid., 1:605–6. 
116 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
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the indigenes in Taipei, Xinzhu, Taizhong and Taidong provinces in 1911, but at least nominally 
the rifles would be retracted within a week and restricted in terms of the number of firearms 
and ammunition when borrowing them from the Japanese officials.117   
In summary, the mountain indigenes generally held modern-to-advanced firearms in the 
early colonization of Japan in comparison with the late Qing reign, and by the end of our period 
around the 1920s they owned more firearms, which were modern and increasingly in the hands 
of those who would use them against the Japanese. Matchlocks were less seen, only reported 
in the first few years under Japan’s governance. Mauser rifles seemed to be the main 
armaments that mountain indigenes used. Murata rifles which were manufactured and given 
by Japan also appeared quite commonly in the reports. Overall, firearms that were possessed 
by the indigenes or given to the mountain indigenes were generally modern and advanced 
types which gave the increased capacity in fighting against the Japanese military, but getting 
firearms may well have become extremely difficult for the mountain indigenes and increasingly 
monitored by the Japanese police. The data for the 1920s illustrates that mountain indigenous 
people were determined and successful in resisting Japanese colonisation on all fronts.  
3.3. Accessing of Firearms among mountain indigenes  
 
Taiwan Sotokufu took great notice over controlling and managing the mountain 
indigenes for the purpose of exploiting mountain resources, but Japanese governance also 
understood the obsession of indigenes coveting firearms from their early colonization. Here I 
would like to discuss the problematic avenues of access to firearms and ammunition open to 
the mountain indigenes in the early Japanese governance. As early as the Japanese ruling in 
1896, Taiwan Sotokufu was aware of the mountain indigenes using firearms in hunting, was 
concerned for the public order and urged to regulate, but Japanese also understood that 
immediate control over firearms would cause some mistrust and suspicion amongst the 
indigenes and take away their ways of hunting, and possibly were pragmatic enough to 
understand that to pursue an impossible target was not good colonialism. Every director of the 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau was requested to report on the restriction of the firearms 
                                                             
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 2:228. 
117 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:251–52. 
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and ammunitions118 and encouraged the mountain indigenes to use firearms for the purpose 
of hunting instead of killing people.119 One of the subject matters for every Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau from 1898 was to attempt a milder regime of gun usage in indigenous 
areas.120   
 
3.3.1.  Provision from the Taiwan Sotokufu  
 
How did the mountain indigenes keep open the avenues of access to firearms and 
ammunition under the increased Japanese surveillance? Especially as we have stated, the 
Taiwan Sotokufu enacted several restrictions on firearms. In fact, the regulations on firearms 
were imprecise in the first few years of Japanese colonization because Taiwan Sotokufu 
considered hunting was one of the major economic activities of indigenes’ which they could not 
prohibit entirely.121 In the official report of the Taidong Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in 
October 1897, it stated, “Although there was no enactment and methods yet on the firearms 
and ammunitions supply, the mountain indigenes in the mountain depend on their hunting 
activities. Thus ammunition should be supplied to some extent in order to save them from 
predicaments." 122 Therefore, firearms and ammunition were supplied by the Japanese officials. 
As an official report stated in 1897: 123 
1. Authentication from the directors of Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureaus should be provided by the businessmen when supplying 
firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes. 
2. Authentication from the directors of Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureaus should be provided by the non-businessmen when supplying 
firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes. Within limits a 
                                                             
118 Ibid., 1:15. 
119 Ibid., 1:21. 
120 Ibid., 1:84–85. 
121 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 2:37. 
122 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年 9 月份台東撫墾署事務報告' (Reports of Taidong Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, September 1897), (V00164\A35) in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 
Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter 
Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 204. 
123 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:37–38. 
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supply of firearms, ammunition 11.25 kg and 500 detonators would be 
permitted by the police or military police. If the quantity is more than 
the limited amount, it should be permitted only by the local province.  
3. Firearms and ammunitions should be handed over to the indigenes 
at Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus and the official administrator 
should keep a record.  
4. The directors of the Pacification Reclamation Bureaus should report 
the firearms, types of ammunition and the quantity that are handed 
over to the mountain indigenes to the Police Department or Military 
Police Department monthly.  
Nevertheless, the director of Puli Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 埔里撫墾署 suggested 
that these regulations only applied to the indigenes in the southern regions, below Puli province 
who were tame and reasonable, unlike the ferocious mountain indigenes in the north, and to 
the chiefs who had visited the Japanese as tourists.124 Places for the mountain indigenes to 
exchange firearms, ammunitions, salt, clothes etc. were limited, as the Records of Indigenes’ 
Management recorded in 1898: Doliu 斗六, Jiayi, Fanshuliaoz 蕃薯寮, Ahou 阿緱, Hengchuan 
and some restricted places in Taizhong, Nantou and Taidong Provinces could exchange freely; 
Shengkong, Xinzhu, Miaoli Provinces were run by the appointed business; Yiland and Taoyuan 
were run through the officials. However, the Sanjiaoyong, Dakekan, Xiancaipeng, Nanzhuan and 
Dahu Provinces were entirely forbidden to exchange any goods.125 The Wuzhishan 五指山, 
Dahu and Nanzhuan branches began to examine and branded the mountain indigenes’ firearms 
when they visited the bureaus and strictly banned any gun importation. 126Even some Truku 
indigenes, who were famously rebellious and recently submitted themselves to Japan, could 
buy 10 shots of bullets, 75g ammunition (2 兩), 10 detonators and less than 20 inflammation 
devices from the appointed Japanese businessman Kata in 1898. But this was under a condition 
of setting up schools for tribes as a policy of conciliation.127 However, these regulations did not 
                                                             
124 Ibid., 1:38. 
125 Ibid., 1:157–58. 
126 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年 8 月份新竹縣轄內各撫墾署 (五指山, 大湖, 南庄) 事務成績報告' 
(Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus of Wuzhishan, Dahu, and Nanzhuang in Hsinchu-ken 
jurisdiction, August 1897), (V00163\A022) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據
時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in 
Japanese Colonization), 106–107. 
127 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
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apply to every tribe, as some mountain indigenous tribes were refused any ammunition supply 
from the Japanese officials. For example, some mountain indigenes from Wuzhishan brought 
some rattans, bamboos, woods to exchange for pots, clothes, firearms and ammunitions in 
1896, but they were refused. 128  In 1897, 28 Atayal indigenes of the Mianduyou 面都油, 
including the chief, came to Shangpingzhuang 上坪庄 branch of the Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau and requested firearms and ammunition, but they were also rejected.129 
Supplying firearms to the mountain indigenes in the name of considering their dependence on 
the gun for hunting activities was seemingly to please and satisfy the needs of mountain 
indigenes for the purposes of opening Japanese accesses to the mountain regions – exploration, 
building roads, railway and telegraph cables, reducing the tensions between mountain 
indigenous tribes and the Taiwan Sotokufu, and ultimately exploiting mountain resources.  
From 1905, several changes were made in the regulations of supplying firearms, which 
were stricter and more demanding on any the mountain indigenes who wished to obtain 
firearms and ammunition than in the previous years. The chief commissioner of police was also 
aware of the risk of provoking uprisings if the firearms and ammunitions provision suddenly 
stopped, so now only particular indigenous groups would be given concessions for supplying 
firearms. According to the firearms and ammunitions provision regulations in Taidong Province, 
as it outlines: the Puyuma group, the Amis groups and the Swa Tarumake of Rukai groups 東魯
凱群 were permitted to be supplied with firearms, ammunition and replace useable firearms 
because they were being used against other indigenous groups; the Paiwan group should be 
prohibited a supply of firearms, but only ammunition allowed, and with restrictions such as 
withholding ammunition when mountain indigenous tribes did not obey; the Truku group 
would be given limited numbers of modern models of firearms, confined to the amount of 
ammunition but not given ammunition for older models so the old ones would be abandoned 
by the mountain indigenes naturally; low-graded ammunition, leads and detonators were be 
supplied, but not firearms, unless authentication was applied in advance; firearms and 
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ammunition were all branded and the supply of new ammunition based on the number of the 
cartridges or case shells.130 The regulations of firearm and ammunition supply for the mountain 
indigenous groups in the south, which included the Nantou, Doliu, Jiaoyi, Fanshuliao, Ahou and 
Hengchuan provinces, were different, as it outlines: firearms holders were permitted to 
continue to use their firearms, but were limited in the provision of ammunitions and detonators; 
everyone was permitted to get 1.5kg powder (40 兩) and less than 20 shots detonators but the 
amount was flexible with proper reasons; ammunition and detonators should be traded in cash 
and provided by the police stations who would keep the records; those showing disobedience, 
selling ammunition and detonators without permission and convicts were allowed to receive 
only ammunition supply. Meanwhile the Japanese officials encouraged and gave rewards to 
the indigenous tribes working in tillage.131 But these were not put into practice for the Tsou 
indigenes of Kanakanavu 簡仔霧社 or 卡那卡那富族 (Dapu Township, Jiayi County) and the 
plains indigenes from the Yujing basin (Tainan city) who did not have headhunting customs 
anymore, who enquired about getting powder, but the Taiwan Sotokufu did not permit it.132 
The submitted mountain indigenous tribe could also obtain the firearms and ammunition 
supply from the Japanese official when they reported threats from other tribes. This can be 
seen in a case in 1913: the director of Taoyuan province gave firearms and ammunition to 100 
Atayal indigenes of Kauiran tribe 卡宇伊蘭, who submitted to Japan when the Malikowang 
group 馬利克灣群 of the Atayal group threatened to start a war (this incident began with 
Atayal men from the Kweijings tribe 奎輝社 who live in the Kauiran tribe who ambushed and 
killed some Chinese civilians in the Malikowang group’s territory). 133  Again, the Taiwan 
Sotofuku enacted the regulations of supplying and controlling firearms and ammunitions to the 
mountain indigenes in the south with the intentions of controlling the indigenes’ hunting 
customs gradually and eventually forcing the indigenes to give up their old customs by not 
giving them the firearms, gunpowder for the old models of firearms, lower-graded ammunition, 
or lead and detonators. Also the Japanese officials ordered the mountain indigenes to trade 
firearms ammunitions and detonators for cash, which mostly came from hunting animals – 
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thereby the mountain indigenes could not earn any or have enough cash from hunting prey for 
buying ammunition. Most importantly, they could easily manipulate their strategies of 
supplying firearms to certain mountain indigenous groups and setting certain locations, which 
might actually stimulate more original hostilities and fights between tribes.  
In Eastern Taiwan, the mountain indigenes were required to obtain a proof or license for 
buying firearms or transferring the ownership of firearms from the Japanese officials. To obtain 
this license, they had to meet the requirements which included providing their names, address, 
ages and background check, and were limited in the amount of firearms and ammunition they 
could purchase. 134 According to the records of the number of gun and ammunitions licenses 
for firearms and ammunitions from September 1899 to September 1900 in Taiwan Sotokufu 
official document redaction, licenses were given to 2,734 indigenes, that would have been the 
Paiwan, Rukai, Puyuma, Amis, Kavalan, Sakizayas groups in eastern Taiwan, and 106 Murata 
hunting rifles, 13,541.25g of ammunitions and 2,935 detonators, which included the old models 
in total, were given to the indigenous license holders.135 This seeming insufficiency of firearms 
and ammunition and the complicated process of getting firearms and ammunition would have 
limited their hunting and headhunting activities. It was this that the Taiwan Sotokufu wished 
for. This also reflects on the lesser tendency of mountain indigenes for purchasing firearms and 
ammunition from the agency despite the Japanese officials sometimes assisting the mountain 
indigenes to fill in the application form for purchase.136   
 
3.3.2. Firearms and Ammunition as Rewards  
 
Another way of getting the firearms and ammunitions for the mountain indigenes were 
as rewards from the Japanese government. In the reports from the branches of the Pacification 
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and Reclamation Bureau in Xinzhu County in 1897, exceptional rewards to the mountain 
indigenous tribes were listed and they were usually in the form of the ammunition, firearms, or 
Japanese sword, which they could only choose one of. In order to obtain this special reward, 
the mountain indigenes needed to fulfill certain behavioral conditions: a. strictly forbid 
headhunting, but work in cultivation with 1 year probation; b. spread such virtues to other 
tribes with positive results; c. allow opening roads within mountain indigenous regions; d. chiefs 
who accomplished a certain set of tasks, e.g, who convened more than 20 mountain indigenous 
men for particular missions. 137 In 1899, some mountain indigenes received firearms as a reward 
from a Japanese officer Tanisige Dugurou 谷重次郎, because “this nourishes in the mountain 
indigenes a notion of earning these honourable gifts when they do not do evil things 
[headhunting] and work on good virtues” as reported in the official document on indigenes’ 
affairs. 138  Cases for the mountain indigenes getting firearms and ammunitions as rewards 
seemed to be very small and only occurred before 1900. However, the notion of headhunting 
in the Japanese officials’ view was completely different from the mountain indigenes’ in that 
the former regarded the headhunting as evil or immoral behaviour and forbade this custom, 
whilst as we have seen earlier the Formosan indigenes saw their headhunting custom and the 
heads they hunted as signs of inserting energy or spirit into the tribes, bringing good harvests, 
connecting with their god and ancestors, establishing status identities for the male indigenes 
among their tribes etc. (see Chapter 2 on the indigenes’ headhunting custom, pp. 30-38) and 
our analyses of cultural contexts for firearms in Chapter 7)   
 
3.3.3. Smuggling  
 
Smuggling was another method for the mountain indigenes to procure firearms and 
ammunition in the early Japanese colonization, which had been practised between mountain 
indigenous tribes and with the Chinese in Taiwan for a few hundred years. The Taiwan Sotokugu 
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naturally paid great attention to any secret activities on gun and ammunitions trade and 
suppressed them. This can be seemed in the Japanese’ official reports. In November 1897, 
Nanzhuang Pacification and Reclamation Bureau reported how the black market seemed to 
dominate the gun trade although the trade had been set up in appointed places. Camphor 
workers purchased firearms and powder regularly, but often not knowing the sellers. Bullets 
and powder seemed to travel easily within mountain indigenous territories where it was 
dangerous for people to enter. 139  In the same month, Japanese engineer Yanagimoto 
Michiyoshi 柳本通義 visited Xinzhu and Taizhong provinces for investigating the expansion of 
Donshijia Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 東勢角撫墾署 and reported on the Atayal tribes 
such as Mosibabarai tribe 馬以哇來社, Manapan tribe 馬那邦, Sumanhan tribe 司馬限社 and 
how they often attacked the indigenes in the Dahu and Nanhu areas, where they also obtained 
their ammunitions.140 In the report of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1898, 
new bullets for Mauser rifles were carried by the mountain indigenes or hid in their belts. 141 In 
Wang Xuexin’s research, he also found some evidence of how the Shilorao tribe of the Atayal 
group procured their firearms and ammunitions from the Puli tribe; their enemy the Truku 
indigenes of the Mkbaraw group 內太魯閣 procured their firearms, ammunition and 
agricultural tools from the Truki Indigenes of the Mkssiy group 外太魯閣 in 1902.142 During the 
“Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme”, the Taiwan Sotokufu decreed a fine or 
punishment on firearms and ammunition exchange. In accordance with another source 
reported in Records of Indigenes’ Management in 1912, several mountain indigenes from 
different tribes in A-Hou province and Taidong province were engaged with ammunition 
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exchange or trade with each other, but their ammunition was confiscated by the Japanese and 
the mountain indigenes were fined or punished by caning once they got caught. 143  
Chinese Tongshi 通事 or interpreters were also involved in smuggling firearms and 
ammunition sometimes. In the report of Xinzhu Paficification and Reclamation Bureau in 1897 
and Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureau in 1898 it was noted that the Chinese interpreters sold 
ammunition secretly to the mountain indigenes. But the Chinese interpreters did not seem to 
act as the only contacts through which the mountain indigenes obtained ammunitions. There 
was a case in 1899: some bandit entered the indigenes’ territories with Chinese interpreters’ 
assistance and carried off powders, ox, pigs, etc to please the indigenes in return for their 
temporary shelter.144 Particularly there is the case of Chinese interpreter Li Along 李阿隆, who 
had long provided firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes in eastern Taiwan in 
exchange for mountain resources since the Qing. It has also been suggested that the fighting 
capacity of the Truku indigenes was upgraded because Li A-Long put pressure on the chief of 
Taidong Province Sagara Tyoutuna 相良長綱 to provide large amounts of ammunition and 
supply new types of armaments.145 Furthermore in 1911, a secret shipment of nitre was caught 
in Aligang Provincial Affairs sub-bureau to Isbukun group 郡社群 or 施武郡群 from the Bunun 
group, and the Japanese police had suspicions of the Chinese interpreter who might have been 
teaching the mountain indigenes to manufacture their own ammunition.146 Nevertheless, the 
Japanese officials also had suspicions of Chinese interpreters smuggling firearms and 
ammunitions till 1911 without getting much evidence.147  
Indeed, it does seem that a lot of the modern rifles the mountain indigenes possessed 
earlier were from trading with the Chinese soldiers who served in the Qing army during the 
intense period of armaments anarchy in 1894-95 (see pp. 187-192 above), as many sources 
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suggested. For example, the Japanese officials in Eastern Taiwan reported on the armaments of 
Liu Yongfu’s troops, who were left in Taiwan and fled into eastern mountains in 1896, who 
possessed about 200 firearms, mostly single shot firearms and repeating rifles, 2 foreign 
cannons and at least 3 crude local made cannons in Leigonghuo.148 Similar accounts of the 
mountain indigenes trading with the Qing soldiers or Chinese near the borders or robbing from 
the Qing soldiers were found in the Japanese’ official reports in Yiland and Xinzhu regions. 149 
Another more unusual source is found in The National Geographic Magazine, March 1920, 
written by Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff,150  
At the time that the Chinese army of occupation left Formosa and the 
Japanese entered their new domain, firearms were at a premium. As 
the Chinese residents were not allowed to retain fire-arms, nearly all 
the rifles belonging to the departing army, numbering about 20,000, 
were sold by Chinese traders to the savages. It is this possession of the 
fire-arms that is dangerous to cope with.151 
 
Smuggling firearms and ammunitions from the Chinese into the indigenous 
communities was also seemingly inevitable, especially in those places where the indigenous 
tribes and the Chinese villages were mixed or near each other. In 1900, according to the report 
on the incident of pacifying the mountain indigenes in Dakekan regions, they received 
ammunition supply from workers, who used to work in manufacturing camphor and served in 
the punitive expedition military in southern Dakekan and exchanged some indigenous goods.  
152 In the same year a Chinese civilian Lin A-Zhang who lived in the Talunas tribe (大崙坑社 or
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太魯那斯) in Pushige 璞石閣 branch (Yuli township, Hualian County) was about to get arrested 
for secretly selling ammunition, which was manufactured by the Bunun indigenes of the Talunas 
tribe, but he escaped and hid himself. 153  Sources and evidence on the firearms and 
ammunition smuggling are now difficult to trace, but there were rumours of firearms and 
ammunition importation to the mountain indigenes in various regions such as Wuzhishan in 
Xinzhu in 1898154, Neiwan 內灣 in 1899155, Shimenzhuan and Sanjiaoyong in 1899156 , and at 
an illegal camphor-still in Nanzhuan and Neiwan villiage157, which were reported by different 
local administrations.  
Another conceivable smuggling route was through the guards at the guard lines or 
camphor sites who were given/stored firearms and ammunitions for defence, but this was very 
difficult as all the firearms were branded and the guards were required to report regularly and 
were only able to obtain new ammunition from exchanging their old cartridges/shells. 
Nonetheless, snatching firearms and ammunitions during the combats could never be stopped, 
especially when there were numerous and different sizes of battles occurring every year. It was 
less reported in the Japanese’ official reports, although there was an interesting instance when 
indigenes attacked guards at the oil site and it mentioned how the mountain indigenes took 
firearms from the guards in July 1896. 158  Traces of mountain indigenes making their own 
ammunition could also be seen - as mentioned earlier a Chinese interpreter seemingly taught 
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the indigenes to make powder in 1911 and in The National Geographic Magazine in 1920, it is 
reported how “He related to us how the savages make bullets from the heart of a very hard 
wood cured by a special process. These bullets are only effectual when fired from a short range, 
and when they lodge in the flesh they explode like dumdum bullets.”159 Crackers were sold to 
the mountain indigenes as a replacement for the detonators and 122,411 crackers were 
apprehended by the Japanese officials in 1913. 
It was extremely difficult for the mountain indigenes to obtain firearms under the 
Japanese governance and the Japanese officials were also fully aware or suspicious of any 
smuggling activities. However, mountain indigenes persistently used their firearms and 
sustained their capability of using firearms to make war against other hostile indigenous tribes, 
attacked the Japanese officers, the Chinese camphor workers and neighboring civilians and 
engaged in different scales of rebellions through to the 1930s.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Firearms may have been one of the several weapons of hunting for many years, but in 
our period they seem to have risen in status as the weapon of headhunting, warfare and 
resistance. It was this most important armament in mountain indigenes’ resistance which 
caused such a great impediment to the Taiwan Sotokufu in exploiting mountain resources and 
obtaining fully control over Taiwan, which none of any previous regimes did before them. Under 
the early governance of Japan, the possession of firearms among the mountain indigenes had 
generally reached to a modern or advanced level. The processes of producing firearms and 
ammunitions for the mountain indigenes were mainly from the Taiwan Sotokufu, but their 
attempts at control or confiscation were clearly ineffectual. The procurements for the firearms 
and ammunition became more complicated, arduous and sometimes dangerous for the 
mountain indigenes than in the late Qing reign.  
Taiwan Sotokufu began to implement different methods to make mountain indigenes 
stop their headhunting rituals and their resistances. These methods included persuasion, giving 
them goods such as salt, clothes, matches, powder, wine, pigs, rice, etc., encouraging and 
rewarding them for work in cultivation, sending the mountain indigens’ chiefs to Japan and 
                                                             
159 Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, 285. 
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Taipei for tourism, setting up schools in the mountain indigenous districts, and confiscating 
firearms and ammunition whenever possible. However, they all had limited effects on the 
mountain indigenes as their headhunting ritual and determinations of protecting their 
territories could not be removed or even easily reduced within their cultures. Eventually Taiwan 
Sotokufu initiated the Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme under General Sakuma 
Samata’s instruction, especially giving impetus to military and police pacifications against the 
rebellious mountain indigenes during 1910-1914. Warships, aircrafts, several advanced 
artilleries such as mountain guns, mortars, Gatling guns, and field guns were transferred to fight 
against the mountain indigenes as briefly mentioned in Section 2. Electric barbwires were 
installed along the guard lines and landmines were buried near the mountain indigenes’ 
territories.160 Under these circumstances, the mountain indigenes were seemingly forced to 
give in their firearms and ammunitions after the military expeditions or submitted their firearms 
and ammunition before the military expeditions. Despite everything the Taiwan Sotokufu had 
done to supress the mountain indigenes with advanced military technologies and confiscating 
the mountain indigenes’ firearms and ammunition, the mountain indigenes did not stop fighting 
against Japan’s colonization and developed a unique gun culture. This gun culture among 
different indigenous communities assisted them in adapting firearms from the traditional level 
to modern and advanced level in battlefields and also sustained their customs.  
The securing and re-securing of firearms across the frontier between mountain 
indigenes and Chinese is central to any story of how mountain indigenous people resisted 
Japanese colonialism so successfully for so long. Despite the regulations and confiscations and 
seeming hand-over of weaponry, the Japanese methods were expensive, costly in manpower 
and ineffectual. Firearms did three things that we can generalise about for those years – they 
grew in number over time, they became more modern and effective, and they came increasingly 
into the hands of mountain indigenous groups who were habitually opposed to outside  
interference, whether that be Chinese or Japanese. The final part of the story of resistance based 
on new technologies concerns the manner in which the mountain indigenes converted the gun, 
a foreign technique, into an essential technology of resistance and cultural integrity. Adaptation 
                                                             
160 Details on the installation of barbwires and electric barbwire on the guard lines and the landmines 
near the indigenous border, see Zheng Anxi  鄭安晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian  1895-
1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the 
Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’, 111–19. 
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was not of the gun itself or of the culture, but of the gun into the culture of the Formosan 
indigenous. This is the focus of Chapter 7 below. 
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Part III Cultural Embedment and Comparative Advantage 
Chapter 7 The Cultural Embedment of Firearms among the Formosan 
Indigenes circa 1860-1914 
 
Throughout the thesis, we have argued that the indigenous people of Taiwan mounted 
a very remarkable, even surprising resistance to the encroachment of the Chinese, the West 
and the Japanese in the years before 1914. The argument has clearly tried to show that such 
modern firearms were obtained from a great variety of sources as detailed in Chapter 4, 5 and 
6. However, this itself, as we have also foreshadowed, does not explain the particular, even 
peculiar use and very effective use made of firearms especially from the 1890s, or perhaps even 
earlier. We have suggested very strongly that a culture of arms was beginning to operate from 
quite early years, involving emebedment of modern technology -firearms- in the existing 
cultures of indigenous people, particularly key groups, the Atayals and the others. In particular, 
in Chart 2:1 at the end of Chapter 2 (p. 63) and Chart 3:1 in the end of Chapter 3 (p. 110), we 
have shown that the cultural assets were building up that allowed an efficient usage of arms in 
the cultures that were not in fact even iron-using. Indeed, in many ways the cultures of 
indigenous people were as non-modern technologically as we could find in many other places. 
How was it that the Taiwanese indigenes resisted through using firearms for so long? The 
answer lay, we argue, in the nature of the cultures which allowed the technology of firearms to 
be embedded very naturally within the more raising value system of indigenous people. In Chart 
2:x, we show that the cultural assets were not only existing, but also changing through time. 
This argument is made much stronger at the end of Chapter 3, where we argued that the culture 
of firearms was vibrant and was allowing the resistance to increase even as the Chinese, 
Westerners and Japanese themselves were using much more modern and advanced 
equipments. Despite the encroachments, the further pressure on eastern Taiwan from every 
advancement of the outside forces, there seemed to be an equal advancement of the 
indigeneous forces. Yet we know they did not make firearms and we know they have no magic, 
but we do know also that the firearms became in technical part of their cultures. This is the 
story of Chapter 7. The resistance of Taiwanese indigenes could not be explained in terms of 
technological superiority or a high level of intelligence or so when compared with other 
marginal groups or indigenous groups that were often given very little opportunity or showed 
260 
 
very little evidence a series of long term resistances. So this chapter takes up in far greater detail 
the actual process and avenues of embedments, the ways that the firearms were brought into 
the cultures as was clearly show to be the case in all our examples of warfare from Chapter 4, 5 
and 6 and in our suggested explaination at the end of Chapter 2 and 3.  
The hypothesis is that despite the fact of having a non-firearms production/manufacture 
culture, the indigenes used the firearms to resist further encroachment after 1860s especially 
after 1880s through: first, obtaining the firearms and second, embedding the firearms within 
their cultures. This embedment of firearms was not a conscious activity, but natural to the 
cultures that existed in the mountains–the culture of warfare, the culture of hunting and 
headhunting and the tribalism-which were outlined in Chapter 2. We illustrated the place of 
this culture embedment amongst other possible factors at the end of Chapter2 and Chapter 3, 
where we wrote of cultural assets. This chapter will illustrate how the cultural assets were 
demonstrated through the embedment of firearms.  
 
1. Firearms as Technology in Culture  
 
Frequently border disputes and disputes between two savage tribes last 
for years, or until the aborigines are so thinned and weakened that they 
are obliged to fall back and to abandon certain territory to the invader. 
Although the Chinese lose more lives than the aborigines, success in the 
long run invariably attends their arms, for almost every border the 
Celestial has a matchlock and plenty of ammunition, whereas few tribes 
can muster more than ten percent of matchlock men, the rest being 
armed with bows and arrows. Amongst the Hakka border men, who live 
a backwoodsman’s sort of life, are many good shots, but it is a difficult 
matter to get sight of the savage although the savages can see them. 
The aborigines have the advantages of the cover and knowledge of the 
country, and the fighting them in the forest is almost like fighting an 
unseen foe. The borderers, who become more grasping as they advance, 
are often checked by the study demeanour of the owners of the soil .1 
 
This account recording how the indigenes managed to resist the Chinese invasions 
                                                             
1Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, The Witnessed 
Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui, 291. 
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effectively by using firearms and obtaining firearms over time was written by John Dodd during 
his stay in the north of the island 1860-1890. After consideration of the types of firearms held 
by the indigenous people and the routes for them to gain the firearms and ammunition in the 
period 1860-1914, we might consider more broadly how firearms were important for Formosan 
indigenes in their cultural lives and the possible relationship of this to their effectiveness in 
warfare and resistance. In addition, we might move further and suggest that the acculturation 
of the firearm might have been crucial to answering the further question of how very successful 
the indigenous resistance was. When Formosan indigenes did not innovate the firearms, nor 
have the techniques of forging firearms from their original cultures how did the firearm become 
culturally naturalised? Was the cultural innovation of firearms of greater importance?   
Chen suggested that the Formosan indigenes did not voluntarily select the types of 
firearms, which resulted entirely from the suppliers’ end. Although the Formosan indigenes 
were in a basically passive position when receiving firearms, they yet sustained some principal 
or notion of selectivity in the usage of firearms.2 However, he neglects the broader impact on 
Formosan indigenes of the economic and political encroachment upon their environment as 
described in earlier chapters here, and which was accelerating in this period. These factors may 
be considered as essential to Formosan indigenes’ motivations in approaching firearms and 
their seeming obsession with firearms actively in order to protect themselves from further 
invasions and warfare. How did they practice this technology in their hunting, headhunting and 
ritual activities? How did firearms represent (in a sense re-present) themselves in their cultures?  
Firstly, I will give examples of how indigenes used or incorporated firearms in their 
hunting activity and in battle fields which demonstrated the implantation of firearms within 
their traditional hunting customs. Secondly, I would like to show how firearms were embedded 
within indigenes’ culture from physical attachment to ritual practices in various manners. 
Thirdly, I would like to illustrate how an involvement with firearms entered into the whole 
communities of Formosan indigenes from the headhunting ritual, which was dominated by 
male indigenes, in ceremonies, to female indigenes and children. These are the cultural 
associations of firearms, which not only enriched and solidified the Formosan indigenes’ cultures, 
but also gave them a capacity to resist encroachments from the western plain and the West, a 
                                                             
2 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang -Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru 、
liutong Yu Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 (The Aborigines with Modern 
Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society)’, 90. 
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notion that we initially considered in Chapter 3, Chart 1. Fourthly, I would like to outline and 
give traces of the failure of the opposing Qing Chinese troops in obtaining, maintaining and 
adapting firearms as a contrast to the more effective outcome of indigenes’ firearms cultures. 
Finally, I would like to sketch briefly how the Taiwan Sotokufu or Japanese Authority on the 
island, seemed to be more efficient than the Qing government, in managing the police, guards 
and braves and in regulating the firearms and ammunition in Taiwan. Nevertheless, both Qing 
and Japanese governments did not manage to cease the rebellions of indigenes completely.  
 
2. Firearms in Hunting, Attack and Defence  
2.1. General Hunting Equipment and the Dependency on Firearms of 
Formosan Indigenes 
 
Firearms were the prime weapons that every indigenous man carried on hunting and 
head hunting expeditions. The introduction of firearms did not seem to make Fo rmosan 
indigenes over-dependent on their instant and destructive power or abandon their traditional 
weapons such as knives, spears, arrows and bows, but rather there was an accumulative 
incorporation within their hunting and head hunting tactics over time or through experience. A 
French Vice Consul in Taiwan in 1868 wrote about the paraphernalia indigenes carried in 
fighting or hunting,  
The apparatus for fighting or hunting is more dignified. It consists of 
[these implements:] There is a bread knife, whose sheath is of wood 
that has been painted red, and this is slipped through the belt. There is 
a long gun with a fuse, and in front of it two or three powder-horns are 
suspended from strings of false pearls. In back the man carries a coat 
which is folded into the net, a bag for balls, and a parchment case 
containing eight powder charges in eight bamboo holders. Then around 
his wrist is a cord, a lighter with a fire-stone, and some banana marrow 
instead of tinder. Sometimes the hunter has a bow, and in that case he 
always uses it with consummate skill.3  
 
This close observation illustrates vividly the readiness of indigenes when fighting or hunting in 
using firearms, powder supply, igniting fire, and auxiliary weapons and arranging these items 
                                                             
3 Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’î Le de Formose.’, 555. 
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in order to contend with any unanticipated ambush. This picture below was painted around the 
mid-1870s and portrayed the application of firearms in indigenes’ hunting.4 (Figure 7: 1)   
 
Figure 7:1 Indigenes hunted with firearms 
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of 
Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 
120. 
Extensively, the firearms were implemented effectively in the raids and defence of indigenes 
which were often reported. Firelocks were furnished by the plains indigenes when marching 
through the mountain territories in large groups of 70 men, as noted by Steere,5 and matchlocks 
were carried for defence by the plains indigenes who were stationed as outposts of the villages, 
as Captain Bax detailed when entering mountain regions in the north.  6  
Ammunition and other required gadgets accompanied the matchlocks as co-joined on 
their bodies, and this was illustrated in Dodd’s observation of mountain indigenes living in hills 
in the northeast of Taiwan,  
Every man who possesses a gun (pâhtûs) wears round his neck curious-
                                                             
4 For the information on the background of Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines 
in Late Qing Taiwan), see chapter 4, footnote no.38. 
5LXXV (#74) Tamsui, Formosa, 01/Dec/1873 in  Steere, ‘Letters from Formosa’.   
6 Bax, The Eastern Seas, 116–34. 
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looking priming-flasks full of powder, and over his shoulder, or round his 
waist, an oblong-shaped case, made of skin, often containing several 
cylindrical-shaped wooden receptacles full of powder. He has generally 
about him a small bag containing shot and long iron projectiles almost 
the size of the little finger, which are slipped down the muzzle of the 
long-barrelled matchlock on top of the powder without any wad 
between.7 
  
The indigenes in northeast Taiwan seemed to have forged some collective manner of carrying 
firearms which especially displayed their proximity with them. They also collocated the firearm, 
the powder, the shot and other firearm-related assortments on their bodies perfectly well in 
order to react deftly to any sudden attack, ambushes or combats. Similar finding of the 
furnished firearms among the deputy chief of the Paiwans -Bunkiet and his 12 fellows- could be 
seen in Taylor’s account. Before entering the Tipun village of the Puyuma tribe (知本, 卑南族) 
in southern Taiwan in the 1880s:  
Gun covers were taken off, and the barrels polished until they shone 
like silver; all baggage was transferred to the other members of the 
party; the ammunition pouches were hung in proper order, and lastly 
the white scarf, which denoted that the wearer is a warrior ready to 
encounter all comers, was donned. With guns loaded and a spare 
cartridge held between the teeth the band entered the village, and, 
savages as they are, they looked a gallant troop of lithe young fellows.8 
Until the early Japanese reign, the Formosan indigenes continued to use firearms 
primarily for their hunting and their reliance on firearms in hunting seemed to escalate due to 
their more difficult circumstances. As the chief of the Shiron tribe from the Atayal group told a 
Japanese officer in 1896, 
There is shortage of food, particularly in the mountains. The indigenes 
don’t have much money, nor store food, unlike the Japanese and the 
Chinese. If we rest for a day, we are short of food for a day. Thus male 
indigenes carried their guns to hunt for animals busily every day. All the 
olds and the young indigenes and women worked in farming or spinning 
and weaving. How would we dare to rest? We have no choice, but only 
devoted to farming. However, we were forced to move from time to 
time without a certain residence for our children and grandchildren and 
could not work in farming since the establishment of Pacification and 
                                                             
7 John Dodd, ‘A Glimpse of the Manners and Customs of the Hill Tribes of Formosa.’, Journal of the Straits Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society 15 (1885): 74. 
8 According to the Aborigines of South Taiwan in the 1880s – in Hengchun xianzhi 恆春縣志 [Hengchun county 
gazetteer], Bunkeit 潘文結/杰 and Tsui Lui 朱雷 are both registered as chiefs of Tierasock (豬月勞束社) Taylor, ‘A 
Ramble through Southern Formosa’, 146. 
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Reclamation Bureau and the oppression from the Chinese and officials. 
We have now escaped to the mountain and can only rely on the meat 
of birds and beasts.9   
This account not only shows that firearms became indispensable tools for them in hunting 
animals, but that they were also increasingly reliant on them to obtain essential food. And the 
photo Figure 7:2 displays explicitly this close attachment of indigenous man with his modern 
firearm in hunting.  
Figure 7:2 Firearm in an indigenous man’s hand and his game 
 
Source: Suzuki Hideo 鈴木秀夫, 台灣番界展望, p 28 in Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan 
Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 122-123 
                                                             
9 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., '明治 29 年大嵙崁撫墾署報告 ' (Reports of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau, 1896), Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 台灣日日新報 in 01/10/1896 in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 
(Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes 
Management ) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2011), 8.   
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Another appeal made from the Atayal chief Taimomisseru 代麼密鮮 of the Gihen tribe 宜亨社 
to the director of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1897 also showed the 
requisite use of firearms, and as he said of his fellows, “the knives and guns are worn away and 
utterly useless. Hopefully the authority could render as soon as possible. Without knives and 
firearms, we would starve in mountains. How can they be seen merely as tools for killing 
people?”10 Later, the Atayal chief demonstrated his ingenious techniques in shooting by firing 
at a squirrel with a single gunshot as the director reported with praise.11 This explicit narration 
showed their dependency on firearms in hunting and his reassertion of this by shooting a 
squirrel with a single shot in front of the Japanese officials. Figure 7:3 from the Fengsu huabao 
風俗畫報 (Custom Pictorial) drawn by the Japanese, symbolised the firearms used by the 
indigenes in hunting.  
Figure 7:3 Hunting expedition of indigenes in firearms 
 
                                                             
10‘大嵙崁撫墾署長巡視蕃社狀況報告’ (Reports by the Commissioner of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau on the inspection of indigenous tribe) in May 1897 , (V04533\A026) in Ibid., 282.  
11‘大嵙崁撫墾署長巡視蕃社狀況報告’ (Reports by the Commissioner of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau on the inspection of indigenous tribe) in May 1897 , (V04533\A026) in Ibid., 285. 
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Source: Dongyangtang 東陽堂 edited, Fengsu Huabao 風俗畫報 (Custom Pictorial), Vol129: 
1, 26-27 in Chen Zhongren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 122-123 
This dependency on firearms of the indigenes did not just apply in hunting, but also in their 
defence as we have shown in many instances in Chapters 4-6, and as generalised for the later 
years in this Japanese official report of 1897,  
The indigenes have the custom of possessing guns while trudging in 
mountains, which is to defend from the Chinese invasion and to hunt 
animals for food supply. Therefore, they regard their guns as their lives. 
If they were taken, it would be like taking their lives away …12  
Moreover, in 1905 the director of Jiayi Province delivered a note to the chief commissioner of 
police about the impact of the ban on the supply of ammunition and detonators on the Tsou 
indigenes of Alishan group after 1903. The note reported that since the ban was introduced, 
not only could the indigenes not hunt to obtain nourishment and materials for clothes and daily 
goods, but they were also threatened by the neighbouring tribes, lost their hunting territories 
and their crops were destroyed by wild hogs whose numbers increased because of lack of 
hunting. 13  This fully explained the significance of using firearms in hunting for the Tsou 
sustaining and maintaining their lives, their existence and the ecology system. This certainly 
applied to the other indigenous groups as well. Such evidence shows how indigenes 
incorporated firearms in their hunting activities and developed them as cultural assets, which 
assisted them in functioning effectively in any armed conflicts with others.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., '明治 30 年 8 月份新竹縣轄內各撫墾署 (五指山, 大湖, 南庄) 事務成績報告' 
(Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus of Wuzhishan, Dahu, and Nanzhuang in Hsinchu-ken 
jurisdiction, August 1897), (V00163\A022) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據
時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in 
Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2003), 106–107. 
13 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:349. 
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2.2. Styles in action  
 
An amalgamation of their group hunting tactics and firearms was noticed in Francis 
White’s journal when he joined a hunting activity with the Pepos:  
Between the bank and the mountains was a level space, some half a 
mile wide covered with long coarse grass reaching up to our middles; 
here, the greater part of us were placed in position forming a half circle 
facing inwards. The remainder with the dogs then ascended the hill side 
and commenced driving the game. One fine stag soon broke cover, and 
immediately fell victim to a well-directed matchlock ball.14 
 
This was another way to ensure hitting their targets when firing with accuracy in combining 
their knowledge of geographic conditions in groups, by half circling and driving their chases, to 
where they could easily fire upon them. A narrative that accompanied one of the illustrations 
in the Illustrations of aborigines in late Qing Taiwan described the indigenes’ hunting tactic with 
firearms. Indigenous tribes would surround the mountain with other tribes and burn the forest. 
Some of them carried their firearms, arrows and bows and waited until the animals fled from 
the fire.15 See in the top left hand corner of Figure 7:4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 Francis White, ‘A Visit to the Interior of South Formosa.’, The Cycle: A Political and Literary Review 17 (27 
August 1870): 199. 
15 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing 
Taiwan), 134. 
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Figure 7:4 Indigenes’ hunting tactics  
 
Source: 陳宗仁, ed., Fanshe fenlie tushuo ‘番社焚獵圖說’ (Illustration of indigenous tribe 
burned the forest for hunting animals) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 134 
Even a broken musket would be used in setting up snares, like the one Dr. Warburg 
nearly fell into as he described,  
They called my attention to a thread that was hidden in the grass, and 
was connected with a piece of lead, which, if I had walked against it, 
would have triggered a broken musket hidden in the bushes. A not very 
gentile, but necessary manner of village defense.16 
Here, then the snare merged their traditional primary techniques of trapping animals with the 
foreign muskets, which very precisely exemplifies the insertion of the musket inside the 
indigenous hunting cultures. The exercise of firearms, which provided rapidity and lethality was 
essential and satisfactory among the Formosan indigenes while hunting animals, therefore, 
firearms were instinctively used by the indigenes and then adapted into their hunting cultures. 
                                                             
16 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
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The indigenes also seemed to understand the importance of calculating the distance 
when firing their firearms in order to create the most potent results. Swinhoe, Pickering and 
Beazeley each mentioned that the indigenes often fired at their targets within a relatively short 
distance. 17 In this way, they might have a much higher chance of shooting down their targets 
and then capturing their prey or cutting their enemies’ heads as their triumph as quickly as 
possible, although they also thus exposed themselves closely to their enemies and situated 
themselves in dangerous positions. This tactic of firing their firearms over short distances when 
initiating attacks did not seem to change into the early twentieth century. This was illustrated 
by Kirjassoff in The National Geographic Magazine when an indigenouss man Kim Soan talked 
about his experience in a headhunting expedition. Kim Soan said, “my companions shot the 
guardsman through the heart from an ambush ten feet distant … they cut off the woodsman’s 
head, and we returned home.”18 The mountain indigenes also innovated their own fighting 
position which was lying on their backs in the bush and using their foot to pull the triggers as 
Mackay described in Chapter 4, p. 131. This was completely different from the Western soldiers 
who were trained to lay on their stomach and aimed at their targets from a raised position. The 
indigenes’ posture would give far less exposure of their body to their enemies while hiding in 
the bush.  
An interesting passage concerning a shooting competition between English officers and 
indigenes in southern Taiwan as early as 1875 was reported by Beazeley:  
A party of English officers from a man-of-war landed on the island, and 
meeting a company of natives armed with matchlocks, challenged them 
to a trial of skill in shooting. Affixing a mark to a tree about 100 yards 
distant, the officers made what they considered pretty fair practise, 
without, however, astonishing the natives, who, when it came to their 
turn to fire, disappeared into the jungle like one man, and crawled on 
their bellies through the undergrowth to about three yards from the 
target, which, of course, from that distance, they all hit exactly in the 
centre. When the Englishmen protested that such a method of 
conducting the competition was hardly fair, the natives replied, "We do 
not understand what you mean by fair, but anyhow that is the way we 
shoot Chinamen.19  
                                                             
17 Swinhoe, ‘Additional Notes on Formosa’, 128; Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867’, 
1878, 29–31. 
18 Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, 284–85. 
19 Beazeley, ‘Notes of an Overland Journey through the Southern Part of Formosa in 1875, from Takow to the 
South Cape, with Sketch Map.’, 21–22. 
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This passage shows the flexible or guerrilla postures and braveness of the indigenes when 
targeting with their matchlocks in close distance, which was completely different from the 
English officers who received formal training. It seemed to atone for their backwardness and 
limited range of firearms. They had also exhibited familiarity and knowledge of their 
geographical environment and their physical flexibility while using firearms. Another 
entertaining account on the Pepos of the Kabalan group demonstrated their continual and 
highly developed vigilance when they were tricked by Dr. Collingwood’s party,  
While some were thus engaged, the idlers allowed themselves to be 
amused by some of our party, who showed them little tricks, which 
caused hearty laughter, and which they tried their best to imitate. 
Seeing a revolver, they were very anxious to have it fired off, and stuck 
a leaf upon a door to be shot at, which was done twice, upon which 
there immediately appeared two or three men armed with matchlocks, 
who had evidently turned out at the sound of the pistol to protect the 
community in case of need. This little incident seemed to prove that 
they were always on the alert, and gave colour to the general report 
that they, like Chinese, are subject to the raids of the raw mountain 
savages, against whom they are always more or less prepared to defend 
themselves.20 
 
This small incident not only reflected the conventional cautiousness and the speed in retort of 
the indigenes, but also revealed that even in the early years matchlocks functioned as their 
paramount weapon, instead of knives or arrows, in dangerous circumstances.  
 
2.3. Firearms in Defence and Attack 
 
British and American troops encountered various gunfire assaults from the indigenes in 
southern Taiwan in the 1867 Rover incident, and these ended in retreats (see Chapter 4, 
pp.116-122). Some hunting tactics with the application of firearms of the southern indigenes 
could be seen in battle with the American troops in 1867 (see Chapter 4, pp. 118-120) when 
they drove the American soldiers to their controlling position and fired at their enemies whilst 
hiding in grass and moving their positions without being seen. Mudan and Kusakut indigenes 
struck the Japanese military with firearms which caused mostly Japanese soldiers injuries 
                                                             
20 Cuthbert Collingwood, Rambles of a Naturalist on the Shores and Waters of the China Sea; Being Observations 
in Natural History during a Voyage to China, Formosa, Borneo, Singapore, Etc, Made in Her Majesty’s Vessels, in 
1866 and 1867 (London: John Murray, 1875), 102–15. 
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during the Japanese expedition of 1874 (see pp. 123-129). Shen, Baozen reported that 
ferocious indigenes fired with firearms at Chinese braves in several ambushes whilst opening 
roads in the northern mountain regions in 1874, which forced the Chinese troops to 
withdraw. 21  The Estonian military officer, Pavel Ivanovich Ibis remarked and recorded the 
actions of the southern indigenes in battlefield whilst shooting and he noted that, 
they never engage in open battle that could put them at a disadvantage, 
but rather follow the enemy by foot, unseen, unsuspected, and then 
shoot at him from the bushes, or weaken him through surprise attacks, 
or lure him into their hiding places, from which retreat is not possible 
without substantial losses.22 
 These accredited tactics accompanying the utilization of firearms amongst the southern 
indigenes were reported on by professional and experienced military officers that validated the 
potency of indigenes fighting in battles.   
A combination of primary weapon and firearms were furnished and carried by the 
indigenes, which could still be seen in 1886 when George Ede, an English Presbyterian 
missionary at Tainan from 1883, noted on his way to Palongui 巴塱衛 (Taidong County) that,  
Shortly after our start I happened to be taking the lead of the party, and 
had got some distance ahead of my fellow-travellers when suddenly, 
just as I turned a bend in the road, there were two savages right in front 
of me -- one kneeling on the ground with his arrow on the string, and 
the other crouching behind with his musket levelled from his shoulder.23 
Both arrows and muskets were employed by the indigenes, possibly the Paiwans in this case, 
in their readiness for attack, which changed little over time. Ede also illustrated the indigenes 
in their prepared attack position which was rapid and apt to strike at unattended travellers, 
and their combat position with the combination of arrow and musket might well have given 
them advantage in shooting the enemy, which resulted in a seemingly high ratio of death to 
injury. 
 Moreover, Formosan indigenes appeared to be always in readiness, accompanied with 
their firearms for skirmishes even when working in the fields. The Rev. James Mackay himself 
perceived two dozen of the local tribes with their chief monitoring them at the border of two 
                                                             
21 Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Shen Wensugong Du 沈文肅公牘 [Correspondence of Shen Baozhen], 196–97. 
22 Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, 167–71. 
23 George Ede, ‘Journey to North Formosa’, The Prebysterian Messenger, 1886, 4. 
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tribes and cropping up with their matchlocks equipped. 24  Pepos who lived in Sua-sam-la 
(Shanlin district, Kaohsiung) were armed with matchlocks, knife, and hatchet as protection even 
when working in the field within accessible distance to unforeseen incursions from the inimical 
mountain indigenes or Hakka people.25 Dr. Warburg also mentioned in the 1880s about how 
the Christian plains indigenes first fetched their firearms when they cultivated further afield.  26 
Their use of firearms seemed to continue to serve side by side with their traditional knives, 
spears, arrow and bows in hunting animals. Firearms began to synthesize with the indigenous 
hunting cultures, and the indigenes even depended on the firearms to hunt for subsistence.    
 
3. Embedment of Firearms among Indigenes’ Cultures 
 
The deeper meanings of firearms were also reflected in various aspects of indigenous 
cultures. Thanks to the foreign visitors, including missionaries, scientists, anthropologists, 
military officers, businessmen, etc., who had been to the indigenes’ territories and recorded 
their close observation of the Formosan indigenes’ behaviours and cultures, we can penetrate 
into this level of cultural embedment. Here I am hoping to demonstrate the significance of 
firearms and the engagement with firearms, within indigenous cultures which was associated 
with their habits, attitudes, and customs and extended to their social systems and entire 
communities. These engagements may be interpreted as measures of the embedment of 
firearms as a new technology within the basic cultural attributes of Taiwanese indigenous 
peoples. Various narratives from foreign visitors and Chinese officials, who recorded and 
observed closely the lives of indigenous people in Taiwan will be a major source for this section. 
 
3.1. Personal Necessity for Indigenous Men 
 
Firearms were regarded by the indigenous men as a personal necessity and the ability 
to operate a firearm for an indigenous man was crucial to his livelihood, status and self-esteem. 
This was because the deadly force of the firearms determined the characters, social positions 
                                                             
24 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 260. 
25 White, ‘A Visit to the Interior of South Formosa’, 198. 
26 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
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and authorities of their users among their communities or even larger regions in hunting and 
headhunting activities, which were dominated by indigenous men. In some indigenous societies, 
the possession of firearms also represented what amounted to class differences. An account in 
the Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), 
which was dated around 187 by the Qing officials, noted the attitude of the indigenes toward 
firearms,  
They regarded firearms as the most valuable, so they were perfectly 
polished. Those who could not afford firearms practised their skills of 
using arrows, bows, knives and spears. However, these were 
abandoned once they obtained firearms. They would not fire 
irrationally, but they always hit the target when firing. In order not to 
waste the powder, they had to be well-practised in using the firearms 
because the powder was rare.27 
 
Also, a few drawings demonstrated vividly how the firearms were carried by the indigenous 
people when joining the tribal war or going out. See Figure 7:5 and 7:6. Every single Tsui-Hwan 
male, from the Thao tribe could handle a firearm, but these were in the main only actually 
possessed by the rich as Bullock mentioned.28 In John Dodd’s notes on the camphor district in 
north Taiwan, he mentioned the indigenes men shouldering their weapons, which might 
include firearms, but not helping to carry the household gear.  29In the matrilineal indigenous 
societies, the ownership of firearms among indigenous male was rather significant and 
prominent. Hu Zhuan explained that, 
Indigenous Men would carry his guns, knives and clothes and live in 
Bailangguan 擺郎館 [the male gathering house] if the couple quarrelled. 
Their sons or daughters, property, and herd, all belonged to the wife.30  
 
Bailangguan 擺郎館 is also called Palakuwan by the Puyuma indigenes. It is the place or 
gathering house where the Puyuma indigenous male discussed tribal affairs, defended the 
tribes, training etc. Firearms signified the indispensable and fundamental tool and weapon for 
the male indigenes, and here they were clearly helping define and maintain the nuanced notion 
of a special privilege for males in the midst of matrilinearity.  
                                                             
27 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing 
Taiwan), 98. 
28 Bullock, ‘A Trip into the Interior of Formosa’, 267. 
29 Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, The Witnessed 
Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui, 292. 
30 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taidong Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊 [Journal of Taidong], 49–50. 
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Figure 7:5 Indigenes in Tainan carried firearms when joining tribal war.  
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Tainan fanmu juanhou tushuo'台南番目眷口圖說' 
(Illustration of Indigenous chief's family in Tainan) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 74. 
Figure 7:6 Indigenes in Taipei carried firearms when with their family 
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Source: Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Taibe fanmu juanlou tushuo '臺北番目眷口圖說'  
(Illustration of Indigenous chief's family in Taipei)in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 78. 
It was reported frequently that indigenous men went on to carry firearms commonly as 
their personal requisite well after the Japanese colonization of Taiwan. In the report of the 
director of the Dahu Pacifcation and Reclamation Bureau (Dahu Fukenshu 大湖撫墾署) on the 
Atayal indigenous lives and customs in 1896, he stated “male indigenes in the age from 15 or 
16 to 60s all possess firearms and carry the firearms wherever they go. If the guns have some 
damage or rust, they can take them apart, even with the latest guns.”31 In the report from the 
Jinwei and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureaus 景尾, 三角湧辦務署 (Jingmei and Sanxia 
Districts, New Taipei City) in 1899, where the Atayal indigenes lived, “Almost every indigenous 
group possessed firearms and firearms were essential devices for the indigenes in their lives as 
armaments for the troops. Without these devices, the indigenes could not continue their 
lineage [to obtain a wife]. The male indigenes have to master in hunting.”  32  In Mori 
Ushinosuke’s 森丑之助 investigation reports, the Tsou indigenes from the Tufuya tribe (Alishan 
township 阿里山鄉, Jiayi County) that they employed, all carried spear and firearms in 1900 33 
and in 1909 every Bunun indigene had a firearm among the tribes in the Fanshuliaoz Province
蕃薯寮廳 (Qishan District, Kaohsiung City).34 Most importantly, the way in which firearms 
shaped the identity of Formosan indigenous men was presented in a lecture, which was given 
by Shinji Ishii, a Fellow of  the Royal Anthropological Institute (UK) to the China Society at Caxton 
Hall, London in February 1916. He said, “Now nearly every savage fighting-man has a firearm, 
which he holds only second in value to his life, just as our Samurai looked on their swords in 
                                                             
31 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli 
Areas in Japanese Colonization), 417.  
32 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 32 年 2 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至 事務及情況報告' 
(Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, February 1899), 
(V04594\A009) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃
園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 101.   
33 Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳：森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations 
of Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], 259. 
34 Ibid., 400. 
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feudal times.” 35 Here, he appeared to equate the necessity of firearms for indigenous men to 
that of swords for the Samurai. This notion of comparing to the swords of the Samurai never 
appeared in Japanese official documents or reports on managing indigenes in Taiwan. Some 
pictures of indigenes carrying firearms were also shown in the lecture. See Figure 7:7 and Figure 
7:8  
 
Figure 7:7 Bunun and Atayal indigenes with their firearms  
 
Source: Shinji Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants (London: Japan 
Society, 1916), 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
35 Shinji Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants (London: Japan Society, 1916), 23. 
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Figure 7:8 the Paiwan indigenes with their firearms. 
 
Source: Shinji Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants (London: Japan 
Society, 1916), 11. 
 
3.2. Presentation, Maintenance & Decoration  
 
The presentations or additional features of firearms also reflected the attitudes toward 
firearms which became implanted in the indigenes’ cultures. As firearms were valued highly by 
the Formosan indigenous men, their rifles were always very clean 36  and seemingly the 
                                                             
36 Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 138. 
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matchlock owned by the chief of Sabaree, “had just come from the hands of the armorer”.37 
Taylor also mentioned how the Palangka (Pilam 卑南族) embellished their firearms with covers 
and the barrels were polished and glinted like silver. 38 Men showed signs of their appreciation 
and pride while cleaning and polishing their firearms, and of how they valued (or hid or 
protected) their firearms with the covers. The firearm cloth could also be seen in the list of 
items which were collected from some indigenous tribes in northern Taiwan in 1897 by Jiyu Sho 
Min 竺紹珉, a Japanese army officer (see Figure 7: 9). According to Jiyu Sho Min’s note, this 
firearm cloth was made of animal skin and it covered the mechanism part of the firearm.  39 This 
might have given some protection to the firearms from the rain to avoid getting damp or rusted. 
Again, this shows some carefulness amongst indigenes in maintaining the firearms they valued. 
In addition, in the report of the Jinwei and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureaus in 1899, the 
Atayal indigenes did not appear to abandon their matchlocks even when they possessed some 
modern and efficient firearms later, but used the matchlocks as ornaments instead. 40   
 
Figure 7:9 Cover for the firearm 
 
Souce: Wang, '竺紹珉蕃地狀況報告' (Report from Zhu Shao-Min on the indigenous 
territories, June 1897), (V04534\A002) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao 
                                                             
37 Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 30. 
38 Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern Formosa’, 146. 
39 Wang, '竺紹珉蕃地狀況報告' (Report from Zhu Shao-Min on the indigenous territories, June 1897), 
(V04534\A002) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃
園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策, 300.   
40 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 32 年 2 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至 事務及情況報告' 
(Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, February 1899), 
(V04594\A009) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃
園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 100.  
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Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 
[Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: 
Policies on Indigenes Management], 303. 
Ornamentations on the firearms possessed by the indigenes could also be noticed in 
Dodd’s narrative:  
They often load their necks with metal trinkets, cuttle-fish beads, &c., 
to which they attach numerous little appliances connected with the 
priming and loading of their matchlocks, a motley sort of collection, 
which excites the curiosity of the beholder.41 
And Steere’s narrative:  
The arms of these savages consist of a few fire-locks procured of the 
Chinese, and used principally in hunting, and lances and large knives 
used in hunting Chinese heads. They decorate these weapons with 
tresses of Chinese hair, and when upon the hunt for Chinese, carry 
highly ornamented red bags for carrying home the captured heads.42 
These assortments symbolised various meanings – relating to class differences, rewards, and 
sacredness, within different groups, which might have been served to assure or remind others 
of their success in hunting and headhunting expeditions when attaching them to their firearms. 
Parts of firearms sometimes became ornaments on their bodies. For instance, it was found that 
firearm cartridges were pierced on the ears of some Atayal indigenes from the Marikowan sub-
group.43 Some brass or copper- made rings, which were used as a spile to protect the muzzle 
and barrel on the old firearms originally, were worn by the Atayal indigenes of Mashatan tribe 
from the Ma’aw sub-group.44  
Firearms were also placed with special care in the Formosan indigenes ’ houses. As Dr. 
Steere described, the firelocks and other paraphernalia of war and hunting were displayed and 
hung on the central post or opposite the door with skulls of animals and human heads as 
ornament in the house of Thao indigenes.45 The position of the firelocks in the house and with 
animals and human heads which were the symbolic features from their hunting and 
                                                             
41 Dodd, ‘A Glimpse of the Manners and Customs of the Hill Tribes of Formosa.’, 74. 
42 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 308. 
43 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30 年 12 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification 
and Reclamation Bureau, December 1897), (V00272\A016) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 
Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu 
Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 245.   
44  '明治 29 年 10 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 
1896), (V00084\A004) in Ibid., 440.   
45 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 34. 
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headhunting, seemed to flaunt the triumphs and prestige of their owner. The chief of Sabari – 
Issek’s room where at one time Pavel Ibis stayed, was decorated with a “whole arsenal of 
firearms, knives, spears and other hunting gears” hanging on deerskins on the wall.46 These kind 
of scenes could still be found in the report or visitor’s journal in the Japanese period. For 
example, a group of Japanese administrators from the Yilan Province were sent to survey the 
Atayal tribes of the Mnibu sub-group 溪頭群 in 1900 and reported that,  
A higher seat was put up in the indigenous house and some hair from 
the hunted-heads were hung on it. Guns, knives, arrows and bows were 
displayed next to the hair. They assumed it is the seat for worshipping 
their god and for the guests. Food, drink and dirty items shouldn’t place 
on it. They were rebuked by the indigenes when sitting on the seat with 
their straw sandals.47  
This shows that the hair from the hunted head and the firearms and other weaponry were 
valued equally and highly regarded by the indigenes according to the place where they were 
located – a higher seat where they situated these items. And when the Japanese administrator 
sat on the higher seat, the indigenes’ reaction or behaviour also show that the hair from the 
hunted heads and weaponries, which they regarded as their sacraments, would not be intruded 
upon. The indigenes near Tainan appeared to display their weaponries differently as Mrs 
Marjorie Landsborough noted in her visit in February 1911 when she wrote,  
Inside it was so dark that at first we could see nothing, but a savage put 
up his hand, and pushed aside one of the slates of the roof, which were 
only laid on, not fixed down. And then all I could see were knives, guns 
and spears, bows and arrows, some black, rusty, cooking pans, and rows 
and rows of animal’s jaw bones strung on to ropes across the hut.48  
The weaponries were situated at the most obvious place when entering the indigenous hut, 
along with their cooking pans and numerous animals’ jaw bones. Firearms appeared to 
represent the identities or essentiality of male indigenes and publicity for the achieved status 
                                                             
46 Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, 21. 
47 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., '宜蘭廳轄內溪頭蕃社踏查報告' (Field report on Xitou indigenous tribe in the 
jurisdiction of Yilan County, July 1900), (V04625\A026) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in 
Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2001), 355.  
48 Marjorie Landsborough, In Beautiful Formosa: Being a Personally-Conducted Tour of Boys and Girls to View the 
People, the Scenery, and the Work of the Missionaries in Strange and Lovely Places (London: R.T.S., 1922), 26. 
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of prominent individuals with trophies, not only just in his family, but also among indigenes’ 
societies, their guests and even outsiders.   
3.3. Etiquette 
 
A number of accounts from foreign visitors related how Formosan indigenes fired their 
firearms or matchlocks on various occasions. The precise reasons or meanings of firing firearms 
amongst indigenes is at times obscure, therefore, some conjectures only drawn from the 
narrators’ descriptions. Firing their firearms seemed to integrate with the indigenous people’s 
manner of courtesy, sign of agreement or signal of exchange. In Bax’s trip in the north, he 
noticed how two parties of Pepos greeted each other and formed consensus by firing 
matchlocks,  
We were here met by some Peppo-hoans from their camp, which was 
on the other side of the valley. The two parties saluted each other by 
firing matchlocks, shouting and dancing ... After deciding that we were 
friends this party also fired off their matchlocks in the air.”49 
 
Plains indigenes in Posia also saluted Rev. Mackay, Rev. Ritchie and Herbert J. Allen, by firing 
their matchlocks in the air and shouting “Pahuria raki” (peace be with you) before returning to 
Posia. 50 Dr. Warburg also experienced a similar practice of firearms when receiving salute shots 
on the field by the Christian Pepohwans or the Plains indigenes. 51 This was like a continuation 
of the ritual of Pepos from the seventeenth century Dutch era: by firing of muskets or cannon 
as a signal when mustering church services as interpreted by Shepherd. 52  Clearly this had 
become a stable tradition. For instance, General Le Gendre also mentioned this etiquette of 
indigenes in his usual grumbling manner,  
 Our tent was instantly struck, our baggage put in order, and, in less than 
fifteen minutes, we were away, firing guns on each side, as a sign of 
amity. Besides the firing of matchlocks, these aborigines have no other 
way to bid each other adieu. The same custom obtains from one end of 
                                                             
49 Bax, The Eastern Seas, 116–34. 
50 Allen, ‘Notes of a Journey through Formosa from Tamsui to Taiwanfu’, 263. 
51 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
52In the case of such ‘blunderbuss Christians’ in Sinka at that time it was reported that ‘all the inhabitants, men, 
women and children, young and old, assembled in the Church. Instead of bells being rung, three muskets are 
fired as a sign to come together.”, and in Mattau and Bakloan two small cannon substituted for musketry. 
Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 66. And see Chapter 2, 
footnote: 105.  
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the island to the other.53 
 
In contrast is the Rev. Mackay’ description, who seemed to really enjoy watching this firing ritual 
demonstration and signal exchange between indigenes:  
When on the top of the first mountain range a piercing yell told of 
savages at hand, and at a stream in the valley below we met more than 
fifty of them. Salutations were exchanged. The wild mountaineers 
pointed their guns upward, fired a volley, and bade us follow them. They 
welcomed us to their mountain retreat, where we spent the night and 
they were entirely friendly.54 
 
Firing off firearms also was the method often chosen as a notification before entering the other 
indigenous tribes or parting. Foreign visitors like Pickering were ordered to follow this ritual 
before entering Banga village (Paiwan) and then wait to see the report of a firearm and smoke, 
which was like a permission to enter indigenous territories.  55 Ibis appeared to interpret this 
firearm behaviour of the indigenes differently, as perhaps a trial of the hunting skill of their 
foreign visitor before entering the indigenous village:  
One of them stuck a bamboo staff into the ground about thirty steps 
from me, and Karanbau invited me to shoot at it. With them, as with all 
highlanders of Formosa, there is a custom that forces every stranger to 
shoot at a target before entering a village. This is more, it seems to me, 
to make certain of his hunting dexterity, highly valued by them, than in 
order to unload his weapon.56 
 
Captain Bax noted that both plain and mountain indigenes were shouting, dancing and firing 
matchlocks when departing the camp in 1871.  57 Evidence of how the indigenous men fired 
their firearms as a signal at the entrance of their village could still be found in Ish ii’s lecture in 
1916. This was seemingly to notify their tribal members and family of their success in obtaining 
a trophy from their headhunting expedition and to welcome them in their best clothes, 
although the headhunting custom was strictly prohibited by the Taiwan Sotokufu.58 Another 
form of greeting by shooting targets with firearms seemed to take place in the case of when 
                                                             
53 Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 34. 
54 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 240. 
55 Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867’, 1878, 15–16. 
56 Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 133. 
57 Bax, The Eastern Seas, 116–34. 
58 Ishii, The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants , 17. 
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the chief of the Tipun tribe of the Puyuma met the chief of Paiwan and George Taylor. Both 
parties congregated, as described by Taylor, and 
Grasping a gun and signing to several braves to do the same, the two 
parties began to chant somewhat as follows. ’Who are you of the 
shining muskets and jingling clothes?' "We are princes of the blood and 
warriors from the great confederation of the South.' 'If you are princes, 
you are Tipuns; if you are warriors, you can hit the mark. Prove your 
tale!' 59 
Inevitably, Taylor amazed both the Puyumas and the Paiwans when he hit the sixty yards target 
they set, but it was unclear what types of firearms Taylor used. Taylor and the Paiwan indigenes 
were then treated as warriors afterwards. In this scene, firearms and the practice of firearms 
were considered and indicated as a form of rank or status among the southern indigenes. 
Despite the fact that we now cannot really know the exact meaning of firing firearms for 
Formosan indigenes, it seems certain that even from early in our period the action and the 
practice of firearms were integrated as part of indigenes’ customs or traditions.  
 
3.4. Superstitions 
 
 Firing firearms was seemingly at times required to gratify their belief in indiscernible 
spirits or superstitions, especially when disaster occurred or something took place that the 
Formosan indigenes considered as bad luck. The Rev. Campbell encountered a few occasions 
like these when he visited a mountain indigenous village of the Bunun group in Posia:  
They told me that one of their wells had been under evil influence for a 
long time, and had caused numerous deaths. They had been in the habit 
of firing into it in the evenings in the hope that the bullets from their 
long guns would dislodge the enemy.60 
An episode also occurred to Professor Steere with the Thao tribe:  
As we were just leaving the little lake and valley of Tsuisia behind, and 
everything seemed progressing fairly, the savages suddenly dropped or 
crouched to the ground, and some began groaning, while others 
pounded with their great knives on the butts of their firearms. When 
we inquired the meaning of this, we found that a bird famed for its 
                                                             
59 Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern Formosa’, 146. 
60 William Campbell, ‘Aboriginal Savages of Formosa’, Ocean Highways: The Geographical Review, 1874, 410–12; 
Campbell, Sketches from Formosa, 66. 
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foretelling powers had called out on the left hand side of the path, and 
this was considered an omen of evil. After a little stop they started on, 
but still groaning and beating their gun stocks. This bad omened bird 
stopped our march twice in the same way, but was then heard on the 
right hand, and we went on again.61 
 
It is difficult to know if this enigmatic manner of Formosan indigenes in firing or referencing 
firearms was due to the blasting sound of the firearms or the notion that the destructive power 
of the firearms might expel the evil spirit. The application or invocation of firearms pervaded 
the beliefs of Formosan indigenes. 62  
Other firearm-related superstitions of the Formosan indigenes were the diverse 
interpretations of their dreams among the different indigenous groups. These were 
investigated and collected in the survey on the 526 indigenous tribes from 7 different groups 
by the Taiwan Sotokufu from 1931. For instance, if one dreamed about firearms as being broken, 
robbed or lost, it would be considered ominous by the Seediq Tgdaya 德克達雅 and the Seejiq 
Truku 德路固 from the Seediq group63, Paiwan group64, the Truku indigenes of the Tkdaya sub-
group 木瓜蕃65, the Atayal indigenes from the Gaogan tribe in the Malepa sub-group66 and the 
Bunun indigenes from the Takivatan sub-group.67 If one dreamed about having a bath, it meant 
the firearms could not fire for the Tsarisian 傀儡蕃 of the Rukai group.68 By contrast, if one 
dreamed about obtaining firearms from others or firearms were damaged, it would be 
considered as good fortune by the Saysiyat group69 or as securing prey by the Tsarisian.70 Other 
interesting explanations when dreaming about firearms for the Tsarisian were: a dream of 
firearms during pregnancy indicated the baby would be a girl; a dream of firing firearms 
indicated good weather. 71  
 
                                                             
61 Steere, ‘Letters from Formosa’. 
62 Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府警務局理蕃課 (Taiwan Government-General), Gaoshazu Diaochashu-
Fanshegaikuang 高砂族調查書- 蕃社概況 [An Investigation of the Indigenes in Taiwan: The Overview of 
Indigenous], ed. Zhou Huimin 周惠民 (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 2011), 645, 646. 
63 Ibid., 642. 
64 Ibid., 646. 
65 Ibid., 642. 
66 Ibid., 639. 
67 Ibid., 647. 
68 Ibid., 645, 646. 
69 Ibid., 643. 
70 Ibid., 645, 646. 
71 Ibid. 
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3.5. Firearms and Ammunition for Settlement 
 
Firearms and bullets also appear to have been treated as one’s property, which could 
be used to compensate others when wrongs were committed and to settle conflicts. For 
instance, the one who hunted a head or obtained firearms from the enemy in the headhunting 
expedition became the winner in a conflict in the Saysiyat group.72 As reported by the Jinwei 
and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureau in September 1898, pans, firearms, ammunitions, 
clothes, millets, etc were items for compensating when wrongs were committed within the 
Atayal societies such as negligent homicide, intentional or deliberate injury, robbery, burglary 
and other type of crimes.73 In April 1899, the Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureau also reported a 
survey of indigenous customs for the settlement for adultery – one of the terms was that all 
the firearms belonging to the adulterate husband would be confiscated.74 Similar cases of using 
firearms for compensation when one was considered unlawful could be found among other 
indigenous groups in the south of Taiwan. For instance, within the Bunun communities, if 
someone injured another person, which injury caused the death of that other person, he had 
to unload his clothes, firearms, knives, spears and put them next to the dead body of that 
person and return to his home naked. 75 The murderer in the Tjavualji tribe of the Paiwan group 
had to provide two firearms, one pig and two pans and served hard labour at the chief’s house. 
The murderer had to provide these items until he repented of his action for at least one year. 
                                                             
72 Zhang Xu-Yi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習
與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy 
of Indigenes Management]’ (MA, National Taiwan University, History Department, 1995), 20 quoted in Chen 
Tsung-Jen 陳宗仁, ‘Jindai Taiwan Yuanzumin Tuxiang Zhong de Qiang - Jianlun Qiangzhi de Chuanru, Liutong Yu 
Shiyong 近代臺灣原住民圖相中的槍-兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用. [The Aborigines with Modern Gun: An 
Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society]’, 87. 
73 It also mentioned the monetary compensation was replaced. Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 31 年 9 月份台北縣
景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至 事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and 
Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, September 1898), (V04574\A004) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu 
Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 
(Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes 
Management ), 54. 
74 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 32 年 4 月份台中縣苗栗辦務署有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告' (Reports on 
the Indigenes affairs Mioali Provincial Affairs Bureau of Taichung-ken, April 1899), (V04595\A012) in Rijusheqi 
Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical 
Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization) , 920.  
75 Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府警務局理蕃課 (Taiwan Government-General), Gaoshazu Diaochashu-
Fanshegaikuang 高砂族調查書- 蕃社概況 [An Investigation of the Indigenes in Taiwan: The Overview of 
Indigenous], 570. 
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76 And the person who committed sexual assault in the Paiwan communities would have to 
submit a firearm and his clothes. 77  According to the Kasuvongan tribe 率芒社 , each 
compensating item had different meanings: the pot was represented in repaying the head, a 
harrow stood for repaying the body, two firearms stood for repaying the two arms, two pigs 
stood for repaying the legs, 20 knives and axes stood for repaying the fingers and toes.78 The 
items for compensating and the meanings were varied among the different tribes and 
indigenous groups. However, in these cases, the firearm was generally regarded as a significant 
item which served a function of regulating the indigenes and maintaining harmony 
within/between the tribes. It can be clearly seen that in matters of traditional compensation 
the firearm seemed to be the only modern item appearing in the list of culturally acceptable 
goods. 
Exchanging firearms and bullets was also used in the Atayal custom when making 
promises or forming conciliation between tribes or with other ethnic groups, which was also 
adopted by the Japanese in several circumstances. The process of making a promise is called 
Abao in Atayal language or Daqing 打青 and following this a stone-burying ceremony -moma 
watonofu or moma yamai- in Atayal language or Maishi 埋石 would be held to acknowledge 
the promise.79 For instance, two bullets were buried underneath the stones after the stones 
were buried by the chiefs from several Atayal tribes from the Ma’aw sub-group and the Director 
of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1896 in their promise of not killing anyone, 
harassing women, etc.80 The chief of Swashake tribe 馬凹社 submitted one bullet after he 
made promise of not killing people with his fellows at the Dahu Pacification and Reclamation 
Bureau in 1897.81  The chief of Saheyan tribe and his 3 fellows also submitted a bullet each after 
                                                             
76 Ibid., 572. 
77 Ibid., 573. 
78 Ibid. 
79Wang Mei-Hsia 王梅霞, ‘Cong [ Jiaohuan] Kan Zuqun Hudong Yu Wenhua Zai Chuanzao: Rizhi Chuqi Miaoli Diqu 
Taiyazu de Yanjiu 從「交換」看族群互動與文化再創造︰日治初期苗栗地區泰雅族的研究 (Exploring Ethnic 
Interaction and Culture Reinvention from Perspectives of Exchange: A Study of Miaoli Atayal in the Early Japanese 
Colonial Period)’, Journal of Archaeology and Anthropology 71 (2009): 112, 114. 
80 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 31 年 3 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, March 1898), (V00323\A017) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli 
Areas in Japanese Colonization), 467–469. also in a conversation between 大南勢社頭目烏石烏榮 and Japanese 
official ‘明治 29 年 12 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 
December 1896), (V00163\A036) in Ibid., 622.  
81 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年 4 月份南庄撫墾署事務成績報告' (Reports of Nanzhuang Pacification and 
Reclamation Bureau, April 1897), (V00163\A025) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu
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the chief vowed to the Japanese officials in 1900 never to kill people in the area. 82 In the Report 
on the Customs of Savage Tribes, it also mentioned how the Atayal indigenes from the Mnibu 
sub-group and the Klesan sub-group were forced to bury their firearms by the officials, and 
vowed not to rebel. 83  Atayal tribes exchanged firearms and bullets when they made vow 
together and one of the oaths could be translated something like this, 
Now we have completed the exchange of our firearms and bullets. If I 
cheated, these firearms and bullets would hit myself; if you cheated, 
these firearms and bullets would hit yourself.84   
 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness and the liability of these promises of not killing or revolting was 
problematic and questionable as there were many occurrences of murder, headhunting 
expeditions and rebellions throughout the early Japanese colonization.85 These cases illustrate 
rather the growing value of the firearm in indigenous material culture.   
Through varied narratives and observations of visitors, firearms emerge as being closely 
associated with the indigenous men’s daily lives and practices. This was reflected in their 
dependent manners when carrying firearms, which also joined their bodies with other 
assortments, and their notion of firearm property as conferring some gender status in 
matrilineal societies. The presentations of the firearms and decorations on/with the firearms 
revealed their pride within their societies and to foreigners and Chinese settlers. Firing firearms 
did not occur only for killing, but also extended to diverse cultural functions and possible 
symbolic meanings such as sending signals to their people for guarding their territories, 
expelling disaster or misfortune, informing their triumph after headhunting expeditions, etc. 
Firearms and ammunition were considered as one’s property, which could be used to regulate 
their societies and to settle conflicts. These are sure evidence of how the firearms were closely 
embedded within the indigenous customs and how the indigenes formulated different meanings 
                                                             
日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas 
in Japanese Colonization), 661.  
82 '明治 33 年 7 月份台中縣苗栗辦務署有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs  
Mioali Provincial Affairs Bureau of Taichung-ken, July 1900), (V04623\A002) in Ibid., 1043–44.  
83 Kojima Yoshimichi 小島由道, Fanzu Guanxi Diaocha Baogaoshu 番族慣習調查報告書 [Report on the Customs 
of Savage Tribes: Atayal Tribe], 1:273–74. 
84 Ibid. 
85 If the promise break in the future, someone would have to go to the place where they buried their stones and 
guns and dig them out in advance. If they did not do this, it would be considered to offend their Zuling and cause 
death and injure. Ibid. 
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for firearms in their own cultures, which will be seen as part of a notion of cultural assets as 
foreshadowed in Chapter 3, Chart 3:1.  
 
4. Extent of Involvement of Whole Community  
4.1. Head-hunting  
 
It seems clear that firearms were extensively carried and valued by indigenous men in 
their hunting practice and their lives. The application of firearms also amplified and brought 
impact to whole communities of indigenous Formosa. Particularly, firearms were mostly used 
in killing animals and humans by the Formosan indigenes in our period. I have discussed the 
significance of the headhunting ritual among indigenous societies (see Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) 
and considered hunting as one of the essential indigenes’ economic activities (see Chapter 2, 
pp.38-41). The headhunting ritual was central to the cultures and lives of Formosan indigenes. 
Their belief concerning hunting heads was considered as a striving for communicating with their 
god, hoping for a good harvest and bringing sacred strength and energy to their tribes. As the 
Rev. Mackay emphasised at that time, of headhunting 
they give themselves from earliest youth to decrepit age, following it 
with an ardour that never cools and a cruelty that never relents. The 
deer and the boar may lose their power to stir the old chief to 
enthusiasm, but to his dying day his right hand never loses it cunning; 
and to see his braves return with the spoils of a headhunting raid is as 
life to his bones. The last desire of the dying is that his sons may prove 
worthy of their sire and by stealthy step and certain thrust add to the 
trophies of the tribe.86 
 
This account explicated their passion for the headhunting custom that measured and 
symbolised the ultimate and definite endeavour for every indigenous man to accomplish in his 
life time and dedicate to his tribe. Within the indigenous societies, all individuals of all ages and 
genders also embraced the headhunting custom and cherished and revered the persons who 
hunted heads. This scene could be seen in Pickering’s notes from talking to his indigenous friend 
from the Bangas tribe 芒仔社 of the Rukai group,  
Chan-po told me his wife and children received him with the greatest 
joy and feasting when he had taken the heads of his enemies … The 
                                                             
86 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 267. 
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young girls are anxious to marry a great warrior or expert hunter ... All 
the young men and boys are anxious to distinguish themselves in this 
manner, and will practise for hours merely aiming at a leaf placed 
fourteen or fifteen yards off, supposing it to be an enemy.87 
Similar account can also be found in Steere’s notes, “Each warrior that has won the head of an 
enemy carries the trophy home on the point of his spear, and is everywhere joyfully received 
and entertained.”88 The drawing below of the Qing officials displayed the joy of ind igenes’ 
communities after hunting a head. See Figure 7:10.  
 
Figure 7:10 An indigenous man was gladly received by his community after his headhunting 
expedition.  
 
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Shengfan sharen yaowu tushuo '生番殺人耀武圖說' 
(Illustration of indigenes' triumph from headhunting) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番
俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of 
Taiwan History, 2013), 106. 
                                                             
87 Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867’, 1878, 29–31. 
88 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 137. 
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The headhunting custom of the Formosan indigenes was still unabated in the early 
Japanese colonisation. Janet B. Montgomery McGovern, an American anthropologist who 
arrived in Taiwan in 1916, rendered her observation on the importance of headhunting for the 
indigenous societies,  
That “head-hunting” should be included under the head of “social 
organization” … however, that anyone who has lived among a head 
hunting tribe will realize how closely this custom is interwoven with the 
fabric of their whole social organization. It regulates the social and 
political standing of the men of the tribe; it is directly connected with 
marriage-no head, no wife; and is reflected in the games, the songs and 
the dances of the people. Moreover, head-hunting is regulated by a 
code as rigid as the code of “an officer and a gentleman” in so -called 
civilized society- and is rather less frequently broken.89 
She also mentioned how,  
When a boy attains maturity he is supposed to celebrate this by going 
on his first head-hunting expedition which constitutes part of the 
puberty initiation ceremonies. Usually several boys of about the same 
ages go together on their first expedition, accompanied by older and 
more experience warriors of the same group, or sub-tribe.90 
 
These comprehensive accounts clearly presented the role of the headhunting custom in 
different aspects of the indigenous lives and cultures into the 1920s. In another interview of 
Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff with an indigenous man, Kim Soan, he explained their belief of 
headhunting for eternity as “the bloody hand a passport to the savage heaven”; and went on 
to say that,  
all my people believe that when we die we all must walk up the rainbow 
to the Land-of After-Death. At the end of the rainbow the gateman 
stands, and when we come he will say to us, ‘Show me your hand.’ And 
he will look at our hand, and if he finds it is clean he will say,’ Go to the 
right,’ and he will kick us into the dark nothingness below; but if he looks 
at our hand and finds it stained he will say,’ you may enter,’ and he will 
allow us to pass within.91 
These two accounts seemed to legitimate the custom of headhunting for pursuing statuses, 
capacities and eternities among the indigenous societies.  
                                                             
89 Janet B. Montgomery McGovern, Among the Head-Hunters of Formosa (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1922), 110. 
90 Ibid., 112–13. 
91 Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, 285–87. 
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However, many sources did not directly suggest a linkage of the use of firearms with the 
practice of headhunting. This is because the term “shot” in our sources could also be feasibly 
used to describe the act of using a spear in attack, which is unclear and difficult to dist inguish 
in some cases. And the Chinese word Qian 槍 carries two meanings – spear and firearm. 
Nevertheless, the illustration of Shenfan fuyai zhensha tushuo 生番伏崖偵殺圖說 (Illustration 
of indigenes prostrating on precipice and getting ready to kill) from the Qing official might verify 
the application of firearms in the indigenes’ headhunting expedition (see Figure 7:11). It shows 
that one of the indigenes was holding a firearm (in the square box) aiming at people. The 
enlarged picture below of the section of the picture indicated by a square box gives another 
clear indication of the indigene holding a firearm.  
 
Figure 7:11 Indigenes used firearms in their headhunting expedition.  
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Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Shenfan fuyai zhensha tushuo 生番伏崖偵殺圖說 
(Illustration of indigenes prostrating on precipice and getting ready to kill) in Wan Qing 
Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 102. 
The description next to it says,  
The indigenes are addicted to slaughtering, the one who beheads Han 
Chinese would be granted as the tribal leader. It is usually the case that 
the indigenes hide in the bushes of the side cliffs, await lonely Han 
Chinese traveller descending into the mountain, and then attack the 
Han Chinese with firearms, behead and take the head away with them.92 
Another two descriptions from John Dodd and the Japanese official report from Wuzhishan 
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau appeared to render the application/action of firearms in 
headhunting expedition more precisely. In Dodd’s note concerning the northern district of 
Taiwan,  
Round about the settlers’ outposts and clearings, savage headhunting 
skirmishers are thrown out … older men in possession of matchlocks 
                                                             
92 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing 
Taiwan), 102. 
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called pah tus prepare dry bark, port fire, prick the vent hole leading 
into the powder pan, and fill their ammunition bags with curious 
projectiles, and take up positions suitable for pot-shooting the tailed 
invader.93 
Another account concerned an occasion when Japanese officers were invited by the Atayal 
indigenes from the Repai tribe to view some indigenous dance. Before the indigenous dance 
began, the deputy chief of the Repai tribe and one of his fellows put on an act of headhunting 
exercise, as described here,  
Waatanpaiho, the deputy chief of Repai tribe carries a gun and knife. 
His fellow carries a bamboo-made gun and a knife. They walk to the 
centre of a courtyard and pretend for ambush. They make as if they 
were loading three bullets and shooting after murmuring and raising 
their heads from time to time. Then they shout and run about 10 meters 
to the enemy they shot earlier and cut his head off and return to their 
original position.94  
These two accounts exposed the engagement of firearms in the headhunting operation 
specifically, which shows from very varying perspectives that firearms were adopted and 
adapted by the indigenes in their headhunting custom.  
The availability of firearms amongst the Formosan indigenes and their adaptation of 
firearms from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century as presented in Chapter 
4 to 6, had certainly contributed to their effectiveness and successes in their hunting and 
headhunting expeditions. By firing their firearms in company with their other traditional 
armaments, the heads they hunted not only represented male indigenes’ political and social 
status among their own people, but also the animals they captured fed their entire tribes. 
Besides, if we revisited some of the reasons that indigenes practised their headhunting ritual 
(Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) – conflict resolution, vengeance, disaster or disease elimination, 
pursuance of agricultural fertility95, emotional vent, etc, - then it does seem that the practice of 
                                                             
93Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, The Witnessed 
Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui, 297. 
94 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, 明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification 
and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 
Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu 
Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 165.  
95Taylor noted the Paiwan had headhunting ritual. “Head-hunting prevails more or less in all their communities. 
Among some tribes a warrior need look for little favour with the fair sex unless he possesses a skull or two as 
trophies of his valour. Among others heads are used as public offerings at seed-time and harvest; and yet others 
bury the heads, erecting over each a small stone tablet; each year a counting of tablet takes place and the village 
possessing the most is awarded a handsome prize.” George Taylor, ‘Formosa: Characteristic Traits of the Island and 
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headhunting was easily invoked and provoked by the Chinese settlers, the foreigners, the Qing 
and Japanese governments or ultimately the West throughout the late nineteenth century. 
These invaders frequently took indigenes’ lands by deceit and cut trees for gain, which created 
the hostilities between indigenous tribes and with Chinese settlers. They entered the 
indigenous tribes, possibly spreading disease (see Chapter 8 below) and often destroying their 
original ecology systems eventually. Although there is no direct link to prove that the 
enthusiasm of the headhunting ritual of indigenous people alone impelled them to obtain 
firearms, it was only seemingly socially natural for male indigenes to adopt the more efficient 
and the more destructive power of firearms in headhunting and general animal hunting. The 
application of firearms combined with their strong consensus about headhunting not only 
formulated even more powerful and destructive resistance, but also might have served the 
function of re-assertion of traditions and identities within indigenous communities and 
individuals. This is what I also call the cultural asset of firearms.    
 
4.2. Ceremonies 
 
The function of firearms also extended to ceremonials and rites in indigenous societies 
such as in weddings and funerals. Firearms or matchlocks were included as one of the wedding 
gifts that the groom was required to prepare and to give to the parents of his bride. Amongst 
the mountain indigenes of the Puyuman, as Rev. Hugh Ritchie noted in his visit to Pilam village 
卑南 (Taidong County),  
On the marriage day the husband brings a gift to the parent of his bride; 
—cloth, a gun and a pot; —a pig is killed and wine is handed round; and 
if it be the wish of the husband to take his wife elsewhere, she will not 
follow him during the life-time of her parents.96  
 
In the Draft for the Xinzhu Xian Gazetteer which was edited before the end of Qing governance 
in Taiwan, there was recorded the wedding customs of [probably] the Atayals: 
                                                             
Its Aboriginal Inhabitants’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New 
Monthly Series, 11, no. 4 (1 April 1889): 224–39.in George Taylor, Aborigines of South Taiwan in the 1880s, ed. Glen 
Dudbridge (Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Institute of Taiwan History, Academica Sinica, 1999), 
150–68. 
96 Hugh Ritchie, ‘Notes of a Journey in East Formosa’, The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal 6 (1875): 208. 
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sickle, snickersnee, Chinese matchlocks and other items were used as 
the betrothal gifts. Supreme gifts were sickles and Chinese matchlocks 
which were worth 200 silver tael …97 
 
A portrayal was drawn by Qing official recording an indigenous woman marrying a Chinese 
man and demonstrated preparation of the wedding and the wedding gifts around the same 
period (see Figure 7:12), and a description next to it says,  
Most of the indigenous women often have tedious lives; thus, the 
indigenous girls prefer to be married to the Hans. It's common to see 
parents taking their daughters out of the mountains to search for 
potential matches. The situation applies all across the Puyuma, 
Xiuguluan region. The engagement presents from rich groom families 
would be two firearms, two swords, pig, wine, red clothes.98 
 
Figure 7:12 indigenous woman marrying a Chinese man 
 
                                                             
97 Zheng Pengyun 鄭鵬雲 and Ceng Fengchen 曾逢辰, Xinzhu Xianzhi Chugao 新竹縣志初稿 [Draft Gazetteer of 
Xinzhu Xian ], 190. 
98 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing 
Taiwan), 148. 
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Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Fannu jiahan tushuo 番女嫁漢圖說 (Illustration of 
indigenous woman marrying a Chinese man) Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 
(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan 
History, 2013), 148. 
In the early Japanese rule, Ishii also noted how the value of the rifle was measurable in terms 
of beads and cloth, which were regarded as currency. The rifle could be used as a wedding gift, 
which was also called the bride-money or Naaze or Binajii in Atayal language, when the beaded 
cloth could not be obtained in Atayal custom.99 
Firearms performed as precious gifts for the wedding and this appeared to be shared 
between such different groups as the mountain indigenes in the north and the south of Taiwan 
and in the matrilineal societies of the Puyumas, in the amalgamative patrilineal societies of the 
Atayals and the male dominate-based societies of the Paiwans. Journalist Edward House 
noticed how several shots were fired abruptly from Sialiao, a village of the Paiwans when a 
marriage festival was in progress.100 The joining of firearms could have represented the courage 
of the groom when marrying his bride, which was essential to show his parents-in-law. The 
sounds of firing firearms might have added some more joy and excitement for the couple and 
villagers.  
Firearms also accompanied the deceased in some indigenes’ funeral customs. According 
to the description of Guérin, knives, firearms, and powder flasks were among the several items 
possessed by the dead for hunting and fighting that were buried in the tomb, which was under 
the beds in the indigenes’ huts, almost certainly Atayal.101 This was also often recorded in the 
Japanese’ official reports in such regions as Taoyaun, Xinzhu and Miaoli Counties, where most 
of the Atayal indigene lived in the first few years of Japanese colonisation.  102 The Paiwans had 
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the same custom as narrated by Hu Zhuan and George Taylor in the 1880s, the dead were 
wrapped in clothes (Taylor noted specifically in buffalo skin), lined with knife, firearms, bracelet, 
beads and buried near their huts.103 Nevertheless, the custom of accompanying firearms at 
weddings and funerals among different indigenous groups might vary or in some cases even not 
exist: the Amis, for instance, did not bury firearms or any weapons with the dead, but only 
ornaments, as Dr. Wykeham Myers noted.104  
Not only in the wedding and funerals, firearms were also used in other types of 
ceremony. For instance, several knives, spears, plate and firearms were placed next to the 
house with other items by the plains indigenes of the Siraya group in areas of the Yujing basin 
in the practice of Zhuoxiang 作向. This practice was for the purpose of praying to their god, 
drinking, eating, singing, dancing and hunting, according to the Miscellany of Anping County in 
the 1890s.105 Rifles were also used in the performance of the purification ceremony by the 
Atayal indigenes when there were occurrences of marriage, divorce, adultery, murder and other 
acts, which countered the Atayal’s traditions. 106  Firearms as foreign and alien pieces of 
technology which were forged or transferred by the Chinese or foreigners, served as significant 
and intimate objects in the major ceremonies of their lives. This is in itself a significant and 
remarkable fact. 
 
4.3. Women & Children  
 
Involvements of firearms and their accessories amongst indigenous women and children 
are also perceptible, despite the fact that hunting and head-hunting were not their normally 
acceptable tasks in their societies. According to the survey of the indigenous groups conducted 
by the Taiwan Sotokufu, in some indigenous tribes, women were strictly forbidden to involve 
themselves in hunting or even to touch firearms. For instance, the Atayal indigenous women of 
                                                             
Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu 
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103 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taidong Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊 [Journal of Taidong], 52; Taylor, ‘Formosa: 
Characteristic Traits of the Island and Its Aboriginal Inhabitants’, 224–39. 
104 Myers, ‘Notes on the Aborigines of South Formosa’, 57. 
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the P'anoh tribe from the Tseole sub-group were prohibited touching firearms in order to avoid 
the risk of not obtaining any prey;107 the Paiwan indigenous women of Tjavualji tribe, who were 
in their pregnancy or menses, were not allowed to touch any armaments. 108  But firearm 
primers were worn by the indigenous women as ornament on their necklaces with various 
colours of beads, tobacco pouches and shells, as Swinhoe noted as early as 1862 during his visit 
to mountain indigenes on the northwest coast, near Tamsui River.109 As mentioned before in 
Chapters 4 on the relationship of indigenes with the Chinese, indigenous women often acted as 
mediators between indigenous and Chinese villages, especially some who were married to 
Chinese settlers (see pp.100-102). Indigenous women seemed to recognize the rifle as better 
than a hand-gun or musket. On one occasion, an indigenous woman “recommended the 
mountain indigenes to only ask for the rifle” when a group of mountain indigenes were anxious 
to procure firearms from Swinhoe and his party.110 The character of indigenous women was 
critical, not only in connecting different ethnic groups, but also as they acted in the period of 
transition between traditional and modern firearms. Captain Bax claimed they met two guards 
who were elderly plains indigenous women and who were armed with matchlocks.111 However, 
this does not seem to strictly accord with cultural norms, because the tribal work that 
indigenous women conducted did not include hunting and headhunting, which were reserved 
as only male, although they were often involved in preparing festival and dancing after 
successful raids. The character of indigenous women was mentioned by Ishii, in accordance with 
his observation, that the indigenous women sometimes performed protests against trivial wars 
and restored harmonies between indigenous tribes. 112 And during the wars, the indigenous 
women and their children were the ones preparing provision for the warrior and carrying them 
to the battle field. 113 
It also seemed to be inevitable that boys were trained to use firearms in indigenous 
tribes. Particularly in Amis, Sakizaya, Puyuma, Tsou and Rukai groups, boys from the age of 12 
had to live in gathering houses where they received training and joined hunting and 
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headhunting expeditions. (also see Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) Pickering remarked on this when he 
travelled to the Bangas tribe of Rukai groups in 1866-1867,  
The first things put into the hands of a boy are a wooden knife and gun, 
or a bow and arrow. With these toys they play at lying in ambush and 
taking heads. On the victim falling, the other would rush out of his 
ambush, and pretend to cut off his head, holding it up with a proud 
look.114  
Moreover,  
All the young men and boys are anxious to distinguish themselves in 
this manner (headhunting), and will practise for hours merely aiming 
at a leaf placed fourteen or fifteen yards off, supposing it to be an 
enemy.115 
 
George Taylor also noted how the young Paiwan males were with firearms, “the people seemed 
destitute of the common necessaries of life, yet each boy of twelve possessed a gun without 
which he never left the dwelling.”116 It seemed to be the case that indigenous boys and young 
men were situated in an atmosphere of headhunting and were trained to practise with firearms 
as deadly weapons in order to reach their ultimate goal and gain their positions in their tribes.  
This scene was also reported in an earlier section on the early Japanese governance that 
all the 15 or 16 to 60 years-old male indigenes carried firearms in their hands.117 (See this chapter 
Section 2.1) However, the Atayal boys might have learned to use firearms even earlier than 15 
or 16 years old under the father’s guidance. As Ish ii noted,  
When a boy attains the age of seven or eight, he is placed under the 
care of the father, who teaches him the brave deeds of his ancestors 
and other heroes of the village, in order that the boy may develop a 
warlike spirit. The father also teaches his boy the art of using a sword 
and fire-arms, and takes him out hunting.118  
 
If we revisit the earlier account on the involvement of indigenous boys in headhunting from 
McGovern (see p. 291), this account seems to suggest that the indigenous boys started to learn 
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how to operate firearms at this early age in order to prepare and to celebrate their rite of 
passage by going on headhunting expeditions.  
From the practicality side, Formosan indigenes appeared to adapt the firearms and 
incorporate them with their primitive weapons such as knife, spear, arrow and bow in their 
hunting and headhunting expeditions. Formosan indigenes also endowed meanings and values 
to firearms within their lives and cultures. From using the firearms as their primary weapon in 
hunting and headhunting, polishing their firearms, decorating their huts with firearms, 
displaying firearms in the tribal ceremonies, firing firearms to show how they demonstrated 
their courtesy or signaled delivery and kept evil spirits or bad luck away, the firearms were very 
much embedded within indigenous cultures. The use of firearms also assisted the practices of 
headhunting ritual and the participation of women and boys in it in some way, which enhanced 
existing traditions and identities among indigenous societies and individuals.  
Such strong cultural elements in firearm use amongst the indigenous societies seem to 
be of even great importance when we both identify the contrast with the Chinese and 
acknowledge the acceleration of outside aggression on the indigenous territories through time, 
thus the growth of frontiers of exchange, in which firearms might pass to and fro as identified 
in Chapter 6 above. In comparison to indigenous cultures, apart from using firearms to fight in 
conflicts and the evidence of some Hakkas forging firearms, this type of coalition between 
firearms and cultures did not seem to appear in Chinese societies. These cultural assets were 
also protracted and practised under the growing economic and political encroachment of the 
Western nations, the Qing and the Japanese government and the Chinese settlers, who also 
contributed the flow of firearms into the indigenes’ hands.  
 
5. Negligence of Firearms in Chinese Soldiers’ Hands 
Small, more or less profound excursions in more or less unknown and 
uncivilized countries are often made, but that a huge empire counting 
hundreds of millions, begins to allow European culture, modern facilities 
and modern techniques to enter, that can not be repeated often and is 
retroactive even for the European peoples. It is of such far reaching, in 
detail undeniable importance that I saw it as my duty to briefly draw up 
the specific symptoms and to swiftly sketch the first beginnings, as they 
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to this extent sure enough only have revealed themselves in a province 
lying on the outside. 119  
Warburg’s strong suggestion in 1888 above, seems to reflect on the Qing soldiers who 
were given traditional matchlocks and modern firearms for battling in the external warfare and 
pacifying the indigenes’ revolts in Taiwan, as well as on the Chinese settlers who obtained 
firearms for self-defence – that is, they did not seem to develop any type of culture of firearms 
or to integrate the firearms within Chinese culture in a manner similar to the Formosan 
indigenes. Issues concerning the grades and conditions of weapon and the adjustment of 
firearms among the Chinese soldiers and the Chinese settlers were often reported by the 
foreigners, some of whom had experience in warfare, as well as the Chinese administrators. 
These predicaments seemed to linger over from the last thirty years under the Qing governance.  
Firstly, the backwardness of weaponry of the Chinese soldiers was reported by 
foreigners who travelled to Taiwan and the Chinese officials of the Fujian Province in the period 
of 1860-1884. In the report of the Admiral of Fujian, Jiang Changgui 江長貴 after he examined 
several military bases in Taiwan and Penghu island, he found more traditional weapons like 
arrows and bows, Chinese matchlocks and rattan-made shields were commonly used by the 
battalions.120 Ibis, the Estonian ensign who visited Taiwan in 1875, reported that,  
The Chinese soldier is here, as in China, poorly disciplined, outfitted 
with sorry muskets, spears and similar antediluvian rubbish, and, as 
was frequently shown to be the case, easily gives in to the privations 
and hardships that a field march into the mountains against the 
natives brings with it.121 
 
Ding, Richang, the Governor of Fujian (1875-1879) suggested that the firearms and powder that 
China purchased were the surplus ones after being selected by other countries, when he 
managed the Machinery Bureau in Shanghai in the 1860s, and he urged the purchase and 
replacement of second-rate weapons with the finest weapons for the navy and the army and 
actual manufacture of weapons.122 This problem was to an extent addressed after the Mudan 
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Incident in 1874 when many modern weapons such as foreign breech loader firearms, Henry 
Martini rifles, muzzleloaders, Winchester repeating rifles (see Chapter 4, pp. 141-143) were 
transferred to Taiwan by orders of Sheng Baozhen and Ding Richang. After the partition of 
Taiwan from the Fujian Province, the renovation of armaments in the Chinese military was 
laggardly and straggly, though Liu, Mingchuan actively requested even more modern firearms 
such as Mausers, Krupps, Hotchkiss rifles, Snider rifles, Winchester rifles, Kentucky rifles and 
Lee rifles (also see Chapter 5, p 197-200 and 202-205) during and after the Sino-French War 
(1884-1885) from mainland China, and built ammunition factories in Taiwan. In the report of 
Hu Zhuan, the inspector of garrisons of Taiwan Province from 1891 it was stated that, 
The ordnance and army camps should be told to shortly carry out the 
examination of the old guns like muzzle-loading rifles and rifles to see 
the exact numbers of the usable and unusable. The result needs to be 
reported in writing to verify the number, ask for an entire exchange, or 
exchange for the new ones a few times, it is necessary that every camp 
soldier has a workable gun in order that forewarned is forearmed. 
Furthermore, do inspect the damage in muzzle-loading rifles and rifles, 
etc., especially the muzzle and bolt; the barrel usually works well, the 
broken guns need to be sent to the machinery bureau for repair. It is 
believed that those should be able to work as a new gun. If those are 
repaired instantly and shortly, the guns in the ordnance will not rust. It 
seems also urgent to make sure that the soldiers in every camp use 
them properly.123 
This clearly shows that the weaponry of the Chinese soldiers and braves was not only outdated, 
but also lacked repair in order to serve its full functions under the circumstances of erratic 
threats from the Western countries in Asia and ongoing conflicts between the indigenes and 
the Chinese settlers and the Chinese military in Taiwan. Wang Ermin, a modern Chinese 
historian specialising in imperial Chinese armament development during the late Qing period, 
has pointed out that the lack of technological innovation in the Chinese arsenals was the major 
problem for the armaments industry. He mentioned that the weaponry the Chinese 
manufactured was all copied from the Western models and the machines for manufacturing 
the weaponry had to be purchased from the ever improving innovation of the Western nations. 
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China could only follow the footsteps of the West since China did not develop heavy industries 
like the West and it became a huge burden for China to purchase new machines.124 Although I 
suggested in Chapter 5 that the level of weaponry among the Chinese army in the period of 
1884-1895 was modernized and pointed to the possibility of large numbers of modernized 
armaments being transferred to Taiwan, from here we also lay out another question on the 
level of weapon availability and ubiquity within the grasp of Chinese troops. In themselves, 
firearms do not a soldier make. Clearly Chinese armaments were merely borrowed from 
Western sources and were not integrated into the training and understanding of Chinese troops.  
The transformation of the Chinese soldiers using modern and Western firearms became 
the second major issue. In fact, the Chinese soldiers struggled in adapting modern and Western 
rifles and relied on their shooting skills with bows, spears and swords. General Le Gendre 
commented on how the 500 Chinese soldiers “furnished with good European rifles, were 
inadequate to the task before them” when he and the Chinese troops were sent for the military 
operation after the Rover Incident. 125 An observation on Chinese soldiers in Taiwan depending 
on the traditional Chinese weapons was noted by Steere in 1874,  
the Chinese soldiers carry firelocks, and, in some cases, are armed with 
rifles and sword bayonets; but their preferment does not depend upon 
skill in their use, but upon their skill in using the bow and the spear ... In 
an open park within the walls several military mandarins were practising 
with the bow and arrow, and military preferment in China, in this day of 
breech-loaders and rifled cannon depends upon skill in archery and in 
the use of the sword.126 
This might have been foreseen in the imperial Ever-Victorious Army who nominally adopted 
the Enfield rifle in 1860s, but “seldom drilled more than once a day and they concentrated on 
the use of traditional weapons-fireballs, swords, knives, spears, and a few gingalls” as historian 
Richard J. Smith suggested. 127 Shen, Bao-Zheng appeared to perceive the issue of adapting 
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modern firearms, and recruited experienced foreign officers to instruct Chinese soldiers and 
local Chinese braves in Taiwan. In 1874, Shen reported that,  
Fine soldiers were selected from every battalion and were taught 
foreign battle arrays with foreign firearms by several foreign instructors 
and more than 20 Chinese instructors, but it didn’t appear to have any 
effect and it brought many complaints. If there was no improvement 
after a few months, an order to dismiss will proceed in order to save the 
budget.128 
Obviously the Chinese soldiers could not accommodate to the Western battle array which 
relied greatly on the Western firearms. In a letter of Shen to Prosper Marie Giquel,129 Shen 
spoke about how the local braves recruited in Taiwan could not drill as the foreign firearm 
squadrons could. 130  This problem remained until 1885, even after the Chinese troops had 
repulsed the French troops in the Sino-French War (1884-1885) and was reported on in 
Liuzhuangsugong zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [The memoir of Liu Mingchuan] and Taiwan riji yu bingqi
臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Report on Taiwan], which recorded the reviews of military 
camps in Taiwan. When Liu, Mingchuan examined the troops in Taiwan and reported 
concerning the conditions of the Xian and Anhui Armies in Taiwan,  
Troops were not fine, weapons were not consistent, some drilled with 
breech-loading rifles and some drilled with muzzle-loadings [and] ... 
breech-loading rifles were mostly used by most battalions, which 
required intensive training and practising. If the markings of the rear 
sight were not clear, the soldiers targeted aimlessly without knowing 
the distance and height. Holding firearms would be equivalent as [being] 
without firearms.131 
Further issues were divulged by Hu Zhuan who described in what manner the muzzle-loading 
rifles were held by the Chinese military and the Chinese guards when he inspected several 
camps based in eastern and southern Taiwan near the indigenes ’ territories in the early 1890s. 
He noted how the braves exchanged their firearms frequently, which resulted in the troops 
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being in asymmetrical array and most of the firearms were broken and unrepairable due to the 
low-quality skill of gunsmiths in camps. Moreover, he supervised the soldiers in practise of their 
shooting skills with muzzle loading rifles instead of breech loading rifles, claiming that the two 
type of rifles only had minor differences, to save the cost of breech loading bullets. 132 Although 
Hu Zhuan requested the examination of the operable firearms, to repair and replace firearms 
in every camp and commanded that all soldiers and braves should have firearms and be made 
ready for battles, the entire process would have taken some time. Meanwhile, endless battles 
were being fought and lives lost as the Chinese soldiers and braves encountered the indigenes. 
Also, the Chinese soldiers appeared to demonstrate poor and imbalanced performance in 
target practices when Hu inspected across the camps in 1892. This might also show more clearly 
the difficulties of the Chinese soldiers in adapting modern firearms. For instance, Hu stated that 
in battalions based in Anping, Tainan and Zhenghai Houjun 鎮海後軍, Taidong County, 60 to 
70 percent of soldiers could hit the targets133 and 91 men could hit a perfect score of 3 shots 
amongst 500 men in the best performing battalion of Zhenghai Houjun.134 He also noted the 
number of men in some camps, the total number of hit targets and the number of men who hit 
perfect with 3 shots and 2 shots in southern and eastern Taiwan (See the Chart 7:1 below).  
 
Chart 7:1 The Chinese Military: Firearms performance in 1892 
Location of military camps  No. Men No. Shots 
(A) 
Hit Target 
(B) 
Page No.  B/A % 
Pingdong, Dashuling  
大樹林135 
200 600 127 P16 21% 
Taidong, Balangwei 
巴塱衛, 卑南屯軍136 
100 300 77 P16 26% 
Hualien, Wuquancheng  
吳全城 (Shoufeng township
壽豐鄉) 137 
500 1500 356 P18 23% 
                                                             
132 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan], 44–45. 
133 Ibid., 41. 
134 Ibid., 14. 
135 Ibid., 16. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., 18. 
307 
 
Hualian, Bazizhuang  
拔子莊 (Ruishui township) 
138 
200 600 166 P18 28% 
Hualian, Xinkaiyuan 新開園 
(now Chishang Township 池
上鄉)139 
500 1500 420 P19 28% 
Total  1500 4500 1146  25*% 
 
According to our Chart, 4,500 shots were fired by 1500 men of which 25 percent hit the targets 
and with the variation of 21% as the lowest performance. Within the camps Hu visited, some 
men used breech-loading rifles and some used muzzle-loading rifles, but Hu only recorded this 
distinction in a camp near Sanzhiliao 三隻寮, Guoxing Town, Nantou County where 7 men 
gained a perfect score of 3 shots and 11 men gained 2 shots by using breech-loading rifles and 
only 3 men gained a perfect score of 3 shots by using muzzle-loading rifles.140 Another even 
more obvious evidence in Hu’s reports was that less than 30 percent hit the targets among a 
hundred men from the 3 battalions (1,500 men) who were selected in target practice using 
Mausers, Lee rifles and Hotchkiss rifles, for the men were 
also experiencing obstacles in loading, aiming, cocking the triggers 
which delayed the firing and failed to hit the targets. This is the 
performance from the selected soldiers, it could be known to the 
performance from the rest. After purchasing expensive armaments and 
paying highly to maintain the defence corps, which became one of the 
most important stations, this is the result of troops with a lack of drills. 
The troops will face difficulty in providing any defence, strength in wars 
or assistance to other stations in the future.141  
 
This is a damning judgement at any time and place and full indication that the Chinese troops 
had major, debilitating problems in most aspects involved in adapting modern firearms, very 
unlike what we know of the indigenes who so readily became well accomplished, incorporating 
the firearms within their traditional weapons in their hunting and headhunting customs.  
The poor discipline of Chinese troops was another issue that can not be neglected. As I 
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discussed briefly in Chapter 5 on the ill-discipline of the Chinese soldiers and the misapplication 
and destruction of firearms and ammunitions caused by the Chinese soldiers (see Chapter 5, 
pp. 189-191) before ceding Taiwan to Japan. Nevertheless, this phenomenon was forecasted in 
the journals and the Chinese official reports even before the Sino-Japan War. This could be seen 
in Ibis’ journal when he commended the Chinese manufactured boat in Fu-chau in 1870 – the 
Fooshing, which resembled the English station ship with 80 horse power, 7 to 8 knots of cruising 
speed and armed with 4 copper weapons and 1 steel 6-inch which loaded from the breech end 
and the Chinese officers who seemed to receive a fair education in Fu-Chau marine college - he 
then immediately disparaged the lack of discipline and disorder of the sailor and officers,  
The lack of discipline is striking: the sailors and officers sit on the 
quarter-deck and smoke. The beds are not made for the day on the 
sleeping deck, and off-duty men sleep and smoke in them. Clamor and 
chatter are noticeable at work, though they do work quickly. It is hard 
to distinguish an officer from a sailor by their clothes, in which complete 
freedom reigns: some walk around in Chinese, some half in European.142  
 
Obviously, Ibis, as an ensign, so however junior a professionally trained military officer, 
disapproved of what he saw and made seemly judgements that certainly reflected the lack of 
accommodation of modern weaponry. Another account of the poor condition of Chinese 
soldiers in the military camp was noted by George Ede, the English Presbyterian missionary at 
Tainan 1883 -1903, 
Of the sixty soldiers at this camp only three did not smoke opium. The 
whole set of them were in a most plighty [sic] condition. Many were in 
rags, and not a few had their bodies covered with most offensive sores. 
On asking if the soldiers had not regular drill, I was told by a fellow-
traveller that the only exercise they went through was with the "big 
gun”, which is a name jocularly given to the opium-pipe.143 
Warburg also noted the distressed Chinese soldiers at the stations in the south , which were 
formed to guard at the indigenes’ borders, but in reality the Chinese soldiers failed their task, 
for of “the ten soldiers that are supposed to be stationed there, at least nine are on leave, for 
which they have to deliver three of six dollars of their monthly pay to the mandarin.”144 The 
inferior health and frequent absence of the soldiers (see Chapter 8 below) and the corruption 
                                                             
142 Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 139–40. 
143 Ede, ‘Journey to North Formosa’, 6. 
144 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
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within the military system certainly affected the strength and the standards in drills. The 
Chinese officials – Liu Mingchuan and Hu Zhuan - also gave accounts of the poorly disciplined 
soldiers in their reports. Liu stated his dissatisfaction about the performance of the Chinese 
soldiers, including Xiang and Anhui Armies, and braves in Taiwan, who were mostly lacking in 
training, aging, addicted to opium or were bureaucrats, and where lower-rank of military 
officers led the drills instead of their leaders.145 He also revealed how some battalions did not 
drill all year, approximately 8 or 9 out of 10 battalions and only 2 or 3 out of 10 battalions drilled 
significantly.146 Hu Zhuan also reported how the garrisons based in mountain areas were mostly 
addicted to opium. After he examined 5 shao or companies, which consisted approximately of 
500 men in total, only 85 men were not addicted to opium and most of the opium addicts were 
newly recruited. All opium addicts were given one month to quit, but none of them managed 
to quit or were reluctant to quit.147  
These poor qualities of Chinese soldiers and braves certainly affected the processes of 
adjusting with the modern firearms. It seems very clear and in stark contrast with Taiwanese 
indigenous groups that a culture of the firearm did not exist in the Chinese lives and traditions. 
In contrast, the indigenes appeared to have greater motivation and a deep desire of obtaining 
firearms and using firearms in their hunting and headhunting practices for the pride and prize 
of male indigenes and within indigenes’ societies.  
 
6. Japanese Soldiers’ Proficiency in Modern Armament   
 
So far we have known the success of Japan in modernising her military forces and adapting 
Western military technology from the second half of the nineteenth century as briefly discussed 
in the beginning of Section 3 in Chapter 6. After defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War 1895, 
Japan continued to apply her advanced military technologies to quell the remaining rebels of 
the Qing army and Formosan indigenes’ erratic revolts in the early Japanese colonization (see 
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Chapter 6 Section 2). This was in addition to the establishment of transportation and 
communication systems such as railways, roads and telegram (see Chapter 6 Section 1). These 
not only allowed the Taiwan Sotokufu to mobilise its troops and armament, but also to transport 
the camphor, woods, mineral, tea from the mountains to the plain areas.  
Compared to the late Qing governance, the advanced military technologies seemed to be 
applied efficiently by the Japanese police and troops in pacifying uprisings along with their 
modern warships, whereas the Qing army continued to use backward muzzle loading rifles, 
which were either broken or insufficient. The Japanese police and troops, who were 
commissioned in managing/pacifying the mountain indigenes, did not seem to have many 
issues in adapting Western weapons according to the record of Records of Indigenes’ 
Management.148 Except there were records about how the Japanese police serving in the north 
mountain regions performed poorly in a shooting competition in 1907 and were required to 
improve; 149 a notification to the police in Taipei, Taoyuan and Xinzhu provinces for not wasting 
ammunition in shooting to prevent the indigenes’ attack in 1911; and a report from the Miaoli 
Provincial Affairs Bureau about the absence of institutions to supervise the guards, the 
inappropriate deployment of guards, the addiction of guards to opium ( 8 or 9 out of 10 guards 
used opium), the lack of training and maintaining firearms for the guards, and the employment 
of guards, who did not receive sufficient assessments of their fitness, age and their capacities 
in combat. 150    
More generally, the Police Bureau of the Taiwan Sotokufu appeared to train the Japanese 
police routinely and regulated the firearms and ammunition efficiently. For instance, in January 
1904, several regulations on the firearms and ammunition management for the Japanese police 
and Chinese/indigenes’ guards were enacted and issued by the Taoyuan Province. As it outlines: 
proofs for receiving and returning firearms and ammunition should be submitted to the stations; 
firearms and firearm accessories should correspond with the account books and be recorded in 
the account book before handing them over; each police and guard could borrow 30 shots and 
                                                             
148 The outcome, the sufficiency and efficiency of Japanese troops, police and guards in Taiwan certainly require 
further investigation later. This also requires research from other sources, apart from Riban Shio, which was 
mainly focusing on the management of indigenes from 1895 to 1926.  
149 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:455. 
150 Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民
史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization) , 
979–980.in 明治 32 年 8, 9 月 
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each brave could borrow 20 shots, but they would not be restricted by this limit under some 
special circumstances or transportation inconvenience; each branch should have a sufficient 
supply of ammunition; when the firearm, firearm accessories and ammunitions were damaged 
or missing, further investigation should be made; firearms and ammunition among the police, 
guards and braves should not be mixed in use, but reasons should be provided if  someone 
wished to change the regulated amount of ammunitions; types and number of ammunition and 
reasons should be recorded when the loaned ammunitions were exhausted or required supply; 
cartridges were required when requesting ammunition supply; reasons should be stated if one 
could not return the cartridges; and the section manager of police bureau and the Director of 
each branch should inspect and examine the status of firearms and ammunition every two 
months. 151  
In the same year in August, Shengken Province issued a list of duties for the Japanese 
police and Chinese/indigenous guards, who worked in the indigenous regions. This list included 
duties in the indigenous regions, guides for formality and uniform, instructions for operating 
the firearms and ammunition and for guard and defence. 152 Similar regulations on the firearms 
and ammunition for the guards in the “List of regulations on the duties of the police in 
indigenous borders in Miaoli County” 153 and for some Chinese brave regiments or Zhuangding 
tuan 壯丁團 in Yilan154, and instructions for the camphor workers in using and maintaining 
snider rifles in Sanjiaoyong 三角湧 (Sanxia District, New Taipei City) in 1907155 could be found 
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154 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '宜蘭壯丁團編制' (The establishment of Yilan braves, January 1898), (V00294\A007) in 
Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical 
Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 436–347, 439, 441.   
155  '核准平井勢次郎申請之貸與及攜帶槍械彈藥以防蕃案 ' (Approval of Hirai Seijiro’s application for 
borrowing and carrying guns and ammunition in defence of the indigenes, June 1907), (V05031 \001) in Wang 
Xuexin 王學新, Rizhi Shiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhuminn Shiliao Huibian Zhiyi: Lifan Zhengce 日治時期臺北
桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 [Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in 
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in the Japanese official documents. Moreover, according to the record of Riban shikô in 1908, a 
notification was sent and listed several requirements in live ammunition maneuvers156, such as,  
1. Every man should take accurate position and posture during the firing training. 
2. Every man should fire 5 shots each time.  
3. Live ammunition maneuvers should be held four times annually.  
4. Every man should comply with orders strictly.  
5. Each shot is credited 5 points as a full score.  
6. The distance and the size of the target for the firing training should be noted in 
the result table.  
These regulations certainly must have obtained some control over the firearms and ammunition 
which were held in the hands of police, Chinese/indigenous guard and braves. This might have 
reduced the chances for the police, guards and braves to smuggle firearms and ammunition to 
the indigenes. The frequent ammunition maneuvers and shooting competitions also 
maintained the combat capacities of the police and guards in battlefields. These regulations on 
controlling firearms and ammunition and requirements in maneuvers clearly show the contrast 
with the ill-disciplined character of Chinese soldiers and guards, who were lacking in training as 
mentioned in Section 4 in this chapter. However, the Taiwan Sotokufu could not actually control 
and effectively halt the indigenous rebellions completely until the 1930s, and cases of 
smuggling between indigenous tribes, with Tongshi 通事 and Chinese civilians could still be 
found in the early Japanese colonisation (see Chapter 6, Section 3.3.3). What presently remains 
unclear is whether the greater formality of the relations between modern firearms and soldiers 
in the Japanese case really matched the effectiveness of the cultural embeddedness of the 
firearm amongst Taiwan indigenous groups, especially of those who were still engaged in 
headhunting cultures.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have suggested that cultural embeddedness of the firearm gave the 
indigenous a special edge in eastern conflicts by demonstrating different aspects of using 
firearms in their cultures. The applications of firearms in hunting activities represented the 
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practicality of firearms, which allowed them not only to obtain food and to commence in trade, 
but also to defend themselves and to attack invaders effectively. They had learnt to adapt the 
capabilities that the firearms could offer them and incorporate the firearms into their 
movement and postures in hunting field, in battle field or in any circumstances. Then their 
strong attachment of firearms with their bodies, attitudes, manners and beliefs represented the 
“spiritual” cultural role of firearms individually, which might construct and sustain their 
adaptation of firearms in their lives. The involvement of firearms in the indigenes’ headhunting 
custom, weddings and funerals also continued to reassert their identities and prestige in the 
indigenous communities and the indigenous boys were nurtured under this environment 
through their training in male clubs or joining hunting and headhunting expeditions. These were 
the novel elements of cultural embedment of firearms among the indigenous societies, which 
became their cultural assets, which in turn allowed them to most effectively fight against others 
in their prolonged resistance. In contrast to the backwardness of the Qing Chinese military 
equipment, issues in adapting modern firearms and poor discipline, and to the management of 
firearms of the Taiwan Sotokufu, who succeeded in manufacturing and adapting modern 
firearms, Formosan indigenes’ firearms culture empowered them to preserve some 
independence from the colonists, especially important given their limited supply of firearms 
and ammunition. For the plains indigenes who enlisted in the Qing military, the cultures of 
firearms they inherited might explain the reason why plains indigenes military became the 
major defence corps in late nineteenth century Taiwan as Xu Yu-Liang suggested (Chapter 5).157 
The fact that rebellions went on so long after 1895 is clearly some complex effect resulting from 
increased encroachment, increased exchanges of weapons across indigenous territories, 
contrasting advantages of local environmental factors (that is in brief the detailed knowledge of 
terrain held by the indigenous), and differences in the efficiency of weapon use between the 
indigenous, the Chinese and the Japanese.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
Summary of the Thesis 
 
On the frontier in the eastern mountains of Taiwan, there seems to have been a close 
relationship between the possession of increasingly modern firearms, particularly from the 
1880s and beyond, and the commercialization within those regions, where there were 
increasing contacts and increasing demands for raw materials. It is the importance of firearms 
at the points of continual or repeated conflicts, which we are trying to explain. The indigenes 
in Taiwan, especially the mountain indigenes, appear to have had increasing access to modern 
firearms and developed their firearms cultures at different levels during the late nineteenth to 
the early twentieth century according to our findings in this dissertation, detailed especially in 
Chapters 3-6. Most importantly, by adopting and adapting to firearms, the mountain 
indigenous people of Taiwan revealed an unusual case of a simple forest society that managed 
to fight in a prolonged manner against encroachment from both the Chinese civilization and 
the far more industrially developed military nations.  
It is difficult to isolate the specific and major reasons for the indigenes taking up firearms 
on the one hand or using them so successfully on the other. What I have demonstrated in this 
dissertation is the circumstances of the indigenes and the warfare they were engaged in directly 
or indirectly in this critical period (1860-1914) in a broader context. In this way, we gain 
understanding as to why and how the indigenes took up firearms. I have then gone on to 
demonstrate why it was that the adoption of firearms was so successful as the essential aid to 
resistance in warfare over a fairly lengthy period. This demonstration has involved a variety of 
research and a fairly thick or dense description covering the character of armaments acquisition 
and use, the links between that and the nature of encroachment from various external interests 
and cultures (Chapters 2-3 and passim), the physical incorporation of the gun in fighting within 
the indigenous physical environment in contrast to the rather casual and ineffective use of 
firearms in the hands of Chinese and Japanese soldiery and police (especially Chapters 6-7), and 
the incorporation of modern firearms also within the traditional cultures of indigenous groups 
(Chapter 7) as a seemingly necessary condition of successful resistance. The nuances involved 
in all of this serve together to alter the more general views of cultural adaptation to modern 
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technologies that have been posited by such leading scholars as Peter Berger or Stephen Hill 
(Chapter 1 above).    
It is seemingly obvious that the Formosan indigenes had developed some real capability 
of resisting the lesser intrusions before our research period. The location of Taiwan and the 
conditions of the terrains of Taiwan, especially the eastern regions - rivers, mountain, hills, 
ravine or forests - that the mountain indigenes lived in have been very much confined even 
until today (Chapters 1 and 2). The indigenous tribes have established their own beliefs and 
socio-political systems and have been practising their own hunting and headhunting cultures 
prior to the known written history of Taiwan. Clashes or hostilities between indigenous tribes 
were inevitable due to the geographical constraints and the cultural differences on the island. 
There were also existing tensions or conflicts and underlying contacts between the indigenes 
and the early Chinese settlers and the early colonists, although these primarily occurred on the 
western plains of Taiwan before the nineteenth century when commercial and associated 
demographic pressures were far less. Nevertheless, the weapons that the indigenes possessed 
and used were mostly bows, arrows, shield, swords, spears or darts as in a primary stage of 
arms. This might have provided them with the basic fighting capacities with which to address 
external threats when they began to escalate after 1861 (Chapters 1-2).   
In the encroachments post-1861 the Formosan indigenes were forced to encounter or 
engage with various forms of aggression, not only from the early Chinese settlers, but also from 
foreign settlers, from foreign nations (the Americans in 1867, the British in 1868, the Japanese 
in 1874, the French in 1884-5), and the colonial government (the Japanese from 1895). The 
desire of industrialized nations to profit from extracting camphor from the camphor tree, 
growing tea and indigo, and mining coal, sulphur and gold, urged such foreign elements to 
obtrude into the mountain regions and to exploit the mountain resources. Meanwhile the 
colonializing governances of the great powers more generally imposed their political 
encroachments on the indigenous people by sending out their military troops with modern 
armaments throughout the Chinese maritime areas, including expeditions to the eastern 
mountain areas of Taiwan.  
The weaponry the Formosan indigenes possessed began to change over several phases, 
which often accompanied the varying scales of persistent conflicts with invaders. This theme 
has been presented throughout Chapters 4 to 6. From the 1860s to 1883, as described in 
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Chapter 4, which is briefly categorized as at a traditional level, the weapons the indigenes used 
appeared to be knives, spears, arrows, bows and even matchlocks from the previous centuries. 
(see pp 156-163) Meanwhile, foreign troops were operating with modern industrial armaments 
such as the Snider rifle, Dreyse needle-fire rifle and other types of breech-loading rifles. (see pp 
143-147) The Qing military were primarily, but only newly, furnished with modern Western 
style firearms as well as the traditional Chinese matchlocks, the latter of which were widely 
used by the local Chinese militia and civilians in Taiwan. This is also the period when the 
mountain indigenes began to increase their accessibility to, and their notions and experiences 
of, modern firearms through their various and broader direct and indirect contacts and 
increasing conflicts with invaders. In the period of 1884-1895, as described in Chapter 5, the 
weapons in the indigenes’ hands were of a more miscellaneous status, with both traditional 
and modern types of firearms such as the Martini-Henry rifle, repeating rifles, Remington rifles, 
etc as well as the spear and the matchlock. (see pp. 200-203) Although the mountain indigenes 
were less engaged with the French and the Japanese invasions in 1884 and 1895, large amounts 
of modern armaments were transferred to Taiwan for the provision of wars and pacifying the 
mountain indigenes by the Qing government. As a matter of fact, numerous modern firearms 
appeared to flow into the mountain indigenous societies, as our material showed, especially 
just before Japan took over Taiwan. (see pp. 205-206) This might explain the tremendous 
struggle demanded of the Taiwan Sotokfu in attempting to control the mountain indigenes 
during the early colonial period. During the early Japanese colonization (1895-1914), as 
described in Chapter 6, the majority of weapons of the mountain indigenes were now at a 
modernised-advanced level. By this time, they not only possessed the remaining modern 
firearms from the late Qing period, but had secured a variety of streams of access, and were 
even being given effective weapons by the Japanese officials themselves. Although the 
Japanese authority later tried to confiscate their firearms and to regulate their possession of 
firearms, the confrontations of the mountain indigenes with the Japanese governance did not 
appear to ease off and indeed became more recurrent and of a greater scale than in the Qing 
governance. 
Chapter 7 then evolved another approach, one which suggested the factors behind the 
effective acculturation of firearms in the indigenous societies. This might help us to explain the 
prolonged rebellions of the mountain indigenes by studying their application of and 
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dependency on firearms, from their hunting and headhunting activities and their posture in 
defence and attack. This reflects strongly on the third of the possibilities - some combination 
of particular local culture with global culture - that Peter Berger suggested (p. 12) and also 
reflects Stephen Hill’s notion of “technology enframement” within cultures. The effective 
“possession” of firearms also appeared to be embedded through their ways of life, behaviour, 
manners, and beliefs, especially among the indigenous men, and extended to the entire 
communities as in asserting their status or identities. We show how this contrasted strongly to 
the negligence of the Qing military in operating and adapting firearms (which were also , after 
all, imported into China from the West mostly during and after the Opium Wars), and the 
formalities or inflexibilities of managing firearms imposed by the Taiwan Sotokufu upon the 
Japanese police, Chinese/indigenous guards and braves. In the end, such a regulatory 
environment might have actually detained or restrained the fighting capacities of the Qing and 
Japanese troops, and this in turn might have facilitated the mountain indigenes’ prolonged 
resistance.  
 
 The Numbers of Firearms as an Empirical Problem   
 
The definitive estimate of the number of firearms should remain problematic and 
dubious at any time of our study, even in the later period of the Japanese colonization. This is 
because there were many ways that the firearms could travel from one group to another or 
from the west to the east of Taiwan. It is very likely that the Japanese might have under-
estimated the number of firearms remaining in the indigenes’ hands after they had tried to 
confiscate them or to regulate them, as a large number would have suggested their inefficiency 
as colonists. At other times, the individual Japanese might have exaggerated the number of the 
firearms because they might want to claim that this was the reason that they could not defeat 
the indigenes, rather than to admit their tactical or other mistakes. This was also certainly true 
in the late Qing period regarding the inefficiency of the Chinese soldier, providing all official 
commentators with the temptation to exaggerate the number of firearms the indigenes held. 
As we suggested in Chapter 5 (pp. 176-180), especially in the year of Liu’s modernization 
attempt, the resistance of indigenous peoples symbolized the failure of the Chinese empire at 
its own frontier. The pressure to minimize data on resistance, firearms and the cost of the 
suppression of conflicts must have been very high. In such circumstances foreign observers 
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might well be a better source of information, as every conflict – to them – was a threat to 
commercial profitability or viability.  
The only way that we might circumvent such problems is through the method we have 
chosen, that of dense descriptions of a large variety of incidents which variably illustrate an 
efficient use of modernized armaments in the hands of indigenous people, as related 
throughout Chapters 4-6. It seems methodologically reasonable to assume that the number and 
usage of firearms as described in such incidents could be more reliable as evidence, as such 
evidence was given spontaneously, on the spot and through a very great variety of witnesses, 
instead of collected later and at distant points by officials with special interests to pursue, which 
could both compound mistakes and deliberately bias them.   
In fact, as we have seen, firearms could move either way, through commerce, smuggling, 
rewards and battlefields. Particularly, many firearms were gained or collected by the indigenes 
from the battles they had won or from their successful headhunting expeditions. However, it is 
very difficult to find the balance of this. What we were trying to do from Chapter 3 to Chapter 
6 is to accumulate the instances of particular incidents and try to collect some general 
estimation from an array of material. We hope the evidence we have given were stronger than 
that provided before because we are using a great mixture of sources from the Chinese, 
Japanese and foreigners such as consuls, adventurers, commercial agents and so on who often 
gave evidence in passing in their larger statements. In this way, we might have taken a better 
and more accurate picture than others who have considered this subject previously. 
 
Nuancing Culture: Back to Peter Berger 
 
It should be clear that the above material is our first formal modification of the Berger type of 
approach. As we foreshadowed in Chapter 1, the categories 2 - coexistence occurs between the global 
and local cultures- and 3 -There is some combination of particular local culture with global culture in 
some combination- above (p. 12) seem to best represent the history we have detailed. But even 
so loosely, it seems obvious that both or any of the outcomes as historical anthropology would 
be results of something more than the character of “culture” on the one hand – in Hill the 
degree of its “enframement”- or the nature of the technology on the other. Extraneous factors 
of environment, local knowledge and disease impinged upon the process whereby technologies 
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were perceived, utilised, embedded and thus made effective. In this thesis throughout Chapters 
2-7 much stress has been laid on such extraneous factors, but as in Chart 2:1 (p. 63) and Chart 
3:1 (p. 110) above it is possible to maintain that the greatest dynamic factor was that of 
improved armament. We might come to this general conclusion because that was the most 
changing factor and thus would have acted as the limiting edge of successful technological 
absorption and adoption in this case. We are not claiming that other factors were simply static 
through these years – for instance the aggressors changed, and so it is quite possible that the 
Chinese settlers, say, were more adapted to mountain conditions prior to the 1860s, so less 
susceptible of disease, than were Westerners or the Japanese after the 1880s. It also seems 
certain that a most dynamic process was increased population and associated 
commercialisation through our period. But we can conclude from this that the global 
complexity that generated greater intrusion, commerce and population was the same global 
context that provided firearms. 
More importantly, perhaps, is that we are now in a position to argue that Berger and 
the general cultural anthropology approach cannot take sufficient account of the nuances of 
exact time and exact place. Even a small location such as Taiwan offered great difference of 
interaction between cultures and technique. These differences were mostly determined by 
variation of exact time and exact geographical location. 
It may be that overall we can judge that the culture-technology relationship was some 
combination of possibilities 2 and 3 in Berger, with possibility 3 becoming the increasing trend, 
conditioned by variations in extraneous factors. However, even this degree of modification is 
nuanced further by local factors. For instance, in places where there were high degrees of 
camphor exploitation, tea and indigo plantation or mining, associated with the greater 
penetration and exploitation attempts by the Chinese and the Japanese, the increasing 
interactions or conflicts (revisited in Map 5:1 in Chapter 5, p. 173 and Map 6:3, p. 220) created 
greater availability of firearms through trade or warfare in exactly those districts, thus the more 
use of firearms and the more the adaptation of firearms both to resistance and to a greater 
practice of hunting and headhunting rituals. Again, the Paiwan and the Bunun groups, who lived 
in the southern part of Taiwan, might have suffered less from the generalised economic 
encroachment because most of the camphor resources and thus forest work and processing 
were in the north. They would not – for that reason alone - have had as many conflicts with the 
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camphor workers in comparison to the Atayal indigenes in northern Taiwan, regardless of 
difference in culture or avenues of firearms access. For them to take up firearms could be the 
result of political or cultural tension between tribes or with their neighbouring Chinese settlers. 
In the Japanese period, some indigenous groups formed collaborations with the Japanese 
authority for pacifying other indigenous groups. Even the firearm regulations of the Taiwan 
Sotokufu were applied with variations according to the different groups of indigenes in 
different regions. We have noted several cases of wholesale resistance where the proportion 
of firearms held by male indigenous population was not especially high.  
Resistance seems to have always involved a conjuncture of forces in which firearms 
tended to figure more largely as time went on, with a real watershed occurring around the late 
1880s into the 1890s, the years of high commercialisation. Berger’s typology – summarised in 
notions of cultural replacement, coexistence, combination or rejection, between the global and 
the local – can not be rejected in a study of this scope, but should now be seen as a typology of 
outcomes between culture and technique that involve (possibly in all cases) varying and to an 
extent independent elements of extraneous variables, variations of time, and variation of place.  
To a historian this means taking the political, economic and cultural circumstances of the local 
people into consideration through systematic thick descriptions of events. The reactions or 
responses of the indigenous people towards firearms in Taiwan were actually more complex 
and variable than the categories and technology enframement processes that Berger and Hill 
have suggested as causes or outcomes. In our case, this is because of the fundamental 
differences among the indigenous groups, cultures and customs, the different levels of political 
and economic encroachments in different places and the varying management strategies and 
resources adopted by foreign elements in different periods of time.   
 
 
 
 
- 
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